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Abstract
Olson, Peter Brock. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. May, 2013. American
Romanticism and the Politics of Negative Originality: The Dark Passages of Emerson,
Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville. Major Professor: Dr. Theron Britt.
Critics and commentators have recently reinitiated interest in Romanticism
within the sphere of nineteenth-century American literature, and have sought to
recuperate Romantic aesthetics to explore the implications of the American renaissance.
The scholarship in Romantic theory has given impetus to a New Romanticism that
synthesizes philosophy of literature--phenomenology and poststructuralism--with cultural
and genre studies. This dissertation studies four canonic mid-nineteenth-century
American authors--Emerson, Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville--through the nexus of
Romantic negativity and originality, and takes a metacritical approach to a transatlantic
critical field juxtaposing American Transcendentalism, British Romanticism, and German
Idealism within the sphere of an antebellum cultural matrix composed of American
literary culture and politics. As a central premise this dissertation acknowledges the
dialectical tensions between European concepts of originality stemming from German
and British thinkers and critics and the prevailing tenor of Americanism. The tension in
the American antebellum critical scene was exacerbated by cultural debates among
literati in the main publishing centers, as well as a desire among intellectuals to create a
national aesthetic identity. The critical issue for American literati centered on the relation
between originality and democracy. This study concludes that among American
romantics both British and German metaphysical ideas formed a concept of negative
originality, which becomes a central concern specifically in Emerson's Nature, Poe's
Eureka, Hawthorne's The Marble Faun, and Melville's The Confidence-Man. While
recent studies have explored transatlantic and literary national discursive aspects of genre
v

and publishing in the antebellum era, this study explores the specific relations between a
phenomenology of authorship and a hermeneutics of Romantic theory, and situates
American Romantic literary theory as an effect of politically charged demands for
originality.
.
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Preface
This study explores the territory between literary and metaphysical notions of
originality as these ideas affected the literary agency of mid-nineteenth-century American
Romantics bound by the often negative or disjunctive relation of these concepts to a
cultural matrix drawn from American national literary ideologies.1 American Romantics
drew upon literary-critical ideas about originality from British Romantic literary criticism
and German Idealism. The rhetorical situation for American Romantics, despite an overdetermined discourse over literary nationalism, was basically transatlantic, as the
tumultuous debates over failed appeals for international copyright attest. Much of the
writing by Ralph Waldo Emerson, Edgar Allan Poe, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Herman
Melville and others of the period stretched the boundaries between a “democratic”
readership and an “original” authorship.
Thomas McFarland, in his Originality and Imagination (1985), summarizes the
problem of originality. He explains modernism in terms of a Romantic irony juxtaposing
the poet and the literary context. McFarland understands the tension between the
individual and society in terms of an originality paradox where the notion of individual
creative originality performs a negative function—a dialogic relation—with respect to the
community yet is also dependent upon tradition, as was noted by T. S. Eliot in his famous

1

Derek Attridge defines the cultural matrix as a “changing array of interlocking,
overlapping, and often contradictory cultural systems” presented in a transactional relation to a
particular individual who has experienced a “complex matrix of habits, cognitive models,
representations, beliefs, expectations, prejudices, and preferences that operate intellectually,
emotionally, and physically to produce a sense at least relative community, coherence, and
significance out of the manifold events of human living.” Attridge offers the term ‘idioculture’ as
a term to “refer to this embodiment in a single individual of widespread cultural norms and modes
of behavior.” Derek Attridge, The Singularity of Literature (New York: Routledge, 2004), 21.

ix

essay “Tradition and the Individual Talent” (1919).2 Eliot’s “individual talent”
recognized art through a capacity to produce meaning through tradition. Writing in
Letters and Social Aims (1876), Emerson explains the originality paradox in the essay
“Quotation and Originality,” noting that “[l]anguage is a city, to the building of which
every human being brought a stone…” 3 In Emerson’s later understanding of the relation
between originality and tradition, the individual creates through a shared language.
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, reminiscing about William Wordsworth, noted the paradox of
imitation and creation, stating that “in his imaginative power, he stands nearest all
modern writers to Shakespear and Milton; and yet in a kind perfectly unborrowed and his
own.”4 Language is an inheritance of lexical, syntactic and semantic codes in constant
circulation. In this sense, Romantic originality, then, rather than claiming a “privileged
trans-historical category” for itself, appears instead to be a “cultural convention.” 5
In the mid-nineteenth century the criteria for originality held by American authors
and readers had already been subject to a misreading of transatlantic sources, particularly
in Coleridge’s reading of Schelling. The disjunction between a universal poetics and a
particularized national literature is a fundamental dialectic of the American cultural
matrix of the 1840s and 50s. That Emerson discovered an “original relation to the

2

Thomas McFarland, Originality and Imagination (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1985);
T.S. Eliot, “Tradition and the Individual Talent.” In Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot, ed. Frank
Kermode, 37–44 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1975).
3

The term ‘originality paradox’ is Thomas McFarland’s. He states that “The very
question of originality and the paradoxical relation between artist and tradition arises in the
polarity between the individual and society.” Thomas McFarland, Originality and Imagination
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 3. See also, Ralph Waldo Emerson,
“Quotation and Originality,” Letters and Social Aims (1876), 177.
4

Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, ed. James Engell and Walter Jackson
Bate (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 151.
5

Robert Macfarlane, Original Copy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

x

universe” in German and British Romantic theory is only one of the key ironies of
American literary nationalism, but it is an important beginning point for understanding an
“alternative” strain of American Romanticism that is based on “negative originality.” In
The New Romanticism (2000), Eberhard Alsen recognizes that modernist critics in the
mid-twentieth century, particularly Morse Peckham and René Wellek, reinstated a more
negative attitude with respect to the term romanticism, after the decline of the positive
strain that had defined early transcendentalism.6
As we shall see in chapter two, Hegel describes negative originality as a “turning
point.”7 It is through Emerson’s Transcendental Club that we find that negative
originality latent in American Romanticism can be traced to Immanuel Kant’s “On the
Sublime” and The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, particularly Kant’s concern
about negative freedom.8 Following Thomas Weiskel’s The Romantic Sublime and the
commentary by Mary Arensberg and Harold Bloom on the American sublime, as well as
the work of Leon Chai in his Romantic Theory (2006), textual evidence of a
6

Eberhard Alsen, The New Romanticism: A Collection of Critical Essays (New York:
Garland Publishing, 2000). Peckham develops a theory of “negative romanticism” in Beyond the
Tragic Vision, carrying the idea further in “Reconsiderations.” Morse Peckham, Beyond the
Tragic Vision: The Quest for Identity in the Nineteenth Century. New York: Grorge Brazzilier,
1962; Morse Peckham, “Towards a Theory of Romanticism: II. Reconsiderations.” Studies in
Romanticism 1, no. 1 (Autumn 1961): 1–8.
7

As an axiomatic theorem, Hegel offers “unity as the essence of genuine originality.” G.
W. Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on Fine Art, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 291.
For Hegel, unity is ultimately dialectical, a synthesis of being and negativity. The third term,
becoming, is equated with originality since becoming is a singular, self-reflective, instance of an
individual “movement of return.” Originality comprises an individual side and an absolute side,
in Hegelian thinking. Negativity is already present in the original thing and defines its telos
through becoming. Negativity is the primary dialectical attribute of unity. Hegel states: “Now the
negativity just considered constitutes the turning-point of the movement of the concept. It is the
simple point of negative self-relation, the innermost source of all activity, of all animate and
spiritual self-movement.” G. W. Friedrich Hegel, Hegel Selections, ed. M. J. Inwood (Macmillan
Publishing Company, 1989), 253.
8

Immanuel Kant, Immanuel Kant: Philosophical Writings, ed. Ernst Behler (The
Continuum Publishing Company, 1986).

xi

correspondence between German, British, and American Romantics suggests that the
dialectic between a Romantic authorship in America and the cultural matrix resembles
the movement of return exemplified by theories of the sublime and the dialectical
“negativity” of the Germans Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Herder, Schelling, and Schlegel. 9 In
many ways American Romanticism became a movement of return through British
Romanticism to German Idealism via the sublime disruption, or diremption, of
revolution.10
A number of important studies by New Americanist critics of nineteenth-century
authors “in context” (social and cultural) mark the shift from literary analysis to cultural
criticism, a social turn towards New Historicism that remains influential in American
studies.11 In a review of Michael Davitt Bell’s The Problem of American Realism (1993)
Jane F. Thrailkill notes that “the authors themselves….emerge as the primary ‘texts’ of

9

Thomas Weiskel, The Romantic Sublime: Studies in the Structure and Psychology of
Transcendence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1986); Mary Arensberg, “Introduction: The
American Sublime.” In The American Sublime (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1986); Harold Bloom, “Introduction.” In The American Renaissance, 1–25. Bloom’s Period
Studies (New York: Chelsea House, 2004); Leon Chai, Romantic Theory: Forms of Reflexivity in
the Revolutionary Era (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2006).
10

According to Theodore Adorno, “works of art cannot rest content with such vague and
abstract universality as is typical of classicism. They depend on diremption, and that means that
the concrete historical situation, art’s other, is the condition. Their social truth depends on
whether or not they open themselves to that concrete content, making it their own through
assimilation. Their law of form for its part does not smooth over the cleavage, but concerns itself
with how to shape it” Theodore. Adorno, The Adorno Reader. Edited by Brian O’Conner
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 248.
11

Philip Fisher, Hard Facts: Setting and Form in the American Novel (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1985); Myra Jehlen, American Incarnation: The Individual, the Nation,
and the Continent (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986); Donald E. Pease, Visionary
Compacts: American Renaissance Writings in Cultural Context (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1987).

xii

Bell’s inquiry…”12 This concentration on the author, argues Thrailkill, might obfuscate
“the reflexive engagement of these writers [Howells and Norris] with their particular
cultural moment.” Thrailkill, in her review, suggests a wider scope for the “cultural of
letters” that extends to the “cultural practices” of “American society at large.” In order to
support this suggestion Thrailkill mentions “recent new historicists” Walter Benn
Michaels and Amy Kaplan’s work that exposes “a complex cultural engagement with
artifice.” The deceptions within the cultural matrix involve the relations between “the
fictionality of commodities trading and stock speculation, [and] the romance of a massmarket culture that operates by sparking consumer's desires.” Thrailkill, in other words,
worries that a concentration on authorship obscures “deep-seated cultural anxieties about
the dissolution of stable value.”
Clearly Thrailkill’s concern is to deconstruct the imbrication of cultural
deceptions that persist through a romanticized view of what might be construed as real
rather than as “social practice.” 13 Bell’s concentration on authorship, Thrailkill maintains,
signifies a persistence of a Romantic dialectic between fiction and the social real. This
“cultural” perspective seeks to confront the power of that fictionality and its attributes,
including “originality,” as social constructs privileging a dominant class anxious about its
waning cultural power with respect to an appetitive consumerism duped by the
instrumentality of capitalism. Bell acknowledges that in the “distinction” between a
“relational” approach to literature and culture and a new historical approach as

12

Michael Davitt Bell, Culture, Genre, and Literary Vocation: Selected Essays on
American Literature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 1. Thrailkill’s comments
quoted by Bell.
13

Bell, Culture, Genre, and Literary Vocation, 2.

xiii

represented by Thrailkill, Michaels, and Kaplan, a valuable discursive field opens to the
literary analyst shifts both in critical perspective and in the ideology of historicism.
Bell points out two “contexts” that expose relations between “American
literature” and American “culture.” 14 Bell reminds us that in the post-WW2-era of
American literary studies the so-called “myth and symbol school” of criticism arose
under the sway of Henry Nash Smith Smith’s Virgin Land: The American West as
Symbol and Myth (1950). Smith’s contention that through metonym an image might
represent a reified collective idea that became through Leo Marx’s The Machine in the
Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America (1964), instantiated as a myth of
a “pastoral ideal,” an affective correlative with agrarianism that transformed a historical
literary idea of utopianism into an ideology of American exceptionalism. Bell identifies
the generic distinction between an American romance and a British fictional novel, a
distinction maintained by Richard Chase and others but challenged by Robert Weisbuch,
in Atlantic Double-Cross: American Literature and British Influence in the Age of
Emerson (1986), we are reminded that despite the transatlantic literary transactions that
defined American literary development in the nineteenth century. It is an American
inferiority complex vis-à-vis British literary dominance that held sway from American
literary nationalism in the antebellum era through the 1960s when the myth of American
exceptionalism was called into question by social protests.
As opposed to the context of the school of “myth and symbol” Bell notes that a
subsequent context was defined by the “collapse of this school’s prestige.” 15 Bruce
Kuklick’s 1972 essay, “Myth and Symbol in American Studies,” questions Leo Marx’s
14

Bell, Culture, Genre, and Literary Vocation, 3.

15

Bell, Culture, Genre, and Literary Vocation, 4.

xiv

expression “humanists” as an appropriate term for myth and symbol “practitioners.”
Kuklick, according to Bell, “is particularly critical of ‘the humanist analysis of the
relation between the great work of art’—the kind of work most often central to myth and
symbol scholarship— ‘and the culture for which it was written’.” Bell, though, questions
Kuklick’s assertion that canonized books implicitly argue for their own
representativeness, since it is also the case that some literary works of the nineteenth
century, such as Melville’s Moby-Dick, failed as popular works.
If one may assume that a literary work is inherently culturally reflexive, according
to Kuklick, then its inherent shortcoming is that as a metonym such a text becomes
reductive and its persuasive power rests on an inferred authority that obscures its
inductive limits. Moreover, Kuklick, Bell argues, holds that humanism (following Gilbert
Ryle’s The Concept of Mind, 1949) supposes an oversimplified Cartesian subject-object
split that promotes a platonic formal typology that inoculates the particular thinker from
exposing his or her existential intentions. The problem for cultural historicism, suggests
Bell, is that it remains problematic to correlate individual worldviews to social structures
and cultural formations without falling into the same gap of generalization that cultural
critics charge humanists with.16
Bell analyzes two important problematics of New Historicism. One is “a tendency
to speak of societies as if they were minds, with anxieties and other problems amenable,
for example, to psychoanalytic description.” Another, “is a tendency to speak of societies
and parts of societies--of ‘cultures’ and ‘subcultures’—as if they were essentially textual,
‘discourses,’ patterns of symbolic expression to be decoded as we would decode literary

16

Bell, Culture, Genre, and Literary Vocation, 5.

xv

texts.”17 Walter Benn Michaels, for example, in his Gold Standard, such notions as
“commodity” and “corporation” can never be completely reduced to their constituent
physical properties; “writing,” he argues further, neither transcends its physical marks nor
allows reduction to those marks.18 Writing, then, cannot be distinguished from culture.
For Bell, therein lies the dilemma since the concept of culture must be widened to
accommodate its constituents so that all supposed relations are also held to be
correlations. Bell notes that “[a]ll of this culminates in a well-known dismissal of the idea
that a scholar might ‘posit a space outside the culture in order to interrogate the relations
between that space (here defined as literary) and the culture’.”
According to J. Hillis Miller critical theory proliferates through a range of
“incompatible” frameworks.19 The presence of a theory as a critical mechanism resituates
the way an “example” is read. Moreover, the notion of “history” arises as a contrapositive
to both theory and text. History becomes the changing continuum in which assumptions
about literature and theory are revealed. Meaning within a work is no longer satisfied by
a hermeneutical study, but rather necessitates a study of the generative aspects of
meaning. In the aftermath of the dissolution of New Criticism and the breakdown of
universal ideas of literary value, the multitudinous presence of critical theories along with
varying ideas about canonicity, then critical theory becomes “exigent.”
Literary examples become, in this situation, emblematic of the effect of theory.
Theories generate meaning through example. Critical theory, then, becomes the dominant

17

Bell, Culture, Genre, and Literary Vocation, 5.

18

Bell, Culture, Genre, and Literary Vocation, 6.

19

J. Hillis Miller, Hawthorne and History (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1991),

46-47.

xvi

instrument for literary study. Canonicity becomes less significant as critical theory
instrumentalizes study and examples become more arbitrary. 20 If choices are arbitrary the
result is that the claim of critical theory implies a universal applicability and a free play
of signification. Each theory becomes, in its own domain and on its own terms, a
universal way of reading inscribed with culturally accepted meanings and values. Yet
critical theory promises that it might liberate readers by exposing ideology latent in
meaning. In this sense critical theory promises to be an ethical resource that addresses
politically regressive ideas that are entrenched in institutions of reading. Critical theory
has the power to problematize what is latent in works and thus mitigate the power of the
canon to propagate ideology.
From that standpoint, summarizing Jerome McGann, Romantic art “reflects” both
the individual and social conditions of its subject—the self—since Romanticism
attempted a “double act of reflection,” both in its representation of the observable and of
the self as consciousness, which presents the artist in a transcendent relationship to
culture. Forest Pyle develops a metacritical role for that transcendent relation, arguing
that “Imagination gains a rhetorical status in discourse due to a disjunction between the
claims for the figure and its rhetorical effects.” 21 Terry Eagleton notes that underneath
the emerging concept of the aesthetic in eighteenth-century Germany was the association
20

Miller, Hawthorne and History, 48.

21

Pyle is concerned with a binding of imagination and ideology. The Romantic
imagination provides a vantage point from which to view ideology. The term ‘imagination’ is
“mercurial” Imagination becomes the essential figure of Romantic discourse and it is an
independent concept from self-formation or property definition….The role of the Romantic
imagination is provide an agency where otherwise a device is lacking; in Kant transcendental
reason and empirical reality, requiring a faculty of translation that can move between reason and
appearance. The translation between original and referent is never total, less a matter of
transmission loss than production of meaning hinging on the disjunction between idea and
representation” Forest Pyle, The Ideology of Imagination (Stanford University Press, 1995), 1-5.

xvii

between judgment and freedom on the side of reason, and of the association between
taste and originality on the part of the imagination. Arguably, it is through Immanuel
Kant’s categorical imperative that originality becomes conflated with Thomas Carlyle’s
pretense of the Romantic subject as a universal figure, a bond between genius and
originality which became detached through Adorno and Horkeimer’s Dialectic of the
Enlightenment (1947) and Adorno’s Negative Dialectics. I reexamine that argument from
the point of view of the Frankfurt School and suggest through negative originality
democratic authorship may represent the state by interrogating its ideals. That is David S.
Reynolds’ point about the subversive imagination.
Tilottama Rajan notes that the recent emphasis on theory, as opposed to criticism,
has increasingly looked toward German Idealism as a means to conduct interdisciplinary
“practices.”22 A focus on Romantic Theory in the American context recognizes American
literature’s “aesthetic particularity”—even its “organic form,” as a cultural priority of
romance over realism, and an embrace of its “inventedness.” 23 This return to aesthetics
involves situating much of this study under the rubric of Romantic Theory. My position
attempts the metaromantic node of criticism aligned with theorists such as Paul de Man
and Paul Hamilton.24 According to Tilottama Rajan the study of romanticism has

22

Tilottama Rajan and Arkady Plotnitsky, eds. Idealism Without Absolutes: Philosophy
and Romantic Culture (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), x.
23

Leon Chai, The Romantic Foundations of the American Renaissance (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1987); Leon Chai, Romantic Theory: Forms of Reflexivity in the Revolutionary
Era (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2006); Russell B. Goodman, American Philosophy and the
Romantic Tradition (Cambridge University Press, 1990); Robert Hughes, Ethics, Aesthetics, and
the Beyond of Language (Albany: SUNY Press, 2010); Joseph Riddel, Purloined Letters:
Originality and Repetition in American Literature (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1995).
24

Paul Hamilton suggests that even as the romantic artist is circumscribed by aesthetic
limitations, criticism reveals the way aesthetics becomes a political mechanism. Yet “criticism
remains immanent.” The “aesthetic is indemnified against dissent because critical departures from

xviii

witnessed a shift in perspective in the last quarter century from a literary critical view to a
theoretical view.25 Romantic texts have been and continue to be a “major site…for the
development of a contemporary theory that makes universal claims for its elaboration of
a crisis in the thinking of such categories as representation, the subject, and history.” One
can point to Romanticism’s “originating status” in theorizing problems inherent in
literary texts, and by extension the critical works that have been generated by theory. The
theoretical field has shifted interest from nineteenth-century critics such as Coleridge and
Hazlitt who defined the field in Romantic literary criticism, to German Idealism and its
intellectual field due to the requirements of the emerging field of Romantic Theory.
Romantic literary theory, with its basis in German Idealism, extends conceptually to
involve the disciplines of semiotics and linguistics, which have become increasingly
prominent in Romantic criticism.26
In this study I survey the American antebellum literary scene with the purpose of
explaining a number of discursive cross-relations between literary originality and its
cultural context. In a my introduction, I will contrast David S. Reynolds’ Beneath the
American Renaissance and its concept of a “subversive imagination” thesis with Robert
Milder’s Exiled Royalties, which places Melville’s ethos of an imagined life in the frame

it simultaneously double as the metaphorical distance or troping of an original--as further
aesthetic production.” Negative originality acts as a mode of immanent critique. Paul Hamilton,
Metaromanticism: Aesthetics, Literature, Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003);
Steven Helmling, “‘Immanent Critique’ and ‘Dialectical Mimesis’ in Adorno and Horkheimer’s
Dialectic of Enlightenment.” Boundary 2 32, no. 3 (September 1, 2005), 117.
25

It is notable that Rajan’s view of Romantic Theory approximates Weinstein and
Looby’s return of aesthetics to criticism.
26

Tilottama Rajan, “Phenomenology and Romantic Theory: Hegel and the Subversion of
Aesthetics.” In Questioning Romanticism, ed. John Beer, 155–178 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
UP, 1995), 155-56.
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of negative Romanticism.27 Reynolds’ study, informed by deconstruction and New
Historicism, situates the antebellum originality paradox by decentering elite literary
culture and recontextualizing marginal popular discourses as influential anxieties. In my
focus on negative originality I argue that the position of negativity necessarily frames
both cultural context and aesthetics.
Discussions about American literary originality in the mid-nineteenth century
inevitably recollect the seminal literary criticism—written between the mid-1930s and the
mid-1970s—of F. O. Matthiessen, Perry Miller, and Sacvan Bercovitch. 28 These concerns
were “reconsidered” during a phase of political and historical engagement by
Americanist critics who preferred not to allow aesthetic questions to interfere with the
critical paradigms at stake for New Historicism.29 For Cindy Weinstein and Christopher
Looby “this dismissal has come to seem…limiting,” and they announce that today
“aesthetic questions return to the critical conversation.” 30
Commentators on literary originality, such as W. J. Bate, Isaiah Berlin, and
Robert Macfarlane notably point to issues of literary influence and questions of imitation
or plagiarism.31 Tillar Mazzeo, particularly, in Plagiarism and Literary Property (2007),

27

Robert Milder, Exiled Royalties: Melville and The Life We Imagine (Oxford University
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demonstrates the transatlantic incorporation of literary originality as a criterion that
enforces copyright. Critics concerned with metaphysical originality, such as Harold
Bloom and Thomas McFarland, often address the relation between the artist-as-individual
and his or her cultural context or immediate precursors.32 Such concerns involve the
concepts of creative genius and the ideologies of cultural progress. Furthermore, I
consider literary nationalism to be a manifestation of metaphysical originality—from the
simple point that nationalism proposes a “new beginning,” an idea concretized by
Matthiessen’s notion of an “American renaissance.” 33
Perry Miller, the Harvard Americanist of the mid-twentieth century whose books
The Errand into the Wilderness and Nature’s Nation form the bedrock of any study of an
American concept of originality, has documented the New York literary scene of the
1840 in his indispensable book The Raven and the Whale (1956).34 Sacvan Bercovitch
challenges Miller’s idea that the Puritan “errand” was negativised by a declension in
faith, and invokes, rather, a positive exhortation of exceptionalism in the jeremiad, if then
only to expose its mythic and negative results.35 Before Bercovitch, Matthiessen had
written that democratic authorship might be both critical of the state and representative of
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its ideals. William Charvat, Lawrence Buell, and others that the crux of the practical
debate in the 1840s over American literary nationalism centered on the materially
pragmatic questions of international copyright and publishing, questions which depended
on specific ideas of literary property and originality. 36 American law refused to grant
British authors copyright protection, and as Meredith McGill, Michael Gilmore,
Grantland Rice, and others show, this stance, ironically, made it difficult for American
authors to compete with cheap British literary imports, which were reprinted and
circulated in an ungoverned market that intentionally or unintentionally undercut
American authors.37
Granted that Joseph Riddel, in Purloined Letters, considers the notion of
American beginnings as a “problematics of origination,”38 Joseph Riddel and Joseph
Kronick further argue that the American transcendental appeal to originality can be
deconstructed through the figure of repetition.39 Overlapping the territory carved out by a
thematics of “renaissance” one encounters a cultural matrix of transatlantic literary ideas
in conflict with the pretense of American literary originality. Meredith McGill, for
example, shows that American textual reprinting effectively undercut international
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copyright, and as Edgar Allan Poe’s criticism shows, served to prolong the era of the
literary public sphere well into the mid-1840s, under the regime of what McGill terms the
“culture of reprinting.”40
Following Matthiessen and Bercovitch’s critical approach to democratic
authorship, McGill, Gilmore, Rice, and Michael Warner explore democratic authorship,
following Habermas’s The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, and its
ultimate movement into the capitalist marketplace.41 Although Matthiessen was
ultimately concerned with the originality of creative artists as emblematic of democracy,
an “organic union between labor and culture” as he put it, he wrote at the height of
American socialism in the 1930s, and was therefore arguing in exceptionalist’s terms for
a causal relation between democracy and originality. Bercovitch, Reynolds, and others in
the “structural transformation” continuum focus on the retreat of the author into the
democratic marketplace rather than focusing on authorial resistance to it.
The artist, critic, or writer, might discover that to be bound to the cultural matrix
as a set of aesthetic cultural determinants imposes dogmatic structures as qualifiers for
what passes as creativity. Negative originality, in this sense, implies a contradiction
between an artist’s drive toward creative autonomy, on one hand, and his or her
realization that cultural and historical determinism is, at least in part, unshakable.
Negative originality closely parallels negative freedom in that to be original the artist
must be on guard against constraint. Unlike positive originality, an idealized state through
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which an artist makes creative choices without concern for cultural pressure, negative
originality sees free choice only in terms of what culture has already established as its
rules for what is considered original.
Emerson entered the discourse over originality in the middle 1830s with his first
published writings, and as we shall see, came to view originality in literature as nothing
other than a form of quotation and repetition. And thus, as Emerson’s shift in thinking
shows, the relation between originality and repetition becomes a binary opposition that
can be deconstructed through the figure of negativity. If Emerson’s view offers one way
to deal with the issue, Edgar Allan Poe, Nathaniel Hawthorne, and Herman Melville
arguably develop in their works different and significant strategies of negativity that stem
from the genre of American “romance.” 42
The concept of originality within the American antebellum cultural matrix
arouses, admittedly, a central premise antecedent to my argument: following Tocqueville,
we acknowledge the observation that the drive for an American literary nationalism
deployed the rhetoric of exceptionalism. And it follows that literary nationalism, as F. O.
Matthiessen has offered in his American Renaissance, incorporated “transatlantic”
Romantic theory and literary criticism, ideas that were crucial in American literary
circles. Moreover, I allow that through the Romance genre, following Michael Davitt
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Bell and Evan Carton, transatlantic aesthetic theory played a central role in defining
American literature.43
By considering the issue of aesthetic effect in the romance novel and the related
Poe-Bulwer idea of “unity of effect,” I began to distinguish a structural form of
originality related to the sublime and the Romance from a deconstructive or genealogical
concern for origins. Mary Arensberg in her introduction to The American Sublime notes
that the effect of the sublime moment “produces an uncanny metaphorical effect” upon
the reader. Thus originality in and of itself in American Romanticism, while it remains
ontologically doubtful, also sustains an epistemological problematic in the space between
utopia and ideology. Nowhere is that problematic more allegorized than in Melville’s The
Confidence-Man. When Melville writes in Pierre that “the world is forever babbling of
originality, but never yet was there an original man,” he simultaneously invokes and
negates the utopian ideal of literary originality.
Michael Davitt Bell points out that the degree of relation between the actual and
the imaginary is metaphorized by Henry James as a “balloon of experience” tethered to
the earth by a cable, a cable which ties the imagination to conventional morality in the
actual. To cut the cable is to disengage fantasy from responsibility. That disengagement,
as Harold Bloom shows in the introduction to his anthology, which borrows its title The
American Renaissance from F. O. Matthiessen, arises—originates through negation—via
the mechanism of daemonization, a counterpoint to a precursor through metalepsis, a
form of misprision that evacuates the precursor’s idea of particularity by denying its
capacity to influence. More than a palimpsest, that erasure is a defensive strategy. And in
43
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Romantic Theory Leon Chai argues that the mode of negation arises when the possibility
of originality obtains in a sublime disjunctive movement of disruption, a disruption of the
imagination.44 As a psychological structure, then, as Thomas Weiskel argues in The
Romantic Sublime, the feeling of freedom that results in the sublime movement results in
a “chaos of originality” that returns to discursivity in its dénoument.45 In the return to
discursivity, as Richard Eldridge comments in The Persistence of Romanticism (2001),
rhetoric effaces the “fatigue” that critics have felt towards Romanticism in general; due to
its tendencies to solipsism and evasion, Romanticism’s “special negativity,” as Geoffrey
Hartman puts it, highlights the Kantian problem of freedom latent in aesthetic judgment. 46
The question remains: How does the author speak for the individual in a multiplex
of communities? The question problematizes the prevailing issue in Romantic ideology
that conflates originality with pretense of the Romantic Self.47 John Bryant and Robert
Milder argue that representative artists of the American renaissance and their relationship
to national identity and the canon illustrate that “the very notion of representation
challenges the possibility of democracy even as it enacts democracy.” American society,
leaning ever more toward plurality than seems possible for an Emersonian or
Whitmanesque sense of unity, recognizes a politics that is “perpetually revolutionary.” In
the notion of representation in democracy, the voice of the body politic becomes a
44
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“fictive trope,” a synecdoche, where any coherent sense of part for whole collapses in the
concrete jungle of strangers and invisible men. The original author remains negative in
relation to society as a multiplicity. “No single artist, like Melville,” says Bryant, “can
ever represent an entire culture.” 48
As I began thinking about originality as a topic in nineteenth-century American
literature I noticed Melville scholar John Bryant’s suggestion in a review of Joseph
Riddel’s Purloined Letters that Riddel’s
readings of ‘The Fall of the House of Usher’ and Eureka are lucid fulfillments of
his take on originality and the link between hoax and the tale of ratiocination. In
all, Riddel's primary achievement lies in providing a critical vocabulary of
America's ‘belatedness’ (that is, self-reflexivity) and of its performance and
‘supplementation’ (that is, repetition as invention) that links certain nineteenthcentury writers to modernism. . . As such, this is a provocative statement that
should stimulate more thinking.49
Further, Wai-Chee Dimock, in Empire for Liberty, writes: “Melville conceptualizes
originality as the negation of family relations.” 50 I conceptualized that the idea of selfreflexivity and, as Dimock puts it, Melville’s dream of transcending “kinship,” or the
“authorial fantasy” of singularity, results in a negation of originality at a metaphorically
generative level, where probability erases possibility. Yet, Poe and Henry James
considered originality to possess a potential for aesthetic effect.
In this study I discuss, specifically, the relation between originality and negativity
in Emerson’s Nature, Poe’s Eureka, Hawthorne’s The Marble Faun, and Melville’s
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Pierre and The Confidence-Man. I am arguing that the relation between originality and
negativity became an intellectual puzzle for alternative romantic authors, writers who
were on one hand constrained by the popular and political interests of the cultural matrix,
and on the other, emboldened by the liberating aspects of Romantic originality, ideas that
arrived in America by way of German Idealism, British Romanticism, and American
Transcendentalism. One preliminary step in discussing these authors’ negative originality
is to notice that their stance toward “originality” describes an existential condition.
“Creation is a private event,” says Derek Attridge.51 Creativity depends on culture to be
“registered.” It engages culture through incorporation and the greater the engagement the
greater the cultural “impact.”
I begin by synthesizing Matthiessen’s concern for originality as “imaginative
vitality” as it appears in his studies of Hawthorne and Melville’s aesthetics in the less
political central portions of American Renaissance, and Miller’s denigration, as
Bercovitch puts it, of democratic exultation. I then revise this synthesis by considering
negative originality as Miller frames it in The Raven and the Whale. In that book Miller
points to the author’s (in this case it is surely Melville’s) “befuddlement.” Melville’s
originality lacks the power to overcome the “antinomies” of the cultural matrix. I revise
Matthiessen and Miller’s vitality and befuddlement arguments by addressing a strain of
studies in American Romanticism that concentrate on the romance as an aesthetic field. If
vitality arises in denigration and then encounters befuddlement, I suggest that it is the
sacrifice of relation offered by the sublime that becomes the structural mechanism of
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negative originality.52 Extending from Richard Chase’s The American Novel and Its
Tradition and Joel Porte’s The Romance in America to Richard Brodhead’s Hawthorne,
Melville and the Novel, Michael Davitt Bell’s Hawthorne and the Historical Romance of
New England, and Leon Chai’s The Romantic Foundations of the American Renaissance,
I take a decidedly transatlantic view of American Romanticism from the perspective of
German Idealism and British Romanticism.53
These texts show the role of the Romance genre—and Romantic theory—in the
development of the American novel to be revelatory of a dialectic between the Romance
author’s originality and the cultural matrix. These texts point to the increasing
subjectivity of Romance authors vis-à-vis the traditions from which they emerged. And it
is a central question whether the Romantic imagination, which is by conception
subjective in terms of faculty psychology, might draw negative associations between
problematic traditions and artistic freedom.
That dialectic is further emphasized in Michael Davitt Bell’s The Development of
American Romance that traces what Henry James termed a “sacrifice of relation”
between author and society, and Milton Stern’s Contexts for Hawthorne, which points to
a disjunction between openness and closure in American culture, a disjunction arising in
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the contrast between Romantic utopia and classicist ideology. 54 I am extending the
Matthiessen-Miller-Bell-Stern synthesis by showing that negative originality—Stern’s
openness and closure described by Bell and John Seelye (in Melville: The Ironic
Diagram) as a line (openness) and a circle (closure)—that stems from theories of
Romantic originality latent in Transcendentalism and received through European
sources.55 Emerson’s “The Poet,” “Circles,” and “Quotation and Originality,” for
example, exemplify both linearity (“The Universe is the externalization of the soul,” he
says in “The Poet”) and circularity (“The extent to which this generation of circle, wheel
without wheel, will go, depends on the force or truth of the individual soul”). Emerson’s
notion of horizons, translating “Circles” into originality, where “The EYE is the first
circle,” already recognizes that a principle of negativity lies within the structure of
originality.
Antecedent to the American nineteenth-century cultural matrix, I discuss in detail
the aesthetics of German and British romantic philosophers who influenced Emerson,
Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville profoundly.56 Social satire and criticism found in British
novels became models for American alternative romantics, who culled from authors from
Oliver Goldsmith to Charles Dickens strategies of dissent towards the three-fold status
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quo made up of Common-Sense orthodoxies, literary nationalists in the publishing
marketplace, and the Whig elite.57 Emerson, Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville turned to
subversive literary-politico strategies by negating orthodoxies.58 With the dark romantics,
precepts of romantic originality, particularly the relation found within the presumptions
of the romance genre that imagination is grounded in reality, became overturned by the
subjective imagination. Negative originality presents the possibility of a “sacrifice of
relation” such that fact becomes another fiction. 59 In that strategic move of negation the
actualities of an Americanist ideology partially evaporate.60 Indeed, Edward Said reminds
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us that René Wellek and Austin Warren noted in 1948 that the term originality remained
and perhaps remains, still, “a fundamental problem of literary history.” Said argues that
the primary concerns for understanding originality are matters of definition and critical
employment. The term is suggestive of a privileged aspect of literary history and goes
beyond a catalog of examples only by and through theory. This point, of course,
contradicts current practice, which is dedicated to “concreteness [within a field of]
human, social, and historical” study. Be that as it may, he argues that “literature affords
us aesthetic instances of every variety of experience.”61 Moreover, negation moves in the
other direction severing the tie between imagination and spirit. For alternative Romantics,
as G. R. Thompson terms them, the underlying implication amounts to a crisis in faith.62
In order to narrate the rise of negative originality I investigate selected works of
Emerson, Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville. As background I study the work of Kant,
Schelling, Coleridge, Wordsworth, Emerson and Hedge (as “positive romantics”) and
contrast their work with alternative romantics Schlegel, Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville.
As writers who stress the irony and negation inherent in the American idea of originality,
I deal with Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville following two chapters that contrast the cultural
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matrix with Romantic theory. In my analysis of this cluster of texts I employ
phenomenological and deconstructive approaches as well as new historical approaches to
criticism. My analysis of the theme of negative originality situates the authors and texts I
cover from the point of view of transatlantic cultural transmission, social context, and the
literary market.
In my introduction, “Negative Originality and the American Renaissance,” I
situate the concepts of originality, singularity, and autonomy within a hermeneutics of
negativity. I show the issue of originality as it arises in the American antebellum context,
and discuss the implications of negative originality to American nineteenth-century
politics. Finally, I show how originality and Americanism merged into a Romantic
originality within the sphere of the American sublime.
In chapter 1, “Emerson and Negative Nature,” I discuss the impact of transatlantic
Romantic originality upon an American Sublime, particularly with respect to Emerson’s
Nature and Coleridgean literary theory. I close the chapter by discussion the sublime and
the movement of return. In chapter 2, “Negative Originality and the Romantic Sublime,”
I develop a narrative on the rise of Romantic originality and its related facets, organicism,
negative philosophy and hermeneutics, and Romantic theory. I show ways in which
divergent discourses from aesthetic theory to phenomenology to deconstruction unpack
concepts of negativity and originality. Finally, I distinguish between generative and
structural originality, and show how the latter emerged in the Romantic sublime as a form
of phenomenology. I bridge Romantic theory, then, with an American sublime that helps
situate Edgar Allan Poe’s Eureka in the following chapter.
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In chapter 3, “Poe’s Pure Reason and Literary Morality,” I explore Poe’s writing
in terms of international copyright and its failure to negate American literary nationalism,
and the impact that failure had on Poe’s criticism. I then cover Poe’s theory of plagiarism
and its related transatlantic borrowings from DeQuincey and Coleridge via British
Quarterlies. Lastly, I read Poe’s Eureka in terms of Kantian Idealism, which impacts
Poe’s ideas of originality and metaphysics. In chapter 4, “Hawthorne’s The Marble Faun
and the Negativity of Romance,” I cover Hawthorne's relation to the cultural matrix and
his dividedness with respect to audience and the Romance genre. I survey his ideas about
allegory and symbol and then proceed to discuss his utopian ideas as they arise in the
contrast between actuality and imagination. In a reading of The Marble Faun, I explore
Hawthorne’s moral vision in terms of the movement of return. I analyze the thematics of
The Marble Faun as an allegory of writing. And, in chapter 5, “Melville and Negative
Originality,” I discuss his works Mardi, Pierre, and The Confidence-Man in the context
of his relation to Young America. I assess the impact on Melville's prose writing of his
concept of negative originality by contrasting his “Hawthorne and His Mosses” with his
supplement to The Confidence-Man, “The River.”
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Introduction
In a very condensed sense, the contradictions of American Romanticism which
resided within the oxymoron of democratic authorship were the result of a cultural lag
that followed political independence from Britain. The development of the American
literary public sphere and its subsequent unraveling as the market demands for national
literature increased resulted in a literary scene in the United States where authors were
divided over politics, aesthetic values, and were forced to jockey for literary
independence from publishers and critics.1 As a result, authors of the alternative romantic
mold sought independence from the market by subverting democratic ideology through
negative originality; that is, by negating the contradictory playing field for American
literature through a synthesis of transatlantic ideas. Robert Weisbuch bifurcates the
American context in terms of literary-politico parties.2 The party of mimesis (the cultural
matrix) remained obsessed with issues of influence as they revolved in the material
practices of publishing a national literature bound by the search for American themes.
The party of consciousness, however, was less interested in external manifestations of
American original literature, but rather it was interested in ways that American literature
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could reveal new and American modes of conceptualizing itself through literature. This
internal and intellectual style pointed to Transcendentalism. The transcendentalist
perspective was less interested in the way the “world” might be conceived—and that
viewpoint found it difficult to distinguish between materialistic perceptions on either side
of the Atlantic—but was more interested in transforming, ironically, via modes of
German and English Idealism, a self-reflective poetics into an American ethos. The only
viable response for these “alternative Romantics” seemed to be to evade commercial
success, undercut the presuppositions of literary nationalism, and to question or negate
originality itself, thus deflecting the false expectations of originality, expectations
maintained by the cultural matrix.
Some Romantic writers in America, identified as alternative Romantics, writers
such as Hawthorne, Melville, and Poe, found their original relation to American literary
nationalism problematic.3 The alternative romantics found themselves unwilling to
embrace Emerson’s more philosophically positive and transcendental view of the self.
This act of refusal had to sift through and ironize the specifics of their cultural moment,
and so authors found themselves caught between their relation to the Romantic ‘cult of
genius’ on one hand, and the call for an original national literature, on the other. 4 Michael
Newbury argues that “if authors chose highly individualized, independent figures gifted
3
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with a kind of romantic ‘Genius’ to represent artistic endeavor that would that suggest a
disaffection with professionalization and increasingly centralized urban-industrial order.”5
Such disaffection with the cultural matrix raises the question of a politics of aesthetics
that underscores negative originality.
Or to put it another way, it is plain that Emerson, Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville,
among other authors, sought to develop a literary-critical stance apart from both
European sources and the oxymoron of American “democratic authorship.” If democratic
authorship involved an original and critical stance apart from the democratic mainstream
and its nationalistic themes, it would have to resist pressure to develop its autocritical role
in a reflexive dependency to a literary market that promoted nationalist themes.
Authorship would have to develop its originality in contradistinction to both market
values and Americanist cultural chauvinism. Moreover, negative originality as a
paradigm of alternative Romanticism, in turn, becomes structured, as Harold Bloom and
Mary Arensburg have convincingly shown, according to the concept of an American
sublime.6 Arensburg, Bloom, and Joseph Riddel argue that the “American sublime” is a
rhetoric of a belated newness, original in its relation to the past, by invoking the trope of
metalepsis (a reversal of cause and effect) that accomplishes what Emerson and the
Transcendentalists hoped would result in an “original relation to the universe.” In
America, Ralph Waldo Emerson, who had met Carlyle, Coleridge and Wordsworth in
5
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England in 1833,7 configured the paradox of originality by juxtaposing the notion of selfreliance with the problem of quotation and indebtedness.8 Originality, for Emerson, is
power over Nature. The dialectic of Nature and Spirit result in a possible “prospect” for
human freedom.9
Driven both by practical considerations of the marketplace and by complications
in aesthetic theory, Edgar Allan Poe acknowledged that a growing anxiety within literary
circles over American exceptionalism had arisen, resulting in publishing and reviewing
practices that pinioned the cultural matrix to the literary market in such a way that a cadre
of “dark” romantics found themselves in a critical position against which they discovered
for themselves a state of negative originality. And while the cultural matrix structured the
rhetorical situation in which American alternative romantic writers of the 1840s and
1850s emerged as creative individuals; originality itself became a theme through which
Romance authors explored the relation between originality and negativity.
A central issue for antebellum Romantic writers arose as the critical idea of
originality became conflated with the presumption of an American national literature. In
that cultural matrix the precepts of Romantic metaphysical originality as a received
European aesthetic theory were channeled through Romance authors’ novels. Some
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authors of American Romance and short fiction in the 1840s and 1850s—notably Poe,
Hawthorne, and Melville—encountered criticism within the popular democratic literary
marketplace on account of their obscurity, while as authors, ironically, at the same time
they deployed aesthetics of romantic originality in the interest of social reform to further
democracy. For example, Poe’s aesthetics articulated the disjunction between a popular
confidence in the actualities of democracy and the inherent problems for the
understanding endemic in the interpretation of phenomena. David Ketterer notes that
Fundamental to an understanding of Poe are those tales in which he seeks to
undermine man’s confidence in his perception of ‘reality,’ on the grounds that this
‘reality’ is limited by man’s position in space and time and the mechanisms of his
inner self. Space, time, and self are the three factors, or coordinates, that obstruct
and mislead man’s comprehension, consequently leaving him in a state of
deception.10
Critical theory thus promises to “unmask” ideology. 11 As an example of J. Hillis Miller’s
synopsis of the state of theory circa 1990, we shall turn momentarily to Scott Peeples’
discussion of Edgar Allan Poe’s reception in the twentieth century. This brief survey is
justified since Matthiessen excluded Poe from his American Renaissance, which places
Poe in the position of a relation of negative originality with respect to historicism.
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According to Peeples, Poe’s critical matrix is considered to have engendered, due
to his theories of textual unity that can be traced to “The Philosophy of Composition” and
other articles from the 1840s, a cluster of interpretive methods later associated with New
Criticism, as well as mythical and archetypal critical approaches.12 This emphasis on
unity and originality, which comes to the fore in Poe’s reviews of Hawthorne, led to the
preference for irony over didacticism favored by New Critics. Yet Poe’s appeal to readers
of Gothic and subversive popular literature contests New Critical values for literariness as
David S. Reynolds argues. In 1859, the year of Hawthorne’s The Marble Faun, and two
years following Melville’s The Confidence-Man, chapter 20—the “Reappearance of One
Who May Be Remembered,”—in which Poe appears as a “dried up old man, with the
stature of a boy of twelve, [who] was tottering about like one out of his mind,” it was
Emerson who labeled Poe “The Jingle Man.”
If Matthiessen omitted Poe from his American Renaissance because of Poe’s
transatlantic stature, Matthiesen did write in 1948, curiously, that Poe functioned not as
an original but as a precursor, the reverse of William Carlos Williams view in In the
American Grain (1925). So reignites the contest over Poe’s originality that began two
days after Poe’s death in 1849, when Griswold began the Poe industry by obtaining
publishing rights to Poe’s oeuvre. Re-evaluating Matthiessen’s omission, for the myth
and symbol critics, such as R. W. B. Lewis (The American Adam) of the 1950s Poe
becomes representative of the “destruction of old-world aesthetics and values.” 13 Poe’s
ground-clearing literary criticism becomes in this view quintessentially American; his
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originality cultivates a new literature. This reading of Poe led to developments in Poe
criticism in the 1950s by Charles Feidelson (Symbolism and American Literature) and
Harry Levin (The Power of Blackness) that sought to explicate Poe’s work in terms of
coherent themes and patterns. Richard Wilbur explained Poe’s thinking in terms of his
internal divisions between rationalism and irrationalism, and his motif of the
dopplegänger.
Edward Davidson sought to understand Poe in terms of his use of Romantic
symbolism.14 “The mental ‘fracture’ in much of Poe’s work, the split between ‘inner self
and outer world,’ is not a symptom of his own split personality but rather ‘part of the
major stream of intellectual and artistic life from the seventeenth until well into the
nineteenth, and even into the twentieth century'.” 15 More than merely a psychology of
Poe as an artist, his dualism can be seen as a split between the Romantic imagination and
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not at the mercy of psychology or “psychologism” but have meanings quite beyond anything
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the cultural matrix. For Peeples, Davidson’s Poe: A Critical Study (1957) “is the best
book-length study of the Poe canon prior to the 1970s.” Davidson imagines Poe’s stance
as “defiant,” a manifestation of Romantic Agony, where “the artist destroys the material
world but does not recreate it; instead, he creates art.” In Eureka, says Davidson, Poe’s
desire for purity in art necessitates of a metaphysical world divided between science and
art, where creativity is autonomous and singular. Davidson’s reading of Eureka
represents a phenomenology that anticipates the deconstruction of the 1980s except that
he remains oriented to Romantic language rather than speech acts in general. Indeed,
Poe’s Romantic metaphysics amount to a reflexive gesture indicative of his negotiation
with the concept of originality, as both an epistemological and critical idea, and as an
ontological fundamental.
Richard Wilbur articulates Poe’s work in terms of a Cosmic Myth that develops
from Eureka.16 He writes that “the poet’s business is to help undo phenomena toward
unity, dreaming the oak of creation back to its original acorn, his negation of human and
earthly subject-matter becomes in Poe’s cosmic theory…creative…his denial of Intellect
a means to ultimate truth. In short, Poe's myth of the cosmos presents his every apparent
limitation as an advantage.” Wilbur’s Library of Congress lecture, “The House of Poe,”
posited a “hypnagogic state” between the actual and the dream state, that marks for Poe a
transitive moment, similar to Hawthorne’s “neutral territory, and moreover, similar to the
Romantic sublime, which provides a moment of the possibility of a “visionary
condition.” David Halliburton's Edgar Allan Poe: A Phenomenological View (1973)
argues for the transcendental moment of Eureka situated between formalism and
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authorial psychology within interpretive subjectivity that offers a hermeneutics of Poe’s
creative consciousness.17 If the 1960s and 70s were concerned with Poe’s aesthetics and
motifs, a critical foci that remains active, and which situates Poe as a Romantic caught in
the legacy of John Locke that is signified by the concept of Romantic Irony, it is G. R.
Thompson’s Poe’s Fiction: Romantic Irony and the Gothic Tales that reconnects Poe to
German Idealism. Thompson points to the influence of Friedrich Schlegel as a precursor
to Poe’s ironic self that is attracted to “nothingness” and absurdity.
John Carlos Rowe, in Through the Custom House (1982), helped signal the rise of
deconstruction in American literary studies by acknowledging and then challenging the
notion of coherence, opened by irony, and then unraveling the referential sinews to
expose deferred signifieds. Peeples points out that Poe’s problematizing of transcendental
unities, often through dialogical bifurcation, acts to expose the realization that
decentering and the marginalizing of metaphysics—in Poe’s fictive world a form of
bracketing by encryption—actually acts as a sort of explication resulting, after all, in a
form of coherence. Undoubtedly, Poe’s style involves the reader to participate in
misreading and deception. Joseph Riddel’s Purloined Letters argues that, following
17
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Emerson, Poe’s “nature” acts as a metonym for language, language that is complicated by
a “problematics” of originality and repetition. The Ideal is infinitely deferred in Riddel’s
reading of Poe, which reappears as a preoccupation with mystification in Poe’s texts. 18
Michael Williams, in A World of Words, demonstrates Poe’s penchant for undermining
logocentrism and the Romantic self. Seeing Poe as an ironist Williams presents Poe as an
example of a desired centeredness through the figure of Ligeia, whose beauty figures as
an unreachable infinity obtained through a process of metempsychosis.
Our concern with negative originality begins with the relation between the
cultural matrix and the Romantic resistance to it by American authors. My approach to
this disjunction is through the critical concept “originality.” The concept of originality, as
we shall see, was in a state of crisis in America. Edward Davidson suggests that this crisis
arrived late in the American romantic phase of literary development. “Poe dramatized the
whole problem of what the creative imagination does when it is seeking ways of
communicating those ideas lying beyond the common discourse of men,” says
Davidson.19
The American antipathy towards Britain over literary traditions, and ironically at
the same time, its blatant dependence on that tradition for a literary value schema,
became the central conundrum felt by Romantics in America. This key tension, noticed
by F. O. Matthiessen, between the need for a distinctly American literature and the
dependence on foreign sources, produced a difficult problem.20 How would American
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writers maintain critical distance from the market, avoid editorial puffing of American
national “originality,” and at the same time, escape the dominance of British cultural
preferences circulating in America via non-copyrighted reprints? Furthermore, we might
ask, how did authors respond to their patriotic sentiments toward American democratic
sentiment? In considering these questions, we can begin to get a sense of the difficulty
facing American writers and artists who sought to be original, in fact.
For Matthiessen and the creators of American studies in the 1930s the problem
seemed to be to preserve democracy without sacrificing spirit. Matthiessen thought such
a transcendental synthesis possible through the imposition of a unity concept he attributed
to democracy as a foundational idea a priori to ideology. And, moreover, in preserving
that synthesis, a modicum of anarchy kept democracy honest. But for the authors of the
so-called American renaissance, the actualities of the American situation presented
realities incapable of political, progressive reform, even as the trope of originality offered
sublime power through transumption.
In his American Renaissance, Matthiessen concludes that authors of the
“American Renaissance,” Hawthorne, Melville, Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman, and
extending that group inclusively to Poe, “all wrote for democracy in a double sense.” 21
Matthiessen posits that doubleness in terms of a literature that is either a “true exponent
of democracy” or an “insidious form of anarchy,” and perhaps both. 22 This bifurcation
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poses a number of problems for a historian concerned with the antebellum literature of
the American northeast.23 Framing this literature in terms of an intention that foregrounds
literary nationalism founded on exceptionalism as a paradigm ignores a dependence upon
transatlantic publishing for a culture of authorship. Moreover, as we shall explore, the
main thrust of negative originality stems from Romantic theory as a response to the
cultural matrix, and the movement of return arises in the disjunction thereof through the
work of the sublime. And the notion of anarchy—or dissent—vis-à-vis a presumably
“true” democracy, posits a notion of patriotism that lacks sufficient historicism. The
antebellum authors of the American northeast found themselves in a dialogical and
emerging literary culture bounded by competing strains of American ideology making
national unity a virtual moving target: one author’s anarchy is another’s patriotism.
Matthiessen excluded Poe on the basis of his indifference to democracy, but I
suspect he was also aware that Poe’s atheism would result in a negativity towards
American democracy, and that if widely applied such a view would result in further
anarchy. Poe is uncertain about the trope of metalepsis, given his suspicion of the
didacticism of metaphysics, and instead he sets up a game of duplicity where center and
margin ceaselessly reciprocate, as he repeatedly illustrates by such allegories as Monsieur

transcendentalist over the matter of New York politics. Literary culture was at the same time
political culture.
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D___ and his nemesis Dupin in “The Purloined Letter.” Through sheer rhetorical power
Emerson was able to sustain an American originality through transumption, at least until
his Essays, Second Series (1844). Hawthorne, in his neutrality, I suggest, was aware of
the risks of presenting himself as an anarchist, which is why his narrators find themselves
at the precipice of anarchy and withdraw. Melville, as Hawthorne remarked, was
prepared for cosmic annihilation by doubting “everything that lies beyond human ken,”
and for knowing that the profound consequences of negative originality, the condition of
apostasy towards original sin, was a mode of anarchy of consciousness. 24 Negative
originality, in the American Romantic cultural circuit centering on Poe, Hawthorne, and
Melville, and to a large extent Emerson, becomes metaphorized by means of literary
troping within the transumptive narrative structure of imaginative writing, a mode of
writing essays, tales, and romance novels that involve a “sacrifice of relation” between
the imagination and the actual. For Hawthorne transumption meant the maintaining of a
relation of partial and flexible fidelity between realism and romance, insisting that the
latter offered a particularly apt mode of speaking about the former through the
imaginative work of fiction. Hawthorne, in his preface to his second romance The House
of the Seven Gables, maintained that “[w]hen a writer calls his work a romance, it need
hardly be observed that he wishes to claim a certain latitude, both to its fashion and
material.”25
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Hawthorne’s desire for a “certain latitude” or “freedom of invention,” as Bell
terms it, opens the question of the relation of authorial freedom with respect to his or her
“social texture.”26 The precise relation between idea, cultural matrix, and authorial
subject position was frequently ambiguous and inconsistent. It follows from this example
then that in the main American Romantic authors experienced a sacrifice of relation in
ways characterized, generally, as a state of anxiety. That anxiety motivated a turn from
American exceptionalism toward a type of transcendental aesthetics that remapped the
Kantian sublime onto an American sublime, and ultimately restructured the alternativeromantic American author in a position toward society akin to the Schlegelian Romantic
sublime. I call that subject position negative originality since its orientation, or ideology,
subverted American exceptionalism in favor of an authorial self that was closer to Percy
Shelley and Thomas Carlyle than the Americans James Fenimore, Cooper, William
Gilmore Simms or James Kirke Paulding. No doubt the adoption of transcendental
aesthetics by Romantic writers of New York and New England was certainly due in part
to the historical influence of Puritanism as well as Emerson's rejection of Unitarianism.
But transcendental thinking looking back to Kant and Schelling, combined with the
Common-Sense thinking inherent in British belles lettres and its obsession with
plagiarism and property rights, provided literati in the American Northeast a matrix of
transatlantic critical criteria that complicated literary nationalist claims.
R. W. B. Lewis shows that the literary problematic of originality that took its cue
from the dialectic between the persistence of an unusable past and an overly optimistic
futurity arises in those very interstices that paralleled the rhetoric of and against political
26
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institutions.27 The public-sphere federalism of the early national period was countered by
the agrarian republicanism of Jefferson (and Créveceour) and Jackson. In his Notes on
Virginia Jefferson expressed his fear of the loss of individual dignity that advancing
industrialism would bring upon society. By the 1840s the conservative Whigs and the
anti-federal Jacksonians defined the polarity in America between the rights of the
individual and the rights of the people. The clash between the property rights assumed by
individuals and the social needs of democratic culture tended to be resolved in favor of
populism and reform as the rising mass culture saw itself in contradistinction from
privileged Whigs more comfortable with transatlantic commerce and institutional
memory. The refusal by congress to pass international copyright legislation in the 1840s
attests to the anti-British sentiment held by Jacksonians. The priority of democratic
literature, literary nationalism, and the idea of American unity and exceptionalism
countering a British hegemony of letters, drew the lines between a literary past and
American literary originality. Originality as national literature became coextensive with
John O’Sullivan’s idea of Manifest Destiny.
The net result of the counteraction by literary critics such as Poe was the
establishment of a canon of American literature based, ironically, not on an idea of native
genius, but on an author’s transatlantic stature. Nathaniel Hawthorne and Herman
Melville, for example, looked to British audiences for more favorable reception than they
found at home. Ultimately, the turning away from the contradictory demands of the
American marketplace, as Hawthorne did in The Marble Faun, and Melville did by
undermining trust in The Confidence-Man, narrates a politics of negative originality that
27
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opposes the false premises of American exceptionalism and its originality claims. As the
exemplary “positive” Romantic in this study it is Emerson who inherited Coleridge’s
distinction between reason and understanding, a distinction which posits a positive and
universal idea of spiritual unity that can be traced to Coleridge’s primary imagination and
Kant’s positive sense of freedom. Yet Emerson’s resignation from the Boston Unitarian
Church and his engagement with a problematic of American originality presents for this
study the figure of metalepsis, or reversal, that raises the issue of an Emersonian position
of negativity.
At the outset of the period under consideration, Ralph Waldo Emerson’s
resignation from the Unitarian Church in 1832 signaled a dawning crisis of faith in
America; it was a period of crisis when Orestes Brownson worried over the Unitarian
Church’s position to “unchurch philosophy,” and a moment of rapture, perhaps, that
culminated in the emergence of a negative idea of originality about which Edgar Allan
Poe expressed a denial of a higher power.28 Whereas Brownson agonized retrospectively
(in 1857) over the increasing recognition (in the 1830s) of an oncoming age of eternal
flux as a reality of modernism—that the “plague-spot of the age…had pronounced the
everlasting ‘No’,” Poe, in Eureka, contrarily, embraced it.29 In Nature (1836) Emerson
enjoins Brownson in a Transcendentalist position towards the “prospects” for a “positive”
28
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spiritual rebirth despite a secularizing and materialist universe. By 1872 Emerson, in his
essay “Quotation and Originality” admitted that any claim of originality must contend
with tradition and the continuity of language and ideas. Originality shifts under this
perspective from a generative and positive sense to a structural and negative concept
given under the rubric of “representation.” Against a hoped-for universal spirit that might
arise in a positive originality it becomes clear that any gesture of “re-origination” implicit
in transcendental thinking carries with it an undertone of negativity. My term for this
structure is negative originality. At the outset we might illustrate this structure by
considering Thomas Carlyle’s reaction to the utilitarian (and in America, Unitarian)
outgrowths of the Enlightenment.
In England, Thomas Carlyle’s crisis of faith in science, a complaint which cast
materialism and utilitarianism as worldviews destructive to spirit, points to a general and
sometimes affirmative disposition towards spiritual renewal and moral reform as
expressed in the work of Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Emerson earlier writings. Thomas
Carlyle, in his essay “On History” (1830), exhorted to the nineteenth-century man that
“warring against oblivion, he would fain unite himself in clear conscious relation, as in
dim unconscious relation he is already united, with the whole future, and the whole
Past.”30 For Carlyle, the reigning mood was determined by a relational sense of negative
originality that pertaining to “our whole Metaphysics itself.”31 Arguing against what he
termed “the mechanical age,” Carlyle’s “clear conscious relation” became a dialectic
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Thomas Carlyle, A Carlyle Reader, Selections from the Writings of Thomas Carlyle,
ed. G. B. Tennyson (Copley Publishing Group, 1999), 25-29.
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framed by the Romantic’s position vis-à-vis the Enlightenment. Bitterly opposing such a
mechanical doctrine, Carlyle argued in “Signs of the Times” (1829) that
from Locke’s time downwards, [metaphysics] has been physical; not a spiritual
philosophy, but a material one….His whole doctrine is mechanical, in its aim and
origin, in its method and its results. It is not a philosophy of the mind: it is a mere
discussion concerning the origin of our consciousness, or ideas, or whatever else
they are called; a genetic history of what we see in the mind. The crabbed secrets
of Necessity and Freewill, of the Mind’s vital or non-vital dependence on Matter,
of our mysterious relation to Time and Space, to God, to the Universe, are not, in
the faintest degree touched on these inquiries; and seem not to have the smallest
connexion with them.32
In the turning from the Enlightenment to the period known as the Romantic era, Carlyle’s
emphasis on a “mysterious relation to Time and Space, to God, to the Universe” became
obsessed with the possibility of an “original relation,” as Emerson put it. Carlyle spoke
for many Romantics when he suggested that the notion of “freedom,” a notion closely
associated with originality, as we shall see, is “impossible” without a “belief in the
Invisible.” Against the “faith in Mechanism” that supported “democratic interest” a
tellingly conservative view that reminds us of the differences between Coleridge and
Bentham, Carlyle’s notion of originality became associated with the unique individual
self, or subject, as metaphysicians termed it. Emerson’s self-reliant American scholar had
to contend with not merely the pretense of the Romantic self but what William Ellery
Channing called “self-culture,” the post-Puritan communitarian idea of a democratic
body politic. And the problem for originality in mid-nineteenth-century “America” would
32
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be precisely how original American literature might register Carlyle’s negative concern
over democratic interest.
It is worth noting here that the relation of the individual to tradition becomes one
of the ways originality becomes registered in Romantic thinking. Romantics hope that
nature and spirit my in effect displace tradition and thus ensure re-origination. It is also
clear that this displacement occurs through the rhetorical effect of transumption,
essentially a literary positing of ontological originality through negativity, even as
tradition was always already present to hand. But if the divine might scarify tradition
originality could be affirmed. Wordsworth wrote in his “Essay: Supplementary to the
Preface” (1815) that a poet should “owe nothing but to nature and his own genius.” 33
Emerson and Carlyle, suggests F. O. Matthiessen, held that the age of Enlightenment
“lacked the springs of faith,” principally because John Locke had sacrificed spirit for
scientific thinking.34 One mode of redress offered by Wordsworth, again in his 1815
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“Essay,” was that “Poetry is most just to its divine origin.” 35 In this synthesis of genius,
spirit, and nature, we find the basis of a transcendental originality that became a hallmark
of Romantic thought. Since the Enlightenment had fostered a secular-material worldview
that questioned the assumptions of the Reformation and Puritanism, it is perhaps also fair
to say that this crisis in world-view helped to precipitate a European and American social
revolution. Enlightenment egalitée seemed to be foreclosed due in part to the savage
results of the French Revolution, an unanticipated result of the rise of science and the
questioning of religion in the context of European romanticism. Contemporary writers of
the period saw that the paradoxical social results of Enlightenment faith in reason
produced the reality of a world-historical figure in Napoleon, whose rise suggested a new
order to human destiny connected only obliquely to rational enlightenment ideals. 36
As the German Idealist philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831)
would show, the Romantic situation was marked by the very belatedness that found the
era negatively responding to the Enlightenment.37 Romantics “undertook to save the
overview of human history and destiny, the experiential paradigms, and the cardinal
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values of their religious heritage, by reconstituting them in a way that would make them
intellectually acceptable, as well as emotionally pertinent.”38 Friedrich Schlegel called for
a ‘new mythology’ carved from “the uttermost depth of the spirit,” a mythology that
would provide the well-spring of originality for Romantic poetics.39 In place of
Enlightenment ideals, the “pretense” of the Romantic Self and the notion of originality
became the new locus of value for writers on both sides of the Atlantic from Kant to
Coleridge, from Carlyle to Emerson, Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville.40 At the center of the
shift to Romanticism was an ideology that Carlyle called the “Spirit of Religion in a new
Mythus.” In Sartor Resartus, Carlyle attempted a synthesis of the natural and the divine
through the construct “Natural Supernaturalism,” a gesture certainly designed to make
materialism secondary to spirit.41 We shall see that in Nature Emerson embraces the
“prospects” of “Natural Supernaturalism” by synthesizing a movement from the self into
Nature and then into universal spirit. It is the movement into this third term that is most
characteristic of a positive view of originality, a view the later Emerson was forced to
abandon given that relation between the self and the world could not be overthrown
except for the intervention of a rhetoric of the sublime. What Emerson holds in common
with Romantics in general, and specifically with Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville is the
ideality of a relation between noumena and phenomena that can be traced to Kant.
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The relation between self, nature, and the universe was axiomatic for Emerson:
“What drew Emerson most to Renaissance individualism was its increased awareness of
the self.”42 This Romantic “double consciousness,” the reflective self in its relation to the
world, that Matthiessen notices shifted back from the faculty of understanding and its
objectivity to the faculty of reason, and its intuition of spirit. 43 Romantic originality arises
in that intuition of (an oxymoronic) individual spirit—its original relation—as it seeks
unity in particulars. By seeking a signifier antecedent to the American context in the
quest for an original poetics, poet Walt Whitman would later expose a key irony of
Emersonian thought. Through the figure of originality the poet attempts to situate himself
as free from the strictures of the social world, yet in so doing his quest for literary
originality becomes necessarily bound up with European roots.
Such an irony arises in the paradox of influence in which authors found it
impossible to justify an American national literature, as Poe, Margaret Fuller, and James
Russell Lowell argued, without taking into account precepts of literariness inherited from
British texts.44 Lowell suggested that “[t]he first question we put to any poet, nay, to any
42
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so-called national literature, is ‘who were your forebears?’” 45 Emerson, Poe, Hawthorne,
and Melville accepted, to varying degrees, the idea that the poetic symbol might express
universal value, and they recognized the inherent incommensurability between the
universal symbol and that which national literature proposed for universal art. In
Romantic thought, generally, originality forms the nexus between universal spirit and
individual freedom. Such is the basic formulation of Idealism that structures Romantic
originality. The relation between Romantic originality and negativity, I argue, situates a
phenomenology of American Romanticism in its literary correspondence with national
literature and the transatlantic reception of American Transcendentalism, British
Romanticism, and German Idealism.
More concerned with democratic publicity (in the sense of an individual relation
to a public, per se), Hawthorne repeatedly sought his relation to originality in the “neutral
territory” lying between the imagination and phenomenal world. Melville’s relation to the
cultural matrix discloses his own attempt at negating the linguistic problematic
“uncovered” in Emerson’s attempt to “reconcile nature with spirit.” 46 In seeking that
reconciliation through originality as a romantic trope Melville found himself in a
disjunctive relation with the cultural matrix. The cultural matrix can be defined in terms
of “the public-private binary in the United States culture [that] has usually meant the
45
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obeisance of the private to the public life...” 47 That political tension was the case lasting
from Puritan colonial life through early republican public-sphere ideologies, and into the
realm of immigrant experience. Renza points out that “in Poe’s mid-nineteenth-century
world, the ‘public,’ the highlighted site of accepted or contested values, was coming into
existence as a special, alienated category of social experience, particularly in the guise of
the American capitalist marketplace and mass culture.”48 Following from Ann Douglas’s
The Femininization of American Culture, Renza articulates the rise of a private sphere as
an alternate model for the cultural matrix.49 The private side of the binary occupied by
Poe and others raises the question of the critical schema received from the transatlantic
literary tradition; and in the 1840s, the critical keyword was originality.
Romantic originality, in a view held by Wordsworth that finds poetic originality
analogous to divine creation in his “Intimations Ode,” finds the origination of the literary
work as beyond the material or phenomenal context.50 In this formulation creativity
becomes a sign of transcendence, whereas imitation occupies the material sphere. The
bifurcation that structures the concepts of art and nature establishes the domain in which
these two concepts traverse. Western “grammars of literary creation” have “migrated”
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between the two concepts of invention and creation.51 The original work is created, in this
scheme, by an individual genius—or soul—and the original work presents itself as
wholly new and not derivative, an origination stemming from the imagination of the
writer rather than from the past.
In the European tradition Romantic originality, as Robert Macfarlane has shown,
distinguishes, in a general sense, these two variants of the theory of literary originality:
invention and creation. Invention, as we shall see, can be subdivided into rhetorical
invention and the copying of nature through an admiration for natural “harmony”;
creation can be subdivided between the literary or artistic creation of the new, vis-á-vis a
resistance to the influence of the past, inherited traditions, or social conventions, and the
notion of creation holding that its products result in an instantiation of something ex
nihilo.52 This “creative” aspect of Romantic aesthetic theory describes creative
originality, originality in the sense of a self-inventing product, defined as a type of
metaphysical or ontological originality. It is metaphysical by means of an analogy
conceived in organic terms between the created and the thing, and ontological status of
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the thing in that creation belongs to being. 53 This sort of creative mode is contrasted with
invention, which, in this view, involves an encounter with, and a rearrangement of,
existing materials. Invention, and its related concept influence, becomes generated in
time with respect to a point of origin; creation on the other hand, implies an empty spatial
center from which a being, a self-caused thing, metaphorically arises, and the concept
implies a “making out of nothing.” 54 For example Kant’s notion of “creative” genius—a
“natural endowment”—involves an “innate mental aptitude through which nature gives
the rule to art,” a definition which seems to posit a “creative” view of artistic originality
unhindered or unheralded by tradition.55 The rule is essentially unmediated except that it
exists in temporality. The relation between creation and tradition determines the key
dialectic of what Thomas McFarland terms the “originality paradox,” a notion of selfbinding such that diachronic and synchronic aspects, defined as generative and structural
concepts, indicate moments of presence and absence along a syntagmatic chain of
signification.56
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Parallel to the originality paradox, or the unstable relation between creator and
tradition, the Kantian paradox recognizes that positive freedom presupposes a universal
sense that what is right in all cases must necessarily be a conditional definition. Many
romantics recognized that positive freedom, while desired, could not be sustained, and
that negative freedom must be the normative state of individuality. Even as Friedrich W.
J. Schelling, William Wordsworth, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and Ralph Waldo Emerson
looked to “nature” as a universal that could make a benign world more transparent;
alternative romantics—Friedrich Schlegel, Percy Bysshe Shelley, and Edgar Allan Poe—
saw negativity as a basic irony of the divided human condition, which Friedrich Schlegel
saw as a state of “permanent parabasis.” 57
The anxiety over the divided self becomes a turning point in the shift to Romantic
negativity. In the relation between author and narrator of fiction, as we see in Melville’s
Ishmael, and in the metafiction of Pierre and The Confidence-Man, just as the author
intrudes on the narrator to comment on the problematics of the writing, the fiction
overwhelms the author and brings about “the moment when the author does not return to
the world.” The question of “recovery” or a movement of return concerns whether a state
of romantic irony—the isolation and alienation of the human subject whose selfreflexivity creates a condition of cathexis—might be resolved. Resolution seems
available in a nostalgic hope for the infinite, to a state of unity. But reflexivity creates a
reading of the self from another metacritical vantage point which is a fictionalization of
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the self that the self creates to gain objectivity over itself. But that self-objectification
results in a fictive standpoint that is a negation of the prior self. And that state of
negativity cannot recover the prior self because of its necessary negativity without a
reunification that is self-destructive. If irony gains its power through negativity the mind
becomes helpless in attempting to deny itself the freedom to return to reconciliation; to
do so would bring a halt to the dialectical nature of consciousness; the mind must accept
no point as resolved since it has no temporal power over future states. Although the
dialectic of the ironic consciousness is therefore one of infinite succession, it is bounded
by mortality, and the consciousness must contain the self as substance and as subject.
The basic romantic impulse towards an originality of the Self finds itself
conditioned by the negation of forces perceived as impinging upon its full realization.
Full realization brings up the problem of the individual self in the midst of a society and
literary tradition, a preexisting condition, as it were, that affects perceptions of
originality. The impact of the social context, as critics William Hazlitt, James Russell
Lowell, and T. S. Eliot have argued, cannot ultimately be overcome or erased by the
imposition of an originality predicating the self as a singular subject, because language
and cultural history always already come before it.58 Negativity is then an ongoing
dialectic where the self in its negativity, as G. W. Friedrich Hegel put it, remains in an

58

As distinct as these tree critics are from each other, they share the idea the individual
author exists in a power relation with a literary tradition and cultural matrix of which they are
inextricably part, see William Hazlitt, “Originality,” William Hazlitt: Selected Writings, ed. Jon
Cook (Oxford University Press, 1991), 270-77; James Russell Lowell, “Originality” [North
American Review, 1870], Literary Criticism of James Russell Lowell, ed. Herbert F. Smith
(Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1969), 53-54; T.S. Eliot, “Tradition and the
Individual Talent,” Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot, ed. Frank Kermode (New York: Farrar, Straus,
Giroux, 1975), 37–44.

28

ironic relation to the Kantian notion of positive freedom, which ought to be, as Immanuel
Kant held it, the condition of the undivided self.
Negative originality is thus contingent to the artist’s historical relationship to
history and culture.59 While negative originality erupts due to historical conditions, it
behaves as a reactive pattern.60 That pattern, though it can be seen operating in particular
eras dating from classical epic to the Romantic reaction to the Enlightenment, became
particularly striking in early-19th century Europe, and following a decade or so later in
America, when Romantic originality had become aligned with exceptionalism and
nationalism under the banner of Americanism.61 Then the construct of “originality”
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itself, as a critical schema, had become imbricated into the narrative of national literary
originality. It became impossible to become an “original” artist (in the creative sense)
when the options for originality were already determined by nationalist ideology. 62
Negative originality becomes an allegory of writing in that the drama of
negativity is brought into conflict with originality, as in Melville’s “Whiteness of the
Whale” chapter of Moby-Dick.63 Melville writes: “in its essence whiteness is not so much
a color as the visible absence of color, and at the same time the concrete of all colors...[it]
is for these reasons that there is such a dumb blankness, full of meaning, in a wide
landscape of snows--a colorless, all-color of atheism from which we shrink...” The notion
of a benign, “positive” originality associated with Wordsworth and Coleridge, and in
America, with Longfellow and William Cullen Bryant, had from its beginnings a
negative undertone. Schlegel, Shelley, and Poe allegorized originality in a negative sense.
For Friedrich Schlegel, originality is “incomprehensible” and it is also ironic that it
should be.64 For Shelley, the irony of Rousseau’s intuitive reason that succumbs to feeling
in the Triumph of Life—the title itself is certainly an ironic statement—finds that human
pathos is the unwinding of Enlightenment rationality. For Shelley intuitive reason is no
assurance of a benign sense of the faith in the primary imagination as it is for Coleridge. 65
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Negative originality, then, arises as artists sublimate antithetical popular
discourses, synthesizing them in a process akin to the romantic sublime by subverting
them into an original literariness that is self-reflexive in view of an author’s negative
relation to the universe. Negative originality, moreover, recognizes that the artist is
already bound by the concept of originality that culture promulgates, and the artist
therefore recognizes “pure” originality as an impossible condition. 66 As an aesthetic
concept promising creative independence—what David S. Reynolds sees as an author’s
problematic marginality vis-à-vis culture—the ideology of pure originality becomes
either a creative impediment masquerading as a free aesthetic possibility, or a quixotic
mirage to be attained in some future moment.67 As such the artist remains bound to
culture even as he or she resists or subverts it.68 Michael Hoffman argues that “every
American author since the days of Poe has been [unable] to find his culture adequate to
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his search for value, either in the universe or in his immediate society.” 69 The drive to
achieve pure originality entangles the creative artist further into the grasp of the cultural
matrix.
Poe’s complaint about metaphysical originality, a term closely allied with a
historicized Romantic originality, rests on the distinction between a self-reflexive poetics
(the poem as poem) and a poem that possesses extrinsic meaning. And in Romantic logic
outer and inner correspond infinitely. It is a truism that Romantic originality considered
metaphysical originality intrinsic through a synecdochal relationship to the infinite.
Metaphysical originality is conceptually transcendent, a concept Poe wished to transcend
for the sake of art and the artist. Poetics, for Poe, is thus negative with respect to
originality, if originality is coextensive with the divine. While Poe rejected “metaphysical
originality” as “didactic” he managed to write a metaphysical “prose-poem” Eureka.70
Poe doesn’t reject metaphysics as such but rather insists that a “prose-poem” is
necessarily an aesthetics of materiality and chance. Hawthorne and Melville rejected or at
least reacted to the Spinozist pantheism of Transcendentalism, seeing instead a
Manichean inscrutability or ambiguity as an ever-veiled source of originality lying deeper
than the national-political construct of exceptionalism. Melville, in his essay “Hawthorne
and His Mosses,” shared with Emerson’s Nature a desire for the disclosure of
transcendental truth. Both Melville and Emerson altered their positions with regard to
transcendental truth. The original negativity that might be disclosed through language
69
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became for Emerson a matter of individual poetic power over the reification of quotation;
for Melville an alethetic sense of universal truth as an original negativity became doubled
through his “cosmopolitan” figure by its own inversion into particularity, even
singularity. Negative originality becomes a quasi-Hegelian turn to negation as a parody
of originality that sought to negate transcendental presumptions.
Perhaps because the artistic work in this view emerges from the mind of a single
soul, the work can be traced to an individual, and thus it can elicit “a well-defined sense
both of property…and propriety”; that is, in the “creative” view of originality there must
be clear rights of ownership. Such a notion of private ownership can (and has) lead to a
disparagement of repetition—that imitation is unoriginal—and eventually to a prohibition
against plagiarism.71
Plagiarism became “the determination of aesthetic failure” with respect to
originality in authorship. Discourses in the literary-critical milieu “offer a sustained
account of the cultural negotiations that shaped literary expectations” of Romanticism. 72
As a creation myth, originality discounts what is present in a work that has appeared in
other works, and privileges, rather, a criterion of uniqueness by evaluating a work
according to what is rare in it; that is, originality emphasizes a work’s “singularity” vis-à-
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vis its derivations. Originality, as ideology, despite the deconstructions of originality by
poststructuralists, remains for many commentators “highly resistant” to its detractors. 73
Indeed, copyright law depends on the claim of originality to establish proper
ownership. In a curious turn from creative originality as a manifestation of individuality
to intellectual property, a turn which in one direction becomes associated with Romantic
theory and phenomenology and the sublime movement into negativity as propounded by
Hegel, and in the other direction to Emerson’s later concern for “quotation,” where all
literature is “eavesdropping.” A similar pattern is evident in the deconstructive idea of
grafting, where one discovers “points of juncture and stress where one scion or line of
argument has been spliced into another...” 74 This turn, then, sets up the dichotomy
between structural and generative originality.75
Romantic originality as an autogenic idea becomes further structured by
negativity as a phenomenology of consciousness where the self in a Hegelian move
returns to the original self; or, generative questions about literary originality turn the
question of creativity toward a view, on one hand overburdened by influence, and on the
other “bound” by one’s singularity to a state of flux that becomes isolating, an
apprehension that was theorized by Friedrich Schlegel and Kierkegaard as a condition of
radical irony, and by Hawthorne and Melville as the condition of alienation from
73
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society.76 The originality paradox—the relation between individual creativity and the
literary tradition—maps onto the distinction between structural and generative originality,
openness and closure, space and temporality, and the difference in definition between a
concept of originality as a center or as a continuum.
Transatlantic literary borrowing provided a countermeasure to the pressures the
cultural matrix imposed on American authors to be “original” national figures. For
Romantics in America, Coleridge was acknowledged to be the translator of German
Idealism. Coleridge’s Aids to Reflection published in America, with a forward by James
Marsh in 1829, presented Coleridge’s ideas to American readers. Henry Hedge, who was
a member of Emerson’s circle in Boston and Concord, composed an essay about
Coleridge in 1833. Situated in Bangor, Hedge returned to Boston, and after 1836 his
visits coalesced in the Transcendental Club. Hedge read Kant in the original German after
visiting Germany with George Bancroft at 13.77 It is clear that Hedge recognized
Coleridge as a conduit to German Idealism rather than an originator of Idealistic
philosophy.78
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And as if to confirm that Coleridge is the agency of transfer, rather than the
inventor of transcendental thought, Hedge gives much discussion to Kant. In the
American context, Ralph Waldo Emerson famously turned to the idea of an
unconditioned Self when he sought in nature an “original relation to the universe,” not
just for world-historical figures but for everyone capable of “natural aristocracy.”79 In
retrospect it is clear that Emerson is a primary source for a nineteenth-century American
concern with “originality,” both literary and metaphysical; his transcendental synthesis of
the concept of American exceptionalism and German Idealism cleared the ground for one
stream of an original American literature.80
Traversing another stream, Walt Whitman, writing a decade after Emerson’s
Nature, reminded Emerson that literary originality is an iterative process; a writer
originates a text in a field already occupied by his literary precursors: “The poet shall not
spend his time in unneeded work. He shall know that the ground is always ready
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ploughed and manured … others may not know it but he shall.” 81 Whitman suggested
that if “the expression of the American poet is to be transcendent and new,” then “[i]t is
to be indirect and not direct or descriptive or epic.”82 Interpreting this passage by
Whitman, Matthiessen notices that for Emerson and Whitman, there is a disjunction
between language and reality and that the signifier transcends the signified by
universalizing it symbolically: “Everything in the universe goes by indirection,” writes
Emerson.83 For Whitman, the transcendent signifier—poetry—indirectly symbolizes
(and indeterminately signifies) his “America.”
Yet in the Romantic moment Emerson and Whitman held that originality
overwhelms the boundaries signified by a direct apprehension of reality, since reason
may encompass a field beyond the boundaries of reality. The faculty of reason provides
the syntagmatic chain linking a signified to a transcendental signifier, as Emerson
conceived it. Yet, for Whitman, we are reminded, the irony underlying American
originality is that it must be necessarily “indirect”; there is no direct link between a poetic
signified bound to an expressly national context, since the signifier must be transcendent
to the cultural matrix. By implication the American poet’s originality looks beyond
national literary ideals. In Romantic thought, literary spirit—originality—cannot be
contained in national reality. Thus the relation between poet and context is structured by
definition asymmetrically, or indirectly, as Whitman put it. The “American” poet is
absent from the presentness of context.
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The absence of the American poet from any context comprised through the
cultural matrix as an exceptional form of originality as a national literary construct results
in a deconstructive moment when American literature in the “Romantic” continuum
doubles as both a positing of an original moment and an aporia of any center that might
appear decisive. American literature, Joseph Riddel argues, is implicitly self-critical and
ironic since its self-reflectiveness reveals its belatedness; its newness is forever deferred.
The “poetic” ‘origin’ of ‘American’ literature transgresses its origins through the figure
of transumption, a reversal of cause and effect that rhetorically permits the repetition to
stand as an origin. Moreover, the notion of an intrinsically American discourse of
originality has always been “inscribed within a tropic economy that both undoes myths of
origins and frontiers and prevents any dialectical sublations of this thoughts’
contradictions.”84 Thus the basic ideas of originality, exceptionalism, and nationalism
never resolve into a synthesis, but remain effaced by Emerson, Poe, Hawthorne, and
Melville’s negative relations to the cultural matrix.
The ever-widening Emersonian circles that attempt to enclose the American
concept fall victim to quotation and repetition. Emerson’s “original relation” is itself a
repetition, a new revelation: the Emersonian mind is a “transgression” of “nature” by, a
chiasmus of language. As such, the “American idiom” is a double quotation by definition.
The American “original” is a repetition explaining its belatedness, a belatedness that must
acknowledge that America is an echo of the Old World. American authorship is
orphaned; it must invent its origins in an ahistoric mythos. 85 Riddel’s source-text for his
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deconstructive reading of the American originality position that has been at the center of
an “American renaissance” school of hermeneutics is Emerson’s admission in “Quotation
and Originality” that any rhetoric of originality is already grafted by a burden of the past,
and further that the poet is exceptional not by nation but by nature. In this sense
generative originality is complicated by a double exposure to political and economic
ambiguity. Riddel argues that the deconstructive criticism of American authorship and
originality suggests not that origins lie in a precursor, but that originality itself is a
conceptual anomaly. American originality is performative.
As a consequence of such circularity, the triangular relations within that circle
between transatlantic romanticism, American literary publishing, and the transcendental
and over-determined fascination with the idea of originality came to define writing in the
antebellum era under discussion. Joseph Riddel propounds that a “problematics of
origination” in the understanding of nineteenth-century literary thinking reveals a
putative national identity, an ideology interrogated through the concept of an American
“originality” in literature.86 That concept underscores the related and subordinate
concepts of Americanism (Cornelius Mathews) and exceptionalism (Tocqueville) and
extends into the domain of the concepts of Puritanism, Federalism, Transcendentalism,
and modernism, which for Riddel represents a theme and variations of what is
discursively intertextualized throughout American postmodernism. This is a matter of
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legacy and belatedness for American writers negotiating influence, transcription, and the
“narrative of self-origination.”
The claims of romantic originality during the nineteenth century in America’s
revolutionary middle years became reconstituted within literary nationalism as precepts
of what Tocqueville noticed as “exceptionalism.” Even as Emerson, the recipient of the
transcendental tradition in America who sought to distinguish universal truths from
institutional dogma, it became apparent that American literary independence might
become corrupted by the marketplace, a possibility that threatened the very nature of
republican egalitarianism. The telos of re-origination to which American literary
nationalist ideology clung to would require the negation of its false precepts and in that
relation a legitimate and intellectually independent literary criticism might intercede. At
the center of the American authorial arbitration is the example of the self-reliant author as
presented by Emerson. The reaction to its impossibility because of market contradictions
arises with Poe’s negative example.
Milton R. Stern suggests that the central conflict within Hawthorne’s The Marble
Faun centers on the literary marketplace and the political place of the author within it.87
Stern explores two avenues of inquiry: “a mimetic connection between the literary act
and what appear to be ‘absolute’ universal principles inferred from science”; and, to
explore a “paradigmatic illustration of an ongoing literary relationship between those
‘absolute’ principles and the millennialistic context of American culture.” Stern deploys
the expression ‘millennialist’ as a way to address the feeling for American
exceptionalism, its function as a “city on a hill.”
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Framing this literature in terms of an intention that foregrounds literary
nationalism founded on exceptionalism as a paradigm ignores a dependence upon
transatlantic publishing for a culture of authorship. And the notion of anarchy—or
dissent—vis-à-vis “true” democracy posits a notion of patriotism that lacks sufficient
historicism. The antebellum authors of the American northeast found themselves in a
dialogical and emerging literary culture bounded by competing strains of American
ideology making national unity a virtual moving target: one author's anarchy is another's
patriotism. The canonization that displays both anarchic and democratic functions of
antebellum authors, under Matthiessen’s rubric of an American renaissance, begs the
question of the role of negative originality in authorship with respect to its relation to the
cultural matrix.
In order to understand the bracketing of the author with respect to negative
originality and the consequent bifurcation of the author and the cultural matrix we turn to
Richard Brodhead’s reading of Melville’s literary emergence in the context of the
domestic novel, a literary milieu that, because of its heterodoxy, prompts the question of
relation. Given that Melville and the domestic novel writers shared the same cultural
matrix, we recognize that while domestic novelists accommodated their market, Melville
rejected his. Melville's singularity was not simply a political distance from the bourgeois
domestic market but a difference in writing strategy. Melville attempted an
unprecedented level of artistic autonomy, striving to position himself outside the cultural
matrix he was bound to, and thus fostered a radically different “organizing idea” of
authorship. Moreover, in his essay “Hawthorne and His Mosses,” to which we will return
later, Melville constructs an idea of Hawthorne as an authorial self that is bounded by
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received concepts of originality, thus providing the example of how an author
renegotiates self-conception in spite of the cultural matrix.88
To delve into this construct of an “authorial self” we turn to Perry Miller’s
analysis of the New York literary scene as one controlling aspect of the cultural matrix.
Writing in 1956, Perry Miller looked back at Melville’s romance Moby-Dick (1851) as
“an indubitable masterpiece” of the 19th century, which fell into obscurity soon after its
publication and was rediscovered in the 1920s. Miller argued that “The long eclipse of
Moby-Dick can, of course, be attributed to inherent difficulties in the work itself. But on
the other hand, notwithstanding such difficulties, the forces that drove it into limbo may
arise not from the complexities of its technique but from those of the American
intelligence.”89 In the 1950s, Perry Miller proposed a way to portray Melville’s reception
in his legacy as an author. Miller suggests, in a still commonly held view, that literary
historicism regards Melville as a synecdoche of that literary scene, a part of a forgotten
America, an America structured by the New York literary scene during the 1840s and 50s.
During his decade as a working novelist, if Melville stood as an exemplary American
original, what explains his rather rapid and sustained (until resurrected by D.H. Lawrence
in 1924) eclipse?
The essence of Miller’s assertion, then, is that the poor reception of Melville’s
Moby-Dick is an example of the crisis of literary originality that Mattheissen and others
noticed in the 1840s and 1850s. But also and perhaps more pointedly, it is an example of
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the problems inherent in the ideology of originality in the cultural context and discourses
constituting what Miller describes as the “American intelligence.” 90 The premise of
American literary nationalism’s originality was for Melville a premise based in American
exceptionalism, a premise that winds up collapsing under the weight of a great question:
can America produce an original literature, and if so, what will be its distinctive qualities?
Specifically, can America produce an original literature while demanding that its writers
conform to the rules imposed by a transatlantic literary market? Put another way, we
might question whether literary originality can survive commodification. 91 Certainly,
though, Poe, who in his “Prospectus of the Stylus,” imagined “a Magazine wherein his
interest should be not merely editorial, … It will endeavor to be at the same time more
varied and unique,—more vigorous, more pungent, more original, more individual, more
independent.”92
The Young American literary program, spearheaded by literary critic Evert
Duyckinck and others, folded into the rhetoric of exceptionalism an obsession for what
Hawthorne, in his satirical sketch “A Select Party” (1844), 93 sardonically identified as the
“Master Genius,” whose arrival at the moment of Manifest Destiny, swallowed critical
discourses of genius and originality, discourses that had been adopted by the bourgeois
from British Romantics, and conflated in the dynamics of the market with assumptions of
90
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literary access to universal truths of the human spirit. That structure exposed
contradictions underlying benevolence and material acquisition that bourgeois Americans
often ignored. Perry Miller articulated the problem by suggesting that “A republic may
abandon the artist not because of his aberrations but because of its own.” 94
Little did Melville know at this point in his career of the rivalry between the
democrat Duyckinck and the Whig Lewis Gaylord Clark, editor of the Knickerbocker,
and of their ideologies that were supported by their various interests. That Melville
happened to find himself in Duyckinck’s camp became, for Miller, a matter of the
“greatest importance in [our] deciphering the final nature of his craft.” 95 Melville had
aligned himself with the democratic Young America movement, which under Duyckinck
had fomented a particular sort of literary nationalism that contrasted Clark’s Whig
conservatism. In that struggle for political turf, which had the weight to forestall the rise
of the emblematic American national author, the contest over literary nationalism was
inherently ideological rather than symbolically universal.
But even more significantly, as Miller argues, Melville participated in a cultural
“befuddlement”; by accepting the “pretensions” of originality, he could not resolve
contradictions in the economy of literature by proposing a solution. Melville faced the
problem of befuddlement as a form of declension (of cultural progress) and the role of the
writer as a form of cultural jeremiad. In The Confidence-Man Melville dialectically
portrayed the dilemma facing a ship of state led by a culture of befuddlement. Miller
places the dilemma of exceptionalism Melville witnessed—the ideology of original
national literature based on pretensions necessitated by the commodification of literature
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as a product of Americanism—squarely in the lap of Young American political goals.
Miller states that
In Melville’s case, there is a further and more instructive dimension: an artist can,
once he has caught the ear of his people, abruptly discover himself cut off not
because he thunders some clear sanity against their insanity, but because he
participates completely in their befuddlement. He accepts as the terms of his
problem precisely the terms they propound to him, and can conceive no others; he
finds himself, despite the power of genius, no more capable of resolving the
antinomies, or of making good the pretensions, than they are. If at the end of his
exertions, no matter how titanic, he confronts the blank emptiness of defeat, if
then he is relegated to the unreverberating solitude of failure, the tragedy is not so
much his overreaching as an inescapable collapse of the structures his society
provided for him—indeed, imposed upon him, with no allowance for
alternatives.96
Melville’s literary anxiety had to do with the arbitrariness of originality, the linguistic
problematic behind the “originality paradox,” which structures Matthiessen’s doubleness
thesis.97
The call for originality in national literature was an attempt to conjure through
literary poetics the romanticizing power latent in Romantic Idealism. The attempt to
redress these problems through partisan literary means was to admit to a particularity of
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the transatlantic intersubjectivity in which the negative originality of the idea was cast. If
we are to historicize Matthiessen’s “doubleness” thesis in a way meaningful to an
investigation of negative originality in the nineteenth century, we need to consider both
the democratic situation that produced the literary marketplace and then to understand
the shift from a republican political ideology to a socioeconomic reality, which saw the
public sphere reoriented toward individual authorship.98 Negative originality provides a
metacritical access point of relation between socioeconomics and aesthetics.
As we shall see in Bloom’s discussion of the American Sublime, Emerson
represents the “American writer’s imperial self.”99 Such a view is a “denial of history”;
the “creation of self through style” and the “emphasis on voice at the expense of content”
expresses an “anxiety over the past.” Emerson’s “importance lies in his creating a poetic
program that was only realized, if at all, in the works of Thoreau and Whitman.” Emerson
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is read as incomplete, and Nature’s pleasure is derived from its “epiphanies.” 100 The
tension between democracy and individualism indicated that originality itself, as a
literary value, had become inscribed with ideology. And the vital question centers on
whether there exists a structure of originality that arises out of a metaphysics that remains
antecedent to the interdiction of ideology. That is, we might ask, in what way does
metaphysics rely on aesthetics to do the work of a metacriticism of ideology? We turn to
a phenomenology of negativity to explore that question.
American alternative Romantics were faced with the recognition that their
concept of originality was incommensurable with what they regarded as a false concept
of originality sustained by advocates of literary nationalism. What remained for these
alternative Romantics was a Hegelian negation of grounds from which originality might
be defined. The Romantic “movement of return,” or the passage into negation, a moving
into the other (or antithesis), becomes a mode of transcending. For Poe, the notion of
individuality or of self, or in more transcendental terms of autonomy of spirit, anticipates
the possibility of negation.101 For alternative Romantics originality remained negative
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since no unifying “movement of return” (to society or tradition) was possible without
self-contradiction. Negative originality is thus the recognition of paradox through
reflection upon autonomy. The artist theoretically sees that any conception of autonomy
that is necessary for originality in any positive sense, if that were possible, is always
negative. Morse Peckham offers that “because of the disparity between an orientation and
the data it is called upon to organize, the individual, if he is to adapt successfully to his
environment, must perceive a disparity between the order affirmed by orientation
[towards an ordered universe] and his actual experience of randomness.” 102
That paradoxical problem is the result of Kantian metaphysics, which became
systematized by Hegel as a three-stage dialectical approach to history. Hegelian negation
of negation speaks of a synthetic absolute that culminates the dialectical opposition
between thesis and antithesis. The Kantian sublime, however, because of its negativity,
never results in a synthesis. As we shall see, the “collapse of comprehension” indicative
of the second phase of the Kantian sublime poses the problem of recovery. As the
imagination becomes overwhelmed during the sublime event, the promise of a “positive”
synthesis via intuitive reason becomes challenged by the very incomprehensibility of the
substance present to the imagination. The oxymoron negative-originality, as a

the impact of irony and the “incomprehensible” upon the idea of positive originality often
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metacritical expression, attempts to describe that negativity. 103 Before we can fully
understand the negativity of the sublime moment—what Paul de Man terms an
“epiphany” towards a “presence,” we need to appreciate the shift in Romantic thinking
from influence-oriented originality to the spontaneous origination within the concept of
the organic metaphor.
That shift in thinking centers on the Romantic sublime as a mode of structural
originality. Structure is circumscribed by negativity. Negative originality is manifested in
a state of doubleness, as many commentators have recognized. In Poe’s writing
doubleness appears in the pattern of a negative doubling of the central subjective
consciousness, as in the tale “William Wilson.” In Hawthorne, negativity appears as a
result of the author’s dual relation to actuality and to the imagination. In Melville,
negativity presents itself as an ironized phenomenology of a failed originality intruding
upon the normative state of plurality. In Melville’s The Confidence-Man originality
appears as an allegorical literary problem only to become effaced by the Janus-faced
transformations of the central cosmopolitan figure, or diabolical everyman. The basic
ontological state in Melville’s reading of negative originality is that identity becomes
virtually unreadable in the flux of iteration. As Elizabeth Renker notes in Strike through
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the Mask, “[t]he Confidence-Man’s challenge is effective precisely because he has no
real face that could be recognizable.” 104
For Poe, the negative doubling of the self in his tales such as “William Wilson”
recognizes that the possibility of originality prevents itself not in the absolute in the sense
of an eternal spirit, but in death. Poe, particularly, was aware of his German and British
philosophical antecedents. Melville, moreover, rapidly acquired knowledge of Carlyle
and Kant’s views on romantic philosophy (and came to reject them), as Merton Sealts has
shown. Hawthorne clearly shows a debt to Ovid, Milton, and Wordsworth, as well as the
popular literature of his day. Wordsworth and Coleridge were available to all three
through James Marsh’s American edition of Coleridge’s Aids to Reflection, which posits
the contrast between intuitive and discursive reason. In the collapse of intuitive reason (as
Poe insisted it should) is the negation of benign originality and the rise of negativity
through discursivity.
Thus, while as a concept negative originality suggests a transcendent idea, it here
describes a pattern experienced by alternative romantics writing within the cultural field
of Romance. The pattern faced three interrelated fronts in the cultural matrix: CommonSense orthodoxy, democratic literary nationalism that was spreading under the banner of
Young America, and the Middle-Light Whig conservatism, whose readers preferred
British quarterlies, and against which Emerson and the more radical Transcendentalists of
New England had partial affinity with alternative romantics. It is also the case that Poe,
Hawthorne, and Melville, who each had close ties to the New York literary scene through
their publishing interests, were also affected by the radical wing of the Young American
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movement, the Loco Foco movement of labor dissenters; Young American radicalism
helped for a time to encourage their engagement with literary nationalism.105 Each of the
authors at the forefront of this study, with the exception of Emerson, wrote for John
O’Sullivan’s United States and Democratic Review or Evert Duyckinck’s Literary World.
The relation between these authors and Young America was short lived. Poe was
increasingly ostracized after his Longfellow Wars, which raised the ire of literary elites.
Hawthorne evaded literary nationalism, ironically, in magazine pieces such as “A Select
Party” and called attention to the inequities of capitalism in “The Old Apple Dealer.”
Melville, after attempting to make a case for a national literary value based upon the
tragic human condition he saw in Hawthorne, turned to fully embrace a negative sense of
originality in Moby-Dick through his character Ahab.
In its incipient form, negative originality arises from the originality paradox.106
The very question of originality and the paradoxical relation between artist and tradition
arises in the polarity between the individual and society. The negative response to history
and the Enlightenment can be traced to a sense of anxiety over industrialization and
overpopulation as T. R. Malthus, in An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798),
predicted would occur after the French Revolution. That tension precipitated a mode of
negative Romanticism characterized by alienation that is visible in Byron, Carlyle, and
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Melville.107 The criterion of originality parallels the cultural recognition of the romantic
artist, a concept which became negativised as the originality paradox became more
trenchant. As the individual artist became increasingly anxious about the role of the artist
in society—as the narrative proposes—the artist in turn becomes more anxious about
tradition as an original condition. Originality no longer points behind but only at itself
reflexively, and negative originality becomes defined as a form of reflexivity that seeks
an original condition for the individual by negating society's determining grip.
As Romantic alienation, then, this mode of negative originality points to the
primary issue of reception within the cultural matrix. The position of resistance which the
artist takes toward or against culture invokes (or provokes) a relation of negation.
Negation originates as a mode of unstable autonomy for the individual since it is never
fully realized and always dialogic. The reactive nature of the “original” relation between
107
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art and artist, on one hand, and art and society on the other, in view of post-romantic
theories of aesthetic ideology, characterizes negative originality as essentially a political
relation.108 Frankfurt School social critics Max Horkeimer and Theodore Adorno in their
Dialectic of the Enlightenment (1944) argued from the view that the relation between
modernism and the Enlightenment is largely negative.
The romantic emphasis of art over nature underscores the first turn from the
Enlightenment, which William Hazlitt summarized in his essay “Originality” (1830) by
positing that the “horizon of art” widens with the priority of Reason over Nature. 109 A
century later, Adorno, whose thinking is clearly steeped in a post-romantic “negative
dialectic,” affirms in his Aesthetic Theory (1970) that a “cognitive interest” in art
supports a philosophical interest in aesthetics, and arises with the dialectic of the
Enlightenment. Adorno suggests that “Art, which participates in the process of social
emancipation on its path toward autonomy, is characterized by negativity in a twofold
fashion: in its relation to the social reality which conditions it and in its historical origin
which tradition determines.”110 Adorno’s stance vis-à-vis negative originality proposes
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that in the abandonment of subservience and the opposition to social determinants, art
severs its idea from the stasis of the cultural matrix such that art’s social rationale
emerges as an exponent of change.
Whatever creative originality the artist realizes obtains from his or her negativity
(negative originality is, as such, contingent to the cultural matrix). It is this mode of
relation between art and culture that underscores Theodore Adorno’s negative dialectics.
In his Aesthetics, Adorno states that
Pure and immanently elaborated art is a tacit critique of the debasement of man by
a condition that is moving towards a total-exchange society where everything is
for-other. This social deviance of art is the determinate negation of a determinate
society. To be sure, the rejection of society that we see reflected in the
sublimation of autonomous art through the law of form, also lends itself to
ideological abuse: art's distance from this horrifying society also betrays an
attitude of non-intervention. It must be kept in mind that society is not coextensive with ideology. Any society is more than sheer negativity to be indicted
by the aesthetic law of form; even in its most objectionable shape, society is still
capable of producing and reproducing human life. Art has had to take this aspect
(no less than that of its critical task) into account . . . art has no way of separating
affirmation and critique intentionally.111
Here, Adorno follows Hegel’s idea of experience in the Introduction to The
Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel's notion of consciousness seeks to understand the world
as it is filtered through the mind and its “presuppositions.” 112 Consciousness is dynamic
in its approach to objectivity in light of anthropology. Consciousness reacts dynamically
to contradictions that demand a re-evaluation of assumptions about the world.
Consciousness is transformed when its criterion for understanding fails to meet the
demands of knowing. The movement of transformation is inherently a negative motion
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from static and impoverished criteria to new forms of understanding, which results in
what Adorno terms a “determinate negation.” Negation strives for more “effective” ways
of knowing, where “effect” is a criterion for the correspondence of object to subjective
concept. The movement towards a more effective consciousness is contradicted by an
inertia that prevents a return to a transformed dynamic consciousness.
It is in this negative moment that the phenomenalism of the Romantic sublime
encounters originality as a structure, as Thomas Weiskel shows.113 The inertia of
consciousness is an irrational condition and explains conformity of the self to social
forces that destroy individuality. Negation, while alienating the self from conformity,
produces a release from a state of consciousness in contradiction with itself. If Hegel and
Emerson would hold experience as “irrevocable,” Adorno considered “experience” as
coextensive with self-awareness of constraining contradictions. For Weiskel negative
originality produces a mode of freedom. If meaning arises in the pressure to signify the
incomprehensible, “the sublime authorizes a translation of absurdity into freedom.” 114
The hypothesis of pure and rational freedom—autonomy—suggests metaphysical
originality, but it is plausible only under the condition that we can distinguish
incomprehensibility from a lack of understanding; if incomprehensibility suggests the
unconditioned, a lack of understanding determines the failure of autonomy. The
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distinction between incomprehensibility and the failure to understand rests on the fact
that the latter undermines the possibility of transcendence: the sublime can only arise in
incomprehensibility; it reminds us of the possibility of transcendent reason, but disrupts
it.
Art’s very impetus towards autonomy, though, as a mode of negation, has the
potential to become superseded by a mode of autonomy latent in aestheticism, a concern
that underscores many thoughtful discussions about originality as a theme. Poe’s
formalism, which stresses that poetry is essentially a self-reflexive medium, has
sometimes been regarded as an incipient New Critical poetics. Following Matthiessen,
Myra Jehlen notes that as opposed to the European aristocrat, the American writer “was a
democrat.”115 F. O. Matthiessen's American Renaissance expressed its penchant for the
political left, but submerged its politics under transcendent literary values. Matthiessen,
notes Jehlen cogently, attempted to weld American democratic literary identity with New
Critical literary autonomy, and selected authors for canonization, particularly Emerson,
Hawthorne, and Melville, who themselves were faced with the dual task of originating an
American literature and at the same time bracketing themselves from the social realm by
being its critics.116 Matthiessen wished for a horizontal democratic literature that met the
ideology of the socialist thirties and yet retained the New Critical schema for intrinsic
value.
Beyond the problematics of intrinsic value and the question of originality, Jehlen
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develops a narrative of the emergence of a dialectical negativity in Americanist literary
criticism. Americanist critics of the “myth and symbol school,” she suggests, recognized
the divergence of method between formal and historical analysis.117 Beginning with
Matthiessen's American Renaissance American formalists adapted formalism to myth
analysis and the centerpiece for Americanists of the 1950s and early 1960s was R. W. B.
Lewis's The American Adam. Focusing on the myth of American exceptionalism meant
that history had to give way to myth and symbol. The authorial subject position as well as
the critics’ interestedness entered into a dialectical relation with social conflicts such that
the reality of diversity, much more complex than a popular/art dichotomy might have
anticipated, has resulted in a fluctuating stasis in the critical field where the ability to
accept privileged autonomy has become difficult to defend.
Pluralism has thus demanded a dialectical mode of discourse involving the social
context. Frankfurt Marxists unpacked the ideological structure of culture as an imbricated
ideology; and postructuralists deconstructed language itself. Jameson showed that the
“negative dialectic” of Horkeimer and Adorno was a mode of deconstruction that might
negate dominant discourse and reveal its regressive underpinnings. For Althusser,
ideology is itself a mode of representation. Moreover, Ideology itself is originary in the
deconstructive sense of the word. The literary universe is already structured by the forms
available within ideology and its content originates within the cultural matrix. Ideology,
in this view, is intertextual and interactive, and literary content is generative within that
matrix, its originality is an intersection of determinants that are socially constructed.
Originality is no longer tenable as a Romantic absolute but as a negative force interacting
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in a determinative field.
Works that become canonized within authoritative traditions, even those that may
have arisen with negative relations to the cultural matrix, eventually lose their autonomy
with respect to tradition. In “Fragments on Art: Why the Arts are not Progressive” (1814)
William Hazlitt writes that “[w]hat is mechanical, reducible to rule, or capable of
demonstration, is progressive, and admits of gradual improvement: what is not
mechanical or definite, but depends on genius, taste, and feeling, very soon becomes
stationary or retrograde, and loses more than it gains.” 118 For Hazlitt, originality is
ephemeral with respect to “progress.” Jauss suggests a similar tack in that “[p]recisely
those works that have the historical power to transcend the canon of the customary and
the horizon off what is expected are not immune from losing their original negativity in
the process of their cultural reception.”119 Jauss concludes that such a tendency towards
“the classical” amounts to a Hegelian “cunning of reason.” Hegelian aesthetics
illuminates a transcendent teleology beyond the horizon of originality. This transcendent
aspect of negativity underscores the claim that art, even that which precedes the era of
autonomous works characterized by the negative/affirmative bifurcation, is essentially
polemical.
Originality, as a cultural idea, becomes “not an indwelling quality of writerly
production, but instead a function of readerly reception.” 120 Derek Attridge, who wisely
avoids splitting the matter into a binary idea, notes in The Singularity of Literature (2004)
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that creativity involves materials ready to hand, but also deviates from “norms of the
cultural matrix.”121 Such deviation arises in what Attridge recognizes as a relation
between the “instrumentalism” of literature, that is, the use value of its project to the
cultural matrix—as an exemplum of nationalism, for example—or as a mode of
“resistance to such thinking.”122 Concentrating on a further distinction between
originality and singularity, Attridge observes that whereas originality results from the
creative application of the discoveries of aporia in culture, from tensions, pressures,
omissions, “singularity” partakes of an event and “takes place in reception.” 123
Singularity bears similarities to Edgar Poe’s critical notion of “unity of effect.” Unlike
originality or imitation, singularity
is generated not by a core of irreducible materiality or vein of sheer contingency
to which the cultural frameworks we use cannot penetrate but by a configuration
of general properties that, in constituting the entity (as it exists in a particular time
and place), go beyond the possibilities pre-programmed by culture’s norms, the
norms with which its members are familiar and through which most cultural
products are understood.124
Singularity results from the experience produced through apprehending new possibilities;
singularity is evanescent; it necessitates accommodation. We shall explore this distinction
further in terms of the concepts generative originality (originality “exists in a particular
time and place”) and structural originality, which Paul de Man describes as a spatial
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center. It is through the structural evanescence of going beyond that singularity (in
Attridge’s definition) approximates negative originality, which, like singularity, is
fundamentally relational to culture.125
Singularity, as Attridge theorizes, exists in its negative relation to originality,
which in turn appears as an aporia in culture. It is through Attridge’s phenomenological
and Heideggerian sense of originality that we can distinguish between a Romantic
metaphysical originality and a structural and phenomenal sense of originality. Kant
distinguishes between accidental originality as nonsense—mere difference—and
“exemplary” originality, produced by genius. That sort establishes a pattern to be
followed by imitation; the genius type leads to “new ways to be original in response to
originality.”126 The Kantian definition is the strong definition.127 Kant’s definition of
originality impacted Romantic theory such that further discussions by Hegel, Emerson,
and others necessarily footnote the third Critique.
As opposed to Hazlitt’s notion of an eventual retrograde tendency of art, for Jauss,
art’s very temporality indicates that it is inherently opposed to closure and thus is by
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nature characterized by negativity. The contrast between Hazlitt and Jauss shows the
divide between a utilitarian materiality of the early nineteenth century in England, and a
late-Romantic sense of negative and dialectical thinking. The negativity of art per se
strives to enter the dialectical sphere as a negation of originality, if we define originality
as a horizon of closure or totalization. Negative originality, then, as an instantiation of the
“negativity of aesthetic experience,” derives its power—in this formulation—from the
possibility of transcendental negativity of originality as creation. 128 The power of the
symbol derives its power from the negativity of transcendence which promises an infinite
return to a utopian beginning. However, structural negativity appears a priori to
generative originality, which is the affirmative condition of negative originality. Karl
Mannheim argues that “a state of mind is utopian when it is incongruous with the state of
reality within which it occurs.” 129 The “utopian figure of art” encloses, through its
representation of a generative model of originality, the idea of transcendence. As a model
of transcendence generative originality exceeds the horizons of what Mannheim terms the
existing order and at least hypothetically offers a mindset capable of transcending
ideology.
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The openness of structural originality (as opposed to the closure indicated by
generative originality) reopens the question of poetics. Poetics involves language that
exists in its openness. For Martin Heidegger, says Robert Hughes, poetry is the form of
language most capable of disclosing Being. By poetry, Heidegger means language as an
art that pursues “truth,” and his notion of truth is that it discloses Being. This notion of
disclosure helps us understand the difference between utopia and ideology, as Mannheim
views it. Artistic language, which might include either prose or verse, is contrasted with
“everyday” language. Like a dead metaphor everyday language is a depleted form of
poetics. Poetics alone has the power to disclose Being in its originality.130 Heidegger
suggests that nihil originarium, an original negativity that is structured by temporality,
provides an openness a priori to ideology.131 Paul de Man, in his remarkable essay
“Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant,” supports the notion that aesthetic experience
redounds, ultimately, to materiality.132 De Man’s doubt about whether we can trace poetic
language to a moment of disclosure that transcends aesthetic materiality situates negative
originality in its ultimately ironic context.
Against a sense of transcendental negativity, Tilottama Rajan suggests that
Hegelian negativity disrupts any unity of spirit that might analogize the absolute with a
unified god term.133 In Hegel’s aesthetic system that god term arises only in the
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symmetrical classical frame, only to be eradicated by the romantic condition that follows
it. Hegel’s system then produces a “radical negativity.” Thus Hegel’s notion of
phenomenology must accept the absence of a transcendental signified or a universal
logos. This problematic of absence disrupts the possible teleological reading of Hegel’s
history. Ultimately, for Rajan, Hegel’s phenomenology is “(in)adequate [as the]
embodiment of its Idea.” Logically, then, Hegel’s work needs to be read synchronically,
in the sense that the corpus as a body arises prior to its partitions.
Hegel’s Logic amounts to a “paraphrase” of the corpus that begins with the
Phenomenology and terminates with Aesthetics. Structural originality, then, seems to
arise in the negativity of aesthetic experience which derives its power from a
phenomenological materiality. Negative originality is contingent to this aesthetic
materiality. The paradox of negative originality lies in its imperative to produce
contingent closure, thus preparing a further iteration of negativity. This cyclical aspect of
negative originality in its dialectical nature is conflated in the structure of the sublime and
catharsis. The aesthetics of negativity that produces the flux of autonomy with respect to
the cultural matrix results in monad-like particulars within the general horizon of the
negative structure, which is bound to the flux of openness and closure. The gap between
openness and closure maps onto the gap between negativity and transcendence. One
hypothesis in understanding the relation between particular and universal with respect to
negativity is that negativity is also a relation: the one is the privation of the many and the
many a privation of the one. In the privative concept of unity combined with an actconcept of transcendence, there must be a plurality of transcendences, which are
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inherently privative (negative freedom). Singularity is related to plurality disjunctively. 134
Perhaps because of the social and critical turn in the 1980s, recent scholarship on
nineteenth-century American authors and genres has looked to the relation between
context—the cultural matrix—and texts. In her 2002 essay “Hawthorne and the Real”
Millicent Bell makes the point that Romantic Idealism and the romance genre could not
mask the Real of the American antebellum social texture, which soon led to real
violence.135 Michael Davitt Bell argues that the “Romance,” whether a theme or genre,
was the term made explicit and current by Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville, and, indeed,
finally points to a social texture that I am calling negative originality, a texture bounded
by the conflict between Romantic ideas about nature and literary-national conceptions of
original form. Hawthorne’s “certain latitude,” or “freedom of invention” as Bell terms it,
opens the question of the relation of authorial freedom with respect to his or her “social
texture.”136 The precise relation between idea, cultural matrix, and authorial subject
position was frequently ambiguous and inconsistent.137
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In the American context Milton Stern argues that the dialectic between an Ideal
versus an actual America underscores a vacillation between the concepts of “openness”
and “closure,” which amounts to the difference between Romantic and Classic notions of
utopia.138 More than the familiar instances of Edenic visions strewn throughout
Hawthorne’s oeuvre, which attach themselves to chiliastic motives, Stern, following
Mannheim, asserts that Hawthorne ultimately can be understood as a social ethicist and a
philosophical Classicist. Utopia in the ethical sense differs from ideology, again
following Mannheim, in that ideology, while it may deploy utopian language, has at its
core a “coercive, jingoistic, and sloganeering” motivation. Clearly Hawthorne's classical
utopian ethics put him in opposition to the ideology of American literary nationalism of
the 1840s.
In a recent study by Robert Milder, a Melville scholar and critic who takes an
interdisciplinary view of American romanticism, we find a synthesis of approaches that
suggests a recent emphasis in the way romantic aesthetics and historicism recuperate
strategies first developed in Matthiessen’s generation. Milder shows that negative
Romanticism ironizes the period, when a “[p]rofound constitutional sadness [was] not
what Romantics envisioned as the destination of 'the spiral journey back home.”139 Milder
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continues, in what amounts to a definition of a decidedly Romantic view of negative
originality:
Against the affirmations of Wordsworth and others, Morse Peckham described a
‘negative romanticism’ consisting of ‘the attitudes, the feelings, and the ideas of
man who has left static mechanism but has not yet arrived at a reintegration of his
thought and art in terms of dynamic organism;’ this is the position of Carlyle's
Teufelsdrockh in ‘The Everlasting No.’ Melville, where Peckham's ‘not yet’ is
permanent, negative Romanticism is, instead, a condition of spiritual aspiration
without an accompanying faith in its worldly or otherworldly fulfillment. The
challenge for negative Romantics of this sort is not to regain belief or even,
despite a posture of expectation, how to conduct themselves in the interim; it is
how to establish and maintain human spirituality—their feeling of the self as
divinely created and divinely imbued; as ‘royal’—without the patent of the
supernatural. What negative Romantics set in place of the divine is the soul’s
yearning for divine and the pain of divine absence. In Byron, in Carlyle, in
Arnold, and in Melville the locus of spirituality turns inward from the worship of
God to a mental state of self-contemplative suffering celebrated as ‘godlike’ and
ranging in mood from cosmic anger (the Byronic hero) to abject complaint….
‘Man's Unhappiness,’ Teufelsdrockh says, ‘comes with his Greatness; it is
because there is infinite in him, which with all his cunning he can not quite bury
under the Finite.’ For negative Romantics the converse is equally true: humans'
greatness comes of their unhappiness; their greatness is their spiritual
unhappiness, which testifies to the infinite in them.140
If the negative is the source of human originality, then the relation of the author to
the infinite, a hallmark of romanticism, becomes a problematic for the cultural context
where that relation is bound up in material conditions of the marketplace. David S.
Reynolds turns the American renaissance on its head by focusing on the economic
conditions of the cultural matrix for authors, reversing the position of marginal literature
with respect to the central concerns of the authorial position in the social context. The
matter impacts the position of the canon with respect to the social realm. Ironically, it
would seem, as Reynolds argues in Beneath the American Renaissance, much ephemeral
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popular literature bubbled up into the ranks of what is now a canonized literary art. 141
Emerson’s lectures and essays, says Reynolds, secularized popular religious idioms; Poe,
Hawthorne, and Melville transformed “immoral didacticism” into a subversive style
mixing benign moral sentiments with a pessimistic or tragic worldview that found its
intrinsic value in its Romantic ambiguity. While Reynolds argues that the American
renaissance saw a transfer of the popular into art, a view consonant with New Historicism
in general, it is also a view that militates against the notion that American renaissance
authors were in fact alienated from the popular, as Milder compellingly argues:
furthermore, Reynolds also admits that the “subversive literature” of the American
renaissance was indeed radical for its very moral ambiguity.
In discussing the subversive style, Reynolds distinguishes popular from
“imaginative” texts, and in so doing conspires with the tradition of critics of the Romance
genre who see a difference in direction between popular and philosophical discourse.
Such a view is indeed problematic given Jonathan Culler’s trenchant analysis of the
deconstructive concern for speech-act theory, in which binary oppositions between literal
and “parasitic” discourses become decentered. 142 By parasitic language Culler means such
rhetorical modes as irony, satire, hoax, and parody—language use that depends upon
putatively normative illocutionary modes but undermines them. Culler suggests that “to
set aside as parasitic certain uses of language in order to base one’s theory on other,
‘ordinary’ uses of language is to beg precisely those questions about essential nature of
language that a theory of language ought to answer.” The point of course is that Romance
141
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authors of “imaginative” discourse deployed extended illocutionary modes that
contrasted norms of popular discourses in America. For example, Hawthorne’s “two
reading publics” as Michael Gilmore suggests, parallels Emerson’s “Spiritual Laws,”
where we find both “noisy readers of the hour” and more rarified “court of angels.” 143 In
order to distinguish imaginative from popular texts Reynolds brackets the discursive
relation between alternative romanticism’s negativity with respect to the cultural matrix
by aligning “subversive reform” with a normative discourse with respect to orthodoxy,
thereby sacrificing the distinction between the cultural matrix and negative originality.
Reynolds’ concern that antebellum authors—the “major writers” of the American
renaissance—worked autonomously from culture, a view he says, held by Lionel Trilling
and Richard Chase, raises the debate about the autonomy of New Criticism and the
“alternate reality distant from social life” that modernism proposes, reproduces the
misapprehension that writers are alienated from popular culture because of their elitism.
The association of popular culture and the labor of writing raises the question of Karl
Marx’s notion that the object of labor becomes appropriated by consumption and this
produces estrangement in the worker. This form of alienation, which is not autonomy but
a negation of self, finds Marx commenting on Feuerbach’s revision of Hegel in his
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844). For Marx, Feuerbach was correct that
143
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the Hegelian “negation of negation” posited an absolute that is ultimately an untenable
abstraction, namely theology. By eliminating the second negation Marx locates “sensecertainty” in finite experience, and originality as an abstract ontological absolute is thus
negated. Metaphysically, as Paul de Man argues, materiality becomes an ontological
baseline for aesthetics.144
Reynolds’ admission of ‘literariness,’ which allows an “affirmation of stylistic
potency,” and its “problematic ponderings of ambiguity” points to a literary response
where art is clearly discernible from conventional forms. And without tarrying with the
intentional fallacy it is reasonable to suppose that a subversive mode of literary art might
also result in a degree of separation from convention no matter whether we except that
the text is autonomous from culture, as Poe’s poetics presumed. Poe’s difference in
direction demands a staunchly critical and objective literary logic that was certainly
alienating. And the difference between popular and art-forms as goals suggests also a
difference in reception, even as Poe tried to premise his unity of effect on the ideal
popular reader.145 As Michael Gilmore and Thomas R. Moore point out, this rhetorical
difference admits to a difference between a popular reading public and an esoteric one,
which is recognizable in the language choices writers made. 146 The degree of alienation
experienced by alternative romantics had to do with bridging this difference.147 The lure
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of engaging the esoteric reader is palpable in the difference between philosophical
romance and conventional literature. Nowhere could this difference be more succinct
than in the imaginative writing of Emerson, Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville.
Reynolds’ accommodation to new historicism might be contrasted by his
complementary thesis of a “subversive imagination,” if we also distinguish, as Michael
Davitt Bell does, between genre and process. 148 From that perspective it is possible to
align the transformation of the popular into art, and accept, at the same time without
contradiction, the role of alienation or negativity as part of the process of “subversive
imagination” within a Romance author’s creative originality. That is, in fact,
Matthiessen’s starting point: the American renaissance, he suggested, is defined by its
“doubleness,” a duality that tethers the socioliterary context and its democratic cultural
matrix with the singular (and perhaps isolated and anarchic) author. Negative originality,
rather than disguising such distinctions behind a veil of alleged “autonomy,” in fact raises
the question of the relation between transformation and transcendence. Pure negativity is
impossible as is pure originality, and the two forces interplay in a self-binding relation
redolent of Poe’s Eureka, and appear to be analogous to energy itself.
The literary complexities that underscore the originality of Emerson, Poe,
Hawthorne, and Melville, writers who found it difficult to grasp value from culture or
“alienation of labor” so much as a sense of “Romantic alienation” associated with Romantic
irony. Frederic Jameson reminds that “[o]ne cannot without intellectual dishonesty assimilate the
‘production’ of texts...to the production of goods by factory workers: writing and thinking are not
alienated labor in that sense, and it is surely fatuous for intellectuals to seek to glamorize their
tasks—which can for the most part be subsumed under the rubric of the elaboration, reproduction,
or critique of ideology—by assimilating them to real work on the assembly line.” [My thanks to
Joshua Phillips for suggesting this passage.] For a thorough discussion of Romantic alienation,
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cosmos, are bound up in a literary and political nexus of the problematic of originality—
the semantic and structural disjunctions of meaning between individual artists and their
social environment—as well as the paradox of influence—that it is undeniable that artists
create in a rhetorical and discursive environment already flush with precursors. The
uniqueness of the individual artist’s creative imagination operates in a negative
relationship, in terms of its originality, with the authorial context, to the degree that it is
plausibly singular. As opposed to the invention of characters in novels, for example,
Melville wryly suggested in The Confidence-Man, “they are not, in the truest sense,
original at all. They are novel or singular...”149 In his contrast between singularity and
originality, Melville is reiterating Coleridge’s distinction between fancy and imagination,
though certainly something more.
Indeed, Melville seems to suggest that singularity amounts to a prosaic sense of
peculiarity or idiosyncrasy in individuals, whereas originality is reserved for otherworldly
Miltonic beings: “For much the same reason that there is but one planet to one orbit, so
there can be one such original character to one work of invention….”150 For Melville,
originality in the context of the cultural matrix—that which stood for originality—
amounted to a reification of Common Sense reality: “As for original characters in fiction,
a grateful reader will, on meeting with one, keep the anniversary of that day,” Melville
gibes. For Melville, originality demands “original instincts,” the uniqueness of a
“prodigy,” the “new law-giver,” a “revolutionizing philosopher, or the founder of a new
religion.”
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What Melville described as the “discernibly local” was threatened by an
imagination that allowed the Romantic symbol to intervene in the conventional
discourses of the market and politics, discourses about facts in the realm of the
understanding. Coleridge had stated that symbolism “partakes of the reality which it
renders intelligible,” which means that the symbol, in effect, originates a new imaginary
reality.151 If that is the case then the symbol is the image of a reality apart from what
Common Sense reality understood. Knowledge isn’t in Locke’s primary ideas, in the
object before the senses, but in the perception. Perception becomes a faculty of the
imagination, and knowledge is gained through symbolism. If the symbol reaches beyond
objective reality, then there is a reality beyond conventional denotative language.
Emerson’s well-known formulation of the relationship between language and
symbol, expressed in three emphatic propositions in the chapter “Language” in Nature,
allows that words regress infinitely from “signs of natural facts,” to symbols of
“particular facts,” to Nature as a “symbol of spirit.” 152 From a poststructural point of
view, onomatopoeic signs, which seem to be the natural facts in Emerson’s “Language,”
are conventional and not mimetic. But the contamination of the sign is partly motivated
by the desire of the user of the sign, which affects the poetic suggestiveness of the
similarity between a sign and a thing. The relation between a sign and a thing is not
organic but volitional.153 Indirectly, verbal signifiers symbolize Nature as if to designate a
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universal signifier: spirit (or mind). But to do so is to refer back to an absent origin, a
‘transcendental signified,’ as Derrida termed it. 154
Yet even in the face of unavoidable cultural conventions the artists in the
antebellum period negated conventions by subverting them through the use of popular
discourses that undermined social conventions. 155 In terms of literary originality Emerson
came to see pure originality as impossible. Emerson is emphatic: “Our debt to tradition
through reading and conversation is so massive, our protest or private addition so rare
and insignificant, —and this commonly on the ground of other reading or hearing, —that,
in a large sense, one would say that there is no pure originality.” 156 Emerson's view in
1836 that language depends on nature is ramified by the Romantic sense that America
was still a primeval wilderness, the basis for a concept of language united with
originality. Yet, Emerson would soon recognize that culture is sustained through
language, a view that nature could not fully overcome. Authorial acts of visionary
originality and revivication remained constrained to language. 157 In his 1840 essay
“Circles” he recognized that any instantiation of cultural discourse premised on
foreclosing on another by exiting its circle, requires the establishment of a new circle.
Originality already embodies its own reification.
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Chapter 1: Emerson and Negative Nature
When addressing the graduating class at Harvard College, at the moment of the
Panic of 1837, Ralph Waldo Emerson announced: “the time is already come when
‘literature’ ought to be, and will be something else.”1 What was it in the moment of
economic collapse, that suggested the recognition that the American “sluggard intellect
will look from under its iron lids and fill the postponed expectation of the world with
something better than the exertions of mechanical skill”? 2 Had the Carlylean “mechanical
age” suddenly waked the American scholar from his dogmatic slumber? It is that
awakening that I am tracing in this study of negative originality. Although Emerson’s
Coleridgean tendencies towards “spirit” and “prospects” places him in contradistinction
to Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville—as we shall see further—we encounter in Emerson, as
Harold Bloom has noted, a tendency toward a certain form of negativity where the
Transcendental vision “turns transumptive.”3 The Transcendental vision, as metalepsis,
works by imposing a negative parallelism on two syntagmatic planes: the past is blamed
for the failure of Yankee virtue, and the future portends an overturning by means of a
Sublime vision, in which the infinite erases the finite. Read as a form of radical utopia,
the vision achieves its ideal through a process of resignification based upon the
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overturning of “signs of the times” for “prospects.” It is this tendency towards
overturning that I am calling negative originality.4
The Phi Beta Kappa address given at Harvard in the spring of 1837 under the title
“The American Scholar” coincided with the moment when Emerson knew he would
publically move towards a rupture with Harvard’s Unitarian orthodoxy. For Emerson this
rupture represents a field of a liberalizing Transcendentalism, which opposed the
Unitarian orthodox status quo led by Andrews Norton and the Harvard establishment,
whom Emerson castigated even further the following year in “An Address” given at the
Harvard Divinity School (1838). The rift between the Unitarians and the
Transcendentalists, as Perry Miller has covered in his anthology The Transcendentalists,
presented a significant instance of negative originality in the American Romantic
movement. Emerging from Emerson’s Transcendental Club, this rift points to the cultural
clash between Transcendental futurity and Unitarian orthodoxy. 5 Writing in The Dial
Emerson concludes:
This spirit of the time is felt by every individual with some difference,—to each
one casting its light upon the objects nearest to his temper and habits of
thought;—to one, coming in the shape of special reforms in the state; to another,
in modifications of the various callings of men, and the customs of business; to a
third, opening a new scope for literature and art; to a fourth, in philosophical
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insight; to a fifth, in the vast solitudes of prayer. It is in every form of protest
against usage, and a search for principles.6
Emerson’s movement into negative reflection served as a moment of negative
originality, allowing him to wax in an optative mood.7 Following Kant’s optative
conditional for the possibility of a positive sense of freedom, Emerson intuits the real
possibility of an actuality that is negative with respect to freedom. Emerson presents a
conditional “sublimation of negatively cathected reactions to influences that would
otherwise have made self precisely unfree,” which amounts to a rejection of the present.8
The present, associated with Kant’s understanding and its “buzz and din” becomes
eschewed in favor of “all infinitude” available as an intuitive projection by universal
reason, through which the “over-soul” contrasts mere appearance with “prospects.”
Emerson presents his optative mood suggesting that “one of those fables, which out of an
unknown antiquity, conveys an unlooked-for wisdom, that the gods, in the beginning,
divided Man into men, that he might be more helpful to himself; just as the hand was
divided into fingers, the better to answer its end.”9 In prose that must have caught
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Nietzsche’s interest, Emerson offered in Coleridgean terms the sublime moment just at
the precipice of recovery:
The old fable covers a doctrine ever new and sublime; that there is One Man,—
present to all particular men only partially, or through one faculty; and that you
must take the whole society to find the whole man […] In the divided or social
state [occupations] are parceled out to individuals […] The fable implies that the
individual to possess himself, must sometimes return from his own labor to
embrace all other laborers. But unfortunately, this original unit, this fountain of
power, has been so distributed to multitudes, has been so minutely subdivided and
peddled out, that it is spilled into drops, and cannot be gathered. The state of
society is one in which the members have suffered amputation from the trunk, and
strut about like so many walking monsters […] Man is metamorphosed into a
thing, into many things.10
Emerson knew, of course, that the conservative side at Harvard was vulnerable to
liberalizing tendencies implicit within the Transcendental movement. In Emerson’s
“American Scholar” the basic narrative pattern, says Leon Chai, is “one of extension and
consequent return.”11 Emerson’s provocation demands reconciliation. For when
correction comes, Emerson concludes, “if the single man plant himself indomitably on
his instincts, and there abide, [then] the huge world will come round to him.” 12 Emerson
holds that through intuitive reason reconciliation is indeed possible.
Emerson’s intention, then, is to force a rupture by massing an attack at the
weakest link, which for Norton and Harvard were the materialist and scientific dogmas of
the Enlightenment. Goethe, Wordsworth, and Carlyle showed that “man is related to all
nature.”13 And then Emerson offered the rupturing gesture:
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We have listened too long to the courtly muses of Europe. The spirit of the
American freeman is already suspected to be timid, imitative, tame. Public and
private avarice make the air we breathe thick and fat. The scholar is decent,
indolent, complaisant. See already the tragic consequence. The mind of this
country taught to aim at low objects, eats upon itself. There is no work for any but
the decorous and the complaisant.14
The consequent rupture anticipates a “movement of return.”15 By finding in
America’s complaisance the weakest link in its moral defenses, Emerson can enact his
movement of return, or self-becoming, that ensues from an overcoming of the sublime
effect of rupture and a recovery of originary power. The determined effect of this
movement presupposes that the return will be inevitable. The inevitability of a return to
the Self assures the premise of the optative mood. Once the rupture of the link occurs
through Emerson’s own self-overcoming, the equilibrium that is the prevailing status quo
is no longer sustainable and its coherence falters. Emerson begins the “Introduction” to
Nature commenting that “Our Age is retrospective. It builds the sepulchres of the
fathers.”16 If, he asks, spirit were present to past civilizations then it must outlive material
history susceptible to decay. This is Emerson’s announcement that his view of negation is
a historical one. Emerson’s retrospection seeks to understand which aspects of nature can
be sustained even with a radical renewal supposed in his formula of an “original relation
to the universe.”
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Emerson proposes that a “theory of nature” might unmask the essential aspects of
spirit that, for him, remain reified in the sepulchres of history present to him in 1836. To
divulge this theory of nature he seeks a “philosophy of insight”; a “true theory appears,”
he says, through “its own evidence.” 17 Emerson’s theory, in a position redolent of
Schelling, seeks to “explain all phenomena,” which as a totality comprises what he terms
Nature, or “all that is separate from us.” When Emerson, in the Introduction to Nature,
asks “Why should not we also enjoy an original relation to the universe?[,]” he is
speaking about a negative sense of originality. “Originality,” argues Carton, “means the
curtailment of ‘retrospective’ tendencies and the development of a vigorous commitment
to immediacy, novelty, and personal achievement [...] Originality, in Emerson’s opening
paragraph, seems synonymous with creative self-assertion.”18
When Emerson demands “an original relation to the universe” he demands that
the poet create new horizons, not by imitation but by imagination. The poet constitutes
horizons by willing them through self-empowerment—positive freedom—and then, by
regenerating them and redeeming them through creativity. Yet in order to redeem one’s
horizon as an original relation one has to negate the prior dimension. The artist exerts
power over nature by transforming it.19 Carton adds that “[i]n doing so he both shapes the
material world and creates his own image.” This is precisely why Emerson must rescue
“art” from the Not Me, an aesthetic problem we will discuss shortly. And it must be
established here that the Emersonian moment of negative originality is temporal, which is
the very criterion of Harold Bloom’s assertion that Emersonian negativity is
17
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transumptive. By this definition, as opposed to Schelling and Coleridge’s more
ahistorical view of universal spirit, the Emersonian Self becomes the spirit that survives
history and originates anew in its immediacy.
The notion of subjectivity during the Romantic era, and a view of concern to
Transcendentalists in America, concerned the dichotomy, or continuum, between art and
nature. The term “nature,” Emerson states, in its ordinary sense distinguishes that which
remains “unchanged by man”; “art,” on the other hand, reflects human activity and
judgment. Emerson ends his “Introduction” to Nature stating that art is insignificant in
comparison to nature.20 In this gesture he seems to invoke the Platonic structure of
mimesis whereby Nature becomes the primary form and Art the copy of the copy. Yet,
Art originates in a positive act of creation and then negates itself by detaching itself from
its creation. The inner tension in art “informs romance,” says Carton. 21 Art arises through
a movement of becoming that strives to become nature. It is through this doubled process
of metonymy and then metalepsis that Emerson is able to originate the universal spirit
through the individuality of the Romantic Self.
In a moment, I will discuss Emersonian negativity and trace the ways it arises in
Emerson’s resignation from the Unitarian ministry. Richard Grusin argues that
Emerson’s “disembodiment” from the church, through what Stephen Whicher describes
as Emerson’s “revolutionary or originary power,” did not terminate in a bathos of
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antithesis but culminated in an act of self-reliance.22 In other words, says Grusin,
Emerson crossed the threshold of the second stage of a sublime movement of return
through negative originality and arrived at a third stage of recovery exhibiting greater
autonomy. Furthermore, Emerson’s negative originality, or movement of return, differs
from Schelling and Coleridge, particularly because of his very participation in the
American antebellum context. It is due to the tenets of exceptionalism that Emerson
structured his negative originality around an American Sublime.23
The notion of a Romantic ideology (a system of transcendent values as
propounded by Coleridge and others) obtains if we suspect that the sublime moment is
directed by some “ulterior motive.”24 And the distinction between a universal categorical
imperative that Kant describes as an “unconditioned good,” and what Paul de Man
paraphrases as a form of disinterestedness or “a purposiveness without purpose,” reveals
a view basic to Emerson’s transcendentalism. 25 In “The Transcendentalist,” Emerson
mentions that
It is well known to most of my audience that the Idealism of the present day
acquired the name of Transcendental from the use of that term by Immanuel Kant.
Kant replied to the skeptical philosophy of Locke, which insisted that there was
nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the experience of the senses,
by showing that there was a very important class of ideas or imperative forms,
which did not come into experience, but through which experience was acquired;
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that these were intuitions of the mind itself; and he denominated them
Transcendental forms.26
If the American sublime does in fact reveal an ulterior motive we would then be at the
risk of compounding incomprehensibility with causal substitution. Given that the sublime
moment is singular by nature, the notion of Romantic ideology resists apodeictic closure.
But the causes of the breakdown of logos in the second phase of the sublime movement
raises questions of causality of both the disruption and the recovery. In other words, is the
dynamic negativity originating in the sublime intrinsic or extrinsic? It has already been
suggested that the breakdown is partially a result of linguistic and historical context. Yet
the “dynamic ultimacy” that is the causal impetus may lie in the psychology of a defense
mechanism.
Emerson’s Orphic Poet
In Nature, Emerson puts it plainly: “Strictly speaking, therefore, all that is
separate from us, all which Philosophy distinguishes as the Not Me, that is both nature
and art, all other men and my own body, must be ranked under this name, Nature.”27
Nature, for Emerson is thus held in a dialogic tension, both in a positive and a negative
sense. Like Kantian positive freedom when nature, as Emerson puts it, refers to “essences
unchanged by man,” then nature equates with a state of freedom originating apart from
human existence. Nature in a negative sense, however, is that realm of substance, like
Kant’s phenomena, that are things in themselves, things existing in a state of tension (or
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negative relation) from the self.28 Emerson's philosophical definition of Nature points to
an existential sphere of reality that is negated from the sphere of the self. The self
originates in a subjective sphere such that it must negate Nature.
Negative originality arises as the Self carves itself apart from the Not Me, the
world of materiality, the matrix of culture, its art, history, traditions, and common-sense
nature. The self’s errand in the wilderness, in this view, is to reoriginate itself. Evan
Carton contends that “[c]ast here as nature's reciprocal, the self also assumes a divided
identity, a positive and a negative character.” 29 As such, Emerson’s dualism replicates the
Cartesian mind-body split in that the body is included in the Not Me, the other that is
nature. The dialectic between the self and nature is fundamentally encircled in art. “Art is
initially grouped with the negative or the merely material—nature and body—and is
thereby separated from the self.” However, Emerson’s ‘positive’ definition of nature,
which involves “essences unchanged by man,” seems to preclude objective nature from
the scheme of the self. Indeed, common-sense nature, says Carton, “immediately leads to
Emerson’s characterization of art as the means by which alienated man makes contact
with and gains possession of the essential.”30
Emerson’s chant of the Orphic poet, his interpretation of a creation myth; in the
final chapter of Nature, titled “Prospects,” he utters, “[t]he foundations of man are not in
matter, but in spirit. But the element of spirit is eternity.”31 Emerson’s Orphic poet
declares,
28
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Nature is not fixed but fluid. Spirit alters, moulds, makes it. The immobility or
bruteness of nature is the absence of spirit … Every spirit builds itself a house,
and beyond its house a world, and beyond its world a heaven. Know then that the
world exists for you. For you is the phenomenon perfect. What we are, that only
we can see. All that Adam had, all that Caesar could, you have and can do. Adam
called his house, heaven and earth; Caesar called his house Rome … line for line
and point for point your dominion is as great as theirs … Build therefore your
own world. As fast as you conform your life to the pure idea in your mind, that
will unfold its great proportions. A correspondent revolution in things will attend
the influx of the spirit.32
The impetus for negativity arises for Emerson in originality: “Man is a god in ruin,”
Emerson protests.33 “He works on the world with his understanding alone.” 34 Coleridge’s
notion of “intuitive reason,” found in The Friend (1818), distinguishes knowledge gained
through the understanding from that of reason; it is the latter which leads to knowledge of
God. Following Schelling, Emerson seeks to unite understanding and reason. In a stance
that acknowledges materiality, more so than Coleridge, and allowing another
accommodation to Americanism, Emerson admits that the understanding is essential to
human potential, potential seeking to place the emergence of new ideas in a context of an
epistemology of progress. Natural science, or what Emerson terms “commodity” in
Nature, is democratic since it is the “only use of nature which all men apprehend.” 35 By
the end of Nature, in the eighth section “Prospects,” Emerson admits: “And there are
patient naturalists, but they freeze their subject under the wintry light of understanding.”36
Religion becomes a truth standard to judge ideas as a whole. 37 In the movement of
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negativity Emerson apparently realizes that his ultimate Orphic perspective appeals to
intuitive reason as a premise for “Prospects.”
Friedrich Schelling, whose system preceded Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria by
a decade, held that the unification of self and nature becomes necessary for the
“understanding” as knowledge. In what parallels Hegelian negation, Schelling insists that
a negative philosophy precedes a unification of self and nature. For Schelling, “the self
cannot limit its producing without opposing something to itself. In that the Self limits
itself as it is also producing itself, it becomes something to itself; that is, it posits itself.
But all positing is a determinate positing. Yet all determining presupposes an absolute
indeterminate [...], and so every determination is a blotting-out of absolute reality, that it
is a negation.”38 Upon arriving at this point in the movement into negative originality the
subject becomes aware that “[a]ll knowledge is founded upon the coincidence of an
objective and a subjective.—For we know only what is true; but truth is generally taken
to consist in the coincidence of presentations with their objects.” 39
Schelling describes an unmediated self as a presence, or in Hegel’s terms an
“immediate” being coextensive with subjectivity. According to Schelling:
The intrinsic notion of everything merely objective in our knowledge, we may
speak of as nature. The notion of everything subjective is called, on the
contrary, the self, or the intelligence. The two concepts are mutually
opposed. The intelligence is initially conceived of as the purely presentative,
nature as what can be presented; the one as the conscious, the other as the
unconscious. But now in every knowing a reciprocal concurrence of the two [...]
is necessary.40
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Schelling’s move here is a crucial one since it is plain that subject and object inhabit the
same consciousness.
Such a definition sees the Self as an ontological construct, or individual
consciousness, capable of self-reflection, an inward vision concentrated upon the place of
the soul within the infinite and with respect to outward objective phenomena.41 The
juxtaposition between subject and object, one of the leitmotifs of Romanticism, is
grounded in Kantian philosophy and represented in Emersonian Transcendentalism.
Hegel expanded this juxtaposition between subject and object considerably, working out
the “dialectical” relations between self and otherness (Emerson’s “Not Me”), being and
nothingness. Negative originality arises in that dialectic. The second term of the
movement, negativity, resembles the moment of the “negative sublime” where the
individual’s imagination becomes overwhelmed by magnitude or power. 42 While Hegel
sought the possibility of a return in the third term to an “absolute” consciousness, he was
aware due to the political circumstances of the time that
The spirit cannot rest content with the mere existence of an order or cult; its will
is rather to attain this knowledge of its own determinations. Only in this way can
it succeed in uniting its subjectivity with the universal of its objectivity.43
The identity of the self doesn’t reappear unless there has been a “movement of return”
from its original self into negativity and then a subsequent movement reflecting back into
becoming.
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The sublime arises in what Friedrich Schlegel and others called the
“incomprehensible.” In “On Incomprehensibility” Schlegel notes that “[a] great part of
the incomprehensibility of the Athenaeum is unquestionably due to the irony that to a
greater of a lesser extent is to be found everywhere in it.” 44 Schlegel points to “Critical
Fragment 108,” stating that
Socratic irony is the only involuntary and yet completely deliberate
dissimulation…It originates in the union of savoir vivre and scientific spirit, in the
conjunction of a perfectly instinctive and perfectly conscious philosophy. It
contains and arouses a feeling of indissoluble antagonism between the absolute
and the relative, between the impossibility and the necessity of complete
communication.45
It is in the dissimulation of Romantic Irony, of which Emerson is a representative
example, that a sublime movement begins.
In “Critical Fragment 48” Schlegel defines irony aphoristically: “Irony is the form
of paradox. Paradox is everything simultaneously good and great.” 46 That, indeed, is the
paradox of influence as it situates the problem of democratic authorship. Negative
originality arises at the interstices of the categorical imperative and poetic genius.
In “Fragment No. 42” Schlegel remarks:
Philosophy is the real homeland of irony, which one would like to define as
logical beauty: for wherever philosophy appears in oral or written dialogues—and
is not simply confined into rigid systems—there irony should be asked for and
provided…. Only poetry can reach the heights of philosophy ….47
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Irony, for Schlegel and the alternative romantics, produces an incomprehensible
ambiguity, an aporia that, as we shall see, would energize Hawthorne’s peering into the
iridescence of the moral picturesque.
Schiller agreed that confusion is the cause of the sublime.48 This confusion is not
merely a “spiritual disorder” but moral arbitrariness. Nature is simply inexplicable from a
moral perspective. The incomprehensible becomes a mode of judgment when confronted
by the absurdity of attempting to square human morality with nature: physis and nomos
are incommensurable. If meaning arises in the pressure to signify the incomprehensible,
“the sublime authorizes a translation of absurdity into freedom”; the hypothesis of pure
and rational freedom—autonomy—suggests metaphysical originality, but it is plausible
only under the condition if we can distinguish incomprehensibility from a lack of
understanding; if incomprehensibility suggests the unconditioned, lack of understanding
determines a failure of autonomy. The distinction between incomprehensibility and the
failure to understand rests on the fact that the latter undermines the possibility of
transcendence: the sublime can only arise in incomprehensibility; it reminds us of the
possibility of transcendent reason. Alienation becomes problematic when transcendent
reason is thwarted by the sublime.
If the sublime suggests a metaphor of height, or hypsos, alienation, the result of a
state of incomprehensibility at the encounter with sublime magnitude, creates a descent
or bathetic response. Alienation recognizes that transcendence is available only upon
mediation. Schlegel, in “Athenaeum Fragment 234,” argues: “It is only prejudice and
presumption that maintain there is only a single mediator between God and man. For the
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perfect Christian—whom in this respect Spinoza probably resembles most—everything
would really have to be a mediator.” 49 But what if the mediator is incomprehensible?
Again we arrive at the negativity of Hegel’s second term. We are grounded in negative
reflection. Transcendence is thus a second remove from the sublime; alienation is
intermediary.50 If the subject is to recover from alienation through transcendence there
must be a supra-ideological ground that locates meaning beyond the range of rhetorical
discourse. Here we are reminded of Coleridge’s distinction between ‘discursive’ reason
(understanding) and ‘intuitive’ reason (transcendence). It would seem then that a failure
of understanding resides in the discursive model of reason, whereas the
incomprehensible, suggests a disruption (diremption) at the intuitive level of reason.
Transcendent reason finds both freedom and the incomprehensible coinciding in the
sublime moment.
Schelling, like Emerson, was concerned with the consequences of freedom,
consequences which result from the separation of the subject from the object, or of the
individual self from the universe. Schelling tried to show that intuitive reason might
rectify the separation between individual consciousness and the possibility that the Self
exists in a part for whole relation with the universe. Kant’s a priori synthesis allowed for
a critical reason dependent on intersubjective understanding of phenomena. The world, in
Kant’s formulation, exists in consciousness through the categories of the understanding.
In distinguishing objects from thinking subjects Kant wished to rescue spirit from the
consequences of Locke’s soul-depriving tabula rasa by showing the mind as the locus of
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primary qualities rather than in the object, as Locke thought. 51 Beyond the
understanding’s “wintry light,” following Schelling (by way of Coleridge) Emerson
sought a unity between self and nature.
Schelling had sought to present a ‘philosophy of nature’ where subject and object
became united in a conscious act of what Coleridge termed intuitive reason.52 Schelling
explains that “[t]he postulated intuition should comprehend what exists separated in the
appearance of freedom and in the intuition of the product of nature, namely, identity of
conscious and unconscious in the ego and consciousness of this identity”53 In a
key anticipation of a phenomenological view of originality, Schelling understood that
intuitive reason originates in the consciousness as an awareness of the unity of Self and
phenomena, thus bridging the gulf Kant had opened between the individual and the thing51
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in-itself, which the Self might only apprehend through subjective understanding.
Moreover, intuitive reason originates this unity in a synthesis possible through the Self’s
freedom. Schelling states that “[o]riginally there is an absolute equilibrium of forces and
consciousness in man….But through freedom he can annul this equilibrium in order to
reestablish it through freedom.” 54 Hegel described this annulment of equilibrium as a
dialectical movement.
Kant did not develop the intuition beyond a faculty capable of connecting the
understanding of phenomena with reason. The Kantian view of freedom depends upon
reasoning through the categorical imperative, the idealized maxim that each individual
ought to reason that moral choices must be made in view of an a priori universal sense of
right action. The obvious problem with this idea arises when we realize that we are free
to choose the good but we are not free from an obligation to define the good a priori. In
redressing this paradox Schelling insisted that an original freedom arises atemporally and
that the individual will is already united with an absolute sense of freedom.55 The good is
already within us. Here is positive originality, by definition. Moreover, Schelling in
seeking to collapse the temporal disparity between phenomena and noumena, argues that
if things are the causes of representations, then they precede representation. And
with that, the separation between them becomes permanent. But our desire was
that after we had separated object and representation through freedom we would
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reunite them both through freedom; we wanted to know that originally there is no
separation between them, and why this is so.56
Thus Schelling’s philosophy of nature attempts to unify individual consciousness and the
world through the freedom available to the Self’s intuitive reason. Moreover, in that
original unity there exists, metaphysically, a center point of emanation that helps organize
structural originality conceptually. Interestingly, Schelling understood that Kant’s
distinction between noumena and phenomena had to be explained in terms of a
movement of consciousness through which freedom obtains. In tracing the movement
through freedom into self-reflection a second stage negativity presents itself. Schelling
suggested that
Philosophy assigns reflection only a negative value. It takes the original
separation as a point of departure in order to reunite through freedom what was
originally and necessarily united in the human spirit, i.e., in order to annul that
separation forever. And insofar as philosophy itself was made necessary by that
separation, was itself only a necessary evil, a corrective of reason gone astray, it
works in this sense towards its own annihilation.57
It follows then, like Hegel, Schelling posits a three-part movement of return that initiates
itself in a moment of reflection, a movement that negates the original reflection through
a separation between the individual consciousness and the world, and then imposes a
reuniting of consciousness and nature in spirit through a “corrective of reason.” It is
through this moment of correction that reason knows through intuition that the self exists
universally. But what if the third stage becomes truncated?
Emerson, like Schelling, attempts to unite nature in spirit through the Orphic Poet.
Redemption obtains through intuitive reason. Emerson states that
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[t]he problem of restoring to the world original and eternal beauty is solved by the
redemption of the soul. The ruin or the blank that we see when we look at nature,
is our own eye. The axis of vision is not coincident with the axis of things, and so
they appear not transparent but opaque. The reason why the world lacks unity,
and lies broken and in heaps, is because man is disunited with himself. He cannot
be a naturalist until he satisfies all the demands of the spirit. Love is as much its
demand as its perception.58
The materiality of Emersonian disembodiment, though it disengages from actual
institutions, does not separate itself from the secular covenants of an American ethos, but
rather seeks to re-originate itself metaphysically. Emerson writes in his essay
“Experience,” that it is “too late to be helped” that consciousness has made the “unhappy
… discovery … that we exist. That discovery is called the Fall of Man.” 59 Consciousness
itself has a negativising capacity.
Emerson recognizes that “we do not see directly, but mediately, and we have no
means of correcting these colored and distorting lenses.” 60 Still that negativising function
originates a new awareness within consciousness. He adds, “perhaps these subject-lenses
have a creative power; perhaps there are no objects [other than what we create].” 61
Emerson worries that “the rapaciousness of this new power, which threatens to absorb all
things, engages us.”62 He says, “each phenomenon has its roots in the faculties and
affections of the mind. When the abstract question occupies your intellect, nature brings
it in the concrete to be solved by your hands.” 63 After the Fall we are left with the
underlying question of the Sphinx: “So we shall come to look at the world with new eyes.
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It shall answer the endless inquiry of the intellect—What is truth? and of the affections—
What is good?”64 Existence, after the fall, seeks transcendence.
Nature and Transcendence
It is “nature” that acts to prompt Emerson toward Transcendence.65 Nature, then,
is originary only in the negative sense, as a state of Being that must be transcended
through spirit to universality. But how does one explain and accept the “brutal otherness”
of nature as it arises in experience?66 Brute nature supplies a host of obstacles for human
life, and these obstacles move humanity toward the overpowering of Nature. 67 For
Emerson, the death of another, in terms of a knowledge through experience of that
person’s feelings, is problematic; we could take death as meaningless, or as a chastening
(or as a reproof as Wordsworth had in his Ecclesiastical Sonnets), or as widening of
experience, as something positive. Through memory, others become within us a matter of
our dialectical ideas moving towards absolute consciousness. Ultimately, then, the
human soul and the divine form a continuum through which the design of Nature acts as
an impetus to Spirit, and finally, for Emerson, vision.
In that connection we arrive at a unity of subject and object through
transcendence, as it was generalized in Romantic thinking. Clearly, the significant aspect,
in the movement of return as an event, is the moment of negative originality, the moment
when the potential freedom of the initial originating idea becomes negated by the
necessity of separation between substance and subject. More than a mere Hegelian
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negation of negation, the synthesis of subject and its negation produces a necessary (and
new and different focal point in the self’s) philosophic idea. As a post-Kantian
reinterpretation of negative freedom where the individual consciousness reunifies with
the absolute through a recognition of its own negativity, this synthesis, rather than
exhibiting the blind faith of obeisance to the possibility of a positive sense of freedom,
understands negativity through self-reflexivity. Through Coleridge, whose philosophy is
deeply indebted to Schelling, Emerson in his first book Nature undertook this
philosophical “movement” by casting in its continuum of eight sections a progression
tracing the process of the negative consciousness forward through a point of spiritual
unification with the universe and into a moment of self-reflective prescience of reorigination in the final chapter “Prospects.”
The “sedimentation” of various sources and narratives that Emerson absorbed in
the writing of Nature, sources themselves that have been partly obscured by time and
intellectual history, forms the substrate of “Prospects.” The text’s compilation of exempla
seems to emanate from three sources, a “supernatural rationalist” who seeks to intuit
evidence of intelligent design in creation (the origin of creation), an antinomian reading
of those exempla to distinguish them from religious dogma and philosophical
commonplaces, and a hermeneutical “redactor” who remains a “shadowy figure” while
reconciling precursors.68 Emerson’s triangulation of purposes exposes the book’s
construction and evolution: he initially wrote the first six chapters, adding the latter two
chapters a month before publishing the work. The chapter “Spirit” acts as a binary
opposite to “Nature” and results in the final Orphic song he titled “Prospects.” Hence the
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text Nature (1836) involves a tripartite structure, which, similar to Hegel’s system
features a movement of return that becomes ultimately a synthesis—an overcoming of
nature by spirit—through negation.69
Packer highlights the hermeneutical challenge of resolving the diachronic genesis
of the book with a synchronic structural reading. This hermeneutical challenge,
resembling Friedrich Schlegel’s notion of ‘incomprehensibility’, features a synchronic
structure that forms the key notion behind the sublime. The book is neither biographical
nor wholly dialectical, but a sort of anemnesis, or atemporal memory, that attempts (as in
Plato) to discover truth beyond mortal capability through the eternal presence of nature as
an instance of transparency. Emerson begins his address to the Harvard Divinity School:
In this refulgent summer, it has been a luxury to draw the breath of life. The grass
grows, the buds burst, the meadow is spotted with fire and gold in the tint of
flowers. The air is full of birds, and sweet with the breath of the pine … Night
brings no gloom to the heart with its welcome shade. Through the transparent
darkness the stars pour their almost spiritual rays. Man under them seems a young
child, and his huge globe a toy. The cool night bathes the world as with a river,
and prepares his eyes again for the crimson dawn. 70
The genesis of Nature seems to stem from Emerson’s antinomian abandonment of the
ministry with his Lord’s Supper sermon, the tenor of which culminated in his “An
Address” to the Harvard Divinity School the year following the publication of Nature.
Emerson’s trip to Europe, where he met Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Carlyle obviously
supplied him with a conceptual stratum that influenced New England Transcendentalism.
A key value of that worldview is premised on the acceptance of the doctrine of
“moral sentiment,” a “special faculty in the soul capable of intuitively apprehending
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ethical truths.”71 The moral sense becomes for Emerson, as it was for Coleridge and other
Idealists, a “fixed idea.”72 Packer reminds us that “[m]oral sentiment was for Emerson
this Archimedean point that gave him leverage on the slippery world of experience. Its
freedom from mutability was what distinguished it from mere ‘affections of the heart’ or
‘faculties of the mind’.”73 The stability of the moral sentiment for Emerson was less
important than that intuition that might be grounded in it. Since the affections might be
capricious and the intellect was limited, moral sentiment might be, therefore, the only
basis for truth. And with moral sentiment as his standard, Emerson found it necessary to
disenfranchise himself from the Unitarian Church of Boston.
Emerson’s disenchantment with Unitarian thinking began as early as 1824 and his
full disenchantment became inescapable in 1831.74 His resignation from the ministry was
the deciding gesture of his “originary power.” 75 According to Eric Cheyfitz, “Emerson’s
revolutionary or originary power resides in his disembodiment.” 76 Disembodiment
partakes of an idea grounded in Emerson’s supernatural rationalism in which the body is
read as the “Not me.” In other words, according to Emerson’s third hermeneutical idea,
disembodiment allegorizes reconciliation through transumption. That disjunction became
for Emerson a separation from Unitarianism as an institution as well as a release from the
ministerial profession.77 But Grusin counters that Emerson’s resignation was not a
71

Packer, Emerson’s Fall, 34.

72

Packer, Emerson’s Fall, 35.

73

Packer, Emerson’s Fall, 36.

74

Grusin, Transcendentalist Hermeneutics, 9.

75

Grusin, Transcendentalist Hermeneutics, 10.

76

Grusin, Transcendentalist Hermeneutics, 9. See Eric Cheyfitz, The Trans-Parent:
Sexual Politics in the Language of Emerson (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).
77

Grusin, Transcendentalist Hermeneutics, 10.

97

discontinuation (or disembodiment) of his dedication to the ministerial profession but a
continuation of it in the secular realm. Emerson, according to Grusin, retained the
substance of his ethos through his movement into negativity.
Emerson, in his dedication in “The Divinity School Address,” speaks of the
ministry as “regeneration,” and an act of “trust.”78 He trusts that “the forms and
institutions of his profession will minister to him as well.” 79 Emerson understood that
Unitarian materialism denied this prospect, and thus the Last Supper provides the initial
moment of negativity. Whereas Luther and Zwingli held that the Last Supper functioned
to represent Christ’s actual sacrifice, rather than as a ceremony of Christ’s sacrifice,
Calvin saw the last supper as a ritual of regeneration for the faithful through communion,
or the consumption of the physical into the spiritual.80 Emersonian regeneration is
grounded in the difference between nature and spirit through consummation, through
which spirit melds with natire. Coleridge’s Aids to Reflection (1829) was for Emerson a
primary source. Coleridge posits nature and spirit as binary opposites; he said “the most
general and negative definition of Nature is, Whatever is not spirit.” 81 Emerson’s
“dialectical agility,” says Packer, redounds to his “willingness,” as Emerson puts it in the
essay “Intellect,” to “recognize all the opposite negations between which, as walls, his
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being is swung.”82 Emerson, Packer infers, conceives of being in terms of pairs of binary
opposites.
For Packer, there are a number of difficulties with an interpretation of the text of
Nature: foremost, perhaps, is the issue of explaining Emerson’s “attempt to unriddle the
cosmos [which] can become so absorbing a game that one ends by explaining everything
about Nature except what made it memorable and influential in the first place: the quality
of [its] exhilaration.”83 The New England Puritans, whose colonization of America was
consistently characterized as the founding of the New Jerusalem in the North American
wilderness, would develop Calvin’s association between types and sacraments in the
service of the sacramental renaissance that flourished in New England during the decades
surrounding the turn of the eighteenth century. Despite that renaissance the third
generation Puritans were baptized without their parents in order to stem a decline in
religious participation by the second generation. But the decline in church membership
continued even as the “halfway covenant” permitted baptism to those third-generation
Puritans whose parents had fallen away from the fold.84
Grusin suggests that when Emerson became ordained at Boston’s Second Church
in March, 1829, he had accepted the Lord’s Supper as a symbol of preparation. By
September of that year, when Emerson preached “a meditation on institutional change,”
he had begun to view the Lord’s Supper hermeneutically as a historical development.85 In
that light, miracles and the doctrine of transubstantiation appear to be “superstition” to
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Emerson. And if Jesus had not specified whether the Last Supper was meant to become
an institutionalized ritual, that question was left to interpretation. 86 By analogy, Emerson
told his parishioners, “We read the same books [as past readers had] but they speak to us
in a different sense.”87 Emerson’s notion of progress recognized that the implicit plurality
of interpretation of the Last Supper would reinforce liberal Unitarianism.88
But Emerson began to question whether Jesus had in fact intended to erect a new
institution within Passover, even as the question had been debated by Luther, Zwingli,
and Calvin before him.89 Emerson began to see the Last Supper as metaphor for
negativity, a metaphor which led him to his own resignation from the Unitarian ministry.
In so doing Emerson interprets the Last Supper as the Lord’s Supper, an implicit
suggestion that the metaphor encourages a “critical conscience.” Conscience implies, for
Emerson, a transition away from institutional formalism, which had become a matter no
longer tenable for him in the Unitarian Church.90 The priority of the moral sense over the
intellect, or intuitive reason as it might prevail over the understanding in Coleridge’s
terms, impacts Emerson’s view of Christ’s miracles, which under that doctrine become
one more fiction to confirm by the understanding. 91 Yet Emerson was uncomfortable
with an all-out reform that might abandon scripture: all-out antinomianism might imply
“an exclusive reliance on the inner life of faith can sometimes impoverish the very ardor
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it was intended to exalt,” notes Packer. 92 The difference redounds to formalized morality
and an active conscience. For Emerson, certainly, liberal progress aligns with the latter. 93
The Sphinx
In the movement through the sublime, as negative originality recovers from its
fall, the decision to abide by a sense of original obligation becomes arbitrary. John Smyth
suggests that “[b]ecause […] human freedom means at least a provisional suspension of
law, causality, determinism, and so on, it also presumably presupposes what such a
suspension means when not applied.” 94 The question arises for Smyth “whether we
accept that originality should be understood as an exception to law, or at least to law as
hitherto understood, what is an exception to law?” If we posit an intuitive sense of
freedom that might negate negative freedom and propose instead a re-origination, such a
move begs the question of whether positive originality is merely an exception to
determinism. “Chance, like originality,” adds Smyth, “appears at one level as the
opposite of law, but at another as its apotheosis.” In an aleatoric game of dice,
“everything possible must necessarily occur if the sequence is truly random.” Moreover,
Smyth adds, “[t]he humanist temptation to found human originality (and law) on human
freedom, conceived as a suspension of necessity, finds its quasi-counterpart in scientific
appeals to chance.” Could Emersonian originality as negative freedom be merely a matter
of historical chance configured as nostalgia?
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It is this aspect of chance that alludes to the riddle of the Sphinx, a question that
perplexed Emerson so dramatically in his book Nature (1836). For Barbara Packer,
Emerson’s Nature can be metaphorized as the sphinx; like Romantic originality as a
concept “nature” proposes more questions than can be answered. 95 Emerson entered the
following passage into his Journal: “The aenigma of ourselves swallows up like the
sphinx thousands of systems which pretend to the glory of having guessed its meaning.” 96
This aphorism of Madame de Stael’s anticipates Nietzsche’s famous lines from Beyond
Good and Evil: “That we should finally learn from this Sphinx to ask questions, too?
Who is it really that puts questions to us here? What in us really wants 'truth'? Who of us
is Oedipus here? Who is the Sphinx? It is a rendezvous, it seems, of questions and
question marks.”97 Emerson’s conjectural and metaphorical fall arouses a series of images
that appear associated with a singular crisis or catastrophe. Rather than a literal fall into
material mortality as a postlapsarian Eden suggests, the Emersonian fall presents a
catastrophe as a birth of consciousness. That rebirth, or renaissance as it has been called
by Matthiessen and others—and it has also been called a nascence and a culmination—
becomes within Bloom’s concept of an American Sublime, a “transumptive vision.”
With Emerson, argues Bloom, Yankee Virtue could “no longer triumph over the
Transcendental vision.”98 The Transcendental vision “turns transumptive” through a
sacrifice of relation between the transcendental image and the actual circumstances of the
cultural matrix. The Transcendental vision, as metalepsis, works by negative parallelism,
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composed of two syntagmatic planes: in one, the past is blamed for the failure of Yankee
virtue, and the future portends an overturning by means of a Sublime vision, where the
infinite erases the finite. In that sense of erasure, Emerson represses what he has termed
“Compensation.”99 Within the notion of compensation, Emerson finds a “ray of divinity,
the present action of the soul of this world, clean from all vestige of tradition.” 100 Bloom
regards the concept of compensation as a mode of repression. Freud’s theory of
repression is dynamic, in that repression is a circulating process. What is repressed in the
unconscious may eventually return to the conscious, as preconsciousness; absolute
unconsciousness remains repressed. Unconsciousness is made up of ideas; some
repressions never fully become ideas because they emerge as affects. For Freud the mind
contained an original unrepressed unconscious state, and the mind releases ideas into
consciousness, which return later to the unconscious through repression.101 Emerson,
Bloom suggests, means that through the repression of sacrifice, the unconscious mind reoriginates itself: “Deep calls unto deep.”102
In “Self-Reliance” the specifically American unconscious is given the
nomenclature “Spontaneity or Instinct.” 103 The passage is crucial:
The magnetism which all original action exerts is explained when we inquire the
reason of self-trust. Who is the Trustee? What is the aboriginal Self on which a
universal reliance may be grounded? What is the nature and power of that
science-baffling star, without parallax, without calculable elements, which shoots
a ray of beauty even into trivial and impure actions, if the least mark of
independence do appear? The inquiry leads us to that source, at once the essence
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of genius, of virtue, and of life, which we call Spontaneity or Instinct. We denote
this primary wisdom as Intuition, whilst all later teachings are tuitions. In that
deep force, the last fact behind which analysis cannot go, all things find their
common origin.104
Emerson’s notion of a parallax recalls the way consciousness arises between boundaries
not yet reconciled. But compensation bears a
fallacy [in which] lay … the immense concession that the bad are successful; that
justice is not done now. The blindness of the preacher consisted in deferring to the
base estimate of the market of what constitutes a manly sense, instead of
confronting and convicting the world from the truth; announcing the presence of
the soul; the omnipotence of the will; and establishing the standard of good and
ill, of success and falsehood.105
According to Bloom, Emerson’s “American sublime” involves a tendency within
temporality where “repetition is a metonymic reduction, an undoing of all other selves,
and his restituting daemonization renders him solipsistic and free.”106 That metonymic
reduction amounts to what Bloom terms “poetic repression.” The result is a “Sublime
wildness of freedom,” from which Emerson distills his idea of “poetic repression.”
In the essay “Fate” Emersonian repetition appears as “successive experiences so
important that the new forgets the old … the inward eye opens to the Unity in things, to
the omnipresence of law.”107 Emerson converts negativity to prophesy by means of
overcoming fate, which is “only parrying and defence.” This overcoming appears
apocalyptically as a working of “creative forces” that metaphorize as life: “if we breathe
and live … if truth come to our mind we suddenly expand to its dimensions, as if we
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grew to worlds. We are as lawgivers; we speak for nature; we prophesy and divine.”108 In
Bloom’s notion of an American Sublime the transumptive moment arises when
Transcendental vision recreates the future despite the fall.
Emerson and the American Sublime
In the context of the transumptive moment of Emerson’s first publications in
1837-38, he overcame the problem of influence, creativity, and national literary
originality by concentrating not on landscape but rather on language. Through the
sublime, says Poirer, “[l]iterature generates its substance, its excitements, its rhetoric, and
its plots often with the implicit intention, paradoxically, to get free of them and restore
itself to some preferred state of naturalness, authenticity, and simplicity.” 109
Consequently, “with nothing to depend on, nothing to lean or rely on, the naked and true
self can and will emerge, compelled into expression, or that ‘something’ will emerge.”
Poirer makes the point that
it is sometimes supposed that language itself has an origin outside of culture,
outside of any social purpose, that its true origin is in nature. This is a very old
argument, and Emerson’s first book, Nature, in 1836, is in part a rehearsal of it.
The special value and poignancy of the book comes less from this or any of its
related ideas than from the exhilarated sense that in the New World an ancient
dream—of recovering lost origins—might actually be fulfilled.110
When William James, in Pragmatism, proposes that human experience in the
world is coextensive with the fact of violence, he also acknowledges that human presence
pre-exists human violence, which is to say that humanity engenders violence.
This fact complicates any ambition for ‘originality’ and any desire for the
‘disappearance’ of literature or the idea of the human, an idea which identifies
each of us at birth…any proposal for the disappearance of literature or of the self
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depends for its language on the existence and perpetuation of the very things
scheduled for erasure. The proposal can only be understood, that is, within the
system of signs, the community of words and sounds, by which human beings
have identifies themselves as human.111
The sublime is thus structured by and through discourse and language within the circuit
of the cultural matrix. The desire for freedom through an originality that arises when the
sublime disrupts the complication society places upon individuality comprises the
definition of the negative relation, a relation that must be sacrificed in order to posit a
new originality.
The notion of positive freedom as it is explained by Kant and Isaiah Berlin
assumes that genuine autonomy requires a reason behind the moral forces that establish
that autonomy, and that problematic impels us to recognize that originality is essentially a
negative concept with respect to determinism.112 Originality and repetition are
inextricably bound. It may be that sequences of numbers “generated by mere iteration”
actually undercut tautology eventually and result in originality. “[T]he question of
exceptionality as it concerns relations between human beings, the relation between the
individual and the group … is intimately bound up with the question of exceptionality
more generally. The real problem of originality is therefore by no means just a question
of “solitary genius…but of understanding.” It remains a dialectical cognition that when,
on one hand, an artist can be said to be socially determined, the more one reflects, on the
other, one encounters individuality. The dialectical play between freedom and negativity
replays itself in the Matthiessen’s idea of an American renaissance, in that freedom rests
in the interstices between democracy and anarchy.
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If the American renaissance, in Matthiessen’s view, is held together by a sense of
positive freedom that arises in the gap between conformist democracy and reformist
anarchy, the shock of recognition that suddenly occurs in the recognition that originality
can be defined only in terms of negative freedom confronts the challenge to and by
quotation. It is perhaps with his essay “Experience” (1844) that Emerson shifted from a
positive, creative, and romantic sense of originality to a notion where poetic
representation of cultural values signals that all “cultivation is local.” 113 In his essay
“Quotation and Originality” he pointed out that
Our knowledge is amassed thought and experience of innumerable minds: our
language, our science, our religion, our opinions, our fancies we inherited. Our
country, customs, laws, our ambitions, and our notions of fit and fair,—all these
were never made; we found them ready-made; we but quote them.114
We have already noticed that negative originality is relational to the extent that it
arises vis-à-vis the cultural matrix. American authors in the 1840s were particularly
fixated on the self-generative model of originality they inherited from the British
tradition, and authors negotiated negative originality as they understood the ambiguous
circumstances presented by the contradictory priorities of originality framing discourses
of national literature, on one hand, and a more universal literary criticism, on the other. In
one sense, through the medium of the sublime, the relational aspects of originality
disappear since reason is fundamentally disrupted. While undoubtedly ambiguous, as
Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville consistently maintain, the subjectivity of authorship in
what Emerson termed “lubricity” appears phenomenological. Self-generative originality
becomes negativized by its own ironic relation to itself, a discovery of Romantic Theory.
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The sublime and the role of the unconscious structure a movement of reason that
describes an “unsayable” aspect, a capability both embedded and reproducing that is
always imminent yet inherently absent in creative consciousness.115 Negativity is thus an
aspect noticed by Romantics, especially Coleridge, Emerson, Kant, and Hegel, and
figured by Melville as “a dumb blankness, full of meaning.” 116 Turning to the Romantic
sublime in the late-twentieth century, as a sign of negative originality, we are reminded
by Arensberg that “the sublime is alive and doing well, although it may be living under
the guise of assumed names."117 Mary Arensberg suggests that “the Romantic sublime of
Keats, Shelley, and Wordsworth was preoccupied with crossings between self and
nature—what they called transcendence—and with the boundlessness of the universe or a
field of daffodils.” With deconstruction “the ‘ultimate truths’ of language (Self, God,
Essence, and so on) have been called into question. No longer do some of us view
language signs as absolutes or transcendental signifieds.”
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Arensberg reminds us that in deconstruction “no word or sign is privileged over
any other …” As a signifier freedom becomes another “fiction invented through free play
of other words and signs.” Consequently, as with the signifier ‘freedom,’ the concepts
‘originality;’ and ‘the sublime,’ through poststructuralism, become further fictions for
transcendence and “absolute disclosure.” 118 According to Harold Bloom, The “daemonic
in Emerson [is] that apocalyptic frenzy of an American Sublime.” Greater than the
Romantic Sublime in general, the American Sublime exposes a “deep structure” of
defensive rhetoric.119 Emerson's fall of man involves daemonization as a mode of
negative originality. Bloom cites Emerson from his Journal of 1837, the year of the
Panic:
the boasted world has come to nothing. Prudence itself is at her wits’ end. Pride,
and Thrift, and Expediency . . . are all flat, and here is the Soul erect and
unconquered still. . . as far back as the widening procession of humanity, the
marchers are lame and blind and deaf; but to the soul that whole past is but one
finite series in its infinite scope. Deteriorating ever and now desperate. Let me
begin anew. Let me teach the finite to know its master. Let me ascend above my
fate and work down upon the world.120
The American Sublime is the “transumptive moment” when a Transcendental vision
recreates the future despite the fall. The fall arouses a series of images that appear
connected to a singular crisis or catastrophe. Rather than a literal fall into material
mortality as a postlapsarian Eden suggests, the Emersonian fall presents catastrophe as
the birth of consciousness. Emerson writes in his essay “Experience,” that it is “too late
to be helped” that consciousness has made the “unhappy...discovery...that we exist. That
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discovery is called the Fall of Man.”121 Consciousness itself has a negativising capacity.
Emerson recognizes that “we do not see directly, but mediately, and we have no means of
correcting these colored and distorting lenses.” Still that negativising function originates
within consciousness a new awareness. Emerson adds, “perhaps these subject-lenses have
a creative power; perhaps there are no objects [other than what we create].”
Reading Emerson’s America
Emerson’s negative originality, for Joseph Riddel, enacts itself comically, a
performative improvisation “that turns from itself and undoes the theatrics of
representation.”122 Moreover, in this sublime satire “literature relates to tradition, at once
breaking with and repeating a past it hardly remembers,” and in its relation to tradition
literature must contend with the problem of translation, a problem “of the need for a newworld language that remains enchained in an old-world history, and yet is the ‘beyond’ of
history.” For Riddel, Emerson becomes the name of a paradox that at once seeks to
establish a national literary venue that might disentangle itself from European precursors
and history and at the same time reach back across time to an even more distant and
ancient sense of original and universal reality. Any attempt at translating history into an
American literary originality must also realize that a national literature is a linguistic
impossibility, both in terms of particulars, since language is itself iterated already, and in
terms of universals, since national borders cannot contain universals. American literary
originality, then, is a “dream” that is always futural and never achieved.
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Nativism and exceptionalism, as well as Renaissance or Adamic rebirth are unity
concepts that are formalistically untenable. There is inherent disunity. The ever-widening
Emersonian circles that attempt to enclose the American concept fall victim to quotation
and repetition. The history as signified is always constrained by the linguistic signifier. In
the American Sublime it is the signifier that in its attempt to imagine its own absence
fails to determine its signified. Emerson attempts to “rethink history and thereby rewrite
the genealogy, because the American writer can never forget his belatedness.”123 The
American Sublime suggests a re-negotiation of history and formalism, but the attempt of
situating history in expression remains non-linguistic.124 American literature is implicitly
self-critical and ironic since its self-reflectiveness reveals its belatedness; its newness is
ever delayed.
A poetics of history involves reading and writing; Emerson is the model reader.
“His desire to reconcile nature with spirit led him to speculate on language and history; in
so doing, he uncovered the ‘linguistic problematic’ hidden within any attempt at a
systematic theory of nature and history.” 125 In his 1872 essay “Quotation and Originality”
Emerson considers the “American writer’s anxiety over the question of a national
literature surfaces in his obsession with history.” We are reminded that Emerson’s Nature
is the starting point for a definition of “American literature” in terms of the nexus of the
American Renaissance and the American Sublime. The American “original” is a
repetition explaining its belatedness. Even as America is an echo of the Old World,
American authorship becomes orphaned; it must invent its origins in an ahistoric mythos.
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Emerson’s Nature belies the attempt for the “creation of America itself.” At the
intersection of the Romantic Sublime and an American rhetoric, writers in the American
Renaissance sought a uniquely American history and, at the same time, asserted a
Romantic literary tradition, a paradox in which, “the poet reveals that nature and the past
do not exist outside language: history is generated by metaphors of representation.”126
Riddel puts the American Sublime at a register where the “poetic” ‘origin’ of
‘American’ thought consists “in the transgression of origins …” 127 Emerson’s “original
relation” is itself a repetition, a new revelation; the Emersonian mind is a “transgression”
of nature by, a “chiasmus” of language. Therein lies a rejection of history, whether in
symbolism or renaissance. “American” thought is, according to Riddel, “inscribed within
a tropic economy that both undoes myths of origins and frontiers and prevents any
dialectical sublations of this thought’s contradictions.” That is Riddel’s Derridaian
“American Signature.” The “American idiom” is a double quotation by definition.
Riddel argues that the deconstructive criticism of American authorship and originality
suggests not that origins lie in a precursor, but that originality itself is a conceptual
anomaly. American originality is performative. Performance is both a repetition and a
negation; to say that one may “build therefore your own world” argues also that style is
self.
Emerson reproduces an “American landscape,” a metaphor for a new and
originary territory built from a putatively new relation between language and nature, at
once already a universal thought and which could only be the product of a pattern already
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in the mythos of European Romantic Idealism.128 Anticipating, perhaps, Melville’s
similar concern for the possibility of literary originality in a prosaic culture more
interested in “confidence” than cosmopolitanism, Riddel reads Emerson to ask: “In what
sense could that nature produce or transform an original voice or idiom that would not be
expressed in a language imported from a past, a history, a world older, and in another
sense younger?” American writing, Riddel concludes, amounts to a mistranslation, a
“miswriting and a supplementation, a translation and a displacement not of some past
present but of some past translation.” The “American” poem, as Emerson conceived it is
a “fluxional symbol," a trope astride a horizon, reflecting not so much a past but what
Riddel calls a “future present” signifying its own “effacement.” Rather than recuperating
the past the American poem horizontalizes the future, as a palimpsest traces a text.
Riddel speaks of this horizontalized trope as a “catachresis,” a mixing of language
that is not a derivation so much as a “digression.” The concentration of American poetry
notes a shift from origins to transformatives. The American poem becomes a tropic of
criticism since it interrogates what it retains because it is inherently transactive and
agonistic. Emerson bifurcates poetics into its creative and critical functions, and the
literature, if critical, is combined, with a creative analysis. The text becomes both a
literary and a critical mode of discourse, losing its classical qualities as a promised
conveyance of truth and meaning, and instead becomes essentially disseminative.129
Poetics is a form for Emerson of ‘miswriting,’ says Riddel. Poetics is ‘projective’ in that
it gathers up its materials from what is present to it and then throws its materials forward
creating a tracing of literary motion through time. In such a way literature is a mimesis of
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the future, since it is transformed and disfigured as it projects itself, which is to say that
literature recollects as it anticipates.
Emerson is ambiguous about originality as a mode of projection. Critical of
orthodoxy and dogmatic thinking, in Nature Emerson attempts an “original relation” in
the context of sepulchres of the past. His view of originality always bears a latent anxiety
for the past which he projects forward through his Essays 1 & 2. But in attempting to
build a new first philosophy he concludes, ironically, that originality is inherently a
transformational process and originality and quotation are two sides of the same coin.
Emerson’s figure of an “original relation” becomes a nexus, a structural center, a point
where multiple dichotomies cross in a chiasmatic form. Structural antitheses involving
philosophy and poetics, creativity and criticism, the Me and the Not Me, art and nature,
zig and zag like the whim of character. The locus of originality could not be a prior and
original point of origin but instead becomes a transitive moment of originality, negative
with respect to what it presents itself to be at a prior state of flux. Emerson’s idea of an
“original relation,” anticipating Heidegger’s notion of a transformational node of
originality, is conceived in terms of a natural language, a trope for a dynamic process.
Nature, in Emerson's sense, is then a double troping, because it stands for a scene that is
at once a priori and belated; language as nature is always already present, and thrown at
the same time.
In Emerson’s essay “Quotation and Originality” mimesis becomes a mode of
“creative translation” that is a double form of representation involving “appropriation and
misappropriation.” Riddel’s doubleness thesis is striking in its implicit recollection of
Matthiessen’s doubleness idea, which sought to understand originality in terms of
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resistance. The process of creative translation erases its own recuperation by projecting
forward that which is transformed through the originary process. The act of translation
makes quotation and originality a synthetic doubling. Emerson’s Nature is for Riddel the
“primal scene,” an enactment of “Nature” as a poetic trope and a material text. In his
essay “Quotation and Originality” Emerson writes, “All minds quote. Old and new make
the warp and woof of every moment. There is no thread that is not a twist of these two
strands.”130
Originality, following Heidegger’s development of art and its origination, is not
so much an instantiation of a new series and hermeneutical circle, but a way of
conceptualizing how an existing hermeneutical circle gets performed. In Emerson’s essay
“Art” in the Essays, First Series, he writes: “Because the soul is progressive, it never
quite repeats itself, but in every act attempts the production of a new and fairer whole.”131
Moreover, “not imitation but creation is the aim,” towards which a “new art is always
formed out of the old.” The “aboriginal power” of art is not found in an origin, or in
Heidegger's terms in Being or Presence, but stems from “nature's eclecticism,”
Heidegger's Dasein. Quotation is the vehicle art uses to exert its troped power and create
its circle. Although “new in art is always formed out of the old,” still the artist “must
employ the symbols of his day.” The American seeker of an art of Europe “is in danger of
forgetting the simplicity of the principles out of which they all sprung.” 132 This is
precisely the problem that sets the stage for Hawthorne’s The Marble Faun. If the
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European past promises a cultural model, which because of its age and aesthetic value
overwhelms a fledgling American art-form, then the visitor forgets the principals of
simplicity and eclecticism that differentiate an American art from the European.133 Still, it
is the deficit that is perceived that confuses the idea of originality and the repetition
always undergoes translation into new forms.
Art, moreover, is never finished. Art undergoes a constant flux of transfiguration
through disfiguration. Translation of one representation into another creates an originary
scene but not an original one. The origin is always lost in translation.134 The “univocality”
that was part of one circle is no longer available in another. The transformation involves a
“displacement of signifiers,” says Riddel. The displacement of a signifier “is not simply
negative” but more fundamental in that it discloses the capacity of language to be
radically eclectic. Rather than displacement as simply a negation of an antecedent the
transformative aspect of displacement rather than negating a prior signifier displaces it
forward thus reversing the position the relation of an originary impetus to its consequent.
The basic movement in the American Sublime, then, what many critics of the myth and
symbol school accepted as a new beginning, actually arises in a rhetorical trope—
metalepsis—that simply posits an effect as a cause.
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Riddel speaks of a concept of literature where the central “problematic” is in its
self-engendering. The underlying and critical issue of that problematic arises in the
presumption of a literary model based on a relation between a transcendental signified
and iterative signifieds. The American sublime is premised on the rhetorical gesture of
positing a new world as a transcendental signified when in actually, from a
deconstructive point of view, it is always already an iteration within a transatlantic
schema of semiotic structure. Riddel recalls the transatlantic gesture of the American's
grand tour of Europe as an enactment of repetition, a seeking out of a cultural continuum
within the scope of an instrumentality of culture that can be reinstantiated as American.
The America that is inscribed in the myth and symbol critic’s ideas of a “frontier
myth” or the “Adamic American,” approaches Europe with a feigned “innocence.” For
example, Melville’s Wellingborough Redburn arrives in a Dante-esque Liverpool only to
discover through a faded guidebook that his father has been there already. Moreover,
American innocence seeks in ancient places such as Rome a touchstone of pre-history
that links it with a feeling for new beginnings. In other words, American originality longs
to be centered by the ideology of nature and is at the same time marginalized by it. The
thereness of America is dispersed in time and space. The problematic of American
literature, which speaks to the notion of negative originality, centers on a reading of itself
that stresses its connections with the past, a history which structures its present.
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Chapter 2: Negative Originality and the Romantic Sublime
The American Sublime that was precipitated by Emerson’s Nature and
instantiated by “The American Scholar” becomes a moment of dynamic redirection. 1
Theodore Parker, writing his own reaction to Emerson in an essay also titled “The
American Scholar” (1849), captured the moment of Emerson’s negativity with respect to
institutions:
Such is the scholars’ position in America; such their duty, and such the way in
which they pay the debt they owe [. . .] The scholar never had so fair a chance
before [. . .]The nation asks of her scholar better things than ancient letters ever
brought [. . .] there is a beauty higher than that of art, above philosophy and mere
intellectual grace [. . .] A few great souls can correct the licentiousness of the
American press, which is now but the type of covetousness and low ambition;
correct the mean economy of the state, and amend the vulgarity of the American
church, now the poor prostitute of wealthy sin.2
Theodore Parker’s reformist rhetoric assesses the responsibility of the American
writer to a higher principle than commercial publishing. Writing in 1849 Parker calls
upon the representative men of the Transcendentalist movement to enact a moral
movement within the national literary field, a movement grounded in literary reform that
stems from the prevailing idea among Romantics through which poetics gains its moral
power from universal morality. Parker’s Christian liberalism would agree with much of
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Wordsworth’s metaphysics in that the source of individual moral power is derived from
universal world spirit, yet based on his overt social program he demands that “great
souls” such as Emerson yoke themselves to specific forms of dissent. As we shall see,
apart from Poe’s admonition of didacticism, Hawthorne and Melville will largely concur
with Parker’s dissent, and hence we have in Parker a link between Emersonian selfreliance and Melvillean social critique. As much as he would also agree with Parker’s
social criticism, Emerson would prefer not to be intellectually bound to a specific social
program.
Transcendental Context
Commentators speak widely of Romanticism as a period marked by an emphasis
on subjectivity, a view of the Romantic Self as a locus of identity and a nexus between
the individual mind and universal reason. Hegel defines identity thusly: “In the sphere of
being, identity is immediate self-relatedness, and the negative is merely otherness.” 3 Put
simply, for Hegel, identity is the negative of the other. Recalling Emerson’s distinction
between the terms “Me” and “not Me,” Hegel’s theory of identity appears to be precisely
the same as Emerson’s. The Romantic theory that Emerson inherited from British and
German Philosophy entered New England through a desultory process of print
distribution involving texts by Carlyle, Coleridge, Hazlitt, and Wordsworth. Elizabeth
Peabody, Mary Moody Emerson, and others had met with British thinkers in the early
1830s, but the main transmission of German philosophy to America in the 1820s and 30s
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was through James Marsh’s edition of Coleridge’s Aids to Reflection (1829) and Henry
Hedge’s articles on Coleridge and Kant.
Henry Hedge (1805-1890), a member of Emerson’s circle in Boston called the
“Transcendental Club,” had graduated from the Harvard Divinity School in 1825. He had
visited Germany in 1818 with historian George Bancroft, and read Kant’s writings in the
original German. Among the American Transcendentalists he was regarded as the
authority on Kant. In his 1833 article on Coleridge, Hedge used the opportunity to
explain Kantian metaphysics. According to Perry Miller, Hedge’s “Coleridge” became
“the first word...which any American had uttered in respectful recognition of the claims
of Transcendentalism.”4
Perry Miller states that Coleridge and Carlyle helped expose Americans to a
philosophical alternative to Locke’s empiricism; yet, it is primarily Hedge who was
acknowledged to be the American most knowledgeable about German Idealism.5
Emerson praised Hedge’s “Coleridge” as “a living leaping Logos.” 6 Situated in Bangor,
Hedge returned to Boston, and after 1836 his visits coalesced in the Transcendental Club.
Hedge read Kant in the original German after visiting Germany with George Bancroft at
the age of thirteen. Hedge considers Coleridge’s influence on American understanding of
Idealism. Even though Coleridge is “eminently fitted for such a task” as explaining
German Idealism, because of his “marked fondness for metaphysics,” it is Coleridge’s
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“excessive anxiety to make himself intelligible” that prevents him from explaining “all
that is most valuable in the speculations of Kant and his followers.” 7 It is due to
Coleridge’s “anxiety which leads him to present a subject in so many points of view, that
we are sometimes in danger of losing the main topic amid the variety of collateral and
illustrative matter which he gathers round it...” Hedge’s concern for intelligibility points
to both an American common sense and the incomprehensible character that Schlegel
found in the Romantic sublime.
In America, Hedge notices, it is “the demand for information on the subject [of
German Transcendentalism] is constantly increasing.” That concern prompts Hedge to
finish his essay on Coleridge with a summary on Kant and German Idealism in
expository form. Still, Hedge insists, the onus of blame for misunderstanding Idealism in
America does not rest on Coleridge’s failings but on the reader’s relative capacity to
examine his or her own consciousness. Idealism is a metaphysical system, says Hedge,
“whose only value to us must depend upon our power to construct it for ourselves from
the materials of our own consciousness, and which in fact exists to us only on this
condition.”8
In the second and longer part of the essay Hedge strives to explain German
metaphysics to the American reader for the first time in any thorough sense. This is
perhaps the moment when Kant fully enters the arena of American romanticism. Hedge
suggests that “the present state among literary men in relation to this subject,” demands
such an explication. To begin, Hedge suggests that American readers, to fully
comprehend Kant, will need to develop “the same powers of abstraction and synthetic
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generalization” as the Germans.9 Americans will need to “raise [themselves] at once to a
transcendental point of view.” American readers will be required to shift from their
democratic habits of seeking a “common consciousness”—described as a “passive
state”—to an “active” awareness of “interior consciousness.”10
For Hedge, Idealism is a “free intuition” that demands “vigorous effort of the
will,” and without such effort Transcendentalism appears to be “vague and mystical.” 11
Transcendentalism has an “effect” upon the reader that is “exhilarating,” promotes
“inspiration,” and without such “experience,” readers “will have no conception of the
feeling" it provides. Transcendentalism is a “veil” behind which lies the "metaphysical
existence of this interior consciousness"; those who do not apprehend it are not meant to
see it, says Hedge. Hedge denounces as facile “the empirical and common sense schools
because the universe is reduced to impressions, ideas, and sensations.” 12 Hedge implies
that the shift from the early national period in America to a romantic one, traces a shift
from “spontaneous production” to a “state of reflection,” which prompts thinkers to
inquire into the “nature of their being, the evidence of their knowledge, and the grounds
of their faith.” Here we have an insight into the stakes of a transcendental theory in
America and its assault on the finite circumstances of actuality. Hedge thus outlines a
contrast that we shall return to in Hawthorne’s The Marble Faun.
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What was previously “beyond the reach of human intelligence” is made available
by a transcendental “system,” whose
object is to discover in every form of finite existence, an infinite and
unconditioned as the ground of its existence, or rather the ground of our
knowledge of its existence, to refer all phenomena to noumena, or laws of
cognition. It is not a ratio essendi but a ratio cognoscendi; it seeks not to explain
the existence of God and creation, objectively considered, but to explain our
knowledge of their existence.13
Rather than being a skeptical philosophy, transcendental philosophy seeks to understand
human nature and experience on “scientific” principles, “deducing” an “absolute thesis”
from a “system of representations.”14 Rather than making empirical claims,
transcendental theory claims as its scientific principles what is basically a metaphysical
theory.
The system completes itself in the construction of the intuitions of “time, space,
and variety,” “establishing a coincidence between the facts of ordinary experience and
those which we have discovered within ourselves.”15 The system is derived from an
investigation of consciousness itself, which will be termed “nature” by transcendentalists.
That nature is based on binary oppositional structures, the “distinctions of subject and
object, reason and understanding, phenomena and noumena.” Moreover, German
intellectual culture contributed to the history of ideas, “the categories established by
Kant; the moral liberty proclaimed by him as it had never been proclaimed by any before;
the authority and evidence of law and duty set forth by Fichte; the universal harmony
illustrated by Schelling.” 16 In sum, this philosophy, Hedge suggests, results in a
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“quickening power”; it is no less than an “impulse to mental culture” with the power to
“establish and extend the spiritual in man, and the ideal in nature,” which “commends
itself by its fruits, it lives by its fruits, and must ever live, though the name of its founder
be forgotten, and not one of its doctrines survive.” 17
Such a universal doctrine of positive originality, what Kant had alluded to in The
Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, recognizes a fundamental paradox: the
universal “quickening power” Hedge finds in Romantic originality, a power coextensive
with Kantian freedom itself, is a power premised on a circular argument.18 Kant
acknowledges this paradox:
[T]here is a kind of circle here from which it seems there is no escape. We
assume that we are free in the order of efficient causes so that we can conceive of
ourselves as subject to moral laws in the order of ends. And then we think of
ourselves as subject to these laws because we have ascribed freedom of the will to
ourselves. This is circular because freedom and self-legislation of the will are
both [related to] autonomy and thus are reciprocal concepts, and for that reason
one of them cannot be used to explain the other and to furnish a ground for it. 19
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Unlike Kant, who, as Robert Pippin acknowledges, based his notion of freedom
on the concept of voluntarism (free will) Hegel approached the idea of freedom in terms
of a “state” concept.20 Freedom involves a state of self-relation as well as social relations
of “recognition.” Rather than a condition of causal origins, the state of self-reflexiveness
defines freedom for Hegel. Hence, Hegel’s notion of freedom is basically negative in its
relation between the self and what it recognizes as beyond itself: Emerson’s “Not Me.”
Friedrich Schlegel understood that relation in terms of a state of “permanent parabasis”
that resembles the Romantic sublime.
Kant and Negative Originality
Immanuel Kant, in his Critique of Judgement (1793), acknowledged that a
metaphysical culture of pure reason could not explain art. For Kant, art is a phenomenon
in which he saw no empirical law, but only individual, subjective originality obtained
through genius.21 Moreover, Kant’s idea of originality, which is the “primary property of
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genius,” must also be “exemplary” to be authentic as a “rule for estimating.” 22 Since
Kant’s aesthetic problem is to account for a rule that exists in its freedom from imitation,
he posits that originality obtains directly from nature. And in being free from imitation,
following Kant’s discussion of freedom in his Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals,
freedom arises “independently of foreign causes.” 23 In other words, analogous to his
concept of freedom, Kant’s idea of originality is that it is autonomous.
Through autonomy, in this view, originality becomes free from nature in much
the same fashion as in Kant’s metaphysics, where reason seeks “universal legislation”
above and beyond the will. In its universality, morality and its aesthetic analogue
disinterested beauty “must be derived exclusively from the property of freedom” under
the expressed condition that “freedom as the property of the will of all rational beings
must be demonstrated.”24 Any demonstration of freedom becomes simply hypothetical,
and is moreover paradoxical, since Kant offers it as a condition that “if I were a member
of that [intelligible] world all my actions would always be in accordance with the
autonomy of the will…my actions ought to conform to it.”25 The consequence of such a
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paradox, for Kant, who concludes the third section of the Foundations of the Metaphysics
of Morals thus, is that “[p]hilosophy must therefore assume that no contradiction will be
found between freedom and natural necessity[,]…for it cannot give up the concept of
nature any more than that of freedom.” 26 We are left with the realization that for Kant the
autonomy of originality is a conditional premise, and, though genius, freedom, and
natural necessity originates as a synthesis a priori, we recognize that originality is
probably negative since it awaits the discovery of contradiction.
The discovery of that contradiction, I argue, occurs in the structural originality of
the Romantic sublime in its movement of negativity, a movement that ultimately reveals
aesthetic judgment to be a factor of phenomenological materiality. Such a
phenomenology recalls Kant’s indeterminacy, Hegel’s aesthetic-historical asymmetry,
Heidegger’s nihil originarium, and Adorno’s negative dialectics. While the paradox of
Kantian freedom and originality, where such concepts are neither universal nor
necessarily Ideal, it is Hegel’s view of negativity that untangles the paradox by locating
aesthetics in history. Moreover, it is Horkeimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of the
Enlightenment that reveals the relation of negative originality to the cultural matrix that
appears in the American nineteenth-century context. And we shall also point out that it is
in Kant’s notion that in aesthetic judgment “originality must be the primary property”
where we rediscover that the cultural work of an aesthetics of negative originality is
ultimately bound to materiality through economics.27
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In Kant’s rendition of aesthetics, language becomes capable of a mediated
expression of Nature through the middle term of originality. Originality, in other words,
maintains a relation of negativity with respect to Nature. And yet, as a Romantic trope,
originality acts as a simulacrum of nature. In Conjectures on Original Composition
Edward Young argued in 1759 that the literary possibilities of his generation were equal
to the ancients, which for the neoclassical critics was a heresy; in so arguing, Young
shifted the emphasis on the meaning of the word “original,” stating that “Imitations are of
two kinds: one of nature, one of authors.” 28 Nature, here, is no longer a calibration of
ideal form but a source of life. “An original,” Young writes, famously, “may be said to be
of a vegetable nature; it rises spontaneously from the vital root of genius; it grows, it is
not made.”29
Young’s Conjectures recognizes in “originality” a mid-eighteenth-century
cultural fascination with individual authorship. Romantic originality is distinguished by a
now “familiar” (that is, normative) view of the literary work: if it is original, says
Macfarlane, it is “unbidden, native to an individual, and comes into being out of
nothing.”30 This view of originality, of its coming into being through the medium of
creativity, becomes the hallmark of Romantic originality, and has metaphysical, if not
transcendental implications. Moreover, this view of originality resembles what we will
designate “structural originality” quite closely. In The Rhetoric of Romanticism, Paul de
Man shows that ex nihilo creation attends to organic processes, yet to describe creation
28
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by means of an organic metaphor invests poetic rhetoric with a trope of originality (a sign
structure) that is itself not an organic thing but a Romantic idea. This move precipitates a
linguistic turn to “metaromanticism.” We will trace this point turn shortly.
For the moment we note that at the heart of Romantic originality, as it arose in the
eighteenth century, lies the “organic” metaphor for the ex nihilo creative process of
“growth.” Young speaks of an “Original” as possessing a “vegetable nature”; “it rises
spontaneously from the vital root of genius; it grows, it is not made: Imitations are a sort
of manufacture wrought up by those mechanics, art, and labour, out of pre-existent
materials not their own.”31 Young’s rhetoric, moreover, extends from its figuring of
organicism to the paternal and imperial: Young argues that originals supervene imitators
since they are “great benefactors.” The core idea behind this argument posits a trope that
permits the latter event, the event that supervenes the former, as a moment of
regeneration, and as we have seen with Emerson, the notion of supervening, or what
Hegel termed aufhebung or supersession (related to Heidegger’s aufgehen or emergence).
This idea, in turn, relates to the notion of overcoming through transumption, Originals,
says Young, “extend the republic of letters, and add a new province to its dominion.”32
Young, in a remarkable statement, illustrates by comparison how this new (mideighteenth-century) notion of originality, a notion that becomes connected with creativity,
genius, and transcendental value, eclipses imitation. Young adds:
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Learning we thank, genius we revere; That gives us pleasure, This gives us
rapture; That informs, This inspires; and is itself inspired; for genius is from
heaven, learning from man: This sets us above the low, and illiterate; That, above
the learned and polite. Learning is borrowed knowledge; genius is knowledge
innate, and quite our own.33
In a move characteristic of Wordsworth, art absorbs nature as mind, and it is in that
absorbing movement that we locate the sublime.
Nature becomes mind through the figure of the flowing fountain, which together
with organicism becomes the master trope of the era. In the generative model of creationas-originality nature guides artistic perfection, and becomes, during Romanticism, the
idea that genius illuminates art and the world from a transcendent source through the
medium of the author.34 For Wordsworth, the root of genius is located in the imagination,
and originality becomes its direct associate. In the “Preface to the Lyrical Ballads”
(1800), Wordsworth criticizes the form and content of neoclassic poetry in favor of
Romantic poetic expression. Originality is located in the imagination, which undergoes a
process of “spontaneous overflow” causing “powerful descriptions of the deeper
passions.”35 Wordsworth’s idea of “spontaneous overflow,” says M. H. Abrams, departs
from a “mirror held up to nature” and instead “yields the reader insights into the mind
and heart of the poet himself.” 36 Wordsworth’s famous phrase, “Poetry is the spontaneous
overflow of powerful feelings,” involves a metaphor that according to Abrams “suggests
the underlying physical analogy of a container—a fountain or natural spring, perhaps,
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from which water brims over.”37 Tracing out the metaphor, Abrams suggests that the
poet contains the fluid and flowing feelings emanating from the poet’s mind. The
extemporaneous, or spontaneous, emanations results, says Abrams, from the poet’s
awareness of Nature. That awareness unites the external world of sense with the capacity
of the mind to recollect feelings in a tranquil state of reflection. Moreover, as we have
just noticed, the self, in its originality, becomes posited through transumption to the
rhetorical position of a new dominion in a spatially figured context. In that move we see
that Romantic originality places the self not only within a part-for-whole relation with the
Absolute, but also in a metonymical relation to a space/time relation that is disjunctive
with respect to the past.
Another consequence of such Romantic writer-centeredness results in a distancing
of the outer world from the self as a center—as a province. Readers, moreover, encounter
an aesthetic sensibility that sees the poetic imagination as a naturally occurring outflow
from a vessel of spontaneous thought. The source of that thinking is in the consciousness
of the poet unencumbered by rational control. Originality, in this Kantian sense,
precludes an art of deliberate imitation. In the shift to Romantic sensibility at the turn of
the nineteenth century, following from Kant’s third Critique, the concept of originality
became detached from empirical antecedents and then located itself in a creative power
capable of bringing art into being ex nihilo. As we have seen, Kant had disassociated
originality from imitation in “On Genius,” yet even Wordsworth and Coleridge, in the
37
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sway of Romantic originality’s obvious negativity vis-à-vis imitation, couldn’t escape the
paradox of influence. The Lyrical Ballads (1800) points back to a long vernacular
tradition of English folk ballads. Wordsworth’s nostalgia for nature and the idealizing of
the rustic farmer as the common voice of the people shows an inclination to turn away
from Revolutionary upheaval.38
The question arises again, whether we regard originality as a turning away or
overcoming (negative or structural originality), or as a state of autonomy versus influence
(a state of negative freedom).39 The question remains: what are the consequences of an
originality paradox within the frame of the cultural matrix? We recall that genius, as
Edward Young maintains, involves “the power of accomplishing great things without the
means generally reputed necessary to that end.” 40 While Young struggles to account for
the “means…necessary” for originality, we have seen that Kant more rigorously
attributes exemplary art to nature’s rule, a rule given through aesthetic judgment, as he
termed it. According to Andrew Bennett:
Such a formulation points to a crucial paradox specifically mentioned by Kant
that underscores Romantic authorship; in the ideal author, in the genius, there is a
mysterious disjunction of cause and effect. There is no reason why the genius is
able to create the works that he creates. The idea that the genius is both himself
and beyond himself is something of a commonplace in Romantic poetics. 41
The difference seems a matter of openness and closure, flux and stability. The relation of
autonomy to imitation presupposes a diachronic relation, though autonomy itself, as Kant
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argues in the matter of freedom, is a structural relation: freedom is a structure of reason
or the negation of it. Both definitions, each in their own way, are instrumental. The
Wordsworthian poet, according to the idea of spontaneous overflow, is most creative in a
state of tranquility, and this condition becomes the paradigm concept for the original
Romantic self. Self-origination, as metaphysical (phenomenological) originality, in a
continuum that extended from Wordsworth to Emerson, turns not on a temporal causeand-effect relationship, but on a seemingly atemporal emanation, which Coleridge termed
an “esemplastic power” or spontaneous transcendental imagination. 42 But under the sway
of Schlegel and his notion of Romantic irony, originality was brought under the regime of
a reversal of cause and effect, or metalepsis, a structure that supposes simultaneity and
disjunctive relationships.
Negative Philosophy
Robert S. Leventhal, writing about the beginnings of German hermeneutics,
reminds us that before Schelling and Hegel, and contemporary with Kant, Fichte, and
Friedrich Schlegel, Johann Gottfried Herder noted that the “general consideration of
human knowledge in and through language must yield a negative philosophy.” 43 Herder
(1744-1803), following Linnaeus, conceived culture as an organic life process. Culture
became individuated by its own internal potential. The idea is problematic. Even as the
organic metaphor, reaching back to Aristotle’s ideas of causation, helps understand
Romantic-era poetics in terms of a creative theory of self-referentiality, the organic
metaphor as it constructs an ideological metaphor of a culture circle is both an
42
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anthropological abstraction and carries with it the probability of absurd and dangerous
stereotypes.44 Originality as applied to culture is untenable. Culture becomes more
understandable as an agglomeration of selves and identities sharing some ideas and
patterns.
Herder bifurcates ‘being’ by positing two incommensurable senses of the term:
the ideal and the existential.45 The self in its subjectivity is therefore split between any
ideal and foundational essential grounds to ‘being’ and the actual experiences each
individual person collects. The empirical self, then, is not an original and metaphysical
self but a multiplex identity that is situated by the conflicts that exist for the individual in
history and politics. Herder’s metaphysical anthropology sought to understand the human
being’s experience in terms of its point as a center in sphere of language and history;
human understanding is dialectical and rhetorical.46 Herder’s metaphysical anthropology,
as can be anticipated, suggests Heidegger’s phenomenology.
Given that Herder’s view of anthropological metaphysics amounts to a ‘negative
philosophy,’ Herder's notion of the self involves a pragmatic and critical stance:
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Leventhal suggests that “[a]s a negative discipline, philosophy undermines its own search
for foundations and questions its communicability, its discursive possibility.” 47
Philosophy becomes a mode of inoculation, in which it becomes “simultaneously the
disease and the cure, the illness and the only antidote,” of a metaphysical longing for
foundations. The center for speculation is no longer metaphysics but the relationship of
the human self to language and history. Herder’s negative philosophy amounts to critique
of discourse in that it seeks to understand discourse in terms of the problematics of
‘origins’ and ‘historicism.’ It locates the focus of such a question in terms of the
individual identity in the center of its own linguistic and political constraints and
exigencies.48
Herder’s hermeneutics anticipates the “originality paradox” that arises in the
relation between artist and society. The traditions inherited by the social realm become
grafted onto the cultural matrix’s logocentric structure. The ideology representing the
cultural matrix sets up a “correspondence theory of truth” that can only be defended
within the pragmatic contours of the cultural matrix based upon the instrumentality of its
dominant ideological values. A relativistic view of truth admits to a conceptual
framework that denies absolutes and endangers the cultural matrix with a form of
epistemological nihilism. Negative originality positions the pragmatic paradox between
correspondence (a form of originality) and relativity (negation) as a double-edged
discursivity that admits logocentrism (originality) at the same time it denies it (negation).
At the social level the Self experiences negativity in terms of its correspondence to the
cultural matrix in a dialogic relation that Adorno terms ‘negative dialectics’; it is in that
47
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sense that correspondence results in an aesthetic response to the cultural matrix that
validates the critical work of aesthetics by situating it in the material conditions that
demand its antithesis as subversion.
The idea overturns the universals of Kantian a priori synthesis since it holds that
truth claims are essentially rhetorical and discursive and matters of social
constructedness.49 In the relation between a phenomenology of Romantic originality—
and here we turn from the “linguistic problematic” of generative origins in language to
the structural originality of the sublime—we encounter again the “originality paradox,”
which we initially understood as an incommensurable negative relation between artist
and cultural matrix, but now understand the issue as it reappears as an unresolvable
relation between an Idealist metaphysics and a materialist aesthetics.
Paul de Man, in “Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant,” understands Kantian
aesthetic judgment as a project that ultimately transcends the aesthetic in its metaphysical
or ideological manifestations. As a substrate of materiality that has Heideggerian
dimensions, de Man argues that
[f]rom the phenomenology of the aesthetic (which is always based on an
adequacy of the mind to its physical object, based on what is referred to, in the
definition of the sublime, as the concrete representation of ideas...) we have
moved to the pure materiality of...aesthetic vision. From the organic, still asserted
as architectonic principle in the Critique of Pure Reason, to the
phenomenological, the rational cognition of incarnate ideas, which the best part of
the Kant interpretation in the nineteenth and twentieth century will single out, we
have reached, in the final analysis, a materialism that, in the tradition of the
reception of the third Critique, is seldom or never perceived. To appreciate the
full impact of this conclusion one must remember that the entire project of the
third Critique, the full investment in the aesthetic, was to achieve the articulation
that would guarantee the architectonic utility of the system. If the architectonic
then appears, very near the end of the analytics of the aesthetic, at the conclusion
of the section on the sublime, as the material disarticulation not only of nature but
49
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of the body, then this moment marks the undoing of the aesthetic as a valid
category. The critical power of transcendental philosophy undoes the very project
of such philosophy leaving it, certainly not with an ideology—for transcendental
and ideological (metaphysical) principles are part of the same system—but with a
materialism that Kant’s posterity has not yet begun to face up to. 50
In the “architectonic utility of the system” that Kant’s aesthetic judgment is meant to
achieve, de Man notices that a final “material disarticulation” by means of the sublime
undercuts both nature and body. The net effect of such a consequence is an evaporation
of the Cogito by means of an a priori structure. Initiated by the sublime, the disruption of
cognition results in a “confused mode” of reason that undercuts the potential of aesthetic
judgment to reveal an underlying (natural) rational (metaphysical and ideological) law.
What remains is a “primordial physicality of our being-in-the-world.”51 This “undoing of
the aesthetic” results in a passage from Romantic originality into a form of negativity that
traces the asymmetry we find in Hegel’s Aesthetics, an asymmetry between the Classical
and the Romantic phases of Hegel’s historicism.
Before we address Hegel’s aesthetic historicism we shall inquire into the role of
discourse in its metacritical relation to negativity. Jonathan Culler bifurcates concepts of
contingency (aesthetics) and essentialism (metaphysics), where the contingent is covered
by the essential and the poetic so that the rhetoric (the parasitic) is also covered by trope.
Trope emerges as the foreground presence that through aesthetics covers metaphysics.
Poetic purity uncovers the longing for an absent originality in the logos. Jonathan Culler
notes that “[p]urity is a casting out of the impure aspects of metaphor and the parasitic.
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But the parasitic and metaphoric are already indwelling in what is cast as purity.”52
Culler’s notion of a representational logocentrism counters de Man’s “material
disarticulation” by suggesting that materiality is a concept available through
representation. Yet de Man argues that metaphor is uncontrollable since the language that
might figure it is also metaphorical. Metaphor creates more metaphor and results in a
state of undecidability with respect to the inherent asymmetry of the binary model that
points to the split between the literal and the figurative. This logic interdicts the
distinction between the literal and the figurative, and the same time recognizes the
tension within that distinction essential to understanding the concept. This doubleness
that requires one to refuse to join a club of which one is always already a member is a
tacit strategy of intervention. Aside from the supposition that all readings are bound to
logic of some kind, the inherent literariness of the metaphor blurs the line between
distinctions.
The relation of reality to representation is bound to presence. Representations
seek foundations that are not themselves constructed, but this correspondence is deferred
in a potentially infinite process of regression. To forestall infinite regression philosophers
may offer pragmatism as a way to posit immediate grounds. “Norms are produced by acts
of exclusion.”53 But the refusal to agree on terms points to a weakness in the supposed
objectivity of pragmatism. The cultural matrix is ultimately pragmatic but its foundations
are produced for its own dominance. The consensus that is taken as truth becomes the
point of intervention. Eccentric forces subversive to the consensus reverse the logic of
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center and marginality (negative originality) and create a structure that grafts through
opposition. Truth, as a putative goal, may have the instrumentality of revealing new
perspectives on marginality. As such, the search for truth is “eccentric” as theory but
pragmatic in a fictive sense.
The metacritical relation to epistemological authority raises a critical distance that
questions existing frameworks ensconced in the cultural matrix. A fictive sense of ‘truth’
then plays a role of baiting ideology to emerge from rhetoric. Once the doubleness is
exposed it remains illuminated. It is the framework that ultimately makes the case for
truth whether or not it might be validated in the social context. This doubling of ‘truth’
posits itself as a median point between resistance and the cultural matrix.
The relation between the frame and the center of the object, the relation between
form and content as it maps onto the relation between trope (the organic metaphor) and
essence (whether nature or art) is a critical relation Paul Hamilton terms
“metaromanticism,” a vantage point framed by Romantic paradoxes. 54 And the
phenomenological symptom that I will explore through the frame of structural negative
originality is sustained by the persistence of Romantic theory. The immanence of
romantic subjectivity resists decentering and the core problems of romantic aesthetics
remain intrinsic. Romanticism supplies its own critical matrix and this reconstitutes itself
as it diagnoses its own symptoms. The “self-disgust” resulting from the romantic
reflective consciousness, a self-binding defined by the promise of transcendence,
becomes, through phenomenological aesthetics, universalized. The idealism that
characterized the first generation of romantics becomes politicized in the next generation.
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Even as the romantic artist is circumscribed by aesthetic limitations, criticism reveals the
way aesthetics becomes a political mechanism.
For Paul Hamilton, “criticism remains immanent.”55 The “aesthetic is indemnified
against dissent because critical departures from it simultaneously double as the
metaphorical distance or troping of an original—as further aesthetic production.” Though
theory may be misled into false hopes of “new foundations,” metacriticism does create
new grafts of discourse with respect to institutions and cultural practices.56 The
framework that becomes self-limiting through pragmatism raises a problem within
metacriticsm. It becomes difficult to evaluate the cultural matrix on its own terms until
there is an epistemological paradigm shift. That shift is brought about by metacriticism
through critical work: “even if in principle we cannot get outside conceptual frameworks
to criticize and evaluate, the practice of self-reflexivity, the attempt to theorize one’s
practice [through metacriticism], works to produce change....”57
De Man argues that a work establishes itself as a context in which a critic can be
shown to have misread. That a text can be a “point” of misreading helps to illustrate what
may be a moment of structural originality. Although, Barbara Johnson reminds that “all
readings are misreadings,” and that the idea of truth is rekindled at the point when error is
recognized, since a misreading posits a reading against it.58 Readings are undercut by—
or blind to—their own readings. While a reading presupposes a right one of which it is
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“interested,” it misreads in order to achieve its reading. Rightness is achieved through
negativity. Negativity reinstantiates a fixed point at which misreading’s further negativity
operates. The fixed point may be a necessary phantom. Misreading, then, admits to a
trace of truth, even as reading must be as a consequence of itself, a misreading. 59 The
result becomes a “double movement” where negativity, as it moves away from its object,
points to and instantiates its object. The result becomes a true error in which the
misreading and misunderstanding are partial, a blurred vision of an entity that “resists
metaphysical idealization and captures the temporal dynamic of interpretive situation.”
The consequence of seeing reading as misreading results in a loss of a centered authority
of authorization as the normative case becomes both privileged and special.
The problem of defining the literary can be explored by assessing philosophical
writing in terms of both cognitive (conative) and performative language. It is through
romanticism that literature becomes increasingly inclusive and comprehensive. Romantic
literary works included diverse themes, genres, and situations. Reading romantic texts as
philosophy impels a reading that seeks definitional closure, whereas to read it as literature
is to allow it openness in terms of structure and meaning and freedom of discursive
practice. Generically, literary works comprise an asymmetrical relation to works of
philosophy, history, and journalism.
German Romantic theory helped to establish a view of literature as an art that is
transcendent in meaning, having a quest for meaning and its own identity; these questions
become definitive of literature itself.60 The novel, for example, establishes its identity
through its definition which rises through iteration and commentary. As such, a genre
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may become protean and absorb its neighboring genres, and may come to be viewed as
self-transcending and self-originating. The argument that literature has a special quality
as a superior discourse model must contend with an inescapable heterodoxy. If
philosophical writing tries to resist fiction, rhetoric, and trope (as Nietzsche does not),
literature, as it is normatively defined, admits these aspects. The problem, however, is
that the marginalized aspects of fiction, trope, and rhetoric are not easily defined. One
would need to clearly distinguish fiction from nonfiction, and define the direct and
indirect. The thematics of originality, then, become a position from which to deconstruct
the trope of metalepsis and the mode of the sublime as concerns of phenomenology and
negativity. What becomes significant is the inscription of ideology in works not simply as
themes or “preoccupations” but as complex relations between literary forms and
aesthetics and cultural matrices. What begins with questions of whether certain thematic
questions may be deemed (un)reasonable by a discipline, may also open up to
fundamental questions about language, organization, and experience and the capacity of
texts to exhibit their meaning.61
Organicism
In the Critique of Judgment Kant attempts to frame “pure” judgments of taste
apart from other sorts of ideas. If these non-cognitive judgments can be categorized as
quality, quantity, relation to ends, and modality, then it appears aesthetic judgments are
categorically empty. The frame is given to the concept of aesthetic judgment but the
content is cognitively indeterminate. The lack of internal content of the aesthetic makes
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the concept of the frame extrinsic to the intrinsic negativity of aesthetic cognition.62
Because aesthetic judgment depends on categorical framing that is at the same time not
cognitive the categories are not available to reason but to sense and therefore absent
because they are merely categorical and therefore also unavailable to sense. This explains
the reason why Kant, in section 14 of the Critique of Judgement, terms the frame a
parerga.63 The frame is extrinsic yet confining, and at the same time ornamental. The
marginal becomes redefined as central even as it is pure marginality. Because the frame
is marginal to the aesthetic content and yet is necessary to contain that content it
functions as a boundary of a non-cognitive concept (an empty box) that directs its
attachment inward rather than outward. The aesthetic frame merely signals the
categorical relations of the concept without itself being part of them. In a sense, framing
is creative of an aesthetic experience but is not essentially a part of it. It belongs to the
content and not the experience of the content. It has a negative relation to the original
content that is itself known by aesthetic judgment and not by cognition.
Analogous to Heidegger’s concept of temporality, the frame is a relation of
negativity with respect to the aesthetic center (temporalization) it creates, and we
conceptualize the center aesthetically only because of the frame that is negative to it. This
is because “if framing is what creates the aesthetic object, this does not make the frame a
determinable entity whose qualities could be isolated, giving us a theory of the literary
frame...”64 The center is a structural originality that arises because it exists in relation to
the negativity of the frame. The frame becomes a “disappearing figure,” a “marginal
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supplement,” and yet is essential for aesthetic judgment. The frame is present yet
“unsayable.” In Kant’s notion of “purposiveness without purpose” the nonchalance that
defines ethical disinterestedness, in which an object “does not necessarily presuppose the
representation of an end” and yet may “be called final simply on account of being only
explicable and intelligible for us by virtue of an assumption on our part of a fundamental
causality according to ends,” it is the negativity of the frame—the end, as it were—that
figures the aesthetic object as a free object not bound to external determinants. 65 Beyond
all aspects of the aesthetic bound to representation, the medium and material, what
remains as a defining characteristic of the aesthetic, is the foundational negativity of the
frame.66 The foundational negativity of the frame, what Kant terms a parerga (parergon
or ornamentation) becomes an “adjunct” rather than an “intrinsic constituent,” yet
without the frame as an end in itself there could be no causality for exemplification of
design.67
The frame is the bearer of the trace of negativity that marks the aesthetic.
Originality in the structural sense arises in negativity as the trace of origin crosses over,
passing the frame into the center. The difference between the center and the extrinsic is
marked by a frame. The inner discourse within the frame is defined by the exterior, outer
discourse of metacriticism. Metalinguistic discourse, then, originates in the implied
metacritical discourse that originates inside the frame.68 While metalinguistic discourse
begins within the frame that situates it, the authority of the discourse demands an external
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relation. The external metalinguistic authority depends on the way the internal discourse
is folded with its own metalinguistic discourse. The process of enfolding inside and
outside in a unified original structure is contested by the skepticism that structure is
inherently heterodox and intertextual, even hypertextual; yet to define structure this way
begs the question of relations both closer and farther. The closer the relation is between
center and margin the more unified and thus the more singular. It is also paradoxical that
the very claim of heterodoxy depends on the notion of unity, whether organic or
conceptual.
Organic unity, the metaphor of the concept that is original in the structural sense,
bears a strong kinship to a theological sense of oneness. This ideology is responsible for
the hierarchical superiority-claims held historically for Western fine arts, a cluster of
notions that rest upon a faith in freedom, beauty, and spirit: Originality, unity and
organicism, rather than figures that become evicted or extricated by deconstruction,
become problematic figures. Organicism privileges creation—originality as an analogy to
nature—by re-naturalizing art, figuring artistic creativity in language invoking organic
processes that find a metaphorical home in nature itself. In such a way, mimesis
transforms explicit imitation of nature, corresponding between art and nature, to
originality that mimics organic processes by troping mimesis with organic metaphors.
Skepticism towards organicism and its related concepts of unity and originality
has operated in a system of literary criticism with a relation to theological concepts in the
Western tradition. For Kant the “aesthetic” stands apart from nature and is superior to it
for the reason that its freedom from determinants is posited to be grounded in “nature” in
its transcendental sense. Art stems from free human creativity that can be premised upon
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disinterest. Art, in this respect, should not be “mechanical nor mercenary,” but free “as
if” it were nature itself, and yet paradoxically, undetermined. If Kant could argue that the
aesthetic object could be neutral and free of economic and social constraints, Derrida
deconstructs such evasions in “Economimesis.” 69 Derrida writes that “Pure and free
productivity,” following Kant’s argument, “should resemble that of nature. It does so
precisely because, if free and pure, it does not depend on [determinant] natural laws. The
less it depends on nature, the more it resembles it.”70
Derrida addresses the ideological “sequence” or genealogical historicism that
subtends Kant’s moral subjectivity and artistic autonomy. The upshot of Derrida’s claim
portends that originality, or specifically romantic originality is motivated by politics and
“economimisis.” Derrida’s synthesis of mimesis and economics as a deconstruction of
Kantian aesthetics points to Kant’s “system” or philosopheme and its Copernican
Revolution, which wished to constrain reason to accommodate the Enlightenment. And it
is the construction of Kant’s critical Idealism itself that resulted in a paradigm shift
towards Romantic Theory. Leon Chai shows that the construction of Romantic theories
themselves were part of a strategy, or narrative, of negation needed to accommodate
revolution and the impact of empiricism and materialism on human morality. 71
By definition, it seems, Romantic theory was addressing history both aesthetically
and politically. Derrida, though, wants to focus on Kant’s appeals to economics as they
might persuade us regarding his aesthetic system. Kant accomplishes his argument for
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aesthetic autonomy by distinguishing practical from fine art; fine art must be
categorically an entelechy, that is, free from mercenary constraints. We are immediately
reminded of Plato’s cautions towards mimesis in the Republic. If mimesis is resituated as
a representation of the free imagination, as Coleridge argued, it would no longer be a
degenerate copy of a copy in an economic world of dubious means. In Kant’s formulation
of aesthetics, art transcends nature. Freedom, or the desire for it, compels art to a loftier
plane than techne or physis which are determined by necessity.
We must be careful with the word nature. As empirical reality nature is
determined by its systems and laws; as an ontological concept Nature is the capacity of
human reason to articulate possible freedom: Kant’s fine art is the representation of that
possible freedom. Bound to nature and technological materialism, human freedom is
impossible. Nature, as a concept of reason, enters into a negative economy that strives to
do battle with the Enlightenment, a battle symbolized by the French Revolution.
Paraphrasing Derrida, the art/nature distinction is anthropologically hierarchical, and it is
fine art that represents the delimitation of human freedom. This concept of aesthetic
freedom takes on a representational character as a marker for human autonomy—Kant
thought all human beings were equally capable of reason—notwithstanding a hierarchy
that maps on to an economic order privileging an elite unencumbered by material
constraint. The opposition between freedom and want seems, returning to economics, to
be metaphorized by the appetite. Fine art is pleasurable just as it is disinterested; whereas
commodified art appeals to enjoyment.
Originality as a self-referential and self-presencing process that mimics nature’s
generative processes that reside in the causal nexus of organic growth has led to the
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values that have been embodied within the appeals for organic unity characteristic of
New Critical thinking. The supposed enactment of self-creation instilled in the concept of
an organic poem, for example, leads to a doctrine of self-containment and a fusion and
wholeness of the work as free to itself, a concept analogous to the notion of
anthropomorphic individual autonomy. Self-reference, what Cleanth Brooks described as
a well-wrought urn, becomes a self-reflexivity that is coextensive with self-knowledge.
This sort of self-reflexivity is likened to Kant’s parergon in the framing of selfreferentiality.72 The logical problem arises in such self-presencing as to whether the
aboutness that is promised by self-referentiality can be made simultaneously with the
very notion of reference such that signifier and signified are one and the same identity. In
terms of parergonality the content and the frame in such a case must be identical. Reading
disrupts the claim of self-referentiality since the literary object is transacted through
misreading. If a poem's self-referentiality lies to speak truth, we are left with a matter that
is undecidable.
The organic metaphor, a misreading of self-referentiality paralleling the sublime,
promises an oxymoronic “ontological originality” that in Kantian terms can only function
on a transcendental level. The actual basis for organic origination is grounded in natural
processes rather than in metaphysical concepts. The ontology of the signifier—the way
flowers originate—becomes absorbed into the originality of the signifier—the way words
originate. The image, says Paul de Man, “originates with the statement, in the manner
suggested by the flower image, and its way of being is determined by the manner in
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which it originates.”73 De Man distinguishes between two domains of understanding that
describe on one hand that flowers originate due to their essence as natural objects, and
poetic language, on the other, whose “intent…is to originate like the flower.” The poetic
word, since it means to distinguish itself from ordinary language that circulates without
any claim of originality, “strives to banish all metaphor, to become entirely literal,” by
imitating the flower.
Poetic language precludes signs as names and as such, rather, functions in the act
of naming, as a moment when the event of language originates a name for an experience.
If words originate like flowers then the two concepts can be distinguished by the very
analogic juxtaposition. The concepts are dissimilar with respect to identity and
appearance, but alike in the way they unfold. The concept of ‘flowers’ reveals a choice of
concept that points to an ‘authentic’ signifier for a being in nature whose ‘highest
function’ is growth in terms of its ‘presence’. The image of the word originating as
flower constitutes its imaginative image.
De Man states that “[t]he image is essentially a kinetic process: it does not dwell
in a static state where the two terms could be separated and reunited by analysis.” 74 The
zeugma of word and flower originates with the metaphoric statement, as the literal flower
as thing in itself is said to grow spontaneously. The invocation of the metaphoric image
“requires that we begin by forgetting all we have previously known about ‘words’...” To
think in terms of origination, we must forget (by metalepsis) the antecedent idea. Then,
de Man suggests, in imagining the signification of the term, we instantiate it with a
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concept that universalizes the particularity of the flower with the universality of growth
as an ‘animation’ of the concept word. “The metaphor is not a combination of two
entities or experiences more or less deliberately linked together, but one single and
particular experience: that of origination.” 75 But originality is conceivable only in terms
of difference: “the source springs up because of the need to be somewhere or something
else than what is now here.” Originality has a ‘distancing’ effect, and that effect “equates
origin with negation and difference.”
Concepts originating in consciousness arise from and through negation of foreign
concepts, out of alterity. De Man argues that a “beginning implies a negation of
permanence, the discontinuity of a death in which an entity relinquishes its specificity
and leaves it behind, like an empty shell.” 76 Natural objects arise completely from like
beings.
All particular flowers and at all times establish an immediate identity with an
original Flower, of which they are as many particular emanations. “The original entity,
which has to contain an infinity of manifestations of a common essence [as a universal
premise], in an infinity of places and at an infinity of moments, is necessarily
transcendental.77 The transcendental nature of the flower must reside in its formal cause
rather than its ontology; “origination is inconceivable on the ontological level.” 78 We find
ourselves, de Man infers, confronted by the “poetic seduction of beginnings contained in
the word…” We attempt to support our nostalgia for originality by invoking “the
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ontological stability of the natural object.” Ultimately, in de Man’s argument in which
mundane nature is made transcendental through nostalgia, and for a nostalgic feeling for
originality, a feeling that necessitates the negation of its particularity, forgetting amounts
to a decision that appears as a free choice. Emersonian metalepsis is founded on that
sense of nostalgia for freedom. We shall now turn to the aesthetics of materiality as it
intersects transcendent universal concepts associated with Romantic originality, noting
that for Kant aesthetic judgment was a synthetic idea rather than a phenomenological one,
and that Hegel reversed the disjunction.
Romantic Theory: Aesthetics
Aesthetics refers to a distinction between “the material and the immaterial.” 79
Hence it is concerned with and attempts to reconcile the Cartesian subject/object
bifurcation ultimately in a unification of the natural and the supernatural by conjoining
art and nature, perception and sensation. In the Romantic view of aesthetics, sense and
sensibility are joined through the link between imagination and sensation that Keats
configured as truth and beauty. Underneath the emerging concept of the aesthetic in
eighteenth-century Germany was the association between judgment and freedom on the
side of reason, and of the association between taste and originality on the part of the
imagination.
Kant’s aesthetic view sought a third and middle term between radical subjectivity
and the objective understanding. The principle of freedom is synthetic, in that the
categorical imperative is universal under a synthetic third term: “The positive concept of
freedom furnishes this third cognition, which cannot be, as in the case of physical causes,
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the nature of the sensuous world, in the concept of which we find conjoined the concepts
something as cause in relation to something else as effect.”80 The concept of a rational
will stems from the idea of freedom. Kant argues that
Reason must regard itself as the author of its principles, independently of foreign
impulses; consequently, as practical reason or as the will of a rational being, it
must regard itself as free. That is to say, the will of a rational being can be a will
of its own only under the idea of freedom, and therefore in a practical point of
view such a will must be ascribed to all rational beings.81
Such an intersubjective concept among the nineteenth-century European
bourgeois was a response to the possibility of universal freedom in the positive sense.
The bourgeois public sphere produced a new subjectivity that promised universality in
which the subject “like the work of art itself, discovers the law in the depths of its own
free identity....The liberated subject is the one who has appropriated the law as the very
principle of its own autonomy.”82 Rather than positing an “ought” at the origination of
positive freedom as Kant does, Hegel synthesizes the Kantian split between morality and
sensuality by uniting contemplation and action through political experience. “Reason
works out its own mysterious ends through human beings’ sensuous self-actualizing
activity in the ‘real’ of Sittlichkeit (concrete ethical life) or Objective Spirit.”83
Eagleton sees a paradox in the aestheticization of the bourgeois individual.
“Scientific knowledge of an objective reality is always already grounded in this intuitive
pre-givenness of things to the vulnerable perceptive body, in the primordial physicality of
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our being-in-the-world.”84 At once transformed from a state of nature through Sittlichkeit,
Hegel’s social realm becomes comprised of autonomous individuals no longer obligated
to a supporting giver of rights, but rather becomes a site of self-government. In such a
way the bourgeois social sphere produces and reproduces itself as a “universal subject.”
Whereas for Kant, the aesthetic is an Ideal where judgment requires a natural order
available to understanding, which subordinates particulars to universals, where the
understanding has the specific requirement of fitting the particular as perceived to
universal, for Hegel the universal is a grounded in political materiality.
Hegel’s aesthetic theory of form and cultural practice and the relation of
aesthetics to the structure of consciousness has been a key concept. M. H. Abrams
considered Romantic theory as an expressive theory (as opposed to prior stages of
mimesis and pragmatics), and was hence principally concerned with Romantic
subjectivity. The contrast between the Enlightenment, which emphasized a semiotics of
form, and Romanticism, with its emphasis on expression, required a mediating point.
Kant provided the middle term between form and expression by limiting the capacity of
the subject to aesthetic judgment, which defines the aesthetic as a synthesis of form and
content. Consciousness is dependent on representation and representation defines
consciousness. In semiotic terms, the signified, the content, obtains in a synthetic a priori
relationship with the signifier, form. And the state of the absolute balance between
signifier and the signified—the transcendental signified—balance is achieved with the
classical and lost with the Romantic. Hegel’s romantic theory, then, traces what becomes

84

Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic, 18.

153

the deconstructive and unbalancing problematic of originality by denying history a
dialectical synthesis.
Hegel “develops in the Aesthetics a thematics and semiotics of modes concerned
with non-identity of form and content as expressions of an artistic consciousness that can
be historically situated.” 85 In his Aesthetics Hegel sets up three modes of art: the symbolic
(ancient), the classic (Renaissance), and the Romantic (modern). Hegel’s aesthetic
vocabulary draws for materialist, idealist, and semiotic resources. Hegel’s forms and
modes are the structure through which absolute Spirit reveals itself in materiality and
through history. Moreover, Hegel’s modal structure acts as a relational basis between
interiority and exteriority. As such the modes trace the Idea from its origin (whether in
individual or transcendental consciousness) to its manifestation in phenomenality.86 The
modes also distinguish between the ideas of theme (form) and execution (content) in the
sense of a processive movement that is understood phenomenologically. Hegel’s
phenomenological method involves three loci: it seeks to explain what is invariant in
consciousness as form; it strives to understand form as movement of the Spirit in its selfunderstanding; and as a movement, it sees consciousness as understandable through its
externalization which reveals itself historically and materially.
Aesthetics is framed in terms of a narrative shape that resembles a quest in search
of self-identity that is revealed by objectified form.87 In his Theory of the Novel, Georg
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Lukács suggested that “[i]t is not absence of suffering, not security of being [that impels
the soul towards negativity]…it is the adequacy of deeds to the soul’s inner demand for
greatness, for unfolding, for wholeness.”88 (30). Following Lukács, art is defined, through
the allegory—the parergon—of the epic subject, as the search for, and the revelation of,
Idea through content. Content is defined in terms of the relations between meaning and
shape, which indicates that content appears in a contingent relation to form. These
relations vary in history in a series of narrative stages. If meaning and shape appear in a
harmonious relation of symmetry, then identity of the Idea is present: symmetry between
form and content indicates completeness and presence. When the form and content, the
outside and the inside are revealed to be asymmetrical, the result is an absence of the Idea
to consciousness. Thus the asymmetry of meaning and shape, content and form becomes
over-determined, and the Identity of the Idea becomes indeterminate.
Symbolic art shows its asymmetry in terms of an imbalance where selfconsciousness is not revealed with respect to form. There is a deficiency of meaning and
an excess of shape. Romantic art reverses the pattern, where self-consciousness is
predominant and external form lacks the capacity to contain the Idea. Thus the classical
phase of art represents the standard of an “adequate embodiment of the Idea.” Tilottama
Rajan notes that “the thing-in-itself or ‘Idea’ can be known only as it appears in
phenomena and is nothing other than its appearances.” 89 Rajan implies that in Hegel’s
Classical world phenomena and noumena were in balance. For Hegel the goal of art is a
unity between meaning and shape, and when the standard of adequation is not present
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then art is seen as dis-integrated. Integration of meaning and shape, then, is a unity, or
closure, where both form and content are equally transcendent. In the middle phase of
Hegel’s historical aesthetic movement, only the Classical form becomes a moment of
“pure” presence, a presence that becomes deconstructed through the over-determination
of Idea by the multiplicity of noumena..
The larger scale historical movement beginning with symbolic art is characterized
by a moment of negativity when the symbolic is deficient in containing the Idea, which
transcends the symbolic through negation. Thus negation results in a balance between
shape and meaning, but as consciousness exceeds shape another negation occurs which
brings about a deficiency of shape to contain meaning. History, then, is expressed as the
growth of meaning with respect to reality. This negative movement alludes to a
phenomenological sense of negativity that can be stated in terms of a tendency towards
subversion of aesthetics itself. This phenomenological structure is both semiotic, in its
foregrounding of relations between signified and signifier, and expressive, as in the
aesthetic conditions in which the Idea in consciousness becomes disclosed through
creativity.
The Aesthetics presents two facets of discontendedness that undermine its own
logocentricity, a discontentedness which seeks to resolve itself in the Idea of its own
adequation. In Hegel’s narrative the symbol that represents ancient art becomes iterative
and reappears in inverted form in the late stage of the romantic. As a paradigm the
symbolic/romantic structure produces a chiasmus where the Idea appears and disappears
at the fleeting moment of the crossing of the two strands. In that structure the Idea
remains indeterminate and absent due to the inverted asymmetries. The problem at work
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here resembles the originality paradox in that an originating structure returns but in
mutated form such that originality as a sign of closure is disrupted.90 Another problem
arising in romantic aesthetics concerns the instability of the classical mode that is selfdialectical. Conceived as a strand that at its terminal ends exists as an imbalance, the
presence of instability shifts to an absence of stability at the center since the centeredness
is unsustainable. Completion is impossible since the classical dissolves into the
Romantic. The illusion of synthesis dissolves into futural asymmetry. The failure of the
Classical to resolve itself amounts to a moment of Romantic irony, where the magnitude
of the Idea, as compared to form, promises development but effectively becomes selfcancelling by destroying closure, and as a result art, which is promised an apotheosis, is
negated in and by its own originality. Absence is imanent and originating despite a desire
for centeredness that also takes the name originality. In this framework the Romantic
becomes the incomprehensible sublime moment of Western history.
Romantic Theory: Temporality
The problematic of temporality, as we shall see momentarily, becomes a key
matter in the relation of originality to Romantic theory. Originality is fundamentally an
issue of temporality as it appears in space. The phenomenology of temporal experience
becomes a difference in relation other than that of the relation between the artist and the
cultural matrix. That difference in relation obtains in the distinction between possibility
and probability. Whereas the latter assumes a diachronic movement the temporality of
phenomenology is structural in a synchronic sense, and is thus spatial in concept. During
the period of the emergence of the concept of Romantic originality, the idea of self90
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origination, as we have seen, is coextensive with the notion of subject, the axis point
between nature and art. Through art, the temporal relation between subject and object
becomes reversible (transumption or matalepsis), and the linguistic paradox (generative
originality) that presupposes temporal origins, shifts to a phenomenological paradox
(structural originality), which appears in terms of hypsos, or height (as a spatial idea).
Structural originality figures a relation characteristic of the concept of the sublime.
Through art and the movement of the sublime the subject re-originates the self through a
reversal of nature and art in the temporal order, a reversal conceived as a trope. The
movement, or spatial metaphor, acts as the axis point at which generative originality
converts to structural originality.
Generative originality, conceived in terms of temporal relations to past and future,
is essentially a decentered concept searching in time for a center to signify it. Structural
originality acts as an “organizing principle” in the structural relations of an event. In his
essay “The Literary Self as Origin: The Work of Georges Poulet” (1970), Paul de Man
articulates the difference between generative and structural originality from the point of
view of whether our conception of originality is centered or decentered, and whether we
conceive of originality in terms of space or time:
Greater difficulties arise from the need to define the point of departure as center
as well as origin. As its name indicates, it can function as a temporal origin, as the
point before which no previous moment exists that, with regard to the work, has
to be taken into account. In temporal terms therefore, the point of departure is a
point entirely oriented toward the future and separated from the past. On the other
hand, when it acts as a center, it no longer functions as a genetic but as a
structural and organizing principle. Since the center organizes a substance that can
have a temporal dimension…, it serves as a co-ordinating point of reference for
events that do not coincide in time. This can mean that the center permits a link
between past and future, thereby implying the active and constitutive intervention
of the past. In temporal terms, a center cannot at the same time also be an origin, a
source. The problem does not exist in the same manner in space, where one can
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conceive of a center that could also, as in the case of the Cartesian axes of
analytical geometry, be an origin. But then the origin is a purely formal concept
devoid of generative power, a mere point of reference rather than a point of
departure. “Source” and “center” are by no means a priori identical. A very
productive tension can develop between them.91
Leon Chai, in his Romantic Theory, considers the narrative pattern that is a
leitmotif of the Romantic sublime as a movement. As a spatial metaphor, embodied under
the concept structural originality, Romantic theory alerts us to the paradigm of classical
and romantic music where sections of form are divided into movements and moments.
Chai notes that the basic narrative pattern is “one of extension and consequent return.”
We shall see that the spatial organization of this metaphor maps onto the Hegelian
dialectic culminating in the negativity and “movement of return.”92
In describing the “Napoleonic Curve” that Hegel witnessed at the Battle of Jena,
Chai describes the movement of return in terms that parallel the Romantic sublime. Chai
notes that the determined effect of this cycle presupposes that the return will be
inevitable. There is a basic truth in this faith, a sort of physical property, an absolute
value having to do with proportions of mass, force, and weight. Once the rupture occurs
equilibrium is no longer sustainable and coherence falters. In turn this rupture results in a
sublimation of the moment into the larger developmental principle that is driven by
physics. Part of that developmental process is that the ultimate rupture is forestalled in a
sequence of back and forth motions that bring about psychological expectations and
erasures. This looping formula emerges from a single spatial point and moves outward in
a spiraling curve through its negativity, into its other, and then potentially returns into
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itself at a higher stage. We have seen that in a phenomenological reading of Hegel’s
Aesthetics, which maps the movement of return onto a three-stage historical development
of art, in the final Romantic stage the movement from form into content inverts the
parergonal centering of the aesthetic by overwhelming it, in a Napoleonic-like curve,
with materiality. It is that curve that brings about the collapse of Romantic synecdoche
and drives a metaleptic revision of Romantic thought.
Adherents of Romantic originality “positive romantics” such as Wordsworth and
Coleridge assumed intuitive reason to arise through the translucence of spirit, but Edward
Young provides a model more closely related to sublation, where supervention of an
antecedent occurs through negativity.93 As Hegel suggests, “this ambiguous supersession
[sublation, aufgehen] of its ambiguous otherness is equally an ambiguous return into
itself...through the supersession, it receives back its own self, because by superseding its
otherness, it again becomes equal to itself.” 94 The negativity of structural originality, in
other words, is inherently self-reflexive. Young’s trope here is that of metalepsis since he
is able to simultaneously originate and reverse cause and effect. The original benefactor
(the other for the subject in Hegel’s terms) is the prior and original precursor that is
subsumed through the negativity of the structure as invented by the subject and becomes
translated forward as an after effect of the trope: the original benefactor (in Young’s
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terms), is sublated through negativity, returns for the subject as an effect of an
“originating impulse,” which is also metaphorically conceived as a self-emerging
likeness to an organic being, a being that is autogenerative. That analogy underscores the
overdetermined sense of the term “genius” during the Romantic era. This metaleptic
figure becomes the dominant trope of negative originality as it is structured through the
Romantic sublime, the movement into negativity by the consciousness of the self that
becomes the central concern of aesthetic phenomenology.
We recall that in the Critique of Judgement Kant says that “Genius is the talent
(natural endowment) which gives rule to art. Since talent, as an innate productive faculty
of the artist, belongs itself to nature, we may put it this way: Genius is the innate mental
aptitude (ingenium) through which nature gives rule to art.”95 It is Kant’s italicized
“through which” that signals that structural originality becomes a phenomenological
concern. And that concern emerges through Kant’s concept of freedom, a close relation
to his concepts of originality and universality. In his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of
Morals and Critique of Judgement Kant shows that in the absence of a positive ground
for choice, freedom is conceptually a negative idea; that is, consciousness remains
unaware of the relationship between reason and determinism.96 Because of the circularity
of the concept of freedom in Kant, the inherent negativity of the concept parallels that of
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the temporality paradox.97 At any given point in time we are temporally both cause and
effect. Moreover, in his discussion of the concept of genius, Kant shows that “nature in
the individual (and by virtue of the harmony of his faculties) must give the rule to art.” 98
Moreover, Kant holds that art “must not have the appearance of being intentional” and in
fact the author “does not himself know how the ideas” for his work must unconsciously
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“have entered into his head.”99 Coleridge, like Kant, stated in 1818 that genius partakes
of an “unconscious activity” and that very activity is cause of the genius. It is the
unconsciousness of genius that leads to the disruption of reason in the Romantic sublime.
And in disruption is the seed of negation.
In the nineteenth century, the concepts of freedom, the self, and nostalgia for
antiquity were dominant tropes. All were brought under the rubric of Nature. Friedrich
Schlegel was concerned with Romantic irony and the metaphysical dialectic that the artist
maintains with culture.100 For Schlegel, poetry is the figure that signals the paradoxical
(and ironic) figure of the temporal relation between nature and freedom. For Kant and his
Romantic followers from Schelling to Coleridge it is the movement into the self through
a negativity vis-à-vis nature that exhibits originality in temporality via the sublime. The
Romantic sublime is fundamentally a concept of aesthetic materiality since its twin
forces, the mathematical and dynamical sublime forces as analyzed by Kant, are
inherently temporal. If the Romantic sublime is structured by temporality, its
phenomenology resides in the cultural matrix.
Negative originality sees culture as the determining ground of nature. 101
According to Brian O'Connor, Adorno follows Hegel’s idea of experience in the
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Introduction to The Phenomenology of Spirit.102 Adorno’s assertion that “diremption”
becomes the attribute of the cultural matrix into which negative originality is instantiated.
Hegel’s notion of consciousness seeks to understand the world as it is filtered through the
mind and its “presuppositions.” Consciousness is dynamic in its approach to objectivity
in light of anthropology. Consciousness reacts dynamically to contradictions that demand
a re-evaluation of assumptions about the world. Consciousness is transformed when its
criterion for understanding fails to meet the demands of knowing.
The movement of transformation is inherently a negative motion from static and
impoverished criteria to new forms of understanding, which results in what Adorno terms
a “determinate negation.” In his Aesthetic Theory, Adorno argues that
Pure and immanently elaborated art is a tacit critique of the debasement of man by
a condition that is moving towards a total-exchange society where everything is
for-other. This social deviance of art is the determinate negation of a determinate
society. To be sure, the rejection of society that we see reflected in the
sublimation of autonomous art through the law of form, also lends itself to
ideological abuse: art's distance from this horrifying society also betrays an
attitude of non-intervention. It must be kept in mind that society is not coextensive with ideology. Any society is more than sheer negativity to be indicted
by the aesthetic law of form; even in its most objectionable shape, society is still
capable of producing and reproducing human life. Art has had to take this aspect
(no less than that of its critical task) into account . . . art has no way of separating
affirmation and critique intentionally.103
The inertia of consciousness is an irrational condition and explains conformity of the self
to social forces that destroy individuality. Negation, while alienating the self from
itself on its own stream from social convention and control. Works of art cannot rest content with
such vague and abstract universality as is typical of classicism. They depend on diremption, and
that means that the concrete historical situation, art’s other, is the condition. Their social truth
depends on whether or not they open themselves to that concrete content, making it their own
through assimilation. Their law of form for its part does not smooth over the cleavage, but
concerns itself with how to shape it.” Theodore Adorno, The Adorno Reader, ed. Brian O’Conner
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 248.
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conformity, produces a release from a state of consciousness in contradiction with itself,
or false consciousness. Negation strives for more “effective” ways of knowing, where
effect is a criterion for the correspondence of object to concept. The movement towards a
more effective consciousness is contradicted by an inertia that prevents the return to a
transformed dynamic consciousness. If Hegel and Emerson would hold experience as
“irrevocable,” Adorno considers “experience” as coextensive with self-awareness of
constraining contradictions.
The Romantic Sublime
As a “moment” the “sublime” event has a temporal structure; its “temporality is in
the last analysis fictional or merely operative.”104 In this sense temporality is structural.
The Sublime becomes a metaphor for the power of greatness—in the sense of power or
magnitude—stemming from the source of the mind. It is important to recall that Lockean
materialism located reality in the object, resulting in a skeptical view of metaphysics. The
sublime offered a recovery through the negation of mechanistic thinking, ironically by
overpowering the imagination. Although, the tendency toward ontological skepticism in
the eighteenth century oriented the perceiver towards the object, the subjectivity of the
natural sublime called attention to the “darker implications” of Lockean philosophy of
mind.
This concern about the dark implications of the sublime will return in the
discussion of Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville below. For these authors the sublime results
in the unattainability of the transcendental object. Weiskel suggests that “[in] the sublime,
a relation to the object—the negative relation of unattainability—becomes the signifier in
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the aesthetic order of meaning.” This negative relation between subject and object
presents the possibility through temporality for an overcoming of incomprehensibility,
and points to the primary struggle for aesthetic order in Melville’s Moby-Dick.
Furthermore, and perhaps of ultimate significance in linking Romantic originality to
negative originality in terms of semiotic function, we find that the structure of the
negative sublime creates the “movement of return” that operates through the rhetorical
trope of metalepsis, the master trope of negative originality.
The Romantic sublime implants into the mind a moment that produces a negation
of the imagination. The sublime structure arises, perhaps—at least in terms familiar to
Romanticism in general—where “God withdraws from an immediate participation in the
experience of men . . . the problematic sublime is pervaded by the nostalgia and the
uncertainty of minds involuntarily secular—minds whose primary experience is shaped
by secondary causes.”105 Whereas beauty, the binary opposition to the sublime, is a
humanistic quality, the sublime is by its definition “pure daemon”; as we shall see with
Edgar Allan Poe, it is the intrusion of death into the domain of beauty. The sublime
instantiates nature (physis) through language, but the sublime also suggests the possibility
of transcendence. We shall see that possibility as the subtext in Hawthorne’s The Marble
Faun, where Miriam and Donatello’s crime brings about the possibility of moral
transformation.
In the Romantic sublime, Longinus’s rhetorical sublime, structured by the power
of “great writing” is recast as a natural sublime that imposes a “terrible” power upon the
self, and the transcendental movement comes about through an overcoming of that
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feeling. Longinus’s sublime provides the idea of hypsos, or height, a spatial and
synchronic “metaphor presiding over illusions endemic to reading: we are uplifted as if
instinctively, and our proud flight exalts our soul as though we had created what we
merely heard.”106 For Weiskel, as in the terms negativity and originality, our primary
concern here, is that the “[s]ublime is one of those terms like inspiration, vision,
apocalypse, imagination, and daemonic--and, of course, transcendence—whose continual
sublimation into metaphor makes thought possible by enabling us to grasp experience in
terms sanctioned by the past.” Curiously, as it is with the oxymoronic nature of negative
originality, we find that “[b]ehind each act of intellectual metaphor is an imitation, and
identification or mimesis.” Longinus’s notion of hypsos calls forth the idea, beyond
rhetoric and persuasion, of a “power struggle,” a way language overwhelms another, a
means of usurpation. The poet, as a recipient of language, enters a defensive (negative)
relation to the past, whose literary power becomes a burden on individuality to overthrow
the past through originality.107
The “aesthetic of the beautiful,” as the core principle of positive romanticism, deemphasized the dualism which structures the sublime by uniting imagination and reason
in a moral imperative. The natural sublime, though, stressed the dualism between nature
and the self by delimiting the imagination. The dualism between an aesthetic of beauty
based on judgment, and the collapse of the imagination in the movement of the sublime
by overwhelming the Self, corresponds to the intrinsic difference between Romantic
notions of a positive versus a negative originality. The sublime represents to
consciousness an “original moment” structured around a movement of negation that
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became identified with Hegelian dialectical movement. The movement can be conceived
as a temporal and syntagmatic structure, a structure that is a fiction serving to explain the
way consciousness reacts to the phenomena of psychological defense.
We may identify the ‘metaphorical sublime’ as the mode of the sublime in which
the absence of determinate meaning becomes significant, since it resolves the breakdown
of discourse by substitution. This is, properly, the natural or “Kantian sublime.” 108 It is
characterized by associationist metaphors, which through substitution act as though the
semiotic signs are the cause rather than effects of the sublime. We suspect this reversal
since the sublime moment is resolved in substitution, but this feeling overlooks the actual
cause of the sublime, which lies deeper in psychology. In this way the metaphorical
sublime becomes hermeneutical in that it seeks a “map of misreading.” The substitution
of cause for effect produces the trope of metalepsis, or transumption, the central figure in
Bloom’s analysis of the “American Sublime.” For Bloom, as we shall recapitulate,
Emerson’s American Sublime constructs the “American Unconscious.” 109
The metonymical sublime, differently, tries to resolve the excess of meaning in
the second stage by revising the syntagmatic chain so that the problematic components
are displaced or elided.110 Where the metaphorical sublime tends toward verticality, the
metonymical sublime tends toward linearity. Anaphora is a good example of the
metonymical sublime; by repetition the mind recovers its power over the signifier and
can assert the signified. In the metonymical sublime we shift from structural to generative
originality. In both cases something is substituted for another thing, whether repressed or
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limited. Substitution occurs as a “transformation from the unconscious to consciousness
just as the movement from poetic sublimation to poetic introjection (repression) or
projection (sublimation) restores or returns representations to the unconscious.” 111
Limitation doesn’t return representation to the unconscious, whereas sublimation does.
Repression is a negative originality as opposed to sublimation, which amounts to a fully
articulated (and likely impossible) “movement of return.”
Here we have the description of a metaphysical structure familiar to us through
Hegel—the Hegelian dialectical triad. Hegel states that “[t]he dialectical moment is the
self-suspension of such determinations [as given to the Kantian understanding] and their
transition into an opposing form.” 112 Hegel expresses his dialectical triadic concept as
follows: “As simple self-relation it is a universal and in this universality the negativity
that constituted its dialectic and mediation has collapsed again into simple
determinateness, which can again be a beginning.”113 Hegel considers the second term of
the dialectical movement the turning point of subjective self-reflection. Metaphysically
speaking it is the point at which negative originality arises. Hegel states that
[a]s the first premise is the moment of universality and communication, so the
second is characterized by singularity, which initially stands to its other in a
relation of exclusion, independence, and diversity. The negative appears as the
mediator, since it includes both itself and the immediate whose negation it is.114
As the movement of return ensues from the universal simple substance into its singular
self-reflection, its subjectivity arises in negative originality. Hegel continues, stating that
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for on this subjectivity alone rests the merging of the opposition between concept
and reality, and the unity that is truth.—The second negative, the negative of the
negative, at which we have arrived, is this merging of contradiction, but just as
little [this synthesis] as the contradiction is it an act of external reflection, but
rather the innermost, most objective factor of life and spirit, which results in a
subject, person, free being.—The self-relation of the negative is to be
regarded as the second premise of the whole syllogism. If the terms analytical
and synthetical are employed in their opposition, the first premise may be
regarded as the analytical moment, for in it the immediate stands in immediate
relationship to its other, and hence passes over, or rather has passed over, into
it.115
Hegel’s formal syllogism introduces negative originality as the minor premise. Moreover,
this three-part structure maps onto the structure of the Romantic sublime that presents to
consciousness an element beyond the scope of the imagination, and the recovery of that
displacement through intuitive reason. In other words, the sublime posits the minor
premise as irrational and invokes intuition to reconnect reason and imagination.
For a supernatural being to exist in the Lockean empirical system it must belong
to the natural world, and metaphors of that relation result in the ideas of infinity and
immensity. These ideas are concurrent with the emergence of modern astronomy. During
the post-Enlightenment, a psychology of the affections became associated with physical
magnitude, where the subconscious became expressed in terms of the oceanic. Thus the
supernatural being became an immanent presence in nature through the nexus of
appearance.116 But Locke’s philosophy of mind also had the effect of dislodging the soul
from the realm of essentialism, and replaced the spiritual with the material. Simply put,
Lockean empiricism places the soul in a fundamental sense of doubt, the soul being
neither necessary nor possible as an empirical reality; rather, the soul becomes an
absence, a locus of negativity, an abyss, like the unconscious, the soul was soon to be
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viewed as incomprehensible. The soul becomes the circuit of repression and sublimation
of psychological forms. The soul, in Kantian terms is reflective rather than constitutive;
the soul reflects nature as a metaphorical association. If a sensation is the semiotic
signifier, the soul becomes an arbitrary signified. The progress of the natural sublime
shifts this semiotic relation that disempowers the soul towards a metonymic relation
where the natural signifier points to a vast faculty beneath consciousness, a figure that
constitutes its signified under the figure of originality. Originality is thus a syntagmatic
function that is eventually expressed by Coleridge as an “esemplastic” chain or a
paradigmatic function expressed by Emerson as a “transparent eyeball.”
What overcomes Lockean doubt with respect to the soul is a shift from analogy,
where there is a correspondence between the sense perception and the secondary idea
through an agreement of meaning supplied by language as a conventional code, to a
broader and expansive supra-correspondent associationism that recognizes the
imagination rather than Nature as the constitutive function of meaning. 117 Locke’s doubt
over the faith in the correspondence between sensational reality and idea is thus
negativised to give free play to signification. As a preliminary conclusion it is postLockean associationism that provides the structural framework for the negative sublime
by universalizing the signified. Through a process of associating through metonymy,
universality, and the natural signifier the role of signification expands in magnitude with
respect to conventional codes. Sense becomes one end of a part for whole relationship
with the universe, and thus the supernatural is restored through Nature. Clearly, under
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this structure, the sublime is the fundamental function in conceptualizing originality as a
post-sensational concept.
The negation implicit in Platonic mimesis, where copies are corruptions of forms,
cast a long shadow over the suspicion that language is less an imitation of sense than a
substitution.118 It is that negativising of the faith in imitation that gives rise to the
affective power of the sublime through the vision of the obscure, or incomprehensible.
Passions, said Burke, are aroused by what is uncertain and clouded. Indeterminacy is at
the root of incomprehensibility. The sublime, then, helps to signify irrational affective
experience, and in turn, its signification creates a code with which to represent it without
a form that identifies its imitation.119 What results for Burke and Kant “is the affective
correlative of a semiotic discontinuity in the inexplicable passage between one order of
discourse and another.”120 Weiskel remarks that a study of the sublime suggests the
“hypothesis” that a means of understanding that discontinuity calls for a semiotic
methodology. Weiskel seeks to locate the sublime and the affections in the gap between
the sensation and idea uncovered by Locke. The negation of the soul creates a feeling of
anxiety involving an awareness of a lack. Burke’s notion that the sublime fills a need
admits to the possibility of absence in the mind, a striking sense of a “vacancy.” Burke
argues in “On Ambition” that
when without danger we are conversant with terrible objects, the mind [finds
itself] always claiming to itself some part of the dignity and importance of the
things which it contemplates. Hence proceeds what Longinus has observed of that
glorifying and sense of inward greatness, that always fills the reader of such
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passages in poets and orators as sublime; it is what every man must have felt in
himself upon such occasions.121
Weiskel notices that the relationship between the will and the soul is essentially
economic. Lockean materialism subverts the possibility of autonomy by preferencing
sensation; the mind is simply tabula rasa. The vacancy, by means of the sublime,
encounters a sense of anxiety which produces the need to fill the lack of being by means
of repression of sublimation. The impact of Lockean sensationalism results in a
vagueness in the idea of freedom, that the will was inert. Hence the feeling of disruption,
a lack that becomes an awareness of itself through anxiety, which in turn produces a
desire for filling the absence by means of the “affective correlative.” 122 As the will strives
to make itself autonomous through an act of freedom it becomes aware of its emptiness.
The lack of substance in the will presents itself as desire.
The sublime, then, contravenes reason by a movement of return that eventuates a
state of negativity that defies synthesis. Extempore originality becomes overwhelmed by
sublime feeling. Kant’s version of the sublime divides between the mathematical and the
dynamical. The mathematical sublime is understood as the effect of magnitude (e.g.,
infinity) on the imagination; whereas, the dynamical sublime rests on the grounds of
desire and power. Kant regards the sublime, whether mathematical or dynamical, as
conditions of the subject (and its destiny) rather than the phenomenal object. 123 The
sublime arises for Kant when the subject substitutes concern for humanity with an
attention towards the object. While Kant’s aesthetic judgment regards the sublime as a
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subjective response, it is an a priori function because it is universal. This distinction
separates Kant’s transcendental aesthetics from previous empirical theories (Locke,
Burke). The subjective sublime remains a final cause for the individual subject even as it
is determined and therefore universal. For Kant, the mathematical sublime obtains when
“extreme magnitude challenges the imagination (as the faculty of sensible representation)
to an extraordinary effort.”124 The mathematical sublime ensues when ‘apprehension’, an
intuition, realizes the magnitude presented to the imagination. In a temporal sequence of
intuitions, apprehension normatively proceeds towards comprehension, or a synthetic
intuition of the whole magnitude, but imagination stalls as comprehension reaches its
limit. Imagination, then, begins to fragment, and what remains is an abyss, or “collapse of
comprehension.” Reason, then, must recognize a negation of imagination, and reason
provides instead the idea of the supersensible and the subject admits that its destiny, too,
is in negativity.
For Kant, “the sublime in nature is only negative…it is a feeling of imagination
by its own act depriving itself of its freedom by receiving a final determination in
accordance with a law other than that of its empirical employment.” 125 Further, according
to Kant, the subject experiences in the sublime a “power greater than that which it
sacrifices. But the ground of this is concealed from it, and in its place it feels sacrifice or
deprivation, as well as its cause, to which it has been subjected.” 126 The sublime creates a
negation of the imagination as apprehension fails to gain comprehension, yet reason is
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forced to accept this negation. Reason must partition imagination. Weiskel notes that in
this “alienation between imagination and reason” a feeling of power is gained through the
absence of intuition. Even as reason feels a sense of power as it grasps what imagination
lacks, that power arises in a feeling for negation. That feeling of power originates in the
sublime as a negative originality. Negative originality, then, arises in the imagination
depriving itself of freedom from a law beyond sense intuition. The law results from nonidentity; reason must look to the supersensible for power, and freedom is deferred since
its law is incomprehensible.
Weiskel notices that the negative sublime begins in a similarity disorder where
denotative meaning is understood but metaphorical meaning eludes understanding. 127 In
such a case the idea of allegory’s dark conceits supposes a meaning beyond
comprehension.128 Meaning is often cast as veiled.129 The continuity disorder that
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disrupts normative syntactic order is spoken of as a positive sublime since a re-ordering
of syntax suggests more subjective control. Weiskel considers the negative sublime a
problem of effect and the positive sublime, a problem for creativity, but he also reminds
us that the overlap is too vague to make the poet/reader binary meaningful. 130 We should
remind ourselves that Kant’s main objective in his notion of pure reason is to show the
limits of reason constrained by understanding (aided by sense intuitions as they are given
by imagination). Without the imagination to ground reason, reason becomes isolated,
negating what originates in the world. The sublime raises a feeling of power in reason
that it alone can restore to the imagination: it provides to consciousness ideas out of itself
rather than in the world.
Reason is thus creative, but again, a mode of negative originality, in that
origination is fabricated through a collapse of comprehension. If we regard the sublime
moment as a semiological event we can see that the mental stasis that precedes the
apprehension of the sublime acts as a conventional basis for signification. As signifiers
collapse in the moment of defeat of the imagination all signifieds are negated; that is,
meaning that is suggested or promised evaporates until the power of reason begins to
recover the abyss of meaning by paradigmatic or syntagmatic substitution. Reason calls
upon itself to provide meaning, and the act of negative originality involves a dynamic
action where signifieds are both repressed and sublimated. In the restoration of meaning,

relationship between “mind and nature” or subject and object—relationships internal to the
concept of romanticism—an approach to romanticism as historical change stems from a
reorientation of perspective is to look for ways language is figured by an appeal to Nature. Rather
than seeking meaning in the veiled signification of nature de Man seeks meaning in the relation
between rhetoric and trope.
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the sublime eventuates a creative solution of meaning through negation. We could define
the sign as an instantiation of negative originality.
Rather than view the Kantian sublime in terms of its “idealist metaphysics”
Weiskel sees the Kantian sublime as a “psychological” event. 131 Weiskel remarks that
“[w]e call an object sublime if the attempt to represent it determines the mind’s relation
to a transcendent order.” An object as represented in the mind, when it exceeds the power
of representation, will cause a “collapse” of the representation since the mind lacks the
power to present it (such as the idea of infinity). Instead of a representation the mind
produces an intuition of the objects as a thing “unattainable.” Because the thing is
“unconditioned” in that there is no concept available to the understanding, reason
becomes aware of a condition of unattainability as a deficit or a negation. As a result of
the imagination’s inability to assign a representation to the object because of its
unconditioned state, the mind becomes immediately aware of the limits of reason through
the effect of negation.
The origination of the negative sublime coincides with the disruption of intuitive
reason. There is a moment Wordsworth’s The Prelude VI when the poet realizes that
“Our destiny, our being’s heart and home, / Is with infinitude, and only there.132 The
disruption of intuitive reason results from the sudden onset of the negative sublime:
“Imagination—here the Power so called / Through sad incompetence of human speech—
/ That awful Power rose from the Mind’s abyss / Like an unfathered vapour that enwraps
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/ At once the lonely Traveller.”133 Negative originality becomes an “unfathered vapour.”
Wordsworth’s Simplon Pass episode is illustrative of the desire to ascend to mountain
heights yet to encounter a stream that blocks the passage:
By fortunate chance, / A peasant met us, from whose mouth we learned / That to
the Spot which had perplexed us first / We must descend, and there we should
find the road, / Which in the stony channel of the Stream / Lay a few steps, and
then along its banks, / And that our future course, all plain in sight, / Was
downwards, with the current of the Stream.134
As Weiskel suggests, “The Romantic sublime was an attempt to revise the
meaning of transcendence precisely when the traditional apparatus of sublimation—
spiritual, ontological, and (one gathers) psychological and even perceptual—was failing
to be exercised or understood.”135
The economy of desire remains in a state of imbalance; the anxiety of absence
always exceeds the ability of sensation or reflection to fill it; thus, we can never know the
object through sensation or perception. The soul remains a tautology; subjectivity is
bound to itself. It can never know itself through the subjectivity of the object except by
its capacity for negative capability. So a reduction of will is the requisite means of
understanding the economy of the soul: “Anxiety replaces the will as the principle of
individuation.”136
In his essay “What is Metaphysics?” Heidegger discusses the relation of the
sublime and its role through anxiety of opening to negativity:
Such being attuned, in which we ‘are’ one way or another and which determines
us through and through, lets us find ourselves among beings as a whole. The
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founding mode of attunement not only reveals beings as a whole in various ways,
but this revealing--far from being merely incidental--is also the basic occurrence
of our Dasein….Now we have come to share even less in the opinion that the
negation of beings as a whole that re revealed to us in mood places us before the
nothing. Such a thing could happen in a correspondingly original mood which in
the most proper sense of unveiling reveals the nothing….Does such attunement,
in which man is brought before the nothing itself, occur in human
existence?...This can and does occur, although rarely enough and only for a
moment, in the fundamental mood of anxiety. By this anxiety we do not mean the
quite common anxiousness, ultimately reducible to fearfulness, which all too
readily comes over us. Anxiety is basically different from fear. We become afraid
in the face of this or that particular being that threatens us in this or that particular
respect. Fear in the face of something is also in each case a fear for something in
particular....Striving to rescue himself from this particular thing, he becomes
unsure of everything else and completely ‘loses his head’….Anxiety does not let
such confusion arise. Much to the contrary, a particular calm pervades it. Anxiety
is indeed anxiety in the face of...., but not in the face of this or that thing. Anxiety
is the face of...is always anxiety for..., but not for this or that. The
indeterminateness of that in the face of which and for which we become anxious
is no mere lack of determination but rather the essential impossibility of
determining it….Anxiety reveals the nothing….[In the sublime] Anxiety robs us
of speech. Because beings as a whole slip away, so that just the nothing crowds
round, in the face of anxiety all utterance of the ‘is’ falls silent. That in the
malaise of anxiety we often try to shatter the vacant stillness with compulsive talk
only proves the presence of the nothing.137
Heidegger is suggesting here that it is the structure of the sublime, through a
mode of attunement attributable to the mood of anxiety that permits consciousness to
become momentarily aware of the fundamental negativity of being, or Dasein. The essay
“What is Metaphysics?”(1929) postulates nihil as a transcendental signifier. While in
Hegel’s view negation was a mode of becoming in a movement of return, a century later
Heidegger posited a nihil originarium as a horizon of temporality in which the worldstructure originates as an “ecstatic happening.” 138 Unlike earlier Romantic concepts of
originality that unite the particular with the universal as in Coleridge’s primary
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imagination or Hegel’s absolute spirit, both eternal concepts, Heidegger’s temporality
provides a theory of transcendence that is tangential and moves toward a fundamental
ontology that is conceivable in the world. Temporality is phenomenological in that it is a
mode of consciousness. Heidegger observes that the paradox of Kantian freedom, a
spontaneous and disinterested relation to others, parallels time, in that both concepts arise
a priori to will. Temporality is “primordial” and thus transcends reason and language,
and acts as a tabula rasa. Reality becomes a temporalization due the awareness of
oscillation, as Poe discussed in Eureka, and through this awareness temporality projects
itself. In Melvillean terms that moment of projection becomes the instant when one may
actually strike through the mask.
Yet if temporality is primordial to language the phenomenalization of temporality
as temporalization originates in language. Heidegger’s concept of presentness holds that
communicative language is grounded in expressivity and signification. Robert Hughes
notes that for Heidegger language transaction “does not exhaust itself in signifying.” 139
Language, in its act of transaction, also discloses Being. Language makes the world
present. Entities become revealed through language. Presentness has both general and
particular aspects. Language discloses Being to phenomenal subjects. From the
standpoint of the particular, then, originality is disclosed from it negativity through
presentness. For Heidegger, says Hughes, poetry is the form of language most capable of
disclosing Being. By poetry, Hughes clarifies, Heidegger means language as an art that
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pursues truth.140 Artistic language, which might include either prose or verse, is
contrasted with “everyday” language. Like a dead metaphor, everyday language is a
depleted form of poetics. Poetics alone has the power to disclose Being in its originality.
Hughes notices that Heidegger and Emerson share the view that everyday
language originates in poetic language. Hughes summarizes that “the poetic word—
language in all its original brilliance and power—calls forth the world (and the whole of
what is) in a way that everyday language, fossilized and long since dead, can no longer
do.”141 Hughes further clarifies that “for Emerson and for Heidegger, what is ultimately at
stake in the poetic force of the each original word is not an isolated signified or referent,
but rather the world that the poetic word summons into the open.” Poetry and criticism
are thus uniquely empowered to disclose Being through language. This disclosure
amounts to an experience of Dasein in a momentary encounter with language, an
encounter that temporarily unveils the unsayable. This unconcealment of originality as
negativity approaches a redefinition of “truth” from its apodeictic and epideictic senses as
rhetorical persuasion, to an aletheic sense of an essential truth.
What remains with presentness and unconcealment—the disclosure that takes
place in this model of nihil originarium—is that the discernability between original and
mimesis is itself premised on metaphysical distinctions. Mimesis and memory are related
in that memory is a form of representation. Mimesis, when it is seen from the analogy of
memory, rest on its relation to the concept of truth. According to Jonathan Culler, “when
truth is conceived as aletheia, the unveiling or making present of what has been hidden,
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then mimesis is the representation necessary to this process, the doubling which enables
something to present itself.” Yet, “when truth is not aletheia but homoiosis, adequation or
correspondence, then mimesis is the relation between an image or representation and that
to which it may truly correspond.” 142 The relation between original forms from their
representations remains unstable, conceptually; mimetic presentations proliferate such
that mimesis weakens compared to an absolute original.
While Heidegger’s transcendental concept of temporality suggests an a priori nihil
originary to Being, its disclosure to beings appears in language, and with language
thought enters the domain of mimesis. Mimesis splits into modalities that are essential
and inessential. In the unveiling process the essential is retained, whereas in recollection
the mimetic representation is no longer valued. Mimesis thus relates to truth on one hand,
and imitation, on the other. Imitation becomes a devalued concept in the arts if such arts
have recognized this distinction. Imitation implies further imitation and the concept gains
weakness due to iteration. If the concept of originality turns to the relation between texts
then the concept sets up the deconstructive problem of generative originality. If “the play
of mimesis” shifts the concept of originality to a “(non)concept of originary mimesis,”
the hierarchy maintained between original and mimesis breaks down. Mimetic relations
become fundamentally intertextual. “Texts that assert the plentitude of origin, the
uniqueness of an original, the dependency of a manifestation or derivation of an
imitation, may reveal that the original is already an imitation and that everything begins
with reproduction.” Texts are both unoriginal and too fully original.
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The Movement of Return
As a narrative of the psychology of negative originality the temporality of the
Romantic sublime describes a three-phase structure. Hegel had employed the term
“sublation” (aufgehen) to describe the dual process of negation and reflection. Hegel
suggests that “self-consciousness…has a double object; one is the immediate object, that
of sense-certainty and perception, which however for self-consciousness has the character
of a negative”143 The negativity that defines the second term of the movement of return is
posited as a stage where
Self-consciousness is faced by another self-consciousness; it has come out of
itself…it has lost itself, for it finds itself an other being…it has superseded the
other, for it does not see the other as an essential being, but in the other sees its
own self.144
Hegel’s first term in the three-part structure of the dialectic is as follows: “Selfconsciousness is, to begin with, simple being-for-itself, self-equal through the exclusion
from itself of everything else...it is an individual.” 145 In a post-Freudian rendering of the
first stage of the movement of the sublime, the late Yale structuralist Thomas Weiskel
suggests that the mind (for Hegel, it is unmediated being) originates “in a determinate
relation to the object.”146 The impetus in negation is a recognition of the originary self as
other. Hegel puts it that the first stage arises when “individuality appears on the scene as
an original determinate nature: original, for it is implicit; originally determinate, for the
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negative moment is present in itself...” 147 At that moment, the relation of mind to object
is in a state of equilibrium and is thus preconscious. In structuralist’s terms, Weiskel
suggests that the movement of return at this stage can be described as “syntagmatic
linearity”; the temporality of the mind finds a normative conscious state of
comprehension. Representations of ideas to the mind are metonymic in that associations
are paradigmatically unitary.
In the movement of the negative sublime, the second phase finds a disruption of
normative consciousness and a disjunction between the object and the imagination. These
two conditions, disruption and disjunction, describe negative originality as they occur in
the movement of return. The imagination is unable to present to the understanding a
representation of the object because the object has become incomprehensible due to a
psychological block. Thus the syntagmatic continuity of consciousness loses its grip and
by means of an obscure intuition that is “unconditioned,” reason recognizes a
paradigmatic absence of concept. The “affective correlative” results in a sublime state of
bewilderment. There results in this moment a “disconcerting disproportion between inner
and outer”148 The relation between mind and object becomes indeterminate. There thus
occurs a disjunction between a “residue” of a signified (the presumption of an idea that
originated prior to the moment), and its negation (through the discovery in consciousness
that there is no signified to attach to the signifier). The “excess” of the object, negativity
to consciousness, “cancels the representational efficacy of the mind which can only turn,
for its new object, to itself.” 149 Weiskel adds that “self-consciousness too, can be prior
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and can force the rupture when the object (or memory) represented is too insignificant
(fails to signify).”
The second term of the dialectic is the crucial point in the movement of return.
For Hegel negativity is a theory of the movement and development of thought. Hegel
recognized that negativity itself might refer not simply to pure negation (contradiction as
an intuition) but from ontological concepts where being becomes itself by negative
movement.150 Pure negativity (as contradiction) does provide the truth that contradiction
is reciprocating: in reciprocity there is a movement of return. But ontological (negative
originality) negation interposes an antithetical and enclosing sequence whereby being
returns into itself already transformed and more actualized. Negative originality (in this
metaphysical sense) is according to Hegel, “not an original unity” but a “reflection into
otherness within oneself.”151 A significant passage from Hegel’s Science of Logic
deserves quoting in full:
The second term, the negative or mediated, is further at the same time the
mediating term…it is the negative of the positive, and includes the positive in
itself [...] it is the intrinsically other, the other of an other…it includes its own
other in itself, and is consequently, as contradiction, the posited dialectic of
itself.—Since the first or immediate term is the concept in itself, it is therefore
only in itself, the negative, and thus with it the dialectical moment consists in the
difference which it in itself contains being posited in it. The second term, on the
contrary, is itself the determinate, difference or relationship; hence with it the
dialectical moment consists in positing the unity that is contained in it.—If, then,
the negative, the determinate, relationship, judgement, and all the terms which
come under this second moment of the method do not at once appear on their own
account as contradiction and as dialectical, the fault lies solely with the thinking
that does not bring the thoughts together. For the material, the opposed terms in
one relation, is already posited and at hand for thought. Formal thinking,
however, makes identity its law and allows the contradictory content before it to
fall away into the sphere of representation, into space and time, where the
contradictions are held asunder in juxtaposition and succession and so come
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before consciousness lacking the reciprocal contact. Formal thinking lays down
the definite principle on this point that contradiction is unthinkable; but [...] the
thinking of contradiction is the essential moment of the concept. 152
The passage from the second to the third stage of the sublime moment can be
characterized as an “instance of sublimation.”153 Weiskel suggests sublimation is both a
psychological idea and a chemical analogy, much as Eliot had done in the essay
“Tradition and the Individual Talent.” The consequence of negative originality is that
substance remains itself but within it the self develops through a series of negating
moments into a developed (bildung) subject as a self-defining actuality. These moments
collapse into a circular movement eventuating a return to self in a transformed state. This
“labor of the negative” becomes a bildungsroman, a narrative form of the individual.154
Through sublimation a psychological disorder is supplanted by a higher order
resolution. In the chemical analogy a solid state is directly transformed into a gas. The
transposition of one condition from lower to higher modality seems to be accompanied
by an implicit value schema. It is worth considering whether the lower position may be
equally valuable. Originality is substantiated at the second stage when the lower order is
in effect, and thus it is at that locus when origination happens. “To consider the problem
of originality is to find the two kinds of sublimation, the poet’s and readers’, compounded
or superimposed. In the sublime moment the poet will be ‘daemonized,’ or possessed by
a power which seems to be merely mediated by the text or scene he reads” 155
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The recovery of the ego in the movement of return proceeding to the third stage
involves daemonization which involves both a metaphorical substitution of signifier and
a metonymical displacement.156 The free play that was imminent during the second stage
becomes sublimated only at the cost of a negation of freedom. Recovery begins in
originality but succumbs to self-binding: “Sublimation offers motility to one ‘surface,’
but it requires submission to a new control.” 157 That control arrives as sublation.
Hegel describes the third phase of the movement of return as a sublation that
restores the subject to a state of immediacy. He posits that
The self-relation of the negative is, therefore, its return into itself; it is immediacy
as the sublating of the negative; but immediacy simply and solely as this relation
or as return from a negative, and hence a self-sublating immediacy. This is
posited being or positedness, immediacy purely and simply as determinateness or
as self-reflecting. This immediacy which is only as return of the negative into
itself, is that immediacy which constitutes the determinateness of illusory being
and which previously seemed to be the starting point of the reflective moment.
But this immediacy, instead of being able to form the starting point is, on the
contrary, immediacy only as the return or as reflection itself. Reflection therefore
is the movement that starts or returns only in so far as the negative has already
returned into itself.158
The third phase, or the recovery from the sublime moment that arose in stage two
of the negative sublime, the state of incomprehensibility, results not in unmediated being
in the pure sense it held in stage one of objective individuality, but a resulting state of
“illusory being,” or a reflective state that is mediated as a result of original negativity. In
other words, consciousness has spiraled beyond its originary state as a result of
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negativity. Negative originality operates “in itself” and “for itself.” This movement
moves from instability, where the in-itself is as yet undefined, to a stable recognition of
actuality for itself. Further, the in-itself lacks the insight to see the forms of alienation the
individual will encounter in time and movement, and thus has a false sense of its
outcome. The for-itself, on the other hand, traces the series of negations and chooses
from possibilities what it can to achieve actuality. This is the volitional aspect of
subjectivity permitted by negative originality. Negative originality is a form of mediation
the self produces for itself. Mediation is the agency that reproduces identity through
reflection. Through reflection the negated substance is reflected back on to itself in
mediate form. The absolute end of this development is achieved when negation returns to
simplicity and what was latent in the original is now consummated in the subject. 159
The question arises for Weiskel, in terms of structural psychology, whether in the
second structural phase of negation a further reconstitution or resolution of the structural
paradigm is existentially possible. If not, the negative is preserved, such that the signified
becomes an aporia, a gap between signifier and sign that is marked by negativity or
absence. This “excess of the signified” creates and “overdetermines” a condition of
metaphorical excess.160 The second phase of the sublime moment can be represented as
the Romantic “wasteland” motif, an apocalyptic scene that disrupts the syntagmatic flow
of the sublime movement. A sense of “restorative action” becomes unavailable, except in
the sense of what Friedrich Schlegel termed “permanent parabasis,” and where “meaning
is overwhelmed by an overdetermination which in its extreme threatens a state of
absolute metaphor, a state of entropy or complete repetition” says Weiskel. The second
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phase is thus a sort of blankness or whiteness, in Melvillian terms, where the scene of
reading is of such overwhelming signification that “the word dissolves into the Word.” It
becomes a Wordworthian “spot in time” and of extreme verticality or metaphoricity, an
abyss of meaning produced by overstauration. “What threatens here is stasis, a kind of
death by plentitude, which Wordsworth elsewhere calls an ‘abyss of idealism,’ which
destroys the seeking for a signifier, the ‘perpetual logic’ in which alone the mind can
continue to live.”161
But the moment of the second phase produces a reactive third phase characterized
by Bloom as daemonization, misprision, or misreading. It is tempting to assume a
Hegelian synthesis, but it produces, rather, a “modal” rather than an antithetical
dichotomy. The affective power of the second phase is never fully overcome, even as the
third phase attempts to restore the disruption in one of two possible ways. One way is to
break the syntagmatic chain and substitute a signifier that the mind can anchor to reason,
as Emerson attempted. This substitution involves instantiating a new metaphor in place of
the “significant absence” in the second phase. This ‘presentation’ of a Kantian sense of
“unattainability” is aesthetic rather than transcendental, singular rather than categorical.
“Perhaps being and depth have no independent ontological status; perhaps they are
reifications of the signifying power, spontaneously created by the mind at the zero
degree, in the mere reflex of making absence significant,” Weiskel considers. 162
Originality seems, then, to arise out of negativity.
The third phase finds the mind in a reactive position to the moment of the sublime
intrusion. The mind overcomes, potentially, its negativity, by symbolizing the
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incomprehensibility (indeterminacy) of the object by invoking a metaphoric or
paradigmatic shift in consciousness. Consciousness bursts from its syntagmatic linear
order and metaphorizes negation as a transcendental idea, as means of ascendance, a
spiraling re-origination captured by Hawthorne. “This new relation has a ‘meta’
character, which distinguishes it from the homologous [syntagmatic] relation of habitual
perception.”163 The perception collapses image into sign, and the “semiotic character of
the sublime moment [...] preserves the sublimation” that is the resultant sign. The
fictional structure of the Romantic sublime identifies in the transcendental moment of
originality the instantiation of sublimation, which resolves the incomprehensibility of
transcendence by resolving the dissonance of the self. Sublimation becomes an “intuition
of depth,” which Melville discovers momentarily in “The Mast-Head”:
In the serene weather of the tropics it is exceedingly pleasant—the mast-head; nay
to a dreamy meditative man it is delightful. There you stand, a hundred feet above
the silent decks, striding along the deep, as if the masts were gigantic stilts, while
beneath you and between your legs, as it were, swim the hugest monsters of the
sea, even as ships once sailed between the boots of Colossus at old Rhodes. There
you stand, lost in the infinite series of the sea, while nothing ruffled but the
waves.164
When this transcendental moment occurs relative to a preceding temporal
moment, as it does in Emerson’s sublime, the precedent becomes erased through
disruption and partial recovery through the trope of metalepsis. Weiskel explains that
“[t]he sublime moment establishes depth because the presentation of unattainability is
phenomenologically a negation, a falling away from what might be seized, perceived,
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known. As an image, it is the abyss.” 165 The structure of the sublime moment that arises
for the subject-object binary of Kantian metaphysics permits a dialectical structure of
instantiation and negation that continues through Hegel. The semiotic reduction to
signifier and signified permits a model where the relation between instantiation and
negation can be mapped onto syntagm and paradigm. The syntagmatic chain is
instantiated in the subject position. The possibility of a chain arises through the concept
of repetition, and through iteration the mind arrives at the intuition, that is indeterminate
and unconditional, of infinity. Thus the verticality of paradigm seems to arise from
syntagm through extension of excess or magnitude.
Towards an American Sublime
Our concentration on the second term of the movement of return—negativity that
originates out of its own originality—acknowledges the dilemma of individual
determination in the context of a dialogic rather than a dialectical relationship with an
existing order. It is clear that Kant and Shelling and their British and American
counterparts, Coleridge and Emerson, sought a ground for transcendence through a
completion of the movement of return into the universal spirit. Emerson held out for the
promise of transcendence even as he exiled himself from the body of Unitarianism.
Emerson’s negative originality located itself, in Hegelian terms, by understanding that the
“highest form of nothingness for itself is freedom, but freedom is negativity when it sinks
into itself to its greatest intensity, and is itself also affirmation.” 166
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The idea that meaning arises out of signification through sign-systems and
negotiations is another way of admitting that discourse has both dialectic and dialogic
content. At issue is the way meaning arises in the American Sublime as a function of
metalepsis and rhetoric. The American Sublime originates in a “poetic defense.” Meaning
becomes over-determined through misprision. Misprision is a form of repression that
results as a “ratio of representation.” The degree of repression results from the repression
of one memory and a re-presentation of an alternative idea. As opposed to repression, on
the other hand, “poetic sublimation” involves (rather than a representation of something
putatively new through forgetting the old) a ratio of limitation, whereby something is
recalled in order to expressly avoid presenting it. Another thing is instead presented that
is always already presupposed by its precursor.
Greater than the Romantic Sublime in general, the American Sublime exposes a
“deep structure” of defensive rhetoric. If de Man’s reading of Nietzsche defines rhetoric
as a “system of tropes,” on one hand, and as a form of persuasion, on the other, there
remains an interstitial aporia lacking definition. The “daemonic in Emerson [is] that
apocalyptic frenzy of an American Sublime.” 167 Bloom posits that aporia as a defensive
system. When tropes relate, what “carries each trope from evasion to persuasion, is that
trope’s function as defense, its imagistic maskings of those detours to death that make up
the highway map of the psyche from anterior fixations to entropic self-destructions.” For
Emerson, meaning and signification indicate different ideas. Whereas signification
implies for deconstruction a structural system to be unpacked, meaning itself is not
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merely the instrumentality of deconstruction, but arises for Bloom, at least, in human
existence and especially self-defense.
Negativity should not be confused with Hegelian negation, which is a dialectical
process, and reveals self-consciousness through its synthesis. Rather, negativity is closer
to Bloomian misprision which avoids reification through the deployment of tactical
power towards texts. But negativity does not offer closure in the enabling sense that
Bloom’s Anxiety of Influence does. Negativity is not merely a tool of the strong poet or
individual artist. Differing from “nothingness” there is no state of negativity. Negativity
is the unspoken meaning behind tranformation and is dynamic and fluid. 168 Negativity
suggests that any singularity in appearance is actually multiple. Negativity resists the
premise of singularity and points to plurality as a basic state. This makes negativity
fundamentally different from negation. While negation eliminates plurality, negativity
enforces it. Negativity resists closure and limits. Therefore it cannot be equated with the
concept of essentialism. Where the notion of originality points directly to some essential
quality enclosing on a concept, and offers a base of orientation, negativity deessentializes the idea by pluralizing it.
Like originality, though, negativity operates to originate plurality against closure.
Since originality is a self-referential concept it is reflexive only in a tautological sense,
whereas negativity resists tautology in that is plurality in prolongation. Whereas
Romantic originality sought a unifying essentialism as an absolute concept, negativity
radically reorients originality so that rather than accept the possibility of an originating
axis as an ideological point of grounding, grounding itself becomes a fallacy since any
168
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idea of originality immediately becomes recontextualized in terms of another. Eric
Carlson articulates the issue of an American sublime from the point of view of Poe’s
metaphysics, as we shall now explore. Carlson writes that
In his “Colloquy of Monos and Una,” however, Poe set forth a cultural and
psychological diagnosis of the sick society of his day. He described it as a time of
“diseased commotion, moral and physical.” He saw “man’s general condition at
this epoch” as marked by “general misrule” resulting from false ideas about
“universal equality”; by “huge smoking cities” and other blemishes of ugly
industrialization; and by the “leading evil Knowledge” — i.e., abstract rationalism
which, along with the mechanical arts, has led to “the blind neglect” of “Taste” in
the schools. As a result, man lost his “sentiment of the natural” and, experiencing
a kind of cultural shock or “future shock,” as we call it, suffered acute psychic
conflict and fragmentation. At this time, too, Poe described the “world of mind”
as a delicate balance of intellect, taste, and moral sense. Anything that upset the
delicate balance would disrupt the whole self.169
Poe’s sublime, as Carlson suggests, arises in the “future shock” he recognizes in his
negative relation to the mundane. And, as we shall see, Poe allegorizes plurality in the
flux of the bipartite self. Unlike originality there no consolidation, but rather the self
exists merely in a state of flux. As such negativity resists appropriation to any ideology.
Whereas originality forms an ideological system that terminates in itself; negativity
originates a tropic of combinatoriality. The tropic itself eludes spaciality but operates in
temporality, and it cannot be hypostatized. In that sense, because it resists fixity, it resists
negation. It is denial and admission at once. Negativity is inherently dialogical in
character.
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Chapter 3: Poe's Pure Reason and Literary Morality
By the mid-1840s Edgar Allan Poe demonstrated a desire to initiate in America a
literary criticism of quality in quantity. Mme. de Stael wrote in De l’Allemagne that
One wishes to demonstrate everything, ever since the taste for the exact sciences
became the fashion among intellects; and because the calculus of probabilities
makes it possible to submit the uncertain itself to rules, one flatters oneself with
having resolved mathematically all the difficulties presented by the most delicate
questions, and with having thus made the spirit of algebra reign over the
universe.1
With respect to Edgar Allan Poe, the issue of a ratiocinative universe is whether concerns
of metaphysics, invoking Kant’s “critical” reason, are matters of probability rather than
possibility. In other words, for Poe, intuitive reason is subject to rule.
Poe seeks a state of intelligibility. The faculty of understanding is universal, he
says, yet comprehension is not. The notion of God “is by no means the expression of an
idea—but an effort at one. It stands for the possible attempt at an impossible
conception.”2 Poe clearly finds transcendental reason unacceptable. He also questions
reason from the perspective that deduction and induction provide a reliable means to
truth.3 Science progresses, Poe admits, by intuitive leaping rather than crawling. Part of
the problem for Poe is a distrust of perception. Close observation arrives at facts about
facts but has no means of attaining Law. Without reasons, facts alone limit any
knowledge of truth. Axioms have never existed; they are castles in the air, he adds. 4
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Moreover, truth seems mixed with the problem of conception. If truth relied on an
“ability to conceive” then “ninety-nine hundredths of what is undeniable in Heaven
would be demonstrable falsity upon the Earth.”5 Poe distinguishes axioms from
propositions, attempting to show that the law of non-contradiction is better regarded in
terms of the latter. It may be a matter of conception that a thing and its opposite cannot
both be true. But an “inability to conceive” cannot be axiomatic as a criterion for truth.
The “impossibility to conceive” admits no degrees, and clearly it is possible to conceive,
of say a tree, being both tree and non-tree. That, in fact, is exactly the premise behind
Romantic figuration. The Romantic symbol by its very nature as metaphor purports to
overcome contradiction. While perception may be seemingly aleatoric and conception
fails to distinguish fact from fiction—Poe’s essential criticism of Transcendentalism—
through ratiocinative probability there is the possibility for an intuitive reason that might
uncover truth through accident.
In Eureka Poe returns to the metacritical device of the accidental letter. This
letter, appearing in a corked bottle on the “Mare Tenerarum” (or dark oceans) “little
frequented in modern days unless by the Transcendentalists” is dated “two thousand eight
hundred and forty eight,” a millennium later than the time of Poe’s writing. 6
Presumably this post-dating allows Poe to conjecture the outcome of the millennium. The
hint at a transcendental apocalypse is immediately disrupted by an attack on reasoning
from self-evident principles. Reasoning by deduction through maxims or axioms brings
Poe to suggest that in fact “no truths are self-evident.” Kant, Poe adds, as “the originator
of that species of Transcendentalism which, with the change merely of a C for a K, now
5
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bears his peculiar name.” Poe’s strategy of negating first principles on which
Transcendental reasoning depends alerts us that he is quite dubious with regard to the
Kantian paradox, that Kant’s moral reasoning depends on self-evident reasons presumed
to originate a priori.
Implicit in the futurity of the found letter in Eureka Poe reveals, ironically, an
almost Emersonian rejection of the past. And anticipating Whitman by a quarter century,
Poe proposes to cross the threshold of an American sublime by “scarifying” Emerson.
Mimicking Emerson’s call for newness in the American Scholar address, Poe has his
future writer state:
I do not quarrel with the ancients ... so much on account of the transparent
frivolity of their logic … as on account of their pompous and infatuate
proscription of all other roads to truth than the two narrow and crooked paths—
the one creeping and the other crawling—to which, in their ignorant perversity,
they have dared to confine the Soul—the Soul which loves nothing so well as to
soar in those regions of illimitable intuition which are utterly incognizant of
‘path’.7
At the outset of Poe’s quarrel with Emerson over the path to truth we are reminded that in
“Self-Reliance,” Emerson had spoken of character as a unique zig-zag pattern that
disguises its consistency.
Here, Poe’s “crooked paths,” which are induction and deduction (materiality and
spirituality) disguise the real consistency of truth. Poe’s future writer demands we
consider “the majestic highways of the Consistent,” which demonstrate that “a perfect
consistency can be nothing but an absolute truth.”8 Poe’s quibbling over consistency is a
red herring, mostly, since Emerson’s point that we read inconsistency incorrectly by
focusing on changes of direction rather than on the overall direction of the path. Poe’s
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real argument with Emerson seems not to be whether there may be an originality of
absolute truth, or whether it can be arrived at by intuition, but whether truth is a matter of
subjective Nature, or whether it is objective and rational. Poe’s complaint about “the two
boasted roads,” deduction and induction, is that neither mode of reason has a claim to an
absolute truth; whereas, an “unencumbered Consistency” amounts to “an absolute and an
unquestionable Truth.” This consistent truth, as Poe conceives it, is affirmed by the mere
fact of gravity. Poe’s writer of futurity, his “unknown correspondent,” reminds us that
Kepler “guessed” gravitational laws, laws which are “the basis of all (existing) physical
principles.”9 And that these laws were discovered on the basis of an imagination confirms
a metaphysical insight; Poe’s future writer imagines Kepler might have boasted: “I do
know the machinery of the Universe. Here it is. I grasped it with my soul—I reached it
through mere dint of intuition.”
But what is intuition? It is, according to the future writer, “but the conviction
resulting from deductions and inductions of which the processes were so shadowy as to
have escaped his consciousness, eluded his reason, or bidden defiance of his capacity of
expression.”10 Poe’s unknown correspondent makes the point that Kepler was essentially
a theorist, an intellectual perspective “now of so much sanctity,” but “in those ancient
days, a designation of supreme contempt.” And it is in futurity that humankind will
“sympathize with the prophetical and poetical rhapsody of his ever-memorable words.”11
Kepler becomes the metaphysician of the scientific revolution, in the view of the
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“unknown correspondent.” As opposed to Newtonian physics based on induction, if
Kepler
could demonstrate that his ‘celestial physics’ was valid, he would be able to
demonstrate that only the Copernican system of the universe made physical sense
and that it was true. Since, as he believed, the heliocentric system was a material
symbol of God in His creation, establishing its truth continued to have an
important religious dimension as well.12
Poe’s unknown correspondent’s claim that it is shadowy reason rather than
induction that led to the suggestion that there might be a binary split between reason and
intuition. A central claim of Kuhn’s work is that scientists do not make their judgments as
the result of consciously or unconsciously following rules. Their judgments are
nonetheless tightly constrained during normal science by the example of the guiding
paradigm. During a revolution they are released from these constraints (though not
completely). Consequently there is a gap left for other factors to explain scientific
judgments. Kuhn himself suggests in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions that “Sun
worship may have made Kepler a Copernican and that in other cases, facts about an
individual's life history, personality or even nationality and reputation may play a role.” 13
Laplace’s Essai philosophique adduces that the relation of causes to events is a
fractional number where the numerator attests to a probable number and the denominator
includes all possible related events. The simple notion of a science of moral probability is
that it is also a matter of epistemology. Human moral judgment is a matter of
consciousness. Romantic views of science and thought seek an ontological understanding
of phenomenon, and to understand nature in terms of a universal idea. Laplacean science
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seeks within epistemological boundaries a comprehensive and general law of Nature; that
is, it seeks an ontological understanding, as such. That binary—Romanticepistemology—informs Poe’s notion of a Romantic Science.14 In Romantic Science the
formalization of phenomena became, for Poe, the doctrine of ratiocination.
This sort of analysis depends on a breaking apart and synthesis of ideas to
understand a thing’s essential make up. The problem of ratiocination is that mathematical
symbols deceive through the suggestion that such symbols are capable of signifying
general truth. The lack of metaphor in science pushes the need for a more linguistic
approach to understanding representation. It is the ambiguity of signifiers, the limitations
posed by mathematics on ratiocination, that induces Poe to an epistemology of aesthetics,
where the most universal term, which subsumes the sublime, is beauty.15 For Poe, as for
Keats, “Beauty is truth, truth beauty.”
The essential bifurcation in Romantic biology, as propounded by Aggasiz, is the
difference between mechanism and vitalism. In Poe’s “Maezel’s Chess Player” he asks
how it is that an automaton can be at the same time not subject to fixed determinacy. “No
one move in chess necessarily follows another….” he notices. 16 Poe’s analysis of such a
mechanized yet aleatoric instrument is centered on its movement, its process towards an
indeterminate end. Chai argues that this analysis equally defines human behavior, and as
such human beings are mechanistic. Yet Poe would argue that a chess game is not mere
indeterminacy but a series of calculations that obtain in variability. 17 Such variations may
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be arbitrary. One might add that machines must operate with the limits of physical laws
so that their performance derives part of its arbitrariness from the vagueries of operation.
He also notices this to be true of human action in the physical world. As such, a clear
distinction between organism and mechanism is not clear. What does distinguish the
organism, particularly the human, from the mechanical, is the matter of variability which
are self-generated, and pertain to speech and mind.
By 1842, however, Poe understood that the power of analysis that may distinguish
between originality and imitation becomes coextensive with imagination itself. In Poe’s
concept of unity of effect, conception is remapped by the power of analysis. Analysis, the
breaking into structural parts is a creative act. Like poems, facts proceed from theory.
That is in essence what occurs in “The Purloined Letter:” Dupin’s results obtain from a
better theoretical model. Such a theory, for Poe, requires an account of extraordinary
circumstances. Truth through ratiocination must account for the unusual or unexpected:
the outre. This is what Dupin terms “analytical power,” a power, not the “fancy” of the
ingenious, but the “imagination” of the analytic. 18 This brings to mind Coleridge’s
distinction, and if we pay attention to Coleridge’s analogy (in Biographia Literaria) of
creativity to chemical processes we discern the principle of ratiocination in the processes
of diffusion as a priori to creation.
Poe shows a bias toward quantitative thinking in his striving for a “unity of
theoretical elegance.”19 Poe, says Chai, “asserts the primacy or essentiality of logical
relations over material appearances.” 20 For example, In “The Purloined Letter,” Dupin,
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rather than succumb to the Prefect’s desultory inductions, deploys probability theory to
discover the whereabouts of the missing letter. The more telling concern for Poe’s desire
for unity through ratiocination is that through mathematics and probability he can achieve
absolute value.21 Following Laplace, it is possible to argue that consistency of effects
makes probable the analogy of causes. Leon Chai notes that Poe’s interest in
mathematics is not quantification, a formal representation of quality, but a “heuristic.” 22
In “The Purloined Letter,” Dupin admits that the Minister D— requires poetry to function
as reason. Poe makes this same claim in his epilogue to Eureka.
Poe seeks to establish a universal basis for reason, but it is a condition of reason
acting in the occasion of the particular. The notion of self-evidence lacks universality
since it has an appeal to logic and lacks a more fundamental cosmic force, a force
originating in the natural processes of attraction and repulsion. Human conception
remains fixed in the particular, and Poe’s view of fancy and imagination are not fully
clarified since both are creative and matters of degree. The point is crucial to
understanding Poe’s metaphysics of originality, which is by and large negative:
Novel conceptions are merely unusual combinations. The mind of man can
imagine nothing which has not really existed … Thus with all which seems to be
new—which appears to be a creation of intellect. It is resoluble into the old. The
wildest and most vigorous effort of mind cannot stand the test of analysis.23
While matter appears limitless in its quantity of particulars Poe questions the permanence
of its general condition. The concern has important ramifications for his aesthetic
philosophy, and specifically his notion of originality.
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Particularity, argues Poe in Eureka, exists in a temporal state of irradiation or
diffusion, a movement away from an originating source. Yet its exact position is never
fixed and ultimately collapses back into an original unity. Originality, then, is an ideal
state never witnessed. Appearance is transitory with respect to time and space. Whereas
Emerson’s positive Romantic sense that a transcendent nature can be reasoned through
art, language, and prospect, Poe’s more negative revision of intuition holds that truth
obtains only in the particular appearance, in temporality, and through ratiocination. In his
“prose-poem” Eureka (1848) Poe writes:
Never was necessity less obvious than that of supposing Matter imbued with an
ineradicable quality forming part of its material nature — a quality, or instinct,
forever inseparable from it, and by dint of which inalienable principle every atom
is perpetually impelled to seek its fellow-atom. Never was necessity less obvious
than that of entertaining this unphilosophical idea. Going boldly behind the vulgar
thought, we have to conceive, metaphysically, that the gravitating principle
appertains to Matter temporarily — only while diffused — only while existing as
Many instead of as One — appertains to it by virtue of its state of irradiation
alone — appertains, in a word, altogether to its condition, and not in the slightest
degree to itself.24
For Poe quality is anything but an essential and atemporal form of Nature. Poe
reverses the idea of a Platonic formal cause. Poe’s idea of quality holds that quality is a
matter of existence rather than essence. Quality describes material nature, and is likened
to an instinct or power, but it is a power both temporary and discursive rather than a
perpetual response. It is an instinct arising in a movement, an occasion, and the
movement occurs only when matter is irradiated, that is, in a state of quantity. The effect
of a movement towards and away from objects results in a temporal condition that is
phenomenal rather than noumenal. Existence is dispersed and in a reactive flux within the
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relation of matter to itself and metaphysics to itself. Applied to the literary field, Poe
proposes that quality obtains in quantity, and that quantity is a fluctuating movement in
time and space.
We might first state that a concept of atemporality or essence lying behind the
concept of originality—a synthesis fundamental to much Romantic theory on poetic
originality—evaporates under Poe’s theory of “conditional” quality. Originality is thus
for Poe a condition of rhetoric: it is not dialectical in that it seeks a fundamental
consonance as a unity of effect that is ultimately a human conception whose intention
originates in the mind of the receiver, but it is temporal in that it obtains in the occasion
of language transmission. Further, as a form of speech act Poe’s unity of effect
recognizes as a basic matter of its concept, a negation of a claim to both transcendental
originality and everyday actuality. In Poe’s art a hoax is as real as a matter of fact. 25
Though quantity seeks resolution in quality through negativity—that is, the particular
agent, for example, Ligeia, who becomes resolved in the abstraction of beauty through
death—originality remains vulnerable to critique and analysis by the ratiocinative mind.
This is not to say that Poe’s instinct for quality doesn’t exist. In the Poetic
Principle, Poe writes:
An immortal instinct, deep within the spirit of man, is thus, plainly, a sense of the
Beautiful…It is no mere appreciation of the Beauty before us—but a wild effort
to reach the Beauty above. Inspired by an ecstatic prescience of the glories
beyond the grave, we struggle, by multiform combinations among the things and
thoughts of Time, to attain a portion of that Loveliness whose very elements,
perhaps, appertain to eternity alone.26
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It is just that an atemporal sense of quality remains a mere metaphysical possibility rather
than an actual probability. It is a truism that Poe’s idealization of essential beauty is
always associated with the collapse of the particular in a cessation of irradiation. The end
of repulsion culminates in the catastrophic movement of return by attraction to the quality
of non-existence.
Eureka as a Metaphysics of Negative Originality
Poe’s extended essay on metaphysical originality is subtitled a “Prose-Poem.”27 In
the brief preface Poe addresses “the dreamers and those who put faith in dreams as in the
only realities … the Beauty that abounds in its Truth.”28 The essay, he says, is to be
thought of as a “Romance,” and also as a “Poem.” Remarkably, he adds in italics, “What
I propound is true: —therefore it cannot die:—or if by any means it be now trodden down
so that it will die, it will ‘rise again to the Life Everlasting’.” Then Poe retracts his truthclaim, stating that “it is as a Poem only that I wish this work to be judged after I am
dead.” Poe retracts his romantic prose-relation to the actual by positing his romantic
science in the area of the poetic imagination. Poe states: “I design to speak of the
Physical, Metaphysical, and Mathematical—of the Material and Spiritual Universe:—of
its Essence, its Origin, its Creation, its Present Condition and its Destiny.” 29 In doing so,
Poe admits, in effect, that he undercuts basic ontological assumptions and beliefs
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propounded by Christian ideas. “In the beginning,” he adds boldly, there is “no such
thing as demonstration” but, rather only hypothesis, which is: “In the original Unity of
the First Thing lies the Secondary Cause of All Things, with the Germ of their Inevitable
Annihilation.” Here again we note a bifurcation between Emerson’s ‘positive’
romanticism and Poe’s alternative to it. In Emerson’s “The Over-Soul,” in the Essays:
First Series (1841), we find confidence in a “Unity, that Over-Soul, within which every
man’s particular being is contained and made one with all other.” Whereas in Poe’s
conception of the universal nature of things, rather than finding a more positive
Emersonian eternal “One,” we encounter a reciprocating flux of attraction and repulsion
that re-instantiates each cosmic iteration with a negating catastrophic colliding of the
forces of attraction and repulsion.30 Due to the state of flux the particular is always
carried by a cyclical negation and there is no direct connection to Unity. For Poe, the
Universe is inherently bipartite.
Poe’s subsequent “survey of the Universe” intends to discover through an
examination via pure reason whether the mind may “perceive an individual
impression.”31 He places that individual, in a gesture similar to the opening of Melville’s
The Confidence-Man, at the top of Mt. Aetna. The observer must take in the panorama of
all that is before and behind to gauge the “extent and diversity of the scene.” Such a
universal vision is impossible due to the limits of subjectivity and the potential disruption
of the romantic imagination by the sublime. Poe defines the term “Universe” as “the
utmost conceivable expanse of space, with all things, spiritual and material, that can be
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imagined to exist within the compass of that expanse.”32 Conversely, Poe suggests that
“ordinarily” the word is a “phrase of limitation.” Taking the known universe as a “limited
Universe,” Poe offers a major premise that “is so taken to warrant deductions from its
individuality.” Yet the tendency toward generality unfortunately tends to “preclude all
individuality of impression.” Such an individual impression, necessary for a conceptual
starting point, is prevented by the general. It is impossible to proceed metonymically
from the particular to the universal if inhibited by the general (or categorical). Given the
difficulty of squaring the particular with the general, Poe objects to both metaphysical
and empirical thinking that masks contradiction through vagueness.
Turning Emerson on his head, Poe writes that “a perfect consistency can be
nothing but the absolute truth.”33 Further, Poe demolishes Transcendental, intuitive
reason as “resulting from deductions or inductions of which the processes were so
shadowy as to have escaped [one’s] consciousness.”34 The binary structure that
distinguishes intuition as a form of reasoning dissolves when Poe admits that moral
reasoning depends on false contradictions. Beyond such morality lies the Universe. Poe
paraphrases Emerson’s “Experience”: “We may ascend or descend. Beginning at our own
point of view, the Universe comprises what the individual comprehends: earth, sun,
planets, systems, human habitation.” The problem for the “individual Universe” (a mind)
is the matter of magnitude. Poe thus arrives at Kant's notion of the mathematical sublime.
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In Eureka Poe posits that the concept of God amounts to the notion of an “original
unity.” The universe, as a creation, is thus a “plot” carried out by God. 35 Human activity
becomes a subsidiary reverberation in which echoes the primary metaphor of originality
as an aesthetic concept. Joseph Riddel suggests that the antecedent figure to such an
original plot, conceptualized as a unity that is also a state of nothingness, can only be
conceived through interpretation. In this sense, originality is incomprehensible; creation
is unknowable and beyond understanding. The original plot, then, can be approached
only through its repetitions as instances of a state of fallenness; human beings represent
that original creativity as a supplement to the original machine of the universe. “Since the
creation is completed,” Riddel points out, “no image of it survives.”36 We might respond
that twentieth-century astronomy has been more successful at seeing the effects of that
creative event. Yet Poe recognizes the original creation is represented through an image
that is manifested in the images that mark its repetitions.
Riddel argues that cosmology is only a history of interpretations that proves the
limits of a representational or empirical system.37 The cosmos, in other words, resembles
a text through which the dimensions of space and time and the logic of induction and
deduction behave as a logocentric interpretation of the original plot. And the cosmos acts
as textual record representing the material universe as it encounters the movement of
return, a return though the dual and reciprocal motions of attraction and repulsion. But
while human beings may read the plot as a regional assemblage of signs distinct from the
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universal plot, the signification of the original plot is absent. Ironically, the only access to
the original plot is through an incomplete regional plot whose figurations reveal its own
fissures. Originality then is excess rather than essence. The general obscures the
particularity that could be known with precision.
As the original poem the figure of the universe is already a synthesis, and as such
already contains its own negativity. As a text it is already supplied with and internal
critical dialectic and represents itself as a belated repetition. The transcendental signified
is already grounded in its temporality. For Riddel, “Eureka is a diacritical text in which
the criticism is primary and the imaginative is the secondary or representational
dimension.”38 By positing the critical dimension as primary, a position that stresses the
primacy of flux and oppositional forces; nature as a unity has already disappeared and the
evidence of its loss reappears as a message “found corked in a bottle on the Mare
Tenebrarum.” Poe’s original poem is merely a myth discovered belatedly in the year
2848 C.E., at which point in time, we suppose, diachronic literary originality (generative
originality) is compressed into synchronic whole, through which—recalling Kant’s
concept of an “innate mental aptitude” or ingenium—we intuit that originality is figured
as a poetic plot that is both temporal and structural. Riddel remarks: “The originality of
an intuition lies in its deviance from, its discontinuity with, all previous interpretations. It
represents discontinuity.”39 Original intuitions, then, are singular and factored in terms of
their non-identity with universality.
In Eureka Poe perpetrates a “hoax” such that his parody of Western philosophy
reduces truth to a “palimpsest” of discourses. The history of science itself is a sequence
38
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revisions and erasures such that the pursuit of fact likens to the pursuit of a myth that is
encompassing of possibilities. As such, Poe admits that impossibility admits no degrees.
An “impossible conception” amounts to an oxymoronic figure like negative originality
itself. The fictive nature of poetic figures and of language in general presents the
impossibility of unambiguous deciphering of meaning hidden in representation. 40
Interpretation and intuition conjoin in an opening of semiotic signification to the problem
of signification. Poe and Melville, Riddel reminds us, share a suspicion that at the center
of putative meaning negativity dissolves its originality in a masking of the theft that
underlies all iteration. Riddel argues that the “nothingness at the center (unity) of Poe’s
cosmos is at once like and unlike the [blank and silent] nothing at the center of Melville’s
pyramid.”41
In Riddel’s view, interpretation by intuition becomes a supplement to and a
substitution for the blank center of meaning. Thus interpretation amounts to a doubleness,
both a reading and a misreading, of that which it supplements. Doubleness becomes both
a centripetal and a centrifugal force. Irradiation corresponds with a movement of return.
In other words, Poe’s cosmology is an allegory, borrowed from Romantic science to
describe the structural originality of intuition as a creative process of discovery in a
continuum of theoretic change. Eureka shows that Poe views a future theoretical science
not as a summation but as a disjunction, a radical alterity or negativity from its origins.
Thus structural originality as a paradigm shift is structured on the principle of deviation.
Poe’s power of irradiation, an energy that forces the redefinition of originality by effacing
it, produces the effect of negativity. Poe’s poetic misprision, then, becomes a proleptic
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(prospective) fissure that begins and ends in myth. And the role of the poet is in detection
of the myth lost through its irradiation.
Poe and Autorial Negativity
Poe’s alterity as a writer arises in his concept of irradiation. Poe’s career as a
writer and critic traced what Bell terms the “deviant image.” 42 Poe “displays all the
anxiety of the outcast, torn between aggression and guilt…” Further, Bell argues that
Poe’s image is a result of his cultural experience. “His imaginative heroes almost
uniformly succumb to the maladies conventionally associated with an ‘ill-regulated
imagination’.” Poe’s William Wilson admits that his “excitable temperament” is caused
by his “disordered imagination.” Bell notices an important distinction in Poe’s critical
vocabulary: “Poe moved the criteria of artistic legitimacy from matters of extrinsic
‘truth,’ of meaning, to the work of art itself, to appearances or effects…[;] he discusses
art on its own terms.”43
Anticipating New Criticism, perhaps, Poe repeatedly maintains that art is a selfenclosed world that is distinct from the social realm of material culture. Art and literature
appeal to the faculty of the imagination rather than the understanding. Poe “effected a
strategic shift in the grounds of the debate over the nature and function of
imagination…”44 Poe gives priority in his criticism to the work of art as a conception that
produces a phenomenal structure characterized by formal autonomy. The autonomy of
the work sets up a relation between the work and the world where the directness of the
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rhetoric affects the reader’s consciousness through the power of words. Aesthetic power,
by this rendering, overwhelms reason, which is striking in its application of the Romantic
sublime. With Poe judgment is undercut by imagination where words and meaning
become disassociated. Poe’s dualism, which situates ratiocination opposite supernal
beauty, leads to a split definition of imagination, one noumenal and immortal, the other
phenomenal and a matter of rhetorical effect.45 Poe, says Bell, “was drawn to the new
doctrines of Romanticism, which encountered in the philosophy and criticism of
Coleridge (and through Coleridge, the Germans).” 46 Poe’s interest in the Romantic
imagination and in originality began, then, with Coleridge. Poe’s interest in originality
and its realm within the imagination pushed him to stress the autonomy of language and
to determine the impact of originality in terms of its “unity of effect.”
Poe anticipated the results of American Transcendentalism by prioritizing the
power of the unseen over reality. While Transcendentalism, and Romanticism, generally,
sought to discover substance in spirituality and to reestablish intimations of immortality
against the orthodoxy of Common Sense reason, it did so by invoking Coleridge’s idea of
“intuitive reason” and its power over “discursive reason.” Romanticism, as a general
trend, legitimized the imagination as a means of approaching spiritual truth. Kant had
linked reason with intuition and distinguished reason from understanding, which was a
mainstay of Lockean and Common Sense empiricism. Emerson’s notion of a “transparent
eyeball” perceived spirit in intuitive reason, and hence imagination had become rational.
Spiritualism pertained to moralism, which opened new questions about the subconscious
and what Kant called the metaphysics of morality (positive romanticism).
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But the subconscious was not necessarily moral even if through the imagination it
might pertain to a form of imaginative mimesis. As the unseen, spiritualism did not
necessarily assure moral rightness. Imagination and fancy could produce images in
language of the unconscious motives and drives that characterize human intercourse.
Spiritualism drifted away from religion and towards psychology. This point underscores
“the curious combination of spirituality and ghoulishness in Poe’s fiction, for it was this
climate of uncertain spiritualism that Poe set out to redefine; he sought to revalidate the
‘supreme’ faculty of imagination and to provide for its ‘spiritual’ claims the sort of
philosophical support his contemporaries by and large neglected.” 47
Poe’s relation to Coleridge is significant since Coleridge had re-assigned
Common Sense psychology’s demotion of imagination to what he termed “fancy.” True
imagination, instead, could be traced through the Kantian faculty of intuitive reason that
leads to spiritual insight. In Poe’s review of Thomas Moore's Alciphron (1840), in a
strategy he replicated in many reviews, he interrogated underlying aesthetic theory, in
this case Coleridge’s theory of imagination and fancy. Poe simply rejected the distinction,
arguing that mental combination (fancy) and creative originality (imagination) are
equally synthetic. Conception depends, ultimately, upon experience. He seems to side
with Kant that intuition supplies a limited degree of a priori synthesis. Poe is neither a
full-fledged Lockean nor is he a card-carrying Coleridgean.
If the imagination requires prior experience there still may be extempore degrees
of imaginative work. Poe putatively assigns the evaluation of imaginative work to the
reader: a work has the potential to achieve its ideal, its unity of effect, through the power
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of invention by the original artist. The reader, presumably, knows intuitively the
difference between the ideal and the counterfeit. Poe states that
The truth is that the just distinction between the fancy and the imagination (and
which is still but a distinction of degree) is involved in the consideration of the
mystic... The term mystic is here employed in the sense of Augustus William
Schlegel, and most of the other German critics. It is applied by them to that class
of composition in which there lies beneath the transparent upper current an under
or suggestive one.48
The ideal imagination is one that obtains in a submerged form of meaning. The
submerged meaning of a work expresses its sentiment, and if ideal, it spiritualizes the
work through its “suggestive force which exalts and etherealizes.”49 In a superlative
imaginative work one encounters the most profound relationships between the “upper
current” and the mystic level of conception.
Poe’s conception of the mystic—Hawthorne borrowed the expression when he
termed the discovery of the letter in The Custom House a “mystic symbol”—should not
be taken with any religious significance. For Poe the mystic is simply the suggestive
aspects of a discourse. Basically, then, the imagination is assigned to rhetorical invention
that maintains a metaphoric current. But Poe’s notion of the mystic seems designed to
shroud his secular spirituality in an imagination bearing no specific relationship to
immortality. The supernal imagination of the artist lies in his capacity to create the effect
of spirituality in the mind of the reader by mimicking the absolute as a unity of effect. It
is a symbol lacking a referent. In Poe’s theory of originality, God is imaginary. Language
thus loses its footing and originality becomes negated as a free floating mental game of
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signifiers. The theory of imagination, in Poe’s view, requires a complete sacrifice of
relation. Originality is negativity.
Moreover, Poe’s critical terminology is deployed with a cunning vagueness where
ordinary connotations evaporate. Expressions such as “mystic,” “spiritualizing,” and
“ideal” seem to be empty signifiers. After 1845 he likened imagination to the effect of
“harmony,” and originality was metaphorized as a chemical reaction resulting in
combinatoriality, a device Eliot seems to have borrowed in his essay on originality,
“Tradition and the Individual Talent.”
It is plausible that Poe dropped the terms “mystic” and “spiritual” because he
could not square his theory of imagination with religious thought. Like materialism,
spiritualism was another structure that threatened the autonomy of the artist. Negative
originality was the only recourse for the artist seeking an unfettered imagination. Poe told
James Russell Lowell in 1844 that he had “no belief in spirituality.” 50 Yet, ironically, by
jettisoning spirituality in a religious sense, Poe had to commit himself to an ontology of
materiality. Imagination is the original combinatoriality of matter and spirituality is
negated. Because spirit exists, if it does, as immateriality, it is “therefore not matter.”51
Poe speaks of spirit as “unparticled matter,” which under rarefaction will eventually
recompress and unify: “The unparticled matter, permeating & impelling, all things, is
God. Its activity is the thought of God—which creates.” It would be tempting to read
Coleridge’s primary imagination into Poe’s unparticled matter, but Coleridge was
obviously convinced that his notion of the primary imagination was Ideal and immaterial.
Poe, on the other hand, posits thought in the material world. Abstractions such as
50
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“infinity,” ”spirit” and “God” are “impossible conception[s]...representative of but the
thought of a thought.” While for Coleridge, spirit is grounded in existence, the relation of
being to Being, for Poe, conversely, spirit is grounded only in thought, and thus in
language, but without a spirit grounded in existence eternal truths evaporate.
In the chasm that Poe uncovers, where eternal truths become thoughts, Poe sets up
a dualism between matter and the imagination that problematizes the materialism of the
Common Sense school of thought. And by re-instantiating matter as the sole reality, Poe
rejects it and thus severs imagination from reality completely. Poe’s autonomy of
language insists that meaning is essentially arbitrary; language and nature, a relation so
important to Emerson and Coleridge, are disconnected. Imagination is displaced into a
realm of ideality where internal conceptual relationships are arbitrary and self-reflective.
Meaning becomes propositional within a scheme of rhetorical assertions bound to a
specific artistic conception. The work is its own world. This total sacrifice of relation
points to Poe’s theory of negative originality.
Poe’s theory of negative originality can be observed in his tale Ligeia where the
Ligeia, the symbol of supernal beauty, dies only to transubstantiate through the physical
body of her antithesis, Lady Rowena. The reappearance of the original through death
becomes the “spiritual” manifestation of negative originality. In “The Poetic Principle”
Poe insists that “[i]nspired by an ecstatic prescience of the glories beyond the grave, we
struggle, by multiform combinations among the things and thoughts of Time, to attain a
portion of that Loveliness whose very elements, perhaps, appertain to eternity alone.” 52
Poe’s struggle, here, is to square Romantic originality and its intimations of immortality
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with the materiality of death. Timeless beauty becomes an “impossible conception”
(Eureka) that can be thought only by means seeking “combinations” in Time. Poe’s
rhetoric of temporality functions as a negation of the infinite by materializing immortality
as a living death.
As a form of negative originality, the idea of “etherealizing” nature or
“spritualizing” material became a commonplace among alternative romantics like Poe
and Hawthorne. In Eureka the idea of spirit becomes a “vision of the destruction of the
material universe,” according to Bell. Emersonian transparency becomes an effect of
spirituality, and takes on the costume of a metaphysical principle. Death, the reversion of
the living body into its material basis becomes a sublimation of the mind-body split
which associated the body with its erotic or brute nature. The cost of exhausting a
metaphysic of spirit into an aesthetics of matter resulted in death as the only outcome of
originality.53 Supernal beauty and ideal of beauty creates the aesthetic effect of erotic
sublimation. Etherealization, then becomes a way of speaking about the body in terms of
metaphysical vagueness.54
Poe structured the unity of effect around the internal consistency of his symbolic
mode. “Before asking what this language means,” suggests Bell, “the reader [of Poe]
must ask how it means.”55 The essential problem in Poe interpretation is the
correspondence between language and the world beyond the text. The language inside the
text leaves a level of vagueness that leaves much of its mean unsayable. The sacrifice of
relation between the denoted and connoted meanings in the text functions as a negativity
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of relation. Poe’s mode of metaphor and its “suggestive indefiniteness” sets up a paradox
between “revelation and concealment,” argues Bell. 56 If the autonomous artist can be said
to remain pure (or negative) with respect to the cultural matrix, Poe’s impure purity rests
on his paradoxical schism between suggestion and the indefinite. The structural gap
between the two amounts to a chasm of negativity in which his aesthetic purity remains
buried.
Poe’s dual concept of his fiction as both Arabesque (the concealment of life) and
Grotesque (distortion of character) represent the desire to be equally pure and impure.57
By excising the Coleridgean symbol of its direct correspondence with spirit, Poe’s
strategy for representing an Ideal art rested on its effect. Since beauty is
incomprehensible apart from immortality, direct reference to beauty in mortal terms is
avoided. Truth becomes non-linguistic and hieroglyphic. “We may question the validity
of non-linguistic ‘purity’ legitimized solely by the negation of language’s normal
function of meaning,” says Bell, but any possibility for autonomy lies through the
sacrifice of relation between language and meaning.
The question of purity, at the heart of the central question of negative originality,
is incomprehensible. Beyond intention, words have a history in the cultural matrix, a
history of language use that produces intersubjective linguistic experience. But the purity
and concealment that is originality in Poe’s sense of arabesque is more of a “secondary
expression.”58 “To maintain the appearance of arabesque ‘purity,’ the reader must
conspire with the author in the suppression of meaning; he must conspire with the author
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to not strike through the mask. The subjectivity of the term, which grows, after all, out of
the specific taboo against representation (and recognition)...is a form of repression; it is
the negative originality of the deviating force against the antecedent orthodoxy.
Emerson anticipates the problems inherent in the polarization within
consciousness stemming from negative originality. Poe’s Eureka seeks to posit an
originary moment instantiating the “material and spiritual universe.” Poe’s “original
Unity” deploys a God function embedded in an original monad or particle, and traces its
creativity through “repulsion.” Such a dispersion of the one to the many Poe considers
“abnormal.” The original universe is the normative attractive force, or steady state in
unity. Dispersion into multiplicity is a negation of that unity and for Poe has an
instinctual (for beings) mode of self-protection. Negative originality not only protects the
self but it protects the original unity from self-destruction through irradiation.
The counterpoise to repulsion requires self-annihilation before a return to unity is
possible. Original unity, or generative originality (in the sense of a beginning state),
becomes annihilated by repulsion, or negative originality, and any subsequent attraction
is the result of annihilation of negation. Because unity is the more powerful force the
individual must preserve the singularity of identity or be annihilated by unity. For Poe’s
cosmogony individuality is therefore the unnatural state given the cosmic unity that is the
universe. Poe’s tale “William Wilson” presents that “essential desire…to be able to
claim, and to have others recognize, his originality and singular dominion over himself
and his environment.”59 Individuality can be maintained only through radical creativity
through negative originality.
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Wilson’s doppelganger, or double consciousness, maps onto the structure familiar
as the mind-body split that points to the moral and metaphysical implications of
individual will. “William Wilson is Poe’s foremost exemplar of the self-reliant
Emersonian individual, the creative sayer (and writer) who would enjoy a wholly original
relation to the universe.”60 The base-stem of Wilson’s struggle for individuality lies in the
deviance of his actions. Originality has the imp of the perverse implicit within its core.
Wilson and his double illustrate the vacillating interactions between metaphysical
originality and imitation where the line between negative originality and the mimesis of
the singular will collapses in the scene of self-destruction in the mirror that is the bathos
of imitation.
Following Emerson’s advice in Nature to direct his will Wilson struggles to
affirm his originality through identity, but in naming himself his identity unravels. The
irony that Poe sets up for Wilson is that in the act of self-naming he expresses his
originality but ties himself to the precedent of the name through imitation. Negative
originality is always tied to its antecedent. “Notwithstanding a noble descent,” Poe writes
through Wilson, who is talking about his name, “mine was one of those everyday
appellations which seem, by prescriptive right, to have been, time out of mind, the
common property of the mob.”61 Wilson’s name, then, becomes the structural gap
between originality (singularity) and multiplicity, the act of naming himself is an act of
negative originality in that Wilson is using his power to instantiate his singularity and at
the same time his name binds him to the “common property” antecedent to his self-
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negation. In attempting his originality through identity Wilson’s negative originality
already and ironically points to imitation.
The irony is already present in the name Wilson. Negative originality (following
Kant’s theory of negative freedom) demands an act of will. Will is by nature indicative of
singularity, a gesture implicit in the act of negating an antecedent. Yet as Kant
understood, behind the act of will must be another act of will, or willing to will. Choosing
requires an antecedent decision to choose. Willing, then, invites the idea of infinite
regression, and so Wilson as a name already bears its descent. The son of Will already
admits to the weight of the father and Wilson’s drive for negative originality commits
him to destroy himself. Self-overcoming becomes self-annihilation. Wilson’s narrative is
couched in the privileged language of uniqueness. His inner contradiction begins by
stating that “Notwithstanding a noble descent” his “everyday appellation” damns him to
imitation. Thus he is divided in his consciousness between a will to originality and an
internal drive to perversity that ultimately leads him to a face-off with himself.
Poe’s Universe
When Poe arrives at his “legitimate thesis,” which is “The Universe,”
hyperbolically allusive of Emerson, he suggests that his “thesis admits a choice between
two modes of discussion:—we may ascend or descend.”62 Again, the proposition
immediately recalls Emerson’s essay “Experience.” Emerson opens his essay asking
“Where do we find ourselves? We wake and find ourselves on a stair; there are stairs
below us, which we seem to have ascended; there are stairs above us, many a one, which
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go upward and out of sight.”63 For Emerson, the forgetting that separates man from the
past also threatens man’s perception of the future, as if human life exists due to nature’s
“frugality.” Poe reiterates Emerson’s point. He reminds us that “[b]eginning at our own
point of view—at the Earth on which we stand—we may pass to the outer planets of the
system—thence to the Sun—thence to our system considered collectively—and thence,
through other systems, indefinitely outwards; or, commencing on high at some point as
definitely as we can make it or conceive it, we may come down to the habitation of
Man.”64
The descent to the “habitation of man” provides Poe with a “distinct conception
of the individual universe.”65 In all probability Poe concurs with Emerson, who says in
“Experience” that human originality admits a lack: “Ah that our Genius were a little more
of a genius,” Emerson recognizes. Poe says much the same idea:
it is clear that a descent to small from great—to the outskirts from the center (if
we could establish a center)—to the end from the beginning (if we could fancy a
beginning) would be the preferable course, but for the difficulty, if not
impossibility, of presenting, in this course, to the unastronomical, a picture at all
comprehensible in regard to such considerations as are involved in quantity—that
is to say, in number, magnitude and distance.66
Lacking a center, Poe’s cosmos, then, is incomprehensible.
Poe arrives at his core argument, that the intelligibility of the Universe is a
problem for a conception of infinity from the standpoint of an individual universe.
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Infinity becomes an “impossible conception.” 67 In terms akin to Kantian categories, Poe
suggests that infinity becomes a thought of a thought. Infinity, says Poe, is a term of
relation between human beings and the intellect. For Poe, infinity appears coextensive
with Kantian “freedom”: and with limitations upon human intellect, the “mind admits the
idea of limitless, though the greater impossibility of entertaining that of limited, space.”
Poe’s notion of an “impossible conception” mediating an absolute universe and an
individual universe points to two important Kantian concepts. That the faculty of reason
“is called upon to decide” between limitation and the unlimited alludes to a reading of the
Kantian sublime. Poe has just pointed to the “impossibility of entertaining” magnitude.
Here we find ourselves in the moment of the Kant’s mathematical sublime. Moreover,
Poe implies that negative originality amounts to an existential paradox; here, he admits
that there is no a priori reason available to intelligence to make sense of limitation as a
finite constraint, or the unlimited as a non-empirical thought of a thought. We are in the
midst of a conundrum of negative freedom. Poe admits that
all this is undeniable: since the choice of the mind is to be made between
impossibilities of conception; since one impossibility cannot be greater than
another; and since, thus, one cannot be preferred to another: the philosophers who
not only maintain, on the grounds just mentioned, man's idea of infinity, but, on
account of such suppositious idea, infinity itself—are plainly engaged in
demonstrating one impossible thing to be possible by showing how it is that some
one other thing—is impossible too. This, it will be said is nonsense; and perhaps it
is...the argument alluded to both proves and disproves its own proposition. 68
If the notion of limited space is a property of a subjective individual universe, the notion
of an unlimited dimension of freedom remains an impossibility; if the notion of absolute
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infinity is a result of the idea of limitless space, the constraints upon individuality limit
reason’s ability to understand its magnitude in any palpable sense.
The mind may try to imagine a “First Cause,” which is to admit that the notion of
generative originality arises as a reaction of reason when attempting to comprehend the
beginning of things. Poe argues that it is impossible for a human being to have a
conception of infinity. A less “introspective” thinker might fall into self-deception in
imagining that she has a conception of infinity, but all this redounds simply to faith, or an
“intellectual belief” in “mental conception.”69 Ideas of infinity as “thoughts of thought”
originate as a negation of conception. Poe imagines infinity to be an incomprehensible
“mental vision” lying outside the horizons of the “utmost ‘conceivable expanse’ of
space.”70 The negation of these horizons is defined by Poe as “a sphere” comprised of an
unlimited center and a null circumference.71 The upshot of the conundrum of faith here
outlined points back to the individual universe: we should have to be God ourselves, Poe
realizes: the soul is “everlastingly condemned” to an intellect absent of God.
As Poe will argue, the absolute universe is comprised of matter resolved into the
basic energies of attraction and repulsion. God becomes a sort of anti-matter, and as
Spirit, the question of creation ex nihilo arises. It appears incomprehensible that matter
can arise out of spirit. Poe is searching for a pure intuition through which he can
comprehend originality. He conceives this originary state to be “simplicity” or “oneness.”
His thesis is as follows: “Oneness is a principle abundantly sufficient to account for the
constitution, the existing phenomena and the plainly inevitable annihilation of at least the
69
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material universe.”72 The “primordial particle” is the originating source for the
“conception” of Creation. It would seem that in Poe’s definition the teleological
conception of Creation originates a flux in which materiality can arise and decline, which
is to suggest that the original particle is immaterial and an idea of absolute Universality.
The first cause is conceived not as omniscience but as utter simplicity, or negativity—
what Heidegger conceives of as nihil originarium73. Poe’s “irresistible” yet
“inexpressible” intuition is that negativity is the originary steady-state and it becomes
conceptualized as a result of a reaction to the idea of infinity. Put another way, originality
becomes conceivable during the Kantian sublime moment.
Poe states that the “constitution of the Universe” arises from the original
“Particle.” Since materiality (matter) can be annihilated by the “principle” of simplicity,
it is unlikely that he means the particle to consist in matter alone, but rather must be—
anticipating Heidegger—a transcendental idea. The Universe, then, is a state in which the
original “condition” of oneness moves into multiplicity through a basic mode of action—
irradiation (Heidegger’s nihil originarium)—upon the simple particle so that if breaks
into a multitude of atoms. The concept of originality arises by recognizing the
“difference” between the state of diffusion and the state of origination.74 Poe lists a
number of categories of differences that mark the relations between originality and the
original. Poe makes the point that in the flux from simplicity to complexity there is no
cause for superergation, which is to say that there is no “design” other than contingency.
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There are differences of kind, size, and form that result in a transformation or
“disclosure” of “essential nature” as phenomenology75
Poe makes an effort to explain the relations and proximity of atoms that clearly
harkens to Leibniz’s Monadology. Poe is interested in explaining through the example of
the atom how proximity and force create the motions of attraction and repulsion. The
drive to multiplicity ultimately rests in “coalescence,” when the movement of return
ensues. The attraction to the original state is more powerful than multiplicity. And of
course the analogue to this three-stage movement is Newtonian gravity and its laws of
motion. Poe speaks of heterogeneity, electricity, and magnetism as analogous forces that
presuppose individuality. He is attempting to account for singularity (as opposed to
original simplicity). Poe’s conception of individual universality as a “phenomenon of
vitality” leads to the structure of attraction and repulsion as mapped by body and soul. To
account for heterogenous consciousness—singularity—Poe sees that repulsion is a
movement towards perception. But perception leads to the errors of “concentralization”
and “especiality,” presumptions that lead to thinking that heterogeneity as a normative
state. The “vital truth,” he says, is that Unity is the “source of the phenomena.” 76 There
are no things in themselves.
All differences strive to return to their point of origin. Poe confirms that the
“point of origin” is not a locality but a principle.77 The principle, he repeats, “the truth of
original Unity as the source—as the principle of the Universal Phenomena.”78 Poe’s
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original unity anticipates what Heidegger regarded as an essential state of Being: Dasein.
Poe is careful to forestall the possibility of a refutation of his theory. He denies selfevidence as premise of axiomatic thinking, a move which appears as a challenge to
Kantian metaphysics. In order to bracket his own thesis he reserves one basic principle:
Unity. This leaves open the ontological question of whether the sole instance of selfevidence is original Unity. Poe probes the question. It is immaterial whether original
Unity is an attribute of simplicity, God, universal gravitation: originality lies in the
immeasurable diffusion through space. The appearance of spatial phenomena through
diffusion, radiation and luminosity allow for a Lockean understanding of primary
qualities. Space reveals what is not in the mind. The mind employs rational procedures to
measure space through the transmission of light. By measuring spatial distances and
geometric relationships among heavenly bodies through a measurement of original
radiation, Poe asserts he can determine gravitational relationships.79
We can now anticipate that Poe’s idea of quantity resolves into the unitary idea of
originality that must be disclosed through negativity. His idea of quality, furthermore,
arises in an intuitive sense of the ratiocinative principle. Poe attempts to employ
ratiocination as a way to overcome the mathematical sublime so as to conceptualize
originality itself. In a series of three proofs Poe claims to show that radiation is
proportional to distance, that motion follows a straight line, that his theory is in fact the
first principle. And because he has proceeded to the absolute principle as a limitation of
thought, he claims “My [original] Particle Proper is but Absolute Irrelation:” that is,

79

Poe, “Eureka,” 1292.

227

negative originality.80 Poe proposes that as galaxies situate space it is acknowledged that
earth’s solar system is not the center but off to one side of space. Earth’s position, with
respect to the center of space, is analogous with the structure of the sublime itself. Earth’s
position suggests a proximity to a cosmic abyss. Earth, metaphorically figuring ‘nature’
or ‘mind’, exists in isolation in the “wildernesses of Space.”81 Because of Earth’s
isolation the laws particular to earth do not have bearing on the rest of space, which
opens the question of multiple universalities: metaphysics leads ultimately to an abyss
where no primal unity exists. That thought causes us to “task our imagination" and we
find ourselves “struck and overwhelmed.”82 Indeed, that is the very definition of the
Kantian sublime.
The mind is always in a relational parallax to whatever fixed points it can grasp to
situate itself within reason. In the recovery or movement of return, Poe states that “we
have no difficulty in understanding the absolute accuracy of the Divine adaptations” to
the sublime movement; he suggests that the movement has a predestined teleological
structure. The goal of creation, the end, is premised on an “absolute reciprocity of
adaptation.”83 Poe is suggesting here a ratio between the given and the ends and that the
reciprocity between cause and effect operates analogously like a fictional text’s perfect
plot. For Poe, the solar system provides an analogical inference that describes poetry as a
figure for metaphysical originality. “In the construction of a plot,” he says, and within
“fictitious literature, we should aim at so arranging the incidents that we shall not be able
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to determine, of any one of them, whether it depends from any one side or upholds it.”84
Although the conception remains for Poe a priori, the unity of effect requires suspension
of disbelief. Disbelief reveals a “grasping for the infinite,” and in turn the “poetical
instinct of humanity”; the poetical instinct is an “instinct for the symmetrical,” a
“symmetry of surface: —this instinct, which the Soul, not only of Man but of all created
things, took up, in the beginning, from the geometrical basis of the Universal radiation—
impels us to the fancy of an endless extension of this system of cycles.” The Galaxy is
imagined to be a “cluster of clusters” revolving in a series of “agglomerations.” The
“infinite sublimity endlessly multiplied by the infinitely sublime…, continued in
perpetuity, which the voice of what some people term ‘analog’ calls upon Fancy to depict
and the Reason to contemplate.”
Poe and the Sublime
Rather than depicting the sublime infinite “generally,” Poe suggests that a specific
analogy points to a system in the Galaxy where all objects revolve around a single center.
Moreover, it is that center that becomes his direct point of contention. This central sun is
invisible to us. It is “non-luminous.” With invisibility the analogy falls away; “we have
certainly no reason whatever for supposing that the non-luminous suns in question are
encircled by luminous suns, while these again are surrounded by non-luminous
planets.”85 The Cosmos, then, is for Poe an allegory of the ontological argument.
“Admitting the thing to be so, we cannot help here picturing to ourselves how sad a
puzzle the why it is so must prove to all a priori philosophers.” So “we may still inquire
how this orb, so enormous, could fail of being rendered visible by the flood of light
84
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thrown upon it from the 100 millions of glorious suns glaring in all directions about it.”
In that inquiry "the idea of an actually solid central sun appears, in some measure, to have
been abandoned.”86 “This idea of the circle—an idea which, in view of all ordinary
geometry, is merely mathematical, as contradistinguished from the practical [moral]
idea.” The mathematical idea is the only practical idea “we have any right to entertain.”
Poe argues that the ontological argument is a response to a psychological anxiety,
a figurative aporia that seeks a centering term. The galaxy appears to be “rushing toward
a great central mass in consequence of the action of some great power.”87 Yet, actually,
“we find many groups of [stars] moving in opposite directions.” So it remains improbable
that visible clusters in the Universe “are revolving about any particular center unknown,
whether luminous or non-luminous.”88 “It is but Man’s longing for a fundamental First
Cause, that impels both his intellect and his fancy to the adoption of such an hypothesis.”
Instead, Poe posits that the appearance of an “orbital movement about a centre” suggests
“a state of progressive collapse.”89 It is “precisely this state in which alone we are
warranted in considering All Things.”
Poe maintains that the “tendency to collapse” and the gravitational effect of
attraction are “convertible phrases”; either expression points to a reaction to a first cause;
radiation is a temporary moment in the movement of return from the many to the One.
The universe is a poetical allegory: “the Universe…is the most sublime of poems”; the
“symmetry” of the Universe demonstrates its consistency: “A perfect consistency…can
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be nothing but an absolute truth.” 90 Here, Poe, we note again, is jesting with Emerson,
whose phrase “[a] foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds,” stands for a selfreflexivity Poe seems to charge with Transcendentalists, and Transcendentalism, in
general, with incomprehensibility, labeling Bostonians, “Frogpondians”, and Emerson,
himself, one of “a class of gentlemen with whom we have no patience,…His present role
seems to be out-Carlyling Carlyle.”91 The consistency Poe maintains here is not the
absolute unity of which Emerson and Hegel shared an ultimate view, but an unresolving
binary view of the universe which Poe saw as attraction and repulsion, a dialectical
position that has been understood so far as a formal structure of negative originality. But
if ideally Hegel’s negation of negation would become transformed as absolute unity,
Poe’s perfect poem remains fundamentally dualistic. Emerson saw in nature this
possibility, that the “me” and the “not me” might remain unreconciled. In Eureka, Poe’s
intuitive reason redounds to the ultimate truth that periodicity and reciprocity control
reality. Poe’s version of the movement of return holds that as a period becomes
foreclosed, a new and different period originates negating the previous cycle. There is no
absolute beyond cyclic reality. Poe’s irradiation thus extends Hegel’s second term
indefinitely.
The intuition held by many that the Universe might retract into a central orb
supposes a pre-existing central orb as the cause of the universe. The phenomenon of
nature as idea is distinguished from the matter of the universe held in suspension by
ether. Ether is the spirit of matter. As such, “the Universe has no conceivable end. The
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lack of finality makes us view Creation as an “imperfect plot in a romance.”92 The
“dénouement is awkwardly brought about by interposed incidents external and foreign to
the main subject.” The equilibrium between the centripetal and centrifugal forces of each
system breaks down as the differences in atomic proximity shift the balance where
equilibrium ultimately precipitates a catastrophic closure.93
Poe speaks of a “Reciprocity of Adaptation” or “the idiosyncrasy of Divine Art.”
In diffusion “matter is enabled to exist” in a state of multiplicity. Matter exists in such a
state of heterogeneity to “influence” individual spirit, that is to say, consciousness. By
analogy to diffused matter, consciousness and individual intelligence exist. Matter is a
means, not an end.94 Attraction and repulsion allow matter to be “manifested to Mind”;
and therefore, “Attraction and Repulsion are Matter.” 95 In absolute Unity, no attraction is
possible and therefore “attraction implies particularity.” Catastrophic closure results “on
fulfillment of its purposes … Matter shall have returned into its original condition of
One—a condition which presupposes the expulsion of the separate Ether,” but Ether
exists merely to promote the state of separateness of Matter in its state of Attraction; once
expelled there is “Matter without Attraction”; or, “Matter no more”; or anti matter. So
“we can readily conceive that a new and perhaps totally different series of conditions may
ensue—another creation and radiation, returning into the self.” 96 Catastrophe,
allegorizing the sublime consciousness, is cyclic.
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The human imagination is guided by the law of periodicity, the iterative process
of the movement of return; like a human heart, it is “a novel Universe swelling into
existence and then subsiding into nothingness … It is our own.” 97 For Poe, then,
metaphysical originality is grounded in periodicity and flux. “The phenomena on which
our conclusions must at this point depend, are merely spiritual shadows.” Existence is the
natural feeling of youth. “But now comes the period at which a conventional WorldReason awakens us from the truth of our dream. Doubt, Surprise, and
Incomprehensibility arrive at the same moment.” 98 The thinking self becomes perplexed
by the paradox that it is both created by a superior intelligence that fosters existence, and
the recognition of the “utter impossibility of any one’s soul feeling inferior to another”;
the “incomprehensibility of the paradox is overwhelming.” The individual soul strives to
return to the original unity, proving for Poe, that “no one soul is inferior to another—that
nothing is, or can be, superior to any one soul—that each soul is, in part, its own God—
its own Creator.”
Poe and Attraction and Repulsion
Poe is not a pantheist but more akin to a presocratic; he is not a Spinozan who
sees a single substance, but a dualist who sees flux in terms of attraction and repulsion. 99
Essence for Poe isn’t a unitary substance—Wordsworth and Coleridge’s oneness. Poe’s
idea of creation is one of flux and expansion. Pantheism refuses expansion because
substance is already full. Poe’s notion of originality is “physicalistic-spiritualistic” in that
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primordial creation of a particle of matter forms the cosmos through division. 100
Expansion is not simply a physical one but also teleologic, in that it implies a design
towards relationships that are bound in flux, and ultimately indicate a desire to rejoin in a
collapsing force. Repulsion prevents attraction from regaining unity.
The same force of repulsion that caused diffusion of particles acts to deter their
attraction.101 Attraction and repulsion are not divine properties adhering to substances and
particles but forces acting on particles, and contingent. For Poe the forces of attraction
and repulsion are a creative form of energy, and irradiating force flowing into and
separating matter. Compared to Coleridge's esemplastic power, attraction is presented as
a physical energy rather than a transcendental one. The shaping forces of energy, when
classical in balance and pre-Christian in cosmic design, are aesthetically creative. Poe’s
notion of attraction and repulsion create a cosmos that invites comparison to an
intelligent design redolent of Liebniz’s monadology. Yet Poe synthesizes classical and
Christian ideas. The motion caused by repulsion is countered by attraction producing a
centrifugal and centripetal circularity, where upon attempting to return brings about a
transfiguration of consciousness that resembles the Romantic sublime. This attainment of
a transfigured consciousness at once classical and Romantic: reunification raises
consciousness from the ideal through the material to ideal, thus producing the Romantic
movement of return.
This movement that presupposes a value in symmetry moves beyond
neoclassicism into Romanticism as the return by attraction brings consciousness into a
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higher plane.102 Poe’s mathematical formalism, as in “The Philosophy of Composition”
becomes not an end in itself of formal aestheticism, but rather a symbol showing reason
to be contingent to spirit, as demonstrated by the circularity of forces. Poe’s cosmology is
thus emanationist rather than pantheist. And unlike the transcendentalists, Poe’s
emanationism sees the soul as a part of Spirit only insofar as it distinguishes itself from
the Absolute through the force of repulsion. God exists only as diffusion; each iterated
gathering becomes the individual in the Universe. The “Divine Injustice” of “Inexorable
Fate” produces evil. But fate is endurable insofar as through sorrow we see that joy is
futile.103 The individual seeks a capacity to expand and concentrate one’s power. All is
Life.
In Eureka, Poe states that ratiocination allows for the understanding that an “inner
perfection of theory,” as Chai terms it, to be a sufficient condition for truth.104 The
notion of inner perfection demands criteria, and we turn to the universe for models:
symmetry, consistency, are the form of the universe, the perfection and completeness of
which indicate absolute truth. Symmetry in turn implies a “correspondence between
theoretical elements such as cause and effect, origin and end...”105 Such a formal
correspondence arises in the “aesthetic quality of thought,” which means, by extension,
that rationality is not a sufficient condition for consistency and beauty, but its theoretical
“inner perfection” is. This correspondence sets up a division between theory and
phenomena, “inner perfection” and “external confirmation.” The paradigm case for this
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complementary concern points to the original of the universe, whose perfection is not
verifiable but conceptualized as ideal beauty according to theories derived from it. Chai
points out that “The origin of the universe is really the origin of the idea, which Poe
traces to the origin of thought itself.”106 The problem of securing a basis for ideas resides
in their relativity, or the “fluctuating principle,” as Poe calls it: more reliable are ideas
structured by Reason.
It will now be readily understood that no axiomatic idea—no idea founded in the
fluctuating principle, obviousness of relation—can possibly be so secure—so
reliable a basis for any structure erected by the Reason, as that idea—(whatever it
is, wherever we can find it, or if it be practicable to find it anywhere) —which is
irrelative altogether—which not only presents to the understanding no
obviousness of relation, either greater or less, to be considered, but subjects the
intellect, not in the slightest degree, to the necessity of even looking at any
relation at all.107
Poe’s notion of irrelativity, parallels the “sacrifice of relation” that Michaeld Davitt Bell
found in Henry James’ juxtaposition between the real and the romantic. Poe’s “unity of
effect” amounts to an effect because it makes demands upon the reason of the subject,
and unity, since the singular form is undivided and thus can bear no relation to itself or
any other thing. This would have to be Hegel’s “absolute.” The only unity, conceptually,
that could possess this quality would be the universal one, which must be a metaphysical
idea only. Chai sums it up saying “The origin of the universe is really the origin of its
idea….”108 This is “pure reason” and there at least two problems. The unity of effect is an
oxymoron since the notion of effect implies “apperception.” Unity may be a “pure
concept of the understanding” but effect seems to involve the operation of secondary
imagination, which is an individual phenomenon. The original “idea” must be an absent
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presence like the purloined letter; it exists in no place (utopia) since it must be irrelative,
yet to demonstrate it, we must find it, and the only “place” it exists is in the mind. The
intellect has to run through all the concepts and work to the top of the hierarchy. This is
pure noumenality. Like the Prefect, any inductive search for originality will turn up
nothing. Originality is pure intuition, but, it seems, not just anybody’s. Otherwise the
Prefect would have been successful.
And yet irrelativity is the most secure idea, even as it is non-existent. To exist it
would be pure idiosyncrasy, ultimate peculiarity: singular form; form, itself being a
‘being’ and the result of a process, implies relation, so that singular form is
fundamentally a conundrum, unless it meets the conditions of unity and idea. Singular
form defines Poe’s notion of Beauty, and Melville’s notion of negative human
exceptionalism. But even Ahab is divided and relational, split down the middle by
lightning. The only unity—originality—like the whiteness of the whale, remains for Poe
a negative originality because a movement of a return into absolute unity is impossible; it
must remain different, which means originality is not irrelative. For Poe as it is for
Hawthorne, relation is the primary force.
Poe: The Cultural Matrix and Negative Freedom
Poe’s confrontation with the growing marketplace of literature resulted from his
inability to find literary independence from the market. 109 Louis Renza reminds us that
“In Poe’s case, American-Republican literature existed in embryo, or as an issue more or
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less coming to the fore. His peer public largely consisted of geographically distant British
writers, and in an era of delayed, scattered, and tenuously verifiable information.” 110 In a
situation shared by Hawthorne and Melville, Poe was
forced by economic circumstances to write magazine journalism, Poe, whose
ambition for honorific, literary recognition lay primarily in writing poetry,
emplots and mocks his mass readers in his tales… Poe’s fiction, that is, includes
the fiction of both his public’s reading of it, and his simultaneously witnessing, as
if from some private or undetected position, the effect his emplotted readings will
have on others.111
Edgar Allan Poe, in his essay “The Philosophy of Composition,” points out, that
“[t]he fact is, originality (unless in minds of very unusual force) is by no means a matter,
as some suppose, of impulse or intuition. In general, to be found, it must be elaborately
sought, and although a positive merit of the highest class, demands in its attainment less
of invention than negation.”112 Poe means, of course, that originality arises in an author’s
sense of negative freedom, the aesthetic position the author maintains in opposition to the
cultural matrix. For Poe, one problem of negative originality centers on the situation in
America during the 1840s on the question of a lack of international copyright. Poe
argues:
How we rob foreign authors, and how we argue in our legislative halls that it is an
economical thing for us to pick the foreign pocket, are points too well understood
to need discussion — but there are still found individuals who ask, innocently
enough, in what manner the want of the International Law affects the pecuniary
interest of the native American. The man who asks the question should first write
a book or a magazine article, and then offer it to a publisher for sale.113
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In his series of four articles on the “Pay of American Authors” published in the
Evening Mirror in January, 1845, Poe argues that a lack of international copyright
negates the originality of American authors, by driving them into an obsequious
relationship with publishers (puffing); and, moreover, it undermines the precepts of
democracy because it encourages American legislators in the interest of “expediency” to
steal from British writers and at the same time to discourage authorship by undercutting
its cultural value. Authors are driven to imitate the going fads of national literature, when
in fact their autonomy as independent and original writers is hamstrung by false
exceptionalism. As professional writers are forced into magazine writing, the vacuum is
filled by wealthy and conservative writers who turn to British aristocratic models and
therefore imitate that stilted discourse of belles lettres. Moreover, since it is democracy
itself that has made a sham of national literature the writer is trapped between an
American mass culture unsympathetic to intellectual work and prefers its highbrow
commodities at a bargain rate (thereby thumbing noses at British Tories), and a
conservative anti-progressive class of American bourgeois who have no sympathy for
rational progress: on one side is an American anti-intellectualism, on the other an
agrarian aristocracy. Poe idealizes, ironically, another hypothetical nationality of literati:
“But of the need of that nationality which defends our own literature, sustains our own
men of letters, upholds our own dignity, and depends upon our own resources, there
cannot be the shadow of a doubt.” 114 The squeezed middle finds the alternative romantic
subverting the popular culture that pushes back against the negating effect of the
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copyright issue, and at the same acts to negate the contradictions and hypocrisies latent in
the paradox of “democratic authorship.”
The American antipathy to international copyright presents Poe’s idealized
literary community with three insurmountable problems for literary originality. It allows
the circulation of British literature at an artificially low cost since British authors are
uncompensated. This unfair market for British books and magazines undercuts fledgling
American writers. American writers are, in turn, motivated to allow American publishers
to “puff” their works, and hence such false advertising undermines American criticism.
Thirdly, the unfair availability of British quarterlies allows for British literary opinion to
maintain its literary hegemony over American writing, stilting the development of
American literary criticism. Poe writes, scathingly:
Yet here is the very point at which we are most supine. We complain of our want
of an International Copyright, on the ground that that this want justifies our
publishers in inundating us with British opinion in British books; and yet when
those very publishers, at their own obvious risk, and even obvious loss, do publish
an American book, we turn up our noses at it with supreme contempt (this as a
general thing) until it (the American book) has been dubbed ‘readable’ by some
illiterate Cockney critic”. . . It is not saying too much, to say this.115
Poe points to the underlying problem for an original democratic authorship. When
American democratic readers criticize their own national literature by snobbishly taking
up British literary values they bolster what Sidney Smith meant when he asked: “Who
reads an American Book”? In effect, Poe argues, potential literary originality in America
is undercut by literary-nationalist ideology that forestalls international copyright. In a
moment of ironic reversal, Poe yokes American independence from Britain with British
African colonization, arguing, in effect, that like British colonization of parts of Africa,
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British critics colonize American criticism. Poe’s own “lurking” suspicion of democracy
holds America itself to be responsible for its own servitude to Britain because of its
blockading of American criticism from developing through its resistance to international
copyright.
There is not a more disgusting spectacle under the sun than our subserviency to
British criticism…[It is] truckling, servile, pusillanimous … [it shows a] gross
irrationality. We know the British to bear us little but ill will [and that they do not]
utter unbiased opinions of American books … [If well treated by British critics it
is because Americans have] paid homage to English institutions, or have lurking
at bottom of their hearts a secret principle at war with Democracy…We do indeed
the nationality of self-respect. In Letters as in Government we require a
Declaration of Independence. A better thing still would be a Declaration of War—
and that war should be carried forthwith ‘into Africa.’ 116
In his biography of Poe published in Graham’s Magazine during the height of
Poe’s career in 1845, James Russell Lowell noted that
The situation of American literature is anomalous. It has no centre, or, if it have, it
is like that of the sphere of Hermes. It is divided into many systems, each
revolving round its several sun, and often presenting to the rest only the faint
glimmer of a milk-and-watery way. Our capital city, unlike London or Paris, is
not a great central heart, from which life and vigor radiate to the extremities, but
resembles more an isolated umbilicus, stuck down as near as may be to the centre
of the land, and seeming rather to tell a legend of former usefulness than to serve
any present need. Boston, New York, Philadelphia, each has its literature almost
more distinct than those of the different dialects of Germany; and the Young
Queen of the West has also one of her own, of which some articulate rumor barely
has reached us dwellers by the Atlantic. Meanwhile, a great babble is kept up
concerning a national literature, and the country, having delivered itself of the
ugly likeness of a paint-bedaubed, filthy savage, smilingly dandles the rag-baby
upon her maternal knee, as if it were veritable flesh and blood, and would grow
timely to bone and sinew… But, before we have an American literature, we must
have an American criticism.117
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Lowell’s point is that the diffusion of American literature in the 1840s, most of it in the
form of a variety of magazines and gift books featuring a potpourri of reprinted articles
by British and American authors, often published anonymously, belies a pretense based
in an ideology for national literature. Lowell elects Poe as the critic who will “pass most
erudite judgment upon the merit of thistles.” 118
Written concurrently to Lowell’s biography of Poe in Graham’s Magazine, Poe’s
four-part series in the Evening Mirror (January 1845), titled “Pay of American Authors,”
as we have already alluded, proposed that American national literature was being
undermined by the literary piracy afforded by a lack of international copyright. In the
first installment of the article Poe writes: “How we rob foreign authors, and how we
argue in our legislative halls that it is an economical thing for us to pick the foreign
pocket.”119 The “most momentous evil” caused by a lack of international copyright, says
Poe, “is the bitter sense of wrong aroused in the hearts of all literary men.” In Part 2 of
“Pay of Authors in America,” Poe argues that a lack of compensation given to American
authors since British works are circulated freely results in “depressing our literature.” 120
And here we get an intimation of the hostility Poe felt for democratic institutions:
“What nation has ever yet found it politic to inflict, for the sake of a seeming advantage,
however general, avowed and continuous injury to even the humblest of her individuals?”
Consequently, he says, “One thing is certain — the institutions are not safe which persist
in insulting them.” In Part III, Poe shows the result as what he regards as an injurious
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policy: “The impossibility, in general, of getting pay from the booksellers for the
copyright of books, has driven nearly all the American literateurs to Magazines
contribution.” He adds that “in the content-table of one or more of our Monthlies: — the
Quarterlies are anonymous, and for no better reason than that the British Quarterlies have
been anonymous before them. Who, to-day, is so weak as to value an anonymous opinion
and, unluckily, our reviews are for the most part either disingenuous essays concocted
from the material of the book reviewed, or summaries of sheer opinion.” 121 In Part IV, the
“Synopsis of the international copy-right question,” which we quote at length, Poe writes
The immediate advantage to our people, so far as the pocket is concerned, is of
course sufficiently plain. We get more reading for less money than if the
International Law existed; but what we mean to say is, that the more remote
disadvantages are of infinitely greater weight. In brief they are these: — First we
have injury to our national literature by repressing the efforts of our men of
genius: — for genius, as a general rule, is poor in worldly goods and cannot write
for nothing. Our genius being thus repressed, we are written at only by our
"gentlemen of elegant leisure," and mere gentlemen of elegant leisure have been
noted, time out of mind, for the insipidity of their productions. In general, too,
they are obstinately conservative, and the feeling leads them into imitation of
foreign, especially of British models. This is the true source of the imitativeness
with which as literary people, we have been justly charged . . . In the second
place, irreparable ill is wrought by the almost exclusive dissemination among us
of foreign, that is to say of monarchical or aristocratical sentiment, in foreign
books: nor is this sentiment less fatal to Democracy because it reaches the people
themselves, directly, in the gilded pill of the poem or the novel … We have next
to consider the impolicy of our committing, in the national character, an open and
continuous wrong, on the frivolous and altogether untenable pretext of
expediency. Of this point we have spoken before … The last, and by far the most
important consideration of all, however, is that sense of insult and injury to which,
also, we have already alluded — the animosity aroused in the whole active
Intellect of the world — the bitter and fatal resentment excited in the universal
heart of Literature — a resentment which will not, and which cannot, make nice
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distinction between the temporary perpetrators of the wrong, and that Democracy
in general which not only permits but glories in its perpetration.122
Poe’s criticism of puffing reveals the consequences of a literary market
disadvantaged by the imbalanced trade position granted to British literature by American
trade policy that saw international copyright as favoring British authors. American
readers in the 1840s desired to have the advantage of British culture but were unwilling
to reward British authors, and instead foisted the ideology of literary nationalism upon a
market hampered by trade disadvantages and false advertising. If on one hand Poe’s
position toward international copyright maintained that it stifled American literary
creativity, prioritized British hegemony, degraded national character, and promoted antiintellectualism, on the other hand Poe was already on record criticizing such American
publishers that did exist for the practice of puffing mediocre writing. If a lack of
international copyright discouraged authors from expecting compensation, puffing
encouraged authors to produce inferior work with respect to British examples. For an
author to publish, Poe realized, he or she entered into the business of placing their works
into the hands of unscrupulous publishers and unethical critics. Poe argued that
The intercourse between critic and publisher, as it now almost universally stands,
is comprised either in the paying and pocketing of black mail, as the price of a
simple forbearance, or in a direct system of petty and contemptible bribery,
properly so called — a system even more injurious than the former to the true
interests of the public, and more degrading to the buyers and sellers of good
opinion, on account of the more positive character of the service here rendered for
the consideration received … To so great an extent of methodical assurance has
the system of puffery arrived, that publishers, of late, have made no scruple of
keeping on hand an assortment of commendatory notices, prepared by their men
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of all work, and of sending these notices around to the multitudinous papers
within their influence, done up within the fly-leaves of the book.123
Here we have Poe’s concise argument for independent and original literary criticism. The
problem redounds to the practice inherent in democratic authorship, and a practice
inherited from the republican public sphere of the early national period for anonymous
authorship. Poe writes:
In a word, the press throughout the country has not been ashamed to make head
against the very few bold attempts at independence which have, from time to
time, been made in the face of the reigning order of things … But is this an age—
is this a day—in which it can be necessary even to advert to such considerations
as that the book of the author is the property of the public, and that the issue of the
book is the throwing down of the gauntlet to the reviewer—to the reviewer whose
duty is the plainest; the duty not even of approbation, or of censure, or of silence,
at his own will, but at the sway of those sentiments and of those opinions which
are derived from the author himself, through the medium of his written and
published words? True criticism is the reflection of the thing criticised upon the
spirit of the critic.124
As we shall see, anonymity was at the beginning of the nineteenth century and
before a mode of democratic “publicity,” a way for the public to voice its political will.
As the market for literature enlarged the notion of publicity became a way for authors to
circulate literature anonymously. Anonymous authorship was a key means in which
individuals might enter the collective public sphere and contribute to the public interest,
yet remaining unidentified authors could voice political views as a public voice.
Anonymous authorship circulated without copyright identification through the practice of
reprinting. But eventually the market interceded and demanded the identification of
authors due to the increasingly important function copyright law played in highlighting
individual authorship and the literary-critical issue of plagiarism.
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Poe’s criticism clearly demonstrates the semantic shift that occurred in the use of
the term publicity. What had been a term to describe a mode of print distribution
originating anonymously in the democratic public sphere for the public’s benefit, which
had survived through the early national era into the Jacksonian era through
“reprinting.”125 As the literary marketplace took hold of the term it shifted to its modern
sense as a form of marketing.126 Book advertising, or “puffing,” had adopted anonymity
as a means of book reviewing, and an outraged Poe states that
We shall thus frown down all conspiracies to foist inanity upon the public
consideration at the obvious expense of every man of talent who is not a member
of a clique in power … Yet in the attempt at getting definite information in regard
to any one portion of our literature, the merely general reader, or the foreigner,
will turn in vain from the lighter to the heavier journals. But it is not our intention
here to dwell upon the radical, antique, and systematized rigmarole of our
Quarterlies. The articles here are anonymous. Who writes? who causes to be
written? Who but an ass will put faith in tirades which may be the result of
personal hostility, or in panegyrics which nine times out of ten may be laid,
directly or indirectly, to the charge of the author himself?127
Poe was, as we can see, alarmed at the potential for fraudulently aggrandizing the
originality of texts, a concept of originality that was based both in intellectual property
and also in originality as a mark of literary value, a value saturated with Romantic
schemas for imaginative originality. Such schemas, as we shall discover, had profound
connections to British and European Romantic ideas about literary and metaphysical
originality, ideas that would ultimately supersede democratic authorship among the
alternative Romantics. By identifying the literary critic Poe could elevate universal
critical values that could transcend literary nationalism, puffing, and the dependence on
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British taste. By confronting negative freedom, Poe could leverage negative originality
and confront the pretense of originality he abhorred.
Plagiarism and Ratiocinative Originality
By the time Poe had amassed an oeuvre of literary reviews, essays on literary
theory, and marginalia, he was in a pitched battle with the literary establishment. As
much as he wished to gain intellectual control of concepts through ratiocination, Poe felt
that concepts originate not in experience but in creativity. Literary originality ascended as
his primary interest and he was determined to reveal its structure without having to resort
to metaphysics. For Poe literary originality was in part quantitative through an
investigation of plagiarism, a critical issue that became increasingly trenchant with the
rise of the Romantic cult of originality in literature. Arguably, Poe was drawn to
plagiarism as a critical ploy since its investigative process is inherently ratiocinative, a
mood that fit his penchant for reasoned examinations of creativity.
Poe’s ratiocination is essentially a matter of not simply mimesis or representation
but plagiarism.128 The original that comprises the purloined letter is a text figured as a
crypt, a text lost to the moment. The desire for the text amounts to a desire for a deus ex
machina that might through its power and machinery restore the text to its origin. In an
act of duplication the theft of the text becomes its restoration through intuition,
interpretation, and negation. The ratiocinative poet, like Dupin, a duple figure that
deploys both intuitive reason and the irradiating power of possession, overpowers the
signified with an irruptive assemblage of refulgent signifiers, that partially erase the
traces of past signifieds. No transcendental signified can withstand the power of
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irradiation. With Dupin, says Riddel, the author becomes allegorized as a deconstructed
detective and gambler, whose game is to discover and steal. For Riddel, in Poe’s “The
Purloined Letter,” “detection is repetitious theivery of animated substitutions and
displacements that indicate the letter is never at the center, is never representational,
except as a sign that is always everywhere.”129 Poe places the very symbol of authority
under suspicion, where the Prefect is outwitted and for D_____ the letter loses the will to
power. Dupin displaces D____ in a familiar trick of doubling redolent of William
Wilson. The game depends on both since they share the same signifier but contrast in
terms of the ambivalence of the signified. Authority oscillates between analysis and
authorship and becomes resolved into theft by substitution. That same play of reversal
applies to the lost letter itself.
The substitution of the author by the thief maps onto the substitution of the
reversed fold that masquerades as the original fold. And it is the excess of the signifier as
represented by the ambiguity of the folded paper that also disguises the original center
that is evacuated through the excess of its exterior. The fold becomes the parergonal
frame that overwhelms the center displacing it to the margins. The original, suffice to
say, is lost to its iterative exterior. The original center is transgressed by a fictive history
that overwrites its generative one. This repetition through erasure forms an allegory that
maps onto the transition from classical thought that for Hegel and Said represents
centered thought, to a modern thought, which surpasses classical thought by
overmastering it. The genetic pattern that marks classical thought—what I have called
earlier generative originality, an originality of beginnings—is overcome by a structural
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pattern of repetition, a paragenetic or structural originality more synchronic than
diachronic. It is this paragenetic aspect that impels writing to produce more writing;
closure is effaced by insurmountable openness.
In Eureka, Poe “celebrates his poetic will, which can overthrow the old,
exhausted fictions of logic; and in the tales of ratiocination, decipherment produces
differences that break up the prison house of 'antiquated narratives'.” 130 Yet the very
factor of doubleness exposes Poe’s dilemma. In his acknowledgement of the fictiveness
of generative originality, his own structural originality exposes his will to power as a
center of his own fictive presence. Poe’s “William Wilson” presents an allegory of this
bipartite split personality, where the creative resolution of structure through negation of
originality exposes its own original double that mirrors that negation in its own spiraling
negativity, this again erasing its center in an iteration of negation.
The year 1845 opened promisingly with the publication of the poem “The Raven”
in the New York Evening Mirror. The poem’s author, Edgar Allan Poe, began editing The
Broadway Journal that January, becoming its chief editor through the end of the year
when the journal discontinued publishing due to financial hardships. During the spring
and summer of that year Poe had taken up his “tomahawk” in a publically-held private
skirmish with Longfellow over matters of plagiarism. If Poe desired to increase
readership in Gotham by taking up a critical attack against the revered Harvard literati
Longfellow, the idea backfired. Lowell in his satirical poem A Fable for Critics (1848)
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described Poe as “Three-fifths of him genius, and two-fifths sheer fudge.”131 Yet, in
1845, the year of Poe’s ascent in The Broadway Journal, Lowell had described Poe as “at
once the most discriminating, philosophical, and fearless critic upon imaginative works
who has written in America.”132 The after effects upon Poe’s career notwithstanding, the
technical aspects of the Longfellow Wars show Poe’s mastery of critical devices of
plagiarism hunting. Moreover, Poe, it is likely, invents a straw man, which he names
“Outis.”133 Outis's letter in defense of Longfellow was published in the New York Weekly
Mirror (25 January 1845).134
In “Imitation—Plagiarism—Mr. Poe’s Reply to the Letter of Outis,” Poe cites
Outis, who is identified under the anonym “a fourth friend of Mr. Longfellow,” and who
is addressing Nathaniel Parker Willis, editor of the Daily Mirror, thusly: “Dear Willis—
Fair play is a jewel, and I hope you will let us have it.” 135 Poe states in an article titled
“Plagiarism” published in the Evening Mirror (47 February, 1845), that the editorial
policy maintained by The Broadway Journal regarding plagiarism insists upon “no
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resemblance.”136 Romantic critics and writers subscribed to the rubrics of plagiarism
above and understood the matter as a discourse over “literary judgment.” 137 Moreover,
even as writers were principally concerned during the period with originality they were
also equally aware of the way readers would apply standards of criticism to their works.
British critics in the early nineteenth century distinguished between “culpable” and
“poetical” plagiarism. The former involved deliberate attempts to pass off borrowing with
neither improvement nor acknowledgment, whereas the latter was the result of
unconscious borrowing.138 Culpable plagiarism brought with it a charge of moral
abasement; poetical plagiarism failed the minimum standard of Romantic aesthetics of
originality: any borrowing required both acknowledgment and improvement to defend
against charges of plagiarism. Claims of unconsciousness could counter charges of
culpable plagiarism by suggesting that any similarity between two works might be
coincidental.139
That is the tenor of the case that Outis makes to Willis against Poe’s charge of
culpable plagiarism with respect to Hood and Aldrich.Poe deploys DeQuincey’s method
of enumerating “points” of resemblance—or “identities,” suggesting Longfellow’s
conscious and therefore immoral plagiarism. Poe lists the points, demonstrating his
technique of evaluating plagiarism. The examples are drawn from poems by Thomas
Hood and James Aldrich (both were given biographies by Poe in his reviews of American
authors). Poe’s charge of “culpable plagiarism” proceeds as follows:
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In the first place, then, the subject in both pieces is death. In the second it is the
death of a woman. In the third, it is the death of a woman tranquilly dying. In the
fourth, it is the death of a woman who lies tranquilly throughout the night. In the
fifth it is the death of a woman whose “breathing soft and low is watched through
the night” in the one instance and who “breathed the long night away in statuelike repose” in the other. In the sixth place, in both poems this woman dies just at
daybreak. In the seventh place, dying just at daybreak, this woman in both cases,
steps directly into Paradise. In the eighth place all these identities of circumstance
are related in identical rhythms. In the ninth place these identical rhythms are
arranged in identical metres; and, in the tenth place, these identical rhythms and
metres are constructed into identical stanzas.140
Readers of Poe’s literary criticism know his inconsistencies and equivocations on
matters of plagiarism. Poe had charged Hawthorne for plagiarizing his tale “William
Wilson.” The charge was “groundless” since Poe composed “William Wilson later than
Hawthorne’s “Howe’s Masquerade.”141 Poe’s “fingerpointing highlights his definition of
originality and the crucial role it plays in his critical and creative practice.”142 It is behind
the mask of Outis (“nobody”) that we have a glimpse of Poe’s critical problem. In Poe’s
copy of Outis’s letter—how he obtained is redolent of the “Purloined Letter”—we read
Outis’s defense of Hood and Aldrich’s inadvertent and unconscious plagiarism, a mode
of “imitation” or coincidental originality that had been the subject of a debate between
DeQuincey and Coleridge in the 1820s. Poe, an avid reader of British Quarterlies
certainly knew that case, and Outis here takes Coleridge’s defense, while Poe makes
DeQuincey’s charge. Outis’s appeal to Willis for mediation apparently predates Poe’s
insinuation of “fair play”; we read the passage in full:
Some years ago, a letter was written from some part of New England, describing
one of those scenes, not very common during what is called ‘the January thaw,’
when the snow, mingled with rain, and freezing as it falls, forms a perfect
covering of ice upon every object. The storm clears away suddenly, and the moon
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comes up. The letter proceeds ‘every tree and shrub, as far as the eye can reach,
of pure transparent glass—a perfect garden of moving, waving, breathing
crystals. * * *Every tree is a diamond chandelier, with a whole constellation of
stars clustering to every socket,’ &c. This letter was laid away where such things
usually are, in a private drawer, and did not see the light for many years. But the
very next autumn brought out, among the splendid annuals got up in the country,
a beautiful poem from Whittier, describing the same, or rather a similar scene, in
which is this line ‘The trees, like crystal chandeliers,’…was put in italics by every
reviewer in the land, for the exceeding beauty of the imagery. Now the letter was
written, probably about the same time with the poem, though the poem was not
published till nearly a year after. – The writers were not, and never have been,
acquainted with each other, and neither could possibly have seen the work of the
other before writing. Now, was there any plagiarism here? Yet there are plenty of
“identities.”143
Culpable plagiarism thus redounds to the searching out of identities—similar figures and
images (“points of resemblance”) as they call up the creative conceptions of authorial
invention. Poe’s ratiocinative detective work, here, indicates how he traces through
plagiarism for the evidence of “originality.” He continues:
The author of the letter, when urged some years after, to have it published,
consented very reluctantly, through fear that he should be charged with theft; and,
very probably, the charge has been made, though I have never seen it…May not
this often occur? What is more natural? Images are not created, but suggested.
And why not the same images, when the circumstances are precisely the same, to
different minds? Perhaps your critic will reply, that the case is different after one
of the compositions is published. How so? Does he, or you, or anybody read
everything that is published? I am a great admirer, and a general reader of poetry.
But, by what accident I do not know, I had never seen the beautiful lines of Hood,
till your critical friend brought them to my notice in the Mirror. It is certainly
possible that Aldrich had not seen them several years ago—and more than
probable that Hood had not seen Aldrich’s. Yet your friend affects great sympathy
for both, in view of their better compunctions of conscience, for their literary
piracies…But, after all, wherein does the real resemblance between these two
compositions consist? Mr.— I had almost named him, finds nearly a dozen points
of resemblance. But when he includes rhythm, metre and stanza among the dozen,
he only shows a bitter resolution to make out a case, and not a disposition to do
impartial justice. Surely the critic himself who is one of our finest poets, does not
mean to deny that these mere externals are the common property of all bards. He
does not feel it necessary to strike out a new stanza, or to invent new feet and
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measures, whenever he would clothe his ‘breathing thoughts in words that
burn.’144
The matter deserves some consideration. The problem of literary property extends
to identities only tenuously since identities may be thematic and formal, but also
metaphoric and figural. If, as held generally in Romantic theory, that poetic tropes are the
common point of relation between ideal universals and individual poets, they are
identities only at the level of singularity—distinct in terms of immediate identity— but
not at the level of sui generis originality in the sense of a Wordsworthian “spontaneous
overflow.” The charge of plagiarism becomes a metacritical ploy to wrest control over
originality in favor of wily literary critics. Poe, in promoting national literature by
instigating a literary war over plagiarism using British critical procedures against
Longfellow, a national poet with European sympathies, serves to obfuscate the whole
question of literary originality in America. He seeks rational critical standards where he
finds them, and these standards arrived through British journalism. Yet his concern for
international copyright appears less concerned with British authority than it does with
promoting an American literary criticism.
Literary Non-Independence
In a piece written for The Evening Mirror by Poe, the subject of imitation and
literary dependence is raised. Poe argues that “The British reviewers have very frequently
accused us of imitation, and the charge is undoubtedly well based. We imitate, however,
chiefly the British models, and in doing this, we act only in a natural manner—just as it
might have been demonstrated a priori that we should and must have acted under the
circumstances. All colonies have shown a proneness to ape the mother country in arts and
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letters”145 Poe goes on to suggest that it is a conspiracy of conservatism satisfied in its
imitation of British models that seeks to sustain its literary hegemony by suppressing
original writers through a deliberate failure to enact international copyright. Poe argues
that
The want of an international copy-right law renders it impossible for our men of
genius to obtain remuneration for their labors. Now since, as a body, men of
genius are proverbially poor, the want of the international law represses their
efforts altogether. Our sole writers, in consequence, are from the class of
dilettanti; and although among this class are unquestionably many gifted men,
still as a class—as men of wealth and leisure—they are imbued with a spirit of
conservatism, which is merely a mood of the imitative spirit. But apart from this
consideration, we must observe that to imitate is a matter of less effort than to
originate; and we must not expect effort, as a general thing, certainly not as a
continuous thing, from those whose condition is affluence and ease . 146
In the literary-critical period leading up to the Longfellow Wars that raged in the
New York literary journals in 1845, British critics and writers in the late eighteenth and
early-to-mid nineteenth centuries had engaged in a pitched and contentious debate over
plagiarism as a threat to originality. Mazzeo argues that the concern over plagiarism
during the Romantic period defined the aesthetic dimensions of its critical field. 147
Plagiarism became “the determination of aesthetic failure” with respect to originality in
authorship. Discourses in the literary-critical milieu, argues Mazzeo, “offer a sustained
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literature, which was the main concern of the Duyckinck circle and Melville in the late 1840s.
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account of the cultural negotiations that shaped literary expectations” of Romanticism. 148
Moreover, “contemporary debates regarding the legitimacy or illegitimacy of particular
literary obligations masked a larger contest over how to come to critical judgment.” A
focus on plagiarism rather than originality as an aesthetic criterion allows one to focus on
ways in which Romantic writers were involved in “assimilation, absorption, and
appropriation,” as opposed to the normative aesthetic vantage point that “Romanticism
has been traditionally associated with the values of autogenous originality and
invention.”149 Plagiarism studies provide a metacritical approach to Romantic originality.
The debate between DeQuincey and Coleridge over culpable and aesthetic
plagiarism maps onto the dichotomy between epistemology and metaphysics. While
culpable plagiarism charges that an author has in fact consciously appropriated another’s
work that is neither acknowledged nor improved, it also points to a fairly common
practice of imitation in the Romantic era. Lockean epistemology suggests that originality
is essentially imitative, and moreover, that the labor of writing results in the work to be a
matter of material property. As we shall see, Coleridge was able to dismiss charges of
culpable plagiarism by claiming an unconscious originality that resulted in his ideas
bearing aesthetic similarities to Schelling. Poe sided with DeQuincey and Francis
Hargrave, whose Argument in Defence of Literary Property (1774) insisted that “a
literary work really original, like a human face, will always have some singularities . . . to
characterize it and to fix and establish its identity.” 150 But if literary originality arises in
the context of unconscious creativity, its identity points to the metaphysical originality of
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the creator. Wordsworth, in his “Essay Supplementary,” suggested that “genius is the
introduction of a new element into the intellectual universe.” 151
The distinction between culpable and poetical plagiarism can be illustrated by
contrasting Wordsworth’s emphasis on newness versus Emerson’s notion of
transformation. In the “Essay Supplementary to the Preface” (1815), Wordsworth
distinguished between "new" works (such as the Lyrical Ballads) and those which were
“novel” or merely “popular.”152 Wordsworth clearly accepted Kant’s idea that “Genius is
the innate mental aptitude (ingenium) through which nature gives rule to art.” Kant had
also made the influential claim that “genius is a talent for producing that for which no
definite rule can be given: and not an aptitude in the way of cleverness for what can be
learned according to some rule; and that consequently originality must be its primary
property.”153 Emerson made a similar point, except that this original “new element” is
already in the air but unrecognized until the Genius transforms it:
steals by this apology, that what he takes has no worth where he finds it, and the
greatest where he leaves it. It has come to be practically a sort of rule in literature,
that a man having once shown himself capable of original writing, is entitled
thenceforth to steal from the writings of others at discretion. Thought is the
property of him who can entertain it; and of him who can adequately place it.154
T.S. Eliot claimed, rather, that it is the element that is unchanged in the formation of a
mix between talent and tradition, and consequently the “genius” is transformed by the
literary tradition.. But in the Romantic period Wordsworth spoke for the era, stating that
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“every author, as far as he is great and at the same time original, has had the task of
creating the taste by which he is to be enjoyed.” 155 According, to Tillar Mazzeo who
restates the common consensus, it is Coleridge's Biographia Literaria that “represents a
sustained critical effort to recuperate the aesthetics of the new from the denigration
associated with novelty in the eighteenth century.” 156 In context, then, charges of
plagiarism operated in the Romantic era to negate the work of another author and at the
same time valorize originality as the sine qua non of Romantic creativity.
Inhabiting Desire
In 1834, Thomas DeQuincey published four articles in Tait’s Magazine outlining
instances of Coleridge’s supposed plagiarisms in four works. Of particular interest is
Coleridge’s debt to Friedrich W. J. Schelling in Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria (181517).157 DeQuincey’s critique of Coleridge’s borrowing of Schelling outlined two
criteria—culpable (conscious) and aesthetic (unconscious) modes, which would be
canonized as a rubric for plagiarism. Culpable plagiarism is not present if an author has
made an improvement on a source, if an author has borrowed from a widely known
source that is easily recognized by informed readers, and when the borrowing has been
unconscious.
By implication, then, Coleridge is guilty of culpable plagiarism of Schelling since
these criteria are simultaneously not met.158 Romantic plagiarism was forgiven if these
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criteria could be established.159 The matter has a bearing on the concept of literary
property, which in the 18th century redounded to the materiality of the text. For
DeQuincey, though, plagiarism is present if one author is aware of the intellectual
conceptions of another. Intellectual property is a matter of a writer's ideas. One can
absorb another's ideas unconsciously, but intellectual work implies bringing ideas to
consciousness. To avoid charges of plagiarism, critics demanded that a writer must
improve upon the former. In the case of Coleridge’s borrowings from Schelling,
DeQuincey argued, the Biographia Literaria is a wholesale translation of Schelling’s
ideas.160 Coleridge, said DeQuincey, neither improved nor acknowledged Schelling;
moreover, Schelling, it is implied, was not familiar to British readers. Such marks
Coleridge’s culpability.
According to DeQuincey Coleridge’s debt to Schelling involves “circumstantial
plagiarism, of which it is impossible to suppose him unconscious.”161 And while
DeQuincey admits that some of Coleridge’s ideas may have arisen “from that confusion
between things floating in memory and things self-derived which happens at times to
most of us.” Coleridge’s text, though, must admit to, says DeQuincey, appropriating
Schelling’s “most profound speculations on the original relations inter se of the
subjective and the objective, [that were merely] literally translated from the German, and
stretching over some pages.” The central contention put forward by DeQuincey shows
that he understands the role of Romantic consciousness as nexus between originality and
plagiarism.
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If DeQuincey sees consciousness as a function of an individual's knowledge or
intellectual wit, Coleridge could out-maneuver DeQuincey by expanding the role of the
unconscious. While DeQuincey shared the basic tenets of plagiarism with his
contemporaries as relative to the matters he charges against Coleridge—the culpability of
individual writer, Coleridge, in chapter IX of the Biographia Literaria, pointed out the
charge in anticipation of the charge of plagiarism: “In Schelling’s Natur-Philosophie and
the System des transcendentalen Idealismus I first found a genial coincidence with much
that I had toiled out for myself and a powerful assistance in what I had yet to do.”162 The
notion of a “genial coincidence” between Schelling and Coleridge in terms of the basic
tenets of transcendental Idealism rests upon the universality of truth as a form of common
property, available to the writer who understands it and expresses it. The expression of
the ideas of German Idealism, ideas Coleridge derived from reading Kant and Schelling
suggest Coleridge's intellectual “habit.” 163
For DeQuincey the implication of habit is a negative one: Coleridge’s plagiarisms
are habitual and reflect a lack of originality in his character. On the other hand, Coleridge
insisted as early as 1803 in his journal that “habit” becomes a “Desire to Fruition.” 164 As
a form of desire that leads to a palpable result, habit in effect becomes a mechanism that
162
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erases the conscious desire, so as such it becomes a “desire of a desire,” the initial desire
retreating into the unconscious.165 Habit becomes the conscious evidence of the desire,
which erased from the conscious surface retreats into the unconscious to guide the
imagination. Habit is the “means of return” to the moment of occurrence of the desire;
desire points to subjective experience rather than an object desired: habit becomes a
means of inhabiting the desire. This subjective notion of inhabiting desire—and negating
originality—via conscious iteration absolves Coleridge of the material premises behind
DeQuincey’s idea that plagiarism resides in the sphere of acquisitiveness. Coleridge,
rather, according to his claim, seeks to re-experience the moment when his imagination
penetrated originality as a sphere of universal truth, a truth he can share with Schelling. 166
In matters of supposed plagiarism, exemplified by the independent invention of
calculus by Newton and Leibniz, it is possible that “it is part of their originality that they
both came to the same conclusion (i.e., that they were not original in relation to each
other).”167 Clearly then there are two sorts of originality at hand here. In one sense there
is an independent and self-generative mode of originality (sui generis) where the species
is coextensive with the genus (structural originality). Relational originality (generative
originality), on the other hand, point to the past or future as originating, and proposes a
form of influence where one entity exhibits more uniqueness than another. At issue is
how to assess priority in originality. The “idea of originality qua priority … is
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ambiguous.”168 In cases like those of Hood and Aldrich or Schelling and Coleridge where
the possibility of simultaneous originality, or at least coincidental influence, the problem
of attribution, as both Poe and DeQuincey saw, redounds to quantification of identities,
and as Outis—Poe’s foil in the Longfellow Wars—noted the priority of criteria can seem
arbitrary. It would seem then that relational originality would draw attention to forms of
negation and misprision indicative of what Bloom calls an “anxiety of influence.”
Critical Vocabulary
Poe’s critical vocabulary is the foundation of his negative originality. His sacrifice
of relation, the difference between mundane facts (actuality) and a theory of aesthetic
beauty, became compelling by means of his insistent critical rhetoric. At the nexus of
Poe’s notions of actuality and his aesthetics is his theory of relation that comes under his
central concept of “unity of effect.” Originality obtains in the aesthetic relationships of
temporal communication, and acts simultaneously, if its effect is unified, by negating the
actual for the sake of the aesthetic. An important manifestation of Poe’s negative
originality lies in his idea of the “heresy of The Didactic.”
In a striking passage from his Poetic Principle, an essay that appeared before the
reading public shortly after Poe’s death, Poe distinguishes between a didactic poetics that
derives its morality from the current of Transcendental culture and a poetics of aesthetic
effect. Poe states:
While the epic mania — while the idea that, to merit in poetry, prolixity is
indispensable — has, for some years past, been gradually dying out of the public
mind, by mere dint of its own absurdity — we find it succeeded by a heresy too
palpably false to be long tolerated, but one which, in the brief period it has
already endured, may be said to have accomplished more in the corruption of our
Poetical Literature than all its other enemies combined. I allude to the heresy
168
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of The Didactic. It has been assumed, tacitly and avowedly, directly and
indirectly, that the ultimate object of all Poetry is Truth. Every poem, it is said,
should inculcate a moral; and by this moral is the poetical merit of the work to be
adjudged. We Americans especially have patronized this happy idea; and we
Bostonians, very especially, have developed it in full. We have taken it into our
heads that to write a poem simply for the poem’s sake, and to acknowledge such
to have been our design, would be to confess ourselves radically wanting in the
true poetic dignity and force: — but the simple fact is, that, would we but permit
ourselves to look into our own souls, we should immediately there discover that
under the sun there neither exists nor can exist any work more thoroughly
dignified — more supremely noble than this very poem — this poem per se— this
poem which is a poem and nothing more, this poem written solely for the poem’s
sake.169
The reference to the didactic tendency in Bostonian (Transcendental) poetry and the
associated idea of Truth, an association he had made with regard to Wordsworth’s
didactic “metaphysical” originality in “Letter to B—” (1836), finds Poe stating in that
letter that “A poem, in my opinion, is opposed to a work of science by having for its
immediate object, pleasure, not truth; to romance, by having for its object an indefinite
instead of a definite pleasure, being a poem only so far as this object is attained; romance
presenting perceptible images with definite, poetry with indefinite sensations….”170
Through poetics Poe negates the actual of science (including a metaphysics of
eternal truth) and the fancy associated with romance by negating definite pleasure
(another critique of Wordsworth) and definite sensations associated with Lockean
empiricism. What remains is a self-reflexive poetics mentioned in Poe’s 1845 article in
The Daily Mirror “Increase of Poetical Heresy,” which concludes that “there exists no
work more intrinsically noble, than this very poem, written solely for the poem’s sake.”171
Furthermore, Poe’s negation of the relation between the actual and the imaginary resides
169
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in his employment of the concept of imitation. Beyond his critique of plagiarism that
exploded in the Longfellow wars of the mid-1840s, which we shall examine in depth
shortly, Poe’s theory of the unity of effect broadens into the definition and application of
the concepts of verisimilitude and vraisemblance.
Poe’s critique of Hawthorne’s penchant for allegory is a case in point. In allegory,
the association of ideas appealing to “fancy,” says Poe, which requires an
“adaptation…of matters improper for the purpose, of the real with the unreal; having
never more of the intelligible connection than has something with nothing, never half so
much effective affinity as has the substance for the shadow.” In essence, for Poe, allegory
is a “fallacy.” Like metaphor, he says, allegory destroys precise thinking because it
depends on an “undercurrent” of “suggested meaning” that remains hidden until “called
to the surface” by an act of will. The unity of effect occurs prior to willing, apparently,
and it is a point reminiscent of Kant’s Critique of Judgement, where “[t]he concept of
fine art… does not permit of the judgement upon the beauty of its product being derived
from any rule that has a concept for its determining ground.”172
Furthermore, allegory operates only at a fictional level of reality, he says, and
“must always interfere with that unity of effect” that unites reader and writer in the
textual domain, because it causes “injury” to a text’s “earnestness or verisimilitude.”173
Any successful use of allegory, Poe continues, will keep its undercurrent “judiciously
subdued”; a reader’s pleasure in a text will stand “in the direct ratio of his ability to keep
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the allegory out of sight.”174 Poe describes judicious use of allegory metaphorically in
figured as a “shadow” of the text’s truth. By comparison an injudicious application of
allegory would find it “obtrusive” in its “unpleasant appositiveness.” For Poe the
association of ideas that engenders “unity of effect” lies on a horizontal plane rather than
one of competing levels of meaning.
Allegory, for Poe, is subservient to verisimilitude. “Under the best circumstances,
[allegory] must always interfere with that unity of effect which, to the artist, is worth all
the allegory in the world. Its vital injury, however, is rendered to the most vitally
important point in fiction — that of earnestness or verisimilitude.” 175 Yet, in 1846 Poe, in
his essay on Richard Adams Locke in the serialized “Literati of New York City,” he
states:
Reluctantly, therefore, and only half convinced, (believing the public, in fact,
more readily gullible than did my friends,) I gave up the idea of imparting very
close verisimilitude to what I should write — that is to say, so close as really to
deceive. I fell back upon a style half plausible, half bantering, and resolved to
give what interest I could….”
Later in the same essay he provides the sequence of his unity of effect as an applied
theory.
In writing a literary hoax, a form of fictive deception that is at the core of the
negation of actuality, Poe suggests that the writing process involves four stages: “The
great effect wrought upon the public mind is referable, first, to the novelty of the idea;
secondly, to the fancy-exciting and reason-repressing character of the alleged discoveries;
thirdly, to the consummate tact with which the deception was brought forth; fourthly, to
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the exquisite vraisemblance of the narration.”176 Verisimilitude is the rhetorical pivotpoint in the movement out of the actual into the unity of effect; or to put it another way,
the unity of effect disengages the imagination from the actual, which is a negation of the
actual that has originated the vraisemblance.
Poe’s main achievement as a critic is that he made overt the crisis in American
literary aesthetics that could bind literary originality to national ideology, on one hand,
and metaphysical originality within the scope of morality, on the other. Poe’s negative
originality is a double-edged sword, since his core axiom of a unity of effect could
successfully trump moral didacticism and literal realism. Moral didacticism or
metaphysical originality, the idea that art’s purpose lay in moral instruction— that the
source of originality is ultimately spiritual—was one of his pet fallacies. Another
questionable fallacy that Poe’s criticism raises pertains to the question whether realism—
Nature—is itself art. The question places him in a curious relation to Emerson.
While Emerson agreed with Coleridge and Wordsworth that Nature is intrinsically
linked to signification by means of a synecdochal schema where the sign in the particular
is enclosed within the universally true, Poe’s theory of art is based upon the effect
aesthetic experience has on the receiver. Truth is this not based on an eternal essence but
on the capacity of language to reproduce an impression, to invoke signification that
resembles truth but is merely an aesthetic construct that is self-reflexive and morally
inert. For Poe, the criticism of art must be based upon the response of readers to the art,
not the received ideas that society presumes as facts given to it by Common Sense
orthodoxy. Poe’s critical stance places him in a precarious cultural position that finds him
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in a passive-aggressive stance vis-à-vis other authors and literary culture. Poe’s role for
the imagination finds most of his protagonists annihilated by their own insistence on their
imaginative originality. Poe’s originality is literally negative. Psychological originality
metaphorizes as the ‘Imp of the Perverse.’
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Chapter 4: Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Marble Faun and the Negativity of Romance
With The Marble Faun, Or The Romance of Monte Beni, (1860), Nathaniel
Hawthorne presents his “postconsular romance of corruption and redemption in Catholic
Rome of the 1850s.”1 Upon the publication of the book in England, with the title The
Transformation, The Marble Faun marks the point when Nathaniel Hawthorne returned
from Italy via Southampton to his home “The Wayside” in Concord, MA. As an
experiment in the aesthetics of originality within the scope of an American romance in
the Roman ruins which immediately recalls a mythic Arcadia, the book is both
Hawthorne’s dénoument as a writer and Donatello’s emergence as a pastoral figure who
must contend with the actual. George Parsons Lathrop, who collected The Complete
Works of Hawthorne in the 1880s, wrote of Donatello’s transformation in The Marble
Faun that Hawthorne
also shows, in Donatello’s final delivering of himself up to justice, the wisdom of
some definite judgment and perhaps punishment bestowed by society. Thus
avenues of thought are opened to us on every side which we are at liberty to
follow out; but we are not forced, as a mere theorist would compel us, to pursue
any particular one to the exclusion of the others. In all we may find our way to
some mystic monument of eternal law, or pluck garlands from some new-budded
bough of moral truth. The romance is like a portal of ebony inlaid with ivory, —
another gate of dreams, — swinging softly open into regions of illimitable
wisdom. But some pause on the threshold, unused to such large liberty; and these
cry out, in the words of a well-known critic, “It begins in mystery and ends in
mist.”2
Lathrop assures us that Hawthorne’s mode of Romance in The Marble Faun, and with
qualifications, a commonplace of Romance in general, involves an imaginary sphere of
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Romantic originality that offers up a freedom of interpretation grounded in a
philosophical sense of moral truth.
The role of the imagination, “another gate of dreams,” borders on the edge of
reality extending to a region of mystification. The question of society’s judgment of
Donatello’s crime ushers in the central theme of societal responsibility in The Marble
Faun, and thus we arrive at the central problem on the field of literary Romance: the
degree to which the author is at liberty to criticize society by offering up an exemplum of
the moral question at hand and teasing out through the “gate of dreams” a “mystery that
ends in mist” such that society is unaware that it has been criticized. Behind that mist
Hawthorne perhaps presumes an original “monument of eternal law” which engenders its
metaphysical originality through “some new-budded bough of moral truth.”
Lathrop has swiftly led us to the precipice of Hawthornean originality, that
society’s fatal flaw may be redeemed through its fortunate fall. Donatello’s felix culpa is
also a momento mori. Miriam, the dark-complexioned lover and original artist notes that
like the movement of return, Donatello “has travelled in a circle, as all things heavenly
and earthly do, and now comes back to his original self, with an inestimable measure of
improvement won from and experience of pain.” 3 Donatello’s moment of recognition
(anagnorisis) and reversal (peripeteia) arises in the sublime moment of negativity that
necessitates his originality, his transformation from an ahistorical Arcadian state to a
temporal and moral world. Hawthorne’s sense of the term “moral” indicates a more
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expansive meaning than is customary, in that he is seeking to uncover through tragedy an
"underlying human reality—vital, spiritual, and psychological.” 4
In this sense Hawthorne is seeking to explicate what is probable and general in
terms of human nature. The effect of tragedy results in purgation that arises in what
Aristotle terms the recognition scene. In the recognition scene, or anagnorisis, the subject
is immediately impressed by the sudden self-discovery of the inexorable nature of events.
Hawthorne developed a strain of anagnorisis that concentrates on inner moral
recognition. The subject in this case becomes self-aware of an internal presence of evil
and considers justice in universal and self-reflexive terms. The subject becomes aware of
a “purgatorial movement” that ensues with a “movement towards regeneration.” 5 This
movement of return approximates the movement of the romantic sublime: “Moral
recognition is [...] central to the remorse of Miriam and Donatello.”6 Clearly evil for
Hawthorne may be “irreparable,” and that Miriam and Donatello’s humanity is revealed
through its fall. Thereby, “Hawthorne was most able to convey the strength of the heart,
and so create a sense not merely of life’s inexorability and sordidness, but of its
possibilities of beauty and grandeur.” 7 Matthiessen’s “doubleness” thesis here suggests a
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form of democratic redemption that, as we shall see, proves to be for Hawthorne quite
ambiguous.
The transformation between the ideal and imaginary Arcadian spirit and the actual
circumstances of the human condition points to a continuum in Hawthornean romance
often structured as a bifurcation. On one hand Hawthorne regarded himself as “the
obscurest man of letters in America” in his preface to Twice-Told Tales (1851),
possessing a “native reserve,” as he put it in “The Custom House,” which Melville
described as a sense of “melancholy [that] rests like an Indian Summer”; or on the other,
what Melville saw in a singular point of view as “the hither side of Hawthorne’s soul—
like the dark half of the physical sphere…[his ] darkness but gives more effect to the
ever-moving dawn.”8 Hawthorne’s dark side with its “touch of Puritan gloom,” as
Melville saw it, betrays the negativity Hawthorne held as “the inmost Me behind its veil,”
a characteristic through which he harbored what Melville suggested as a “great power of
blackness.” In this well-known passage describing Hawthorne’s “Calvinistic sense of
Innate Depravity,” Melville is suggesting that it is this “hither side” of Hawthorne that
through the medium of Romance has the power of Shakespeare and other masters of the
great Art of Telling the Truth.”9 “In a world of lies,” exhorts Melville, Romance has the
capacity to tell the truth about what is wrong with society by comparing the utopian spirit
of imaginary Arcadia to the actual circumstances of the human condition.
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Hawthorne achieves imaginative control in The Marble Faun through the medium
of ‘iridescence’.10 Hawthorne’s mode of iridescence signals a shift from allegory to
symbol. In allegory Hawthorne creates an alternative reality, as he created in the sketch
“Alice Doane’s Appeal.” But Hawthorne’s use of symbolism proposes that nature itself
acts emblematically, as it does in The House of Seven Gables. For Hawthorne, light is
symbolic of ideality. Thus the actual is saturated with the ideal.11 What might be
described as Hawthorne’s visionary Romanticism, that the source of Hawthorne’s
allegorical thinking resides in phenomena, undergoes a shift to a form of symbolism
through iridescence (or coloration) that is provided to the world by the subject.
Iridescence, then, is for Hawthorne the psychological source of symbolism. This mode is
saturated by an intuition that the real is also infused with the spiritual. Hawthorne’s idea
of iridescence is not a form of pantheism but sees spirit as a thing in itself. Hawthorne’s
“natural symbolism,” rather than a mode of realism, is a mode of the relation between
realism and the imagination; iridescence becomes a “fusion” of realism and
supernaturalism.
Hawthorne symbolizes the human condition at the moment four principal
characters of The Marble Faun assemble: There, exhibited in the
sculpture-gallery, in the Capitol, at Rome…reclines the noble and most pathetic
figure of the Dying Gladiator, just sinking into his death-swoon…Adjacent to the
central image Pagan gods entombed in marble remain, still shining in the
undiminished majesty and beauty of their ideal life. [Hawthorne suggests it is a]
symbol […] of the Human Soul, with its choice of Innocence or Evil close at
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hand, in the pretty figure of a child, clasping a dove to her bosom, but assaulted
by a snake.12
Hawthorne redraws the function of art from its Kantian notion of an “Ideal” form to the
artistic process, a process that serves as an allegory of the quest for spiritual growth.
The novel The Marble Faun remaps a Schlegelian hermeneutics of classicism, by
way of Hegelian synthesis, to an attempted reconciliation of Classical art and Christian
consciousness. The Faun of Praxiteles—Donatello, himself—presents a morphology of
animalia through the figure of an idyllic creature that preexists a higher stage of
consciousness. Donatello, as the human embodiment of that form, must endure the guilt
of causing the fall of the Capuchin monk—“at Miriam's voiceless instigation”—and
through the destruction of both Eden and the Capuchin, whose representation of Christ
through metempsychosis, the possibility opens for reconciliation and transformation. The
allegory of The Marble Faun, then, is that spirit must embody both physis and nomos,
material and spiritual, body and soul, in order to create order. Nature and Art conjoin in
the process of human spiritual development. But the question of the possibility of such a
form of re-origination begs the question of the nature of the actual as it impinges on such
a movement of return.
Hawthorne, says Chai, differs from Wordsworth in terms of their respective views
of the role of Nature in moral consciousness. For Wordsworth, as for Emerson as a
“positive” Romantic, the idea of Nature “participates in man’s moral education” because
it is the Kantian a priori synthesis that furnishes the understanding as practical reason.
Hawthorne sees nature, instead, as only a first stage. In this sense, for Chai, Hawthorne
resolves the dichotomy between Art and Nature in an ever ascending spiral towards
12
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higher consciousness. Like Emerson, Hawthorne realizes that materialism is simply the
platform for Idealism.13 Furthermore, humanity is forever “unfinished”; Donatello
remains bound to the likeness of the Faun. The very organicism of art, following Herder,
as it is construed in Romantic terms, mirrors the human condition.14
Art undergoes “an organic process of development”; the artistic process is itself a
spiritual quest.15 And the impetus to artistic development, like character development, is
that its inception obtains in the originality of its greatest guilt. Art as an allegory of
human growth, and in spiritual—or psychological terms—traces the movement of return
in its negation of the guilt which is only possible through the Fortunate Fall. In this sense,
Hawthorne’s theory of negative originality argues that psychological development can
proceed only through a synthesis of nature in spirit that becomes allegorized in the artistic
process. Development, in other words, originates in the consequences and understanding
of the Fall itself. The Fall, therefore, is incipient to a rise, which is a negation of the
original prelapsarian innocence and its obligatory postlapsarian transformation. In this
sense, following Hegel, transformation is negation.
Before the Fall
R.W.B Lewis, a noted “myth and symbol” critic of the 1950s, argues that “[i]n
Hawthorne’s The Marble Faun, the “Adamic myth is altogether central and
controlling.”16 The Adamic myth structures the myth of American exceptionalism by
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insisting that America could boast a new beginning to human life in a postlapsarian
world.
Unlike the Roman myth [of Virgil's Aeneid], which envisioned life within a long,
dense corridor of meaningful history—the American myth saw life and history as
just a beginning. It described the world as starting up again under fresh initiative,
in a divinely granted second chance for the human race, after the first chance had
been so disastrously fumbled in the darkening old world.
Described as “Our national birth” and “the beginning of a new history” by the
Democratic Review in 1839, Lewis thus historicizes the Adamic myth in the context of
democratic literature.17 The issue underlying Lewis’s Adamic myth idea, an issue
common with much criticism of American nineteenth-century literature written in the
mid-twentieth century including Matthiessen’s American Renaissance, is that the
argument is more circular than the literature it describes. While the effort to instantiate a
Cold War totalization of American exceptionalism through myth and symbol analysis
grafted onto the precepts of national literary originality as a figure, the premise functions
as a tautology. By contrasting Milton Stern and David S. Reynolds’ dialectical arguments
we have already considered ways that Hawthorne’s negative originality undercuts
exceptionalism.
For Lewis, who accepts his own historicism as confirmation of the Adamic thesis,
the new beginning was one “bereft of ancestry,” a “self-propelling” singular individual
event “identified with Adam before the Fall”; the Adamaic “American” becomes the
“archetypal” figure, who “in his very newness,” [was] “fundamentally innocent.” For the
“Adamic American” all of the “world and history lay all before him. And he was the type
of creator, the poet par excellence, creating language itself by naming the elements of the
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scene about him.”18 For Lewis, the Adamic myth operates in a dialectic relation to
tragedy. Contrasting the Adamic myth, “the ideal of newborn innocence” came to also be
“deplored” by authors such as Melville, Hawthorne, and Poe (and later Henry James)
who proposed instead “a new kind of tragedy…inherent in [Adamic] innocence and
newness” that “established the pattern for American fiction.”19 (6). That is essentially the
argument for “renaissance,” which holds that democratic dissent defines an original
American literature. Emerson, rather than recognizing a multi-voiced cultural dialogue,
saw instead a “schism” between past and future, as well as between Understanding and
Reason.
Hawthorne, on the other hand, reflected analytically and philosophically on the
polarization of culture. Confirming what Friedrich Schlegel intuited as a problem arising
in the aporia between the universal reason and the particular understanding, Hawthorne’s
sacrifice of relation is premised upon his acceptance of a permanent state of cultural
parabasis. Lewis posits the idea of a step beyond Emersonian dualism by suggesting a
third alternative: irony.20 Lewis holds out the possibility—a possibility which is largely
negative—that the American conscience might be innocent to the degree it was
“unsullied by the past.” If the American conscience might be free of the past, and in its
ironic feelings of nostalgia for originality it might have remained optimistic; that
optimism might at least be capable of rejecting the moral predestination of Calvinism.
Such was Hawthorne’s starting point.
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Hawthorne’s view, a view neither absorbed by the past nor oriented toward the
headlong future, found its direction in “a sense of the tragic collisions to which innocence
was liable (something unthinkable among the hopeful), and equally by an awareness of
the heightened perception and humanity which suffering made possible (something
unthinkable among the nostalgic).”21 Hawthorne’s sense of a Golden Age found the
possibility of redemption, ironically, constrained to the past. Hawthorne rejected an
evolutionary model of progress since the spiral of spirituality is forever tied to
continuities of human life as he understood it. Moreover, Hawthorne’s ambivalence
toward reform and transcendentalism can be seen in “The Old Manse” when he remarks
about the sycophants of Emerson roaming the streets of Concord. For Hawthorne, truths
remain ambiguous: he accepts the unavailability of “any angular or rounded truth…dug
out of the shapeless mass of problematical stuff.” 22
The “new nostalgia” of the 19th century drives a cultural “veneration for the past
in its pastness”; the “nation of futurity” in its distance from the past became in turn one
more obsession with historical thinking.23 Romanticism countered the Enlightenment idea
of natural law and monolithic human nature by its inclination to historicism. German
romantic irony and hermeneutics offered to writers the sort of historicism that sought
understanding of history in terms of social context. The fiction of Poe, Hawthorne, and
Melville recognized an “organic relation between past experience and the living moment
[that] became a factor in narrative—a recurring theme of narrative,” which “revealed its
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design through an original use of discredited traditional materials.”24 (8). For Hawthorne,
Lewis contends, this literary mode of historicism became an “essential means of human
redemption.”
The Adamic ideal came to be recognized in the American romantic dialectic as
both dangerous and fallacious. At once it was seen as the “helplessness of mere
innocence” to romantic novelists of the 1840s and 50s, and as well a “primary theme.”
These authors saw that the “vision of innocence and the claim of newness were almost
perilously misleading,” yet at the same time the theme of originality became itself an
opportunity for “reflection and invention.”25 The “freedom from the past” came to be
understood as a delusion, which in turn prompted a sense of ironic tragedy balanced
between the illusion of originality and the “burden of the past.” Lewis reminds us that
youthful Romantic cheerfulness found in the Transcendentalists turned towards a “tragic
understanding—paradoxically bred out of cheerfulness”—; Lewis maintains that it was a
view shared by Hawthorne and Melville. That tragic sense combining with Poe’s
aesthetic ambiguity points toward a sense of negative originality.
According to Henry James Sr. “[d]emocracy...is revolutionary, not formative. It is
born of denial. It comes into existence in the way of denying established institutions. Its
office is rather to destroy the old world, than fully reveal the new.”26 Hawthorne’s story
“Earth’s Holocaust” illustrates the idea. Hawthorne, in 1844, presented a fable wherein a
young society committed the entire residual surplus of the past to a sweeping bonfire in
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the “West.” Yet, for Hawthorne, this ritual destruction is unable to eradicate the one
human remnant that may threaten the new world: the human “heart,” a realization
Melville discovered in Hawthorne’s psychological historicism.27 It is that very tension
between the concern for an eradication of the past and the persistence of human evil that
becomes the allegorical subject of American alternative romantics, as well as the point
that distinguishes them from positive romantics.
Iridescence
Evan Carton points out that Hawthorne’s work of romance in The Marble Faun
requires more than he allowed himself in The House of the Seven Gables, a romance
which demanded a “minute fidelity” between representation and history even as the
writer might be allowed a “certain latitude” with respect to depiction.28 Hawthorne’s
imaginative iridescence that uncovers history as a “legendary mist” attempts a truthtelling prescience about the state of the human heart. The mundane condition of
Hawthorne’s present, as it is given in the Custom House, becomes in The Marble Faun a
problematic of moral relativism mapped onto the structure of negative originality.
Hawthorne's Roman “fairy precinct, where actualities would not be so terribly insisted
upon” both doubles and supplements the moonlit room of the Custom House, given that
the Rome of The Marble Faun is depicted with a guidebook-like realism that tests the
actualities of the American remoteness in its grappling with the cultural discontinuities of
a past originary scene. Carton suggests that Hawthorne’s The Marble Faun discovers
both patterns of fragmentation and repetition. The originary mythos of Arcadia becomes
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fragmented in the actuality of a crime that transforms Donatello from the pure (simple
and sentimental) faun figure to a more complex identity revealed through his conspiring
in the murder with the equally guilty and mysterious Miriam. The repetition of the crime
points back to the moral paradox of Beatrice Cenci’s patricide and resultant capital
punishment.
The theme of fragmentation, or “alienation” as Carton terms it, associates with the
matter which is central to the Romance genre as a critical process that situates what Bell
terms the “sacrifice of relation.” Associated with fragmentation is the problematic in
Hawthorne’s narrative centering on the dualism of originality and repetition and the way
art frames the transatlantic problem of an American originality.
In terms of an originary aesthetic in light of the originality of Roman art,
Hawthorne’s American artists Hilda and Kenyon frame a discourse of moral and artistic
decline. Carton notes that Hawthorne scholars Roy Harvey Pearce, Frederick Crews,
Nina Baym, and Kenneth Dauber share in the notion that The Marble Faun itself is
emblematic of Hawthorne’s decline as an author.29 Edgar Dryden structures Hawthorne’s
romance writing as a theme of self-alienation from moral history and the “material
environment,” which conspire to isolate the writer. 30 Such a thesis amounts to a
paradoxical situation for the writer. Dryden describes this situation in terms of the binary
he calls enchantment and disenchantment, or what Milton Stern calls openness and
closure. This mode of ironic duplicity that Perry Miller saw in Melville’s relation to the
literary scene as a kind of befuddlement suggests that bifurcation which we also
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recognize in the criss-crossing that is structured into The Marble Faun. The Model’s
return from history in the catacombs, for example, confronts Miriam, whose own history
is mysterious, and the Model is then cast off the precipice to become transformed into a
Capucin monk. Thus the Ovidian theme of transformation supplements the romantic
binaries at play in the text, allowing for greater movement leaving the question of
negative originality at play in the narrative.
In the opening of “The Custom House” sketch Hawthorne speaks of the relation
between his writing and his readers in terms of his cautionary revealing of “confidential
depths of revelation.” He desires, he says, to address “only and exclusively, to the one
heart and mind of perfect sympathy; as if the printed book, thrown at large on the whole
world, were certain to find out the divided segment of the writer’s own nature, and
complete his circle of existence by bringing him into communion with it”31 Hawthorne’s
desire for “self-fulfillment through the medium of the text,” which parallels his
imaginative technique of melding time and reality with originality in the neutral territory
of light and shade, is central to his “structural effect of romance.” 32
In The Marble Faun, Hawthorne re-presents himself as an author before the
public through the vehicle of a preface. This time Hawthorne narrows the scope of his
receiver as
a character with whom he felt entitled to use far greater freedom. He meant it for
one congenial friend, —more comprehensive of his purposes, more appreciative
of his success, more indulgent of his shortcomings, and, in all respects, closer and
kinder than a brother, —that all sympathizing critic, in short, whom an author
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never actually meets, but to whom he implicitly makes his appeal whenever he is
conscious of having done his best.33
The Marble Faun: Preface
In the preface to The Marble Faun Hawthorne recognizes that any unity between
reader and author is unrecoverable, and as a result he accepts a state of alienation that is
self-reflexive and extensive. This condition of negativity extends beyond any power to
redeem itself since, due to the priority of privacy over publicity in Hawthorne’s ethos,
there is no longer the possibility of communion. Hawthorne’s concept of Romance in The
Marble Faun must accept an unrecoverable state of negation bounded by nothingness.
“Romance and poetry,” he admits, suggest metaphorically that like “ivy, lichens, and
wall-flowers, [artists] need ruin to make them grow.” Hawthorne’s organic metaphor is
encrusted with decrepitude, and his originality becomes realized only through negativity.
Romance, itself, no longer functions for Hawthorne as the intrinsically American
paradigm. “Italy,” he announces
as a site of Romance, was chiefly valuable to him as affording a sort of poetic of
fairy precinct, where actualities would not be so terribly insisted upon, as they are,
and must needs be, in America. No author, without a trial, can conceive of the
difficulty of writing a Romance about a country where there is no shadow, no
antiquity, no mystery, no picturesque and gloomy wrong, not anything but a
common-place prosperity, in broad and simple daylight, as is happily the case
with my dear native land. It will be very long, I trust, before romance-writers may
find congenial and easily handled themes either in the annals of our stalwart
Republic, or in any characteristic and probable events of our individual lives.34
Carton finds this passage “disturbing…not merely for its contention that romance
is a parasite upon physical and moral ruin but for its effort to disown, even to expunge,
the local, familial, and personal history that has sustained and been sustained by
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Hawthorne’s literary career.”35 Hawthorne’s reconfiguration of an American actuality
represses the shadows he found in the Custom House. By repressing the shadows that
were for him so palpable in the matter of Maule’s curse in The House of the Seven
Gables, Hawthorne presents the American actuality of 1859 as the ironically banal world
Holgrave inhabits once he drops his progressive artistic vision and accepts his estate. If
Holgrave could have “insisted upon…a country where there is no shadow” even as he is
well aware of the consequences of an immoral past and the pollution of the American
well-spring, Hawthorne proposes the question of a past that cannot be erased by
American ideology. Rome’s physical ruin, evident history, and its political turmoil
contrast, for Hawthorne, a purported American “original relation” that requires a denial
of its foundational crime, as allegorized in The House of the Seven Gables, and
concentrates on the foundational and transatlantic relation between art and ethics in the
Western continuum.
Rome, then, functions as the originary scene of a Western tradition that passes on
the foundational crime to America, which in turn must be denied in order to found an
original relation. As a romance of “transformation,” Hawthorne becomes complicit in
framing the disjunction between Roman ruin and American material reality, a reality that
through the artists Hilda and Kenyon becomes an aesthetic repetition in a Western
continuum bound in a paradox that wills copying, copying which is morally salvageable,
and at the same time, negativizing Plato, wills a form of copying that condemns the
structural framework in which the ambiguous moral system originated.
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Milton R. Stern explores the relationship between Hawthorne’s guidebook-like
passages and a more fundamental ethical conundrum underlying American originality.
The guidebook passages, says Stern, recognize Hawthorne’s obligations to American
gift-book publishers, whose audience, many of whom were women, had a predilection for
realistic sketches and travel journals.36 It is the European painter Miriam who contrasts
the Americanism represented by the copyist Hilda. For Hawthorne, argues Stern, “it was
difficult, if not impossible…to do other than support Hilda’s straight and narrow
antithematic refusal to illustrate or endorse the utopian closure toward which the entire
book moves.”37 It is Hilda’s ideology that resists Hawthorne’s theme of utopian closure
as represented by the sublime recovery from the inherent catastrophe of the fall. In other
words, Stern asserts that the figure of the fortunate fall is subordinated by Hawthorne’s
struggle between national literature and negative originality. Moreover, Stern claims,
Hawthorne paints Hilda as a young woman of high Christian temperament familiar to the
Unitarian and Middle Light bourgeois of New England. Ostensibly, then, for a book
framed by a tragedy that ought to proceed in a movement of return toward Romantic
openness due to Donatello’s humanistic self-transformation, Hilda’s conservatism overdetermines the sense of utopian closure that defines national ideology in antebellum
literary nationalism. Hawthorne’s Classicist “essence” belies his relationship to the
cultural matrix and thus undercuts his negative originality, his dissent from the
contradictions and dogmas of the American marketplace.
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The preface of The Marble Faun immediately references the ambiguous relations
between the poles of national literature and negative originality in the book’s theme. For
Milton Stern the issue is whether we take “Ruin” as a necessary condition for negative
originality (sublime and radical openness), or the phrase “broad and simple daylight” as a
redemptive condition (Classical closure).38 This crucial interpretive question for Stern,
which perhaps defines his argument as a whole, is whether the preface to The Marble
Faun celebrates American exceptionalism or negates it. The question for Stern is not a
spurious one, since for Hilda the American “broad and simple daylight,” finally, is
preferred over Roman Ruin. Indeed, the American sculptor Kenyon waxes nostalgically
for home saying to Donatello that while America is a
fortunate land, each generation has its own sins and sorrows to bear. Here, it
seems as if all the weary and dreary Past were piled upon the back of the Present.
If I were to lose my spirits, in this country—if I were to suffer any heavy
misfortune here—methinks it would be impossible to stand up against it, under
such adverse influences.39
Stern’s question is whether Kenyon’s nostalgia represents the text’s dianoia or
deliberately refutes it. Donatello's reply is inflected by his crime at the Tarpeian Rock:
“The sky itself is an old roof, now…and, no doubt the sins of mankind have made it
gloomier than it used to be.”
Standing in St. Peters in Rome the two Americans reflect on their exceptionalism.
Kenyon re-imagines the symbol of enlightenment and faith stolen by invading Romans
from Jerusalem, where the seven-branched candlestick has been lost in the mud of the
Tiber River. Hilda, more optimistically, suggests a predestined purpose for each branch
of the candlestick and that the final purpose must be chiliastic; when the candle reappears
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“the whole word will gain the illumination which it needs.” 40 When all branches of the
candle, each of a different color, are lit the composite will be an “intense white light of
Truth.” Moreover, she adds, “the theme is better suited for verse than prose; and when I
go home to America, I will suggest it to one of our poets.” Hilda’s chiliastic prose-poem
suggests Poe’s Eureka though it strongly contrasts the difference between a redemptive
closure in unity and Poe’s more ambiguous cyclical cosmic catastrophe.
Romantic timelessness and American exceptional originality compete for
imaginative space within the sphere of Hawthorne’s main theme of historical ruin.
“Because the actualities of history and setting in the book indicate the underlying utopian
truth of America's indistinguishable oneness with all fallen humanity,” Hawthorne, Stern
argues, “could not be true to his own actualities.” 41 “[T]he underlying utopia was the
book’s truth, and Hawthorne presented the ideological details as though they were the
book’s truth”; in effect, Stern argues, Hawthorne “lost his hold on both Romance and
novel.” This struggle for coherence of theme, genre, and thesis appear through the scenes
in the book that assert a mode of philosophical romance and at the same time contrast
with the book’s actual references to the historical past. The “original precipice” of the
Tarpeian Rock, for example, certainly a reference to human fallenness, is composed of
ancient masonry erected upon a natural geological formation. Here, Hawthorne unites an
allegorical idea related to his larger concern for redemption and situates the figure in the
context of tourist motif. The actuality of the formation becomes etherealized in a fashion
characteristic of Hawthornean Romance: “Brightly as the Italian moonlight fell a-down
the height, it scarcely showed what portion was man’s work, and what was Nature’s, but
40
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left it all in very much the same kind of ambiguity and half-knowledge, in which
antiquarians generally leave the identity of Roman remains.”42 For Stern, “[t]he sense of
discontinuity arises from conflicting sources of the book’s details,” which are from
utopian visions, on one hand, and stem from the desire for verisimilitude, on the other. It
is worth suspending disbelief, since it is equally possible that Hawthorne’s ambiguity is
quite deliberate.
It is difficult not to suppose that Hawthorne is aware that the originary chasm of
ruin might be the central dominant image of Romance, its portent for transfiguration,
rather than a bridge to nowhere. Hilda comments that “there is no chasm, nor any hideous
emptiness under our feet except what the devil within us digs. If there be such a chasm,
let us bridge it over with good thoughts and deeds, and we shall tread safely to the other
side.”43 The chasm of Curtius opens in a moment of sketch-like verisimilitude couched in
a larger Romantic reference to human actuality. The chasm of Curtius functions as
symbol of “the abyss of all human history.” As a moral “picturesque,” through
verisimilitude the chasm provides details that satisfy the American readers’ desire for
travel narrative, which situates them by means of a Grand Tour in the ideological present
of American exceptionalism. Kenyon's “fortunate land” where “each generation has only
its own sins and sorrows to bear” escapes the abyss of history that demands that its
“dreary Past were piled upon the back of the Present.” In other words, at the moment
when Hawthorne’s romance unearths its utopian symbol of moral originality through the
historicity of evil, the Americanism of the ideological distance from the past that situates
Kenyon and Hilda as tourists in a travel sketch removes them from actuality and by
42
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extension American moral continuity. Stern argues that Hawthorne, in The Marble Faun,
finds it necessary to “recoil from the demands of actualities.” 44 The larger question is
whether Hawthorne also recoils from Hilda and Kenyon’s demands.
The contrast between actualities and Romance, which applies a strategy of
verisimilitude, imaginatively conveys an ambiguous but utopian vision. That contrast of
firelight and moonlight in “The Custom House” is a prototypical example. In The Marble
Faun Hawthorne implies that his utopian vision overrides ideology by virtue of the level
of foreground detail and history through which he enacts its utopian possibilities. The
relationship between innocence and experience that underscores the narrative functions as
a central tension in this Italian scene, yet that relationship also is meant to universally
apply to the American context. Stern, however, argues that Hawthorne’s obligations to
the American literary marketplace locate his two idealized Americans in the foreground
of that context, and their ideological relationship to the American status quo obstructs our
entry into Hawthorne’s otherwise central background theme.45 Hawthorne explains that
the details of the Roman scene “are the solid framework of the hills that shut in Rome
and its wide surrounding Campagna; no land of dreams, but the broadest page of history,
crowded so full of memorable events that one obliterates another, as if Time had crossed
and re-crossed his own records till they grew illegible.” Hawthorne’s Rome centralizes
the fundamental metaphysical problematic at the basis of Donatello and Miriam’s
dilemma and marginalizes, at the same time, Hilda and Kenyon’s American Gothic. 46
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The narrative avoids Classicist closure by disjoining his characters from an actual
scene and he re-places them in the realm of the Romantic imagination. The avoidance of
Realism, Stern suggests, raises the question of Hawthorne’s unwillingness to directly
confront American readers with his dissent from American ideology and the marketplace.
“The transcription of records into emblems of meaning, of buried and reburied facts into
generalized, universal essence, was the source of Hawthorne’s creative strength, but the
conflict between ideology of fact and utopia of meaning breaks the narrative into small
moments of self-destruction.”47 Hawthorne announces that he wishes not to “meddle with
that history.”48 The physical presence of Roman history and Ruin, Stern implies, is meant
for guidebook-like verisimilitude but not as intrinsic allegories of Hawthorne’s utopian
vision. Admittedly, Hawthorne’s central metaphysical concern, like the Romantic
pretense itself, begs universal claims, and seeks in Roman ruin a metonymic relation. On
the other hand, Stern is intent upon locating the relational conflict between utopia and
ideology on American soil, where real universality is improbable.
Hawthorne maintains a disassociation between Classicist utopian vision and
literary market ideology through a metafictional commentary that intrudes upon the main
narrative thread, a thread which is itself a split between guidebook realism and
Americanism. The center of this disassociation arises in the very role of representation in
art and whether art has the power to communicate utopian meaning, or whether art is a
sophistic rhetoric that obscures pure truth. The central figures in this bifurcation are
Kenyon, the sculptor who captures the truth of the heart, and Hilda the copyist, whose
paintings reproduce the very purity of truth intended by the original painters. “Hilda is
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the embodiment of a marketplace that insisted on moral uplift, betterment, sunshine,
spirituality, religion, and moonlight prettiness.” 49 Hilda is the embodiment, in other
words, of benign reform in antebellum America.
While Stern, and Charles Sellers, make a strong case for the view that American
ideology in the antebellum northeast was under the ideological power of bourgeois
middle-light Christians, a point reinforced by considering the influence on the literary
market of gift books and annuals, David S. Reynolds argues, in contrast that utopian
reform in America of a Romantic rather than a Classicist strain, found resources in
popular literature that he terms “subversive fiction.” Such writings competed for
American originality and “took the side of oppressed or minority groups while exposing
what was seen as secret corruption among the pillars of society.” 50 Reynolds, in other
words, contests Stern’s view of Hilda as a representative of Hawthorne’s ultimate
acquiescence to benign reform ideology, by reminding us that with Hawthorne’s romance
he transformed reform into subversion.
Stern advances the notion that the ideology held by pillars of society also
represents Hawthorne’s market; Stern reminds that “it is precisely those sentiments with
which Hawthorne agrees in the auctoral voice.” 51 Central to the problem for
Hawthorne’s middle-light readers is the doubted morality of the artist. Raphael’s art, as a
paradigm case, is exposed as morally ambiguous since his humanism allowed him both
sensuous and pious strains. What sort of spirituality allows depictions of both the Virgin

49

Stern, Contexts for Hawthorne, 117.

50

David S. Reynolds, Beneath the American Renaissance: The Subversive Imagination in
the Age of Emerson and Melville (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 200.
51

Stern, Contexts for Hawthorne, 117.

290

and the naked woman in her earthiness?52 It is the copyist Hilda, Hawthorne seems to
propose, whose intrinsic purity of vision and moral rectitude allows her to transform
moral ambiguity within Roman painting that exists in a fallen state, to a prelapsarian state
of moral cleanliness. The irony is that as a copyist Hilda obviously engages in imitation,
but as a spiritual visionary Hilda re-originates representations that conform to the
market’s pious ideology. The dove-like Hilda, the symbol of the mythos of Puritan
America becomes the exemplum of American middle-light ideology, whose
exceptionalism ultimately rejects Rome as the seat of a Christian God. Certainly it is
evident that Hawthorne is engaged in a subversive use of Hilda as a pure copyist by
creating through her an oxymoronic symbol.
Miriam, in contrast, the Jewish classicist and painter, is pursued by evil in the
form of “the Model,” the Capuchin monk-monster that stalks her in the catacombs. To
relieve themselves of this Satanic pursuer, Miriam and Donatello reenact the Edenic Fall
into knowledge and send the Model over the precipice. The opening image of the book
sets the struggle between good and evil before the reader. The image seems to suggest
that Nature itself is Fallen and that that fallenness is without exception. America too is
damned, as it is in The Scarlet Letter, by iteration.
Hawthorne's metafictional and metacritical commentary interspersed through the
narrative, a commentary which struggles with the tension between Miriam’s Classicist
utopian humanism and Hilda’s Puritan ideology, as Stern argues, reveals by means of a
large-scale allegory a conflict within Hawthorne’s own imaginative consciousness. The
moral ambiguities of sublime art undercut a conflicted sense for both a closure through
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Classicist utopia and a desire for the approval of his “gentle reader.” Such a view, I
suggest, requires one to accept the preface at face value. The deeper question underlying
the universality or ambiguity of morality in art, a question that transcends or undercuts
American proprieties, recognizes that the possibility of transcendent closure premised on
morality immediately forecloses on any assertion of American historical exceptionalism.
The example of Hilda overwhelms Hawthorne’s own utopian example in Miriam, who
embodies (like Poe’s Ligeia, who is also a dark classicist spirit), the very utopian vision
that threatens Americanism’s pretenses.
The central image of the fortunate fall resulting from the appearance and death of
Memmius captures the cyclical nature of original sin and redemption, and with
redemption, spiritual transformation, as Donatello and Miriam grow through their selfaware humanism. Here is the nexus of the classicist utopian moment arising in the
sublime recognition of human growth. Donatello’s growth extends back in time to
prehistory and the mythology of Arcadia, through his likeness to the Faun of Praxiteles.
Donatello’s ascent then traces the metaphor of the Hawthornean sublime, where Hilda
inflects the stasic conditions of Hawthorne’s authorial dilemma, Miriam and Donatello
enact their negative originality by reenacting the Edenic Fall. This catastrophe, which
creates the disjunction between Hawthorne’s utopian vision and his moral historicism,
then follows with a movement of return from a Fallen Arcadia to Rome.
This movement of return finds Hilda seeking absolution from a Catholic priest
who is an American expatriate in the body of St. Peter’s Cathedral. In attempting
transcendence in contrast to Miriam’s more earthly natural sensualities and otherness,
Hilda seeks through her Catholic confession a Puritan outcome. Ironically she desires a
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transcendence that undercuts the authority of the Church by her enactment of sole fide.
But by doing so she in turn implicates what Melville had noted in his image of whited
sepuchres, for she is that image of the sin of the Pharisees (Matthew 23:27-28), which
sports the pure exterior vision as a transcendent copy of art, yet masks its humanistic and
morally ambiguous heart, a heart which her Catholic confessor is well aware of. Hilda’s
smug rejection of humanism portrays a more ominous vision of American
exceptionalism.
Hawthorne, finally, sets up the image of Hilda’s purity in an acid test that begs the
question of American patriarchy and the inequality of women. Hilda’s reverence for the
paintings of Fra Angelico exemplifies the moral idealization of True Womanhood, and at
the same time she is unable to accept the human paradoxes of the story of Guido’s
Beatrice Cenci, known to Hawthorne also through Shelley’s tragic drama: raped by her
father and then murdering him, Beatrice Cenci is decapitated in a public showing. Hilda
sides with the judgment, while Miriam charges that Hilda’s “innocence is like a sharp
steel sword. [Her] judgments are often terribly severe, though [Hilda] seem[s] all made
up of gentleness and mercy.”53 Miriam adds, “[i]f I could but clasp Beatrice Cenci’s
ghost, and draw it into myself! I would give my life to know whether she thought herself
innocent, or the one great criminal since time began.” Whether as moral ambiguity or
emblematic original sin, Miriam’s power of humanistic sympathy subverts Hilda’s charge
that “Her doom is just.” Since Guido’s Beatrice Cenci has been copied by Hilda, the
original sin in it has been whitewashed by the noonday materialism of Hilda’s American
ideology: Saying to Miriam, whose ironic feeling for pathos is enraptured by the
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paradoxical painting, “What an actress you are! And I never guessed it before!” Miriam
captures the irony of Hilda’s imitation, and by extension American originality: “It is
strange, dear Hilda, how an innocent, delicate, white soul, like yours, has been able to
seize the subtle mystery of this portrait; as surly you must, in order to reproduce it
perfectly.” Miriam’s subtle but evident excoriation of Hilda’s hypocrisy amounts to a
damning metonym of any American “original relation to the universe.”
The ideology of American exceptionalism, in other words, copies the original
without transforming it, and denies that the morally problematic content of the original
imposes responsibility upon the receiver. Miriam implores Hilda, asking, “would you
sacrifice this great moral consolation, which we derive from the transitoriness of all
things—from the right of saying, in every conjecture, ‘This, too, will pass away’—would
you give up this unspeakable boon, for the sake of making a picture eternal!” 54 Miriam
recognizes that in Hilda’s purity lies the destruction of the possibility of a humanistic
movement of return. Her substantiality admits no negation, no other.
Donatello, as opposed to the allegory of Hilda, is the example of transformation.
Kenyon asks, opening the central question:
Here comes my perplexity…Sin has educated Donatello, and elevated him. Is sin,
then—which we deem such a dreadful blackness in the Universe—is it, like
Sorrow, merely an element of human education, through which we struggle to a
higher and purer state than we could otherwise have attained? Did Adam fall, that
we might ultimately rise to a far loftier Paradise than this?55
Here, Kenyon parts from Hilda’s excessive piety momentarily. Hilda derides his
willingness to ask such a perplexing question about the logic of moral freedom, which
Hawthorne had recounted in his Journal entry about Melville in Liverpool in 1857. Hilda
54

Hawthorne, The Marble Faun, 134-35.

55

Hawthorne, The Marble Faun, 414.

294

charges Kenyon with making a “mockery” of religion and morality since the question
opposes faith: “it annuls and obliterates whatever precepts of Heaven are written deepest
within us…”56 Hilda infers that morality is a copy of an a priori precept already having
originated in human beings. Kenyon gives up by foreclosing on his own question:
I never did believe it! But the mind wanders wild and wide; and, so lonely as I
live and work, I have neither pole-star above, nor light of cottage-windows here
below, to bring me home. Were you my guide, my counselor, my inmost friend,
with that white wisdom which clothes you as with a celestial garment, all would
go well. Oh, Hilda, guide me home!
For Stern, this is the aporia between utopia and ideology. “Either [Hawthorne] must give
the palm to Hilda, or he must repudiate her. To repudiate her he must deliberately make
all potential irony explicit in revealing that everything Hilda stands for is Dracula hidden
in a masquerade of Pollyanna. But he denies the irony and so denies his own utopia.” 57
For Stern, then, Hawthorne’s negative originality is an eclipse of nerve. But is his
presentation of Hilda an ironic allegory intended as a case of subversive romance?
Ambiguity: The Preface
David S. Reynolds makes the case that Hawthorne’s engagement with the
American literary marketplace was a form of “benign subversion,” turning over otherwise
low-brow popular literary materials—tales and sketches—and imbuing them with a highcultural sense of literary ambiguity.58 The dialectical problems of the literary culture,
what Matthiessen called the doubleness of democracy and anarchy, in Reynolds’ view do
not resolve in Hawthorne. Milton Stern goes a step farther, suggesting the ambiguity is
undercut by the problem of Hilda as an emblematic symbol of national literature, a
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symbol that Hawthorne’s own ethos depends upon.59 That, indeed, is the point of
difference between Melville’s more fully articulated negative originality and
Hawthorne’s subtle complicity with—or dissent from—his context. Hawthorne had the
vision of a subversive, but a subversive without the will to power. He wished for a
positive sense of freedom and originality, but his commitments left him, following in
Poe’s commentary, a “peculiar” writer.
Hawthorne’s response is typical of alternative romanticism. In the preface to The
Marble Faun, he writes that although the book is “addressed nominally to the Public at
large.”60 It is in fact addressed to “one congenial friend…that all sympathetic critic, in
short, whom an author never actually meets, but whom he implicitly makes his appeal,
whenever he is conscious of having done his best….”61 Hawthorne goes on to suggest
that such a reader has evaporated after a four-year absence from America. Given his
critique of the possibility of a romantic art in America that began with his essay “The Old
Manse,” and his dubious attitude toward commercial writing success in the expanding
mass market, he recognizes his once hoped for Public (as an abstraction of “publicity”)
finds him alienated. He defines the boundaries between public and private. Moreover,
Hawthorne’s friend Melville, author of the anonymous “Hawthorne and His Mosses” also
abandoned the notion of a sympathetic reader after a decade of negative reviews.
Professional authorship in the American “renaissance” then came to indicate a site
of bifurcation between literary art and the possibility of a sympathetic reader sensitive
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enough to understand the depth of a writer’s thinking. Ironically, even as the market for
literature was rapidly expanding due to a rising literate population and a broadening
middle class thanks to urban industrialism, romantic aesthetics often found itself in a
negative relationship to mass culture. Still, the profession of authorship found it
necessary to accommodate itself to the market and addressed labor as an American trope.
Authors, in America particularly alternative romantics, found their relation to
originality ironized by the cult of genius on one hand, and the call for an original
literature, on the other. The only response seemed to be to evade commercial success,
undercut the presuppositions of literary nationalism, and to negate originality itself,
which thus deflects the false expectations of originality by an uninformed bourgeois
readership. The alternative romantics therefore allegorized their complex relationship to
their contemporary society by thematicizing it discursively. The nexus of this discursivity
for alternative romantics was the evident polarity arising from material circumstances
that were affecting the value of romantic aesthetics for authors influenced by Idealism,
and the semantic values presumed to underlie the authorial poetic purpose.
Hawthorne’s notion of the romance genre stipulates that it “is radically different
from the novel in not concerning itself with the possible, probable, or ordinary course of
experience. It is not an imitation of nature, as nature generally appears, but an exposure
of the ‘truth of the human heart’” 62 According to Joel Porte, Poe’s “
interest in those ‘psychal fancies’ that belong to the realm ‘where the confines of
the waking world blend with the world of dreams’ is precisely analogous with that
‘neutral territory, somewhere between the real world and fairy-land, where the
Actual and the Imagination’ meet and cross-fertilize one another, actual
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experience providing material for fantasy and fantasy exposing the hidden truth
lurking in actual experience.”63
Porte argues that Hawthorne’s preface to The Marble Faun, in a phrase that
ironically states that “ivy, lichens, and wall-flowers, need ruin to make them grow,”
points back to the “submerged suffering” that evokes meaning through art: Porte notes
that in “all of Hawthorne’s romances, the problems of art and the problem of past
suffering or guilt are commingled themes.”64 Hawthorne’s interest in an art of moral
psychology invokes the past as a source of value for present interpretation. Emerson, in
contrast, sought a direct break with the past in order to originate a new universe, and, of
course, an American one. Porte reminds us that “Romance art for Hawthorne is not just
one way of looking at experience; it is a metaphor for a particular kind of experience.
The question of romance-versus-novel turns into and illuminates a moral question: the
meaning and value of the inner life.”65 The central question, then, of The Marble Faun is
to ask whether for the romance as a portal of meaning in the psychic life of the individual
consciousness, whether America lacks a firm basis for an original relation to the moral
universe.
The Marble Faun in Context
Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Marble Faun has been noted generally for its setting
in the environs of Rome and Tuscany, and the central images of Italian art and Classical
mythology. The notion of placing its American characters in such a setting was
groundbreaking in American literature since it is one of the few American novels
preceding Henry James's The American to explore art and originality in a European
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context. The four central characters in the novel (or romance), include two Americans,
the sculptor Kenyon and the painter-copyist Hilda, Donatello, an Italian with a striking
resemblance to the Faun of Praxiteles (itself an Italian copy of a third century BCE Greek
marble sculpture now lost), and the painter Miriam, whose origins are ambiguous.
Hawthorne provides suggestive but conflicting conjectures of her background, hinting
she may be Jewish, German, the daughter of a Southern planter, and even possessing a
“burning drop of African blood.”66 Although she has an affinity with Beatrice Cenci, the
subject of a number of literary treatments, Hawthorne leaves Miriam’s identity quite
ambiguous. The mystery that surrounds Miriam adds to the “psychological effect” of her
character. Matthiessen suggests that through her mysterious nature Miriam’s
impalpability adds to the unity of effect of horror.
The central crisis in the book surrounds the moment of the fall from the precipice
of the Tarpeian Rock and the death of the Capuchin monk by the hand of Donatello and
Miriam. Miriam’s character explores “a background of ambiguous guilt” through what
Matthiessen describes as “Hawthorne's tragic technique.”67 For Hawthorne, Miriam and
Beatrice, represent the “inevitability of suffering.” Where Shelley’s The Cenci
concentrates on the injustice paid to Beatrice, Hawthorne explores both the guilt of
parricide and the moral ambiguity of revenge. “Hawthorne’s intention in suggesting
through Miriam’s likeness to Beatrice her unwilling entanglement in a criminal past was
to emphasize the inescapability of destiny. What he was after was not uncertainty or
obscurity, but breadth of effect.” 68
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In committing this act Miriam and Donatello initiate a felix culpa, or Fortunate
Fall, which enacts a sublime moment when the death of the monk, who has been stalking
Miriam in the Catacombs, brings about a sudden humanization of the Arcadian Faun and
a bond of love in mutual sin between Donatello and Miriam. “All readers agree that the
central idea is one in which Donatello's development shows that suprahistorical
innocence is magically beautiful but inevitably evanescent, and that the effects of sin can
lead to an anguished ennobling understanding of isolation from community within the
magnetic chain of humanity.” 69 Donatello’s taking of the Capuchin’s life enacts a
chiasmus such that his literal fall to death signals the end of the evil that has pursued
Miriam, whereas Donatello’s Fall into the sin of murder becomes the agency for his
rising from a state of innocence to a mature understanding of the human condition and
the paradoxes of morality. In protecting Miriam Donatello leaves a state of innocence and
isolation (implied by Arcadia) and joins Miriam in a state of community.
Donatello’s act, we learn, has been witnessed by the Puritan painter-copyist Hilda,
whose moral self-righteousness allows her no latitude of forgiveness for her friend
Miriam. Miriam’s very impalpability becomes stark in the scene when Hilda discovers in
Mariam's visage the deep sorrowful expression of Guido's Beatrice Cenci. Beatrice’s
expression, for Hawthorne, bears the appearance “of being unhumanized by some terrible
fate, and gazing at me out of a remote and inaccessible region where she frightened to be
alone, but where no sympathy could reach her.” 70 In other words, Hilda is morally
dogmatic, and her emblematic Puritanism paints her as a tightly-bound exponent of
Calvinist precepts. Hilda transplants her City on a Hill to a Roman redoubt in an isolated
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dove-tower. Given Hawthorne’s frequent references to American readers in the novel,
and on the strength of the book’s expressed preface—“the difficulty of writing a
Romance about a country where there is no shadow,” surely a reference to American
exceptionalism—Hilda’s typology in The Marble Faun is that of a metonym of American
nationalism as “a force of ideological closure.” 71
Hilda’s “representational function” in The Marble Faun amounts to a figuration
of Young America itself; her piety, innocence, Protestant ethics, and New England purity
conform to the American nationalist ideology. Indeed, Hawthorne nominalizes her as a
“young American girl.”72 As a “daughter of the Puritans,” she admits to Miriam as they
sit in her “dove-cote hermitage” that it is possible for her to “pay honour the idea of
Divine Womanhood, without giving up the faith of her forefathers.” 73 The point is subtle
but Hilda is saying that she, by denying her faith in the Catholic Virgin may have purity
without mercy. To deny Catholicism is to promote Protestant exceptionalism. Yet
Hawthorne remains ambiguous about Catholicism.
Levine notes Hawthorne’s “attraction to ‘artistic’ and ‘sumptury’ Catholicism,”
which involves the “institutional availability of confession.”74 As Hilda enters St. Peter’s
Cathedral her impression shifts from a prosaic American otherness, from which point of
view she sees the edifice as a “gay piece of cabinet work,” to an interiorized recognition
that she has entered a “magnificent, comprehensive majestic symbol of religious faith.” 75
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Hilda’s confession, during which she “poured out the dark story which had infused its
poison into her innocent life,” her momentary catharsis shifts to a wariness of the
Catholic institution: Hawthorne alerts us that “[h]ad the Jesuits known the situation of
this troubled heart, her inheritance of New England puritanism would hardly have
protected the poor girl from the pious strategy of those good Fathers.”76
Following the confession it is revealed that the priest does betray Hilda using his
authority to force her to betray Miriam and Donatello. The complicity between the police
and the Church reveals Hawthorne’s own democratic propensities, adding thereby nuance
as to the question of the role of art in a despotic society. Moreover, Hawthorne's mixed
feelings for Catholicism parallel his criticism of American society at that moment. In the
face of the anti-Catholic movements in American cities, elites in American literary circles
rejected anti-Papism in favor of a Gothic revival which might serve as a model for
institutional integrity in a period of social disintegration.77 Hawthorne seems to have
recognized that the power of the Catholic hierarchy during the revolutionary era of the
late 1840s in Europe presented a reaction to the consequences of social and political
revolution.
Symbolic of the revolutionary attitude, Miriam sublimates her revolutionary
feeling into her art. That her crime ultimately links her both with the fate of Beatrice
Cenci and her own ultimate political exile by authorities, Hawthorne argues that it is
through art, the imagination, and the carnivalesque that revolutionary temptations can be
channeled. Hawthorne's social conservatism recognizes that the carnival provides an
outlet for social pressure to be preferred over war and weapons. The moral and aesthetic
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improvement of society is better handled by personal redemption than by revolution. That
is why Hilda, as a New England Puritan, must copy only the morally perfect matters of
art rather than permit herself the risk of full-scale originality, the aesthetic equivalent of
social revolution.78
Felix Culpa and Negative Originality
In The Marble Faun, Hawthorne creates a Roman setting where history and
nature intermix with “romance” where art and ruin become the structure of the narrative's
moral picturesque. As a pastoral romance that supplements and displaces the American
“broad and simple daylight” that lacks adequacy for romance, it is the age and mystery of
the Roman landscape that provides the context for a discourse on originality and decay.
The pastoral villa, and escape to a suburban tower and its faux setting figures a
palimpsest that reconfigures and American redoubt. By analogy, the “villa is a
metonymic displacement of Rome” where Donatello is transfigured from a mythical
faun-like creature into a living Count of Monti Beni.79
In The Marble Faun Hawthorne uses the context of Rome as a site of ruin that
layers past and present as an “evanescent moment.” The layering of past and present,
myth and symbol, as an allegory of the conflict between nature and art relies on layering
personas: Miriam represents Beatrice, Donatello the Arcadian faun; these two are set
against modern typologies: Kenyon the Romantic artist and Hilda the American Puritan.
The “ruin” in which he traces his conjecture allows Hawthorne to measure the
subjectivity of his characters against the objectivity of their temporality, by situating
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them in the exigent scene that allegorically frames the actual world in which they inhabit.
Rome, for Hawthorne’s four central characters, has consequences.
By locating his scene in Rome Hawthorne proposes to shift his penchant for
philosophical romance to a place of actualities that are far removed from the ordinary.
Hawthorne’s “The Marble Faun, like The House of the Seven Gables, both pursues and
resists the implications of its predecessor.” 80 True to his romance technique, Hawthorne
places his discourse in the layered actualities of historical description and aesthetic
conjecture. Hawthorne alerts us to his technique of representation in his prefaces where
fancy and reality play in a shifting light of original and copy. Hawthorne, in The Marble
Faun, has Hilda challenge Catholicism on the basis of its form. For her Puritanism
reflects the pure symbol, the morally accurate copy of the historically ambiguous
masterwork. Yet in the preface Hawthorne makes it clear that America lacks the richness
of history and art in which to create a poetics that reaches beyond the prosaic. 81
Hawthorne writes that Rome produces
a vague sense of ponderous remembrances; a perception of such weight and
density of a bygone life, of which this spot was the center, that the present
moment is pressed down or crowded out, and our individual affairs and interests
are but half as real here as elsewhere. Viewed through this medium, our narrative-into which are woven some airy and unsubstantial threads, intermixed with
others, twisted out of the commonest stuff of human existence--may seem not
widely different from the texture of all our lives.82
Hawthorne’s metaphorical “neutral territory, somewhere between the real world and
fairy-land, where the actual and the imaginary meet,” becomes the “aesthetic space,” the
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Arcadian space near Rome, a space where “imagination etherealizes the physical world
and textualizes historical event[s].”83
The central issues of the text involve the aesthetics of art and its moral
implications, and the critique of ideology as it is represented through art and identity. The
nexus between prehistory and an Arcadian utopia and the historical fallenness
represented by Rome and Donatello’s crime is interrogated through the relationship
between Donatello and Miriam, who become elevated through their mutual sin, and the
antithesis between Hilda and Miriam figured in Hilda’s copy of Guido Reni’s portrait of
Beatrice Cenci. Matthiessen notes perceptively that Hawthorne “resented the massiveness
of antiquity that made his moment seem less real in Rome than it did elsewhere”;
Hawthorne’s “American” finds Europe as an “estate” where the past is beyond American
self-conception.
The European past reaches back beyond the circle which American traditions can
posit their renaissance.84 Hawthorne reconfigures his “neutral territory” in the figure of
the Marble Faun. Donatello, the Italian friend of the three artists resembles the Marble
Faun of Praxiteles. Hawthorne notes that
[t]he resemblance between the Marble Faun and their living companion had made
a deep, half-serious, half-mirthful impression on these three friends, and had taken
them into a certain airy region, lifting up, as it is so pleasant to feel them lifted,
their heavy earthly feet from the actual soil of life. The world had been set afloat,
as it were, for a moment, and relieved them, for just so long, of all customary
responsibility for what they thought and said.85
Whatever such passages of romance offer in terms of a utopian moment, such passages
are constrained by the ideology of Americanism. Leon Chai notes that Hawthorne had
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written in his French and Italian Notebooks an entry (March 14, 1858): “The Clay is the
Life; the Plaster is the Death; and the Marble is the Resurrection.”86 In the “Artist of the
Beautiful” Hawthorne had been concerned as “the spiritual of matter,” where “visionary
intuition” may be expressed through “material form.”87
Sensing perhaps that Kenyon’s analogy between gravity and the solidity of a
natural law having the moral certitude of Puritanism, a certitude that informs Kenyon and
Hilda’s inclinations to Americanism, Miriam presents the counter-argument that painting
is more capable of capturing representations of a rhetoric of temporality and irony.
Miriam argues that
You think that sculpture should be a sort of fossilizing process. But, in truth, your
frozen art has nothing like the scope and freedom of Hilda’s and mine. In painting
there is a similar objection to the representation of brief snatches of time; perhaps
because a story can be so much more fully told in picture, and buttressed about
with circumstances that give it an epoch.88
Of course we later realize that Miriam and Hilda’s approaches to painting are dialogic:
Hilda represents a form of imitation that purifies the subject; Miriam represents the form
of originality that humanizes the subject.
Hilda’s rejection of Miriam, because of her unwillingness to understand the
human dimension of Miriam's--and by extention, Beatrice’s--dilemma, points to the
doctrines of unconditional election and irresistible grace: salvation demands
unconditional purity. Yet Hilda walks in the shadow of ruin from which she cannot
escape, except through a longing that sublimates her desire to return to American
sunshine. Entering St. Peter’s she tells her story of the crime to her confessor, an
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expatriate American Catholic who regards her Protestantism as heretical. Here we have
the Christian relativism that centers on the divide between the Catholic Church and
dissent. Hilda’s pride in her Puritan election (American exceptionalism) requires her to
reject absolution, and by extension the blessings of the Church. She remains fixated on
the promise of a direct relation to God, a relation apart from the human condition.
Kenyon, who has taken a Byronesque sojourn to Donatello’s tower, recants his
liberalism, and tells Hilda, “Were you my guide, my counselor, my inmost friend, with
that white wisdom that clothes you as a celestial garment, all would go well. O Hilda,
guide me home!”89
Hilda appears desultorily on the Tarpeian Rock just as Donatello sends Miriam’s
persecuting “model” over the cliff. The scene precipitates the transformation of both
Donatello and Miriam. Donatello is transformed by the act from a prelapsarian Arcadian
innocence into a modern isolato atop his lonely tower; Miriam becomes laden with the
guilt of Beatrice, and has Hilda for her adjudicator. Hilda is “terrifying.” In her interview
with Miriam Hilda confesses that by witnessing the murder she too is “stained with
guilt.” Miriam counters that though in despair she remains a part of the human condition;
she, despite the act, remains a human. Her sin seeks redemption in sympathy and
fellowship. Hilda, though, rejects Miriam. Hilda is “merciless” and with no “conception”
of human failing. Miriam tells her that “as a human creature, and a woman among earthly
men and women, you need a sin to soften you.” 90
Private morality engenders the possibility of preservation of the self, and in the
discovery of self through recovery from loss of self, there is the possibility of a
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redemptive spiritualization that by degrees overcomes the loss and leads to the possibility
of spiritual growth. The sacredness of human interaction lies in the possibility for
spiritual progress through interaction and willing submission to the other who
reciprocates that willingness. Hawthorne bases his moral historicism on the “notion of
collective guilt.”91 In so doing he acknowledges a new conception of humanism that is at
once secular and spiritual. The idea has its foundation certainly in Kant and Herder, who
located reason (Kant) and spiritual vitality in humanity. As a subtext, the concept of
humanism rests on a dialectic between the masses and individualism. The Romantic
negation of self-consciousness implied in Keats “negative capability” throws its light on
humanity as an ‘other’ in Nature. Hawthorne shows an interest in the physical aspects of
nature (as the forces of electricity) as essentially psychological.92 Thus spiritual energy is
a form of physical energy.
Hilda’s Puritanism, moreover, requires her to obey the tenets of Calvinist Tulip,
with its beliefs in total depravity, unconditional election, limited atonement, irresistible
grace, preservation of the saints. While Hilda shares with Miriam the notion of
predestination that underlies total depravity, Miriam and Donatello’s crime of murdering
the Model initiates a spiraling movement toward grace by facing their guilt and
overcoming it. In this way Hawthorne views subjective psychology in a part-for-whole
relationship with the universe as physical unity. Human nature shares the properties of
the whole. The affections become the mechanism of “elective affinities” that work on the
principle of attraction. At its broadest attraction is a universal property so that affection is
a spiritual unity with the world. For Hawthorne guilt results from non-participation in the
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world spirit. And the non-participation makes the individual responsible, in part, for
universal suffering, to which affection seeks to help relieve it. Only through addressing
human suffering can the individual gain access to the infinite.93 When the individual
observes suffering there comes about a moment of metanoia where the soul undergoes a
transformation to a higher state of sympathy, which becomes for the individual an act of
salvation.94
This spiritual progression becomes a spiraling ascent to a higher consciousness. It
is a bilateral correspondence between self and other. For Hawthorne the development of
higher consciousness and spiritual fulfillment is derived from a recovery of Self available
in human relationships. That recovery constitutes a romantic cyclic “movement of return”
to an originary Self antecedent to loss, but at the same time accretes to a higher sense of
self. In juxtaposition to Transcendentalism, then, Hawthorne’s spiritualization abjures the
sort of self-reliance that results in psychic singularity, and instead rediscovers originality
through a willing submission to the other, a gesture of negative capability similar to
Keats’s idea of a negation of self. Assimilation of the other into the self is a creative act.
The soul of the other remains a distinct object from that of the subject and so the subject
must create the soul of the other from its own affective will.95 Therefore, a sin of the
heart is a matter of private rather than public morality, which is of course Hawthorne’s
central thesis in the irony of The Scarlet Letter.
Hawthorne invests Hilda and Kenyon with a sense of a Hegelian ‘unhappy
consciousness’ that rests on a historical framework that sacrifices originality for purity.
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Hilda's good is a Puritan God and her innocence and sole fide requires of her to admit that
“while there is a guilty person in the universe, each innocent one must feel his innocence
tortured by guilt. Your deed, Miriam, has darkened the whole sky.” 96 Such is exactly the
concern held by the first generation Puritans who feared that any human backsliding
might bring down God’s wrath on the entire community. The Puritan covenant required
complete obedience, and by extension Hawthorne is suggesting that American
exceptionalism demands moral subservience, as well. Matthiessen notes that in this
context “moral laws, whether under the aegis of Destiny or Providence, are by their
nature relentlessly inhuman.” In such a context it is apparently obvious that Kenyon and
Hilda, the two representative Americans in the state of ruin too deep for their youth to
penetrate, become entwined with events that force upon them that conditions of moral
ambiguity, and Hawthorne seems to suggest that their moral dogmas are too limited to
understand the depth of moral ambiguity in human consciousness.
The America to which Hilda and Kenyon long for, where Hilda remains hopeful
of seeing “sunlight on the mountain-tops” is also an America where Kenyon admits to
Donatello:
The cloud-scenery gives such variety to a hilly landscape that it would be worthwhile to journalize its aspect, from hour to hour. A cloud, however, (as I myself
have experienced,) is apt to grow solid, and as heavy as stone, the instant you take
in hand to describe it. But, in my own art, I have found great use in clouds. Such
silvery ones as those to the northward, for example, have often suggested
sculpturesque groups, figures, and attitudes; they are especially rich in attitudes of
living repose, which a sculptor only hits upon by the rarest good fortune. When I
go back to my dear native land, the clouds along the horizon will be my only
gallery of art.97

96

Qtd. in Matthiessen, American Renaissance, 358.

97

Hawthorne, The Marble Faun, 239.

310

Kenyon’s vision of America thus contrasts with Hilda’s. Donatello, as the Faun, points to
antiquated, ahistorical, and sylvan beings that “have no longer any business on earth.” 98
If sculpture metaphorizes the notion of a universal morality, painting, particularly
Miriam’s, “is aligned with the mysteries of becoming, the pleasures and terrors of an
ongoing story.”99 Miriam appears in two “critical scenes” that bridge the murder scene on
the Tarpeain Rock. Visiting his studio Miriam finds Kenyon’s sculpture of Cleopatra
revealing of what she thinks is his sensitivity to women. She confesses to him as if he,
because of his representation, were also himself sympathetic. “There is a secret in my
heart that burns me,” she admits. “Ah, if I could but whisper it to only one human
soul!”100 Miriam’s dilemma is suddenly revealed. She is unable to tell Kenyon her secret.
Surely Kenyon’s cool, reasoned character lacks the passion to hear her secret. Miriam
realizes Kenyon is “as cold and pitiless as…marble.”
Miriam’s mysterious nature resides in the ambiguity of her multi-ethnic identity
whose origins are unknown. Hilda’s Americanness trades it power of representation for
the desire to copy classical art, and loses her originality as a consequence. The sculptor
Kenyon represents an aesthetics of imitation. When the four central characters converge
in the sculpture gallery, we identify through their presence the negative dialectics of their
relation to the statue of the Dying Gladiator. Surrounding the figure are numerous
depictions from antiquity, and in the center, a child allegorizing the “Human Soul, with
its choice of Innocence or Evil close at hand...clasping a dove to her bosom, but assaulted
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by a snake.”101 Nearby, a staircase descends through the Capital, as if regressing in time,
to the “triumphal arch of Septimus Severus” and in the background an ancient Forum is
presided over by contemporary peasants washing linens clean.
Like Miriam, Donatello figures a series of significations that lead back beyond
time to unknowable origins. His uncanny resemblance to a faun-creature that is
antecedent to humanity can only be affirmed by comparison to a marble statue, itself a
copy of a now lost original Faun of Praxiteles. As a future present Donatello, as the
Count of Monte Beni, is already determined through the crisis on the precipice. Donatello
marks a trope that is structured by the transformations already inscribed in his negative
originality, the moment when he must suffer the necessary transformation from his faunstate to his human-state, an catastrophic event of violence that marks his mortality and his
movement of return through the negation of the sublime. The aspect of the sublime that
forestalls interpretation arises in the non-identity of the victim, which is only later to be
revealed as a Capuchin monk. This shock of recognition forms the figure of a chiasmus
with respect to Donatello's sublation. Donatello's ascent from faun to guilty man opposes
the descent of specter to monk, and in their antithetical negative originality they foreclose
upon any possibility of comprehending originality per se. The world, says Donatello,
“has grown so sadly serious, that such men must change their nature, or else perish, like
the antediluvian creatures, that required, as the condition of their existence, a more
summer-like atmosphere than ours.” Hawthorne, says Matthiessen,
was meditating likewise on the theme of cheerless decay. Hawthorne was always
aware of how in his Yankee world, ‘no life now wanders like an unfettered
stream; there is a mill-wheel for the tiniest rivulet to turn. We go all wrong, by too
strenuous a resolution to go all right.’ It was the competitive America to which
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Hawthorne, with his usual startling frankness, told Ticknor that he had no desire
to come back. After his long sojourn in Europe he declared that he still loved his
country: ‘The United States are fit for many excellent purposes, but they certainly
are not fit to live in’.102
Hawthorne’s concern about “the slow disintegration of the bases upon which the
earlier moral values had depended” prompts him to admit that “I find that my respect for
clerical people, as such, and my faith in the utility of their office, decreases daily. We
certainly do need a new revelation—a new system—for there seems to be no life in the
old one.”103 Beneath such utopianism Hawthorne, through the sculptor Kenyon, questions
the Dying Gladiator as a valid moral representation of America since its inner paradoxes
mark its impermanence.
Fitting moments, imminent emergencies, imperceptible intervals between two
breaths, ought not to be incrusted with the eternal repose of marble; in a sculptural
subject, there should be moral standstill, since there must of necessity be a
physical one. Otherwise, it is like flinging a block of marble up into the air, and,
by some trick of enchantment, causing it to stick there. You feel that it ought to
come down, and are dissatisfied that it does not obey the natural law. 104
Ignoring the inherent critique arising from the juxtaposition between the Dying Gladiator
figure and an American “new system,” Hawthorne’s American artists in Rome, Kenyon
and Hilda, portray an atmosphere of sentimentalism and piety that gives the “impression
of self-righteousness and prigishness.” 105
There is a bifurcation set up in this division between matter and spirit. In The
Marble Faun Hawthorne abandons that Platonic split between form and mimesis. Instead,
Hawthorne turns to the quest narrative traversing from a state of innocence to a state of
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experience that is clarified by a “Fortunate Fall”; the pagan beginning of “primitive
happiness” is unsustainable, as is clear in “The May-Pole of Merrymount,” as well.
There, summery Eden gives way to Puritan nomos. Yet even in Puritan nomos a divine
comedy is possible through marriage. Marriage, which represents postlapsarian mortality
in its most exalted form, love, offers “the intuition of a higher, more spiritual existence,”
that becomes available to consciousness through the symbolism of art.”106
As we have seen, Hawthorne’s Rome “is situated at the catastrophic crossroads of
history and geography.”107 Hawthorne figures American artistic thinking in the form of a
sculptor and painter, who, as they become absorbed in the aesthetics of place in Rome,
discover that their own artistic resources lose themselves in an aporia, where because of
an “affair of Nietzschean moral indeterminacy,” lose also their sense of aesthetic
independence. Kenyon and Hilda, the American artists, become entwined in the events
perpetrated by Miriam and Donatello resulting in the death of Capuchin monk, who, at
the same time, is revealed to be a timeless persecutor of Miriam, the original and brilliant
pan-European artist. Donatello, her companion, carries with him the lineage of the Faun
of Praxiteles and the romance of Arcadia. Miriam and Donatello “are emblematic of the
deep groundlessness of European culture, of the submersion and indeterminacy of its
historical origins.” Donatello is represented as a descendent of the Pelasgian creation
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myth, whereas Miriam is an amalgam of African, Jewish, and Germanic heritage that has
been lost in her radical temporality.108
Ancient myth provides Hawthorne with a sense of continuity for American
culture to align itself with European literary traditions that lead to Goethe and Rousseau.
Hawthorne recaptures from early Christianity a sense of place for American utopianism
within the context of theological debate. Hilda’s confession at St. Peter’s, a moment
when she both feels a sense of grace in the clarity of the church’s history, but she also
rejects Catholicism in preference for Puritanism on institutional grounds. What happens
by means of Hilda’s interview with her confessor is the unity of a historicity that conjoins
ancient, renaissance, and romantic thought in a fusion that is synchronic and reflects upon
aesthetic problems of originality. The phases of history that are presented in the process
of Hawthorne’s survey of Rome amount to a syllogistic form that ultimately demonstrates
the negation of originality in American aesthetics.
The Model, the Capuchin monk sent to his death at the hands of Miriam and
Donatello on the Tarpeian Rock, represents a timeless persecution of Miriam, who bears
the guilt of a crime metaphorized as Beatrice Cenci’s murder by self-defense. Indeed, a
central theme in the book asks the question of a morality of survival from decidedly
narrow terms of Puritan moral thought, and the question turns on Miriam's friendship
with Hilda who cannot accept Miriam's recovery from sin on grounds decidedly refusing
Hawthorne's humanistic speculations. Kenyon and Hilda, who witness the murder that is
done in self-defense, become involved in the prevailing concern of whether American
self-righteousness might withstand European moral indeterminacy. In choosing Puritan
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righteousness Kenyon and Hilda reject the possibility of accepting Miriam and
Donatello’s moral recovery and growth, and in so doing lose their artistic and creative
originality. Tracing out the romantic stage of Hegelian aesthetics Hilda and Kenyon
represent the fall of classical balance through an overdetermined romantic ideology that
undermines utopia.
While the murder of the Model acts as the central crisis of the novel, the crisis
becomes an effect caused by the appearance of the specter in the Catacombs during the
moment when Miriam disappears. This complication has the effect of separating the
community of friends and fostering their resultant division. The appearance of the specter
requires of each member that he or she create an identity for it by attempting to apply an
explanatory signified. Upon Miriam’s reappearance “everyone tries to identify the figure
by referring him to a coherent context, to fables and myths the meanings of which are
supposedly, or which have been made evident by the orthodoxy of historical exegesis.
The problem is to give the figure a name, a role. But every attempt to identify the ‘model’
by reference only multiplies the mystery.” 109
The haunting of Miriam by the “pagan phantom” posits the presence of a preChristian nature in the aporia that separates an ahistorical Arcadia, a nostalgia for a
utopian nature, and the ruin of Rome that results from historical forces. The nature that is
represented by the specter figures a regression to a savage nature that Miriam’s art
attempts to overwrite. Miriam attempts to represent a humanism that as appearance over
form, the specter cannot be negated unless by death itself. But through the killing of the
specter Donatello and Miriam become entangled, like the snake and dove in the child,
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with the very savage nature they cannot reimagine. This entanglement, then, which
occurs in the catacombs, begins with the disappearance of Miriam when alone she is
confronted by the Model, a figure who grafts Catholic actual history with an allegorical
and ancient dread of evil. Hilda invokes Wordsworth’s Lucy Gray, thus bringing the
context of Romantic originality into the Puritanical presentness of American
exceptionalism.110 And ultimately in the fourth moment Hawthorne invokes the
revolutionary context of the Italian present and the carnivalesque mode of resistance to
the institutional pressure wielded by the unity of church and state. Hilda’s confession of
her struggle to come to terms with Miriam’s sin ultimately becomes an indictment against
disunity that justifies Miriam’s imprisonment by the gendarmes.
Hawthorne’s Mimetics and Negative Originality
In The Marble Faun Hawthorne explicitly poses the problem of American art as
an art of copying. Miriam tells Kenyon, the American sculptor, that “you sculptors are, of
necessity, the greatest plagiarists in the world.” Sculpture, Miriam insists, is an art which
has been eclipsed by language. Kenyon, who works in plaster, creates models that his
marble-cutters will realize by his verbal instructions. As such Kenyon’s art is conceptual
rather than tactile and it is the marble worker who shapes the concept. The marble
product copied by the stone cutters in effect negates Kenyon’s creative influence. The
marble-cutters, too, are alienated from their correspondence to nature by taking direction
from Kenyon. Property rights and the contest over ownership in The House of the Seven
Gables parallels The Marble Faun by Hilda’s discourse over copying masters. 111
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Hegelian historiography, as Hawthorne applies it in The Marble Faun, consists of
four “moments” that ensue with the appearance of Donatello as an Arcadian faun as his
companions see him. Donatello's faun-like “furry ears” are the physical reminder of his
metonymic links to Arcadia. Donatello signifies a double transformation from myth into
an ancient and lost historical aesthetic object to a copy of such. Donatello is thus the
figure that has undergone a metamorphosis from an Arcadian prehistory, through pagan
ritual and mythologizing, and has become an incipient human; half creature, half human,
Donatello can be symbolized as a point of origination, a horizon of culture, and looking
back as a pre-human object of sentiment, lacking modern complexity, and he will be
transformed once again into a modern political animal, as it were, through the
intersession of Miriam’s specter, a crossing from another trajectory of interpretation.
Hilda, because she is no longer confident in her originality, becomes a copyist. In
Italy, she has come too close to the original creators of art she respects, and thus she
attempts to gain control over the originals she copies by isolating aspects of an original
by capturing the essence of a moral spirit even more strongly than it might have
represented for her in the original. She sought to distill the immaculate conception in the
work that could not be possessed by the worldly originator. The question, then, is
whether Hawthorne is foregrounding an aesthetic of mimesis as a more fundamental
consciousness of art than creativity itself. If so, he privileges fancy over imagination as
he seems to in his subtly self-deprecating prefaces. Hawthorne’s caution about
imagination and its risk of a sacrifice of relation can be anchored in the ground of
mechanical praxis, where poesis is present but not dominant. This relation to art allows
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the artists to remain tethered to the social and actual while allowing a creative role in the
performance of spiritualizing the material.
As Hilda externalizes the originator's conception it transitions through a state of
alienation into her memory, where the conception is copied and transumed. In that
detached state as a free original its state of freedom is “merely existential,” according to
Hegel. The existential conception remains identified with its producer as an intellectual
and technical product. As a copy it becomes, as it was for Hegel, a “material kind” of
sign where originality is bound in the sign itself rather than in its act of signification.
While one would suppose that the claim of the producer over the product lies in the act of
poesis and praxis, yet in its alienation the sign becomes attached to the copy simply
because the material cannot distinguish the material difference between original and
copy. Identity is thus erased. And Hilda’s distillation of the original conception into a
new embodied spirit suggests that as a copyist she is also a re-originator with respect to
the sign.
Hilda copies by imitating content over form; Kenyon imitates by copying form
rather than the material content—marble. In both cases originality is merely partial and
the product is fundamentally impure as a creative whole, yet conceived in a rhetoric of
purity in the spiritual sense. In both cases the premise of originality is cast in a state of
ambiguity and contradiction. Kronick argues that “Hilda’s sacrifice [of originality] is a
pure negation that transforms desire into the purely material form of the work.” 112 As
Hilda transforms her desire into the material she displaces her own mortality into
spirituality at the expense of her own creativity. Hilda’s strategy of negative originality is
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a retrograde form. Her negativity, in the Hegelian sense, runs from becoming back to
self-annihilation. In her own self-denial she resurrects the living spirit of the originals she
copies, but in their essence rather than their existence. Thus she displaces life for ideal, an
ideal she justifies according to her own ideology as a self-denying copyist. Her own
survival, then, is premised on a form of misprision, or deamonization, that transumes her
Model through a form of spiritual consummation that performs an embodiment and
materialization of death into a spiritual essence too pure to live. In her own artistic act of
self-sacrifice she restores the sacred thus re-originating the spirit embodied in the art but
not the humanity of the absent precursor artist and thus performs a double negation where
the original artist must die again.
Rome’s art in The Marble Faun becomes reinterpreted through the specter figure
as a transformation of its “specular aesthetic” through “interpretive mechanisms”
motivated by the felix culpa. The appearance of the specter in the Catacombs instantiates
an iteration of a primordial conflict that in turn predicts further repetition. The specter’s
appearance evades reason but it does cause Miriam’s separation from her sympathetic
community. The moment of the meeting signals a sudden instance of negative originality.
It forces Miriam to interpret her relation to an appearance that itself has no apparent
origin other than the catacombs itself. From the dust of death and darkness appears a
harbinger of her own destiny which she must supersede.
The scene in the Catacombs presents Miriam alone face to face with the “specter,”
an ancient artist, a “pagan phantom” who once promised to teach the “secret” to Miriam
of ancient fresco painting. The anomalous specter-artist is recoverable only through a
hermeneutics of mythology and “monstrous fictions” that are both menacing yet provide
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the only primordial urtext to the scene’s belated context. Grounding modernity in an
ancient and universal relation to art hopes to gain a centeredness lost through
representation in art. That hope of completion rests on the telos of the artistic tradition in
the reuniting of American originality and ancient originality. The original fresco paining
cannot establish its originality without its belated representation through which the
specter figure haunts Miriam in the Catacombs, and through whom Miriam becomes the
primary agency of resistance to Hilda’s purity.
Hawthorne’s rendering of the crime, though, offers the opposing narratives of the
felix culpa, the movement of return, as opposed to Hilda’s condemnation of all impurity.
In Miriam’s allegory of the fall of man there is the possibility of redemption; in Hilda’s
purity there is not. Both contest for an ontological paradigm that presents a universal
paradigm of originality. The felix culpa is a negation of crime through redemption;
Hilda's moral picturesque of imitative purity—an erasure of all impurity—is a negative
originality of the possibility of evil. Riddel suggests that the crime becomes “displaced”
through reinterpretation as romance. It becomes a metonym of Hawthorne’s
interpretation of Rome as a place of ruin through which the imaginative work of romance
can supplement its “specular economy.” 113
Hilda’s tendency toward moral absolutism becomes a central interpretive device.
As Hawthorne invokes interpretation as a central mode of reading he stresses not the
narrative mode as carried by his characters but rather a metafictional stance of reflection
upon his characters own interpretations as they react to circumstances. 114 The interpretive
dilemma that Hawthorne discovers, via Hilda’s purity and innocence as a copyist and
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who denies herself of her own originality, is how to interpret Roman ruin from the point
of view of innocence, and, moreover, how to claim American originality through the selfdenial of a copyist. Hilda discovers that she might originate a new mode of symbolization
by copying only parts of paintings, and only the most morally pure scenes, as well. And
she can account for her American innocence by reducing the complex humanistic
depictions of Renaissance art by limiting herself to pure essences that mark her efforts as
mode of transumption. She is able to extract only the original painter’s most pure moral
intentions and thus bury the moral ambiguities intrinsic to the original painter’s live
experiences. Hilda’s copied work thus symbolizes her intention to copy and translate, to
perform an act of displacement that is not original but “pre-original” in that it idealizes an
ahistorical essence that might pre-exist the aesthetic masterwork. Moreover, Hawthorne’s
interpretation necessarily shapes the symbolic object by framing it ideologically as it
originates.115
In this “allegory of writing,” as Kronick puts it, Hawthorne narrates the abolition
of the distinction between meaning and name.” 116 Hilda’s act of copying reproduces the
original through her own intelligence. The sign is thus reconceived and remade
representing no longer the original but the re-original. Representation becomes not just
transferred but re-signified. Moreover, since the transumption is motivated by desire, the
consciousness of the copyist enacts a form of destruction willed by the copyist's own
desire to re-originate. The metaleptic event becomes a sublime act where the original
intuition is consummated by the subsidiary intuition for its own desires. Allegory
reconfigures mimesis into representation, and the mark of the representation—the graphic
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character—constitutes an act of individual will. The act of will in the formation of the
mark of representation is invested with the materiality of nature. It is through the mark,
then, that representation transfers nature through an act of mimesis. Thus nature, as a
thing in itself, becomes possessed as human thought, through the mediation of mimesis.
For Hegel the process is “more or less accidental”; it is a “concatenation produced by the
subjective activity of the poet, by the immersion of his spirit in an external experience.” 117
In American romance originality “lies in a self-reflexive totalizing of
consciousness and nature” bifurcated by rational and irrational domains of consciousness.
For Hegel, the rational seeks to negate the Other through rationality. Consciousness
deploys negative originality and incorporates the other into itself.118 If “American writers
demystify the metaphysics of pure origin” then they may point to a discourse involving a
“transgression of the self-reflexive unity.” That discourse affirms the transgression,
which is a movement away from pure origins involving negative originality. If Emerson
argues that “everyman is a quotation” it becomes contradictory to also argue for an
Adamic mythos that underscores the idea of a supposed American originality. In this
regard, Emerson, who begins in a transgression of the cultural matrix in a moment of the
American sublime, comes to affirm the principle of repetition through the notion of
quotation.
Literary property requires that a text imports signification from the outside of
itself, which becomes planted in its materiality. “As a purely external embodiment of
thought, romance remains the allegorical undoing of the foundation of the inalienable self
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in property.”119 Literary property cannot be conceptualized without admitting that
representation acts to represent thought. For Hegel, says Kronick, allegory utilizes an
aesthetics recognized within the domain of romantic bourgeois individualism. That sense
of aesthetics replaces pure mimesis by dissolving it into allegory, and subsequently
investing it with representation. In this process the notion of the inalienable individual,
rather than negativising originality as a step away from the cultural matrix becomes even
more entwined in it. “Whenever realistic fiction is spoken as a mirror to the world, the
critic has confused mimesis with referentiality—language cannot imitate anything but
language.”120
The American cultural matrix comprises two non-parallel domains: a prosaic and
spiritless world of mundane mercantile exchange, and a world that is coextensive with the
Hegelian notion of the state. The national ideology that sought to portray itself as
separate from European social hierarchies was also a place that struggled with its literary
identity. Romance promised an alternative world, a world shaped by and contrasted with
social ideologies. The prosaic and material aspects of textuality that point to the
exteriority of language as syntax contrasts with the aesthetic aspects of language marked
by semantics and ideology, the interiority of language. The aesthetic, then, acts as the
mediating space between exterior and interior domains of language, and becomes the
“phenomenalization of the idea but also to link consciousness to history.”121 “The
aesthetic and prosaism exist in a chiasmatic relation wherein the latter is the suppressed
trace of the former.”
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The chiasmus that marks the relation between Donatello and the specter is
signified by Miriam’s guilty pleasure in being an agent of transformation. Miriam, in
other words, becomes the agent of originality--in the sense of a spontaneous immediate
originality that marks the moment of negativity--and takes upon herself the transitive
function of movement through the sublime from guilt to redemption. But it is a
redemption that comes at the cost of breaking the community. The consequences of this
realization are stark for Hawthorne. Kenyon and Hilda realize they can only partially reoriginate an American art by doubly copying its European antecedents. Miriam and
Donatello may ascend in a spiral of redemption from fall of man but only at the cost of
breaking apart the community of man that is itself unsustainable in its need for purity as a
mechanism of binding.
If Hawthorne discovered through Miriam the moment of negativity that might
decipher originality itself, he found only repetition. And in that recognition he discovered
that without an origin, ruin offered no basis for transcendence but only the possibility of
an iteration of negative originality. Hawthorne centralizes the world of art in order to
create a mode of self-reflexivity. Yet in Hawthorne’s aestheticizing of philosophical
romance, Kronick, who amplifies Milton Stern’s concern for internal coherence in The
Marble Faun, suggests that “reflexivity is just an effect of the chiasmatic relation
between aesthetics and prosaism.”122 For Kronick a text is necessarily a doubling where
the simultaneity of inside and outside collide. Aesthetic reception must be transgressed
by negativity such that consciousness erases phenomenal appearance and replaces it with
ideal content. This suggests that there is no possibility of a non-thematic reading.
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Is reading constrained by Hegelian thought, which is to ask whether negative
originality is a prevailing principle of reading? In the concept of property, as the will is
exteriorized to subsume the text as thing in itself, the subject recognizes the other through
the medium of allegory. The thematicization of allegory instantiates the representations
of self and other. Through a move from a Hegelian reading to a deconstructive and nonreflexive one, the content of the double allegories involved in the dialectic must remain
negativized in order to move from prosaic to critical modalities. Yet, Tilottama Rajan
argues that whereas
for Hegel the symbol is ambiguous, the allegory is conceptually complete. The
ambiguity of the symbol amounts to a sphere of negativity that corresponds to
Kant’s theory of the sublime in the third Critique. Hegel’s sublime goes beyond
the Kantian mathematical and dynamical sublime in that Hegel eschews
‘premature foreclosure’; the true notion of the sublime operates beyond visibility
and phenomenality, and is pure idea, a mode of romantic inwardness.123
Rajan’s position on Hawthorne’s allegory of writing transcends a negative dialectic, or
doubleness, in that the allegory attempts to express an aesthetic phenomenology prior to a
material one. If that is the case Hawthorne’s own ambiguity remains phenomenologically
open to interpretation vis-à-vis the dialectic between ruin and utopia.
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Chapter 5: Melville and Negative Originality
“There is infinite nonsense in the world on these matters; hence blame me not if I
contribute my mite. It is impossible to talk or to write without throwing oneself
helplessly open; the Invulnerable Knight wears his visor down.” 1
In the well-known “Emerson’s rainbow” letter to Evert A. Duyckinck (3 March
1849) Herman Melville writes: “And never will the pullers-down be able to cope with the
builders-up.”2 While Melville acknowledges that as one of the “pullers down,” Emerson
“is more than a brilliant fellow,” he also claims that “notwithstanding his merit, [Emerson
has] a gaping flaw.” It is likely that Melville’s acknowledgement of Emerson’s putative
“gaping flaw” is in part a hyperbolic response to Duyckinck’s conservative view of
Transcendentalism. Yet, Melville’s negative assessment of Emerson’s transcendental
ideas is grounded in his distrust of Emerson’s rejection of predestination in favor of a
self-originating benign spirit in nature.3
Melville allegorizes the point in The Confidence-Man (1856). In the chapter “A
Mystic” Melville presents the mystic surely as a parody of Emerson.4 The mystic Mark
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Winsome tells ‘the cosmopolitan’: “When any creature is by its make inimical to other
creatures, nature in effect labels that creature, much as an apothecary does a poison. So
that whoever is destroyed by a rattle-snake, or other harmful agent, it is his own fault.” 5
Clearly, then, Melville regards Emersonian self-reliance together with the idea of an
apotheosis of nature interpenetrating humanity—that character “teaches above our
wills”— as inherently untrustworthy.6 Indeed, the primary theme of The Confidence-Man
shows that nature, in fact, cannot and does not “label” a “harmful agent.” Melville thus
undermines Emerson’s theory in Nature (“Language”), a theory which states that “Nature
subserves to Man” and that “Nature is the symbol of the spirit.”7 For Melville, then,
Emerson’s idea that “Words are signs of natural facts” redounds to the natural fact of
moral ambiguity where words themselves remain semiotically ambiguous, and that
ambiguity is predestined by an absent Creator. In Pierre, Melville noted that “[o]ne does
not vitally believe in a man till one’s own eyes have beheld him,” and that very problem
of evaluation becomes compounded in The Confidence-Man, where any possible moral
judgment of men present to evaluation becomes problematized by disguise.8
In a letter to publisher Evert Duyckinck following the attendance of a lecture by
Emerson, Melville confesses sardonically that he was “agreeably disappointed” upon
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hearing Emerson lecture because, in contrast to his reputation, Emerson was “quite
intelligible.” Playfulness aside, with regard to Melville’s characterizations of Emerson for
Duyckinck’s sake, Merton Sealts, in the chapter “Melville in Emerson’s Rainbow,”
shows that Melville’s increasing familiarity with Emerson’s books paralleled a tendency
to become less “hospitable” to Transcendentalism. 9 But Melville’s own transcendentalist
explorations in Mardi and Moby-Dick during the period between 1847 and 1851, when
Melville broke his ties to Duyckinck and the Literary World, suggest that Emerson’s
sacrifice of relation with the New England orthodoxy may have been a factor in
Melville’s own literary singularity. The context of the “Emerson’s rainbow” letter
reveals a good deal about Melville’s ‘sacrifice of relation’ with the literary milieu
represented by Duyckinck. Michael Davitt Bell terms the “sacrifice of relation” as a
disjunction between what is actual (represented here by Duyckinck) and what is
imaginary.10 It is a significant claim in this chapter to say that Melville in effect sacrificed
his relation to the New York literary establishment on the basis of his own originality,
and thus accepted the negation of that relation.
As the editor of the Literary World, the New York journal that would publish
Melville’s (anonymous) essay “Hawthorne and His Mosses” the following year,
Duyckinck, Melville’s letter makes clear, wedged the author of Mardi between the
literary orthodoxy of Young America and Emersonian Transcendentalism. If Duyckinck
warned Melville that Emerson is “a denizen of the land of gingerbread,” Melville appears
to be reassuring his editor and mentor that he would “not oscillate in Emerson’s
9
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rainbow.” That he would “prefer rather to hang [himself] in [his] own halter than swing
in another man’s swing” becomes for Melville a mode of self-reliance that must have
troubled Duyckinck; Duyckinck must have pondered whether Melville was among the
“pullers-down” sharing the “gaping flaw” with Emerson, as different as were the New
York literati from the Transcendentalists of Concord.
The break with Duyckinck might have been anticipated even in the summer of
1850 in “Hawthorne and His Mosses,” in its zeal to universalize the problem of
originality within the ideology of national literature. In a letter to Duyckinck dated 16
August 1850 Melville complains that he noticed “two ugly errors” and that “no one sees
them, I suppose, but me.”11 The errata might in fact have been his editors and their
figurative reifying of a critical position Melville would be forced to reject: speaking of
the two editors of the journal, Duyckinck and Mathews, he asks, “Are you making
mortar? … I have a horrible presentiment that you are even now hanging around CityHall … There is one thing certain, that, chemically speaking, mortar was the precipitate
of the Fall.”12 Melville’s “horrible presentiment” suggests that Duyckinck and Mathews’
mortar-making might precipitate and cement an imminent split. The moment arrived
when Evert Duyckinck reviewed Moby-Dick in the Literary World (November 22, 1851)
unfavorably, stating that Melville had been “reckless” with respect to “propriety.” Titled
“A Friend does his Christian duty,” the review was criticized by Hawthorne; who
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objected to Duyckinck’s dismissal of Moby-Dick, a dismissal which ultimately
characterized the book as being fraught with “painful contradictions.” 13
Eighteen months or so following his review of Hawthorne’s Mosses from an Old
Manse in Duyckinck’s Literary World, Melville wrote a letter from Pittsfield to that
journal stating to the “Editors” bluntly that he wished them to “please discontinue the two
copies of your paper to J.M. Fly at Brattleboro, and to H. Melville…Whatever charges
there may be outstanding for either or both copies, please send them to me, & they will
receive attention.”14 The split, then a fait accompli, showed that Melville was ready to
parody Duyckinck and Mathews in Pierre, as we shall see.
In the “Emerson’s rainbow” letter to Duyckinck, in which Melville’s pretense of
unfamiliarity with Emerson appears, the degree of familiarity is presented by Melville
such that he “had only glanced at a book of his once at Putnam’s store—that was all [he]
knew of him till [he] heard him lecture.” That understatement anticipates a similar
dissimulation at the time of writing “Hawthorne and His Mosses,” when he claimed to
have not yet met Hawthorne. Harrison Hayford argues that Melville had met Hawthorne
during a visit by Mathews and Duyckinck in August, 1850, after which he subsequently
wrote his review essay “Hawthorne and His Mosses” for Duyckinck's Literary World.
Dissimulation or not, there is something “instinctively perceptible” in Emerson; “for the
sake of argument,” writes Melville, “let us call him a fool;—then had I rather be a fool
than a wise man.—I love all men who dive.” Merton Sealts points out that “[d]espite
13
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Melville’s disavowal to Duyckinck, he too has been charged repeatedly with swinging
‘among the stars’ in books such as Mardi, then in the press, and later in Moby-Dick and
Pierre. None of them was a favorite with contemporary reviewers, who preferred
straightforward ‘narrative voyages’.”15 Yet, Sealts continues, “Duyckinck’s own Literary
World found in Mardi ‘poetical, thoughtful, ingenious moral writing…which Emerson
would not disclaim’.” And after Mardi, “Moby-Dick (1851) and Pierre (1852) again
brought down the wrath of those reviewers who deplored Melville’s penchant for what
one of them called ‘philosophy and fantasy’.” 16
Sealts notes that whatever Melville may have gleaned from Emerson's writings
prior to his attendance at Emerson’s lecture in Boston in 1849, and whatever essays he
may have read in Putnam’s bookstore (excluding Nature, which by 1847 was out of print
until late in 1849), he was “obviously minimizing his knowledge of Emerson when he
wrote Duyckinck” in March of 1849.17 Sealts argues that Melville had heard Emerson
lecture (February 5, 1849) and notes that the lecture was titled “Natural Aristocracy.” In
that lecture Emerson stated that “[t]he existence of an upper class is not injurious, as long
as it is dependent on merit.”18 Merit, for Emerson, notes Sealts, involves talent or Genius,
which is “the power to affect the Imagination, as possessed by the orator, the poet, the
novelist or the artist.” Genius, Emerson continues, “being itself representative and
accepted by all men as their delegate…raises men above themselves, intoxicates them
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with beauty.”19 Moreover, says Emerson: “The highest good of rational existence is
always coming to such as reject mean alliances.” That rationale, Sealts argues saturates
Moby-Dick. Quoting Melville in Billy Budd, Sealts suggests that Emerson “brought
Melville ample ‘confirmation of his own more reserved thoughts’.”
Here, Melville sets the terms of the sacrifice of relation—his negative
originality—vis-à-vis Duyckinck. Reacting to Duyckinck’s complaint in the Literary
World (in his review of Moby-Dick) that Melville was guilty of violating “sacred
associations” and a “piratical running down of creeds,” Melville responds in chapter 14
(“Worth the consideration of those to whom it may prove worth considering”) of The
Confidence-Man, by addressing the “prejudice against inconsistent characters in books,”
the inconsistency that apparently disturbed Duyckinck’s “sacred associations.” Here,
Melville exposes his “reserved thoughts” such that he cancels both Duyckinck’s national
literary orthodoxies and Emerson’s idealisms. Both perspectives, for Melville, contradict
“fixed principles.” It is a question of “the revelation of human nature on fixed principles,”
which, contrasting Emerson’s self-reliant ‘character’ in non-conformism, opposes a
principle that forgets that “[t]he grand points of human nature are the same to-day [as]
they were a thousand years ago.”20 Moreover, Melville distinguishes his own difference
of relation vis-à-vis Emersonian non-conformism through the “rainbow” letter to
Duyckinck: Melville, clothed in the persona of the Shakespearean fool, attacks the
wisdom of Young America by undercutting Duyckinck’s “habits of thought”; in his
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previous letter, he confesses, “I seemed, but only seemed irreverent.” 21 Here, as he does
in “Hawthorne and His Mosses,” Melville plays the cult of Shakespeare against the tenets
of literary nationalism:
I would to God Shakspeare had lived later, & promenaded in Broadway. Not that
I might have had the pleasure of leaving my card for him at the Astor, or made
merry with him over a bowl of the fine Duyckinck punch; but the muzzle which
all men wore on their souls in the Elizabethan day, might not have intercepted
Shakspeare’s full articulations.22
By analogy Melville suggests a relation between Young America’s literary
nationalism, via Duyckinck’s Literary World, and the Elizabethan cultural matrix that
muzzled its original authors. Melville expresses his indirection, here, by means of a
paradox: “I hold it a verity,” he admits, “that even Shakspeare, was not a frank man to the
uttermost. And, indeed, who in this intolerant Universe is, or can be?”23 We recognize
Melville’s “verity” here as a foreshadowing of Frank Goodman, one of the identities of
his central character “the cosmopolitan” in his last romance-novel The Confidence-Man.
In chapter 29, “The Boon Companions,” Frank Goodman explains to his associate
Charlie Noble the “most singular theory” that
Humor is, in fact, so blessed a thing, that even in the least virtuous product of the
human mind, if there can be found nine good jokes, some philosophers are
clement enough to affirm that those nine good jokes should redeem all the wicked
thoughts, though plenty as the populace of Sodom. 24
This satire through which the presence of ironic humor is interposed as redeeming the
“intolerant universe” anticipates the entrance of Mark Winsome, the parody of Emerson
21
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in chapter 36 of The Confidence-Man, whose disciple Egbert (Thoreau) puts his
philosophy satirically into practice. Winsome says to the cosmopolitan, “yours, sir, if I
mistake not, must be a beautiful soul—one full of all love and truth; for where beauty is,
there must those be.”25 The cosmopolitan retorts: “I am pleased to believe that beauty is
at bottom incompatible with ill, and therefore am so eccentric as to have confidence in
the latent benignity of that beautiful creature, the rattle-snake.” Winsome’s benign sense
of nature is unable to pull down the absurdity posed by a naturally benign rattle snake, a
contradiction that figures The Confidence-Man’s “original genius” who, as a “mysterious
imposter,” releases onto the steamboat the Fidele a host of shape-shifting con men.
Winsome personifies the Emersonian rainbow that might confuse beauty with ill.
Thus we have, in the “Emerson’s rainbow” letter to Duyckinck, Melville’s sacrifice of
relation to both Duyckinck’s literary world and Emerson’s rainbow. Emerson’s “gaping
flaw” is that “latent benignity” that would pull down a Manichean world where the
Transcendental good is ascendant. With that “insinuation” Melville chides that “had he
lived in those days when the world was made, [Emerson] might have offered some
valuable suggestions.”26 Of course Melville considers that world eclipsed by Sodom, and
for that reason Transcedentalists “are all cracked right across the brow.” Against the
Transcendentalists, Melville’s “pullers-down” (of the mask that separates the actual from
the imaginary), cannot “cope with the builders-up,” the mass of mankind iterating
through the human condition the predestinated original sin present in reality from the
beginning.
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But such suggestions as Emerson might have provided the moment of Genesis
amount, in the millennialistic consciousness of the 1840s, to an attempt at “pulling down”
a construction too formidable to rebuild.27 Melville’s point is clear; he writes that “this
pulling down is easy enough—a keg of powder blew up Brock’s monument—but the
man who applied the match, could not, alone, build such a pile to save his soul from the
shark-maw of the Devil” (122).28 Emerson’s optimism toward “an original relation to the
universe,” stated as a rhetorical question in the “Introduction” to Nature, rests on the
premise that “we have no questions to ask which are unanswerable.” 29 But Melville’s
unanswered question asks whether a new “original relation” will not merely mimic the
old. We can trace Melville’s unanswered question by turning to Ahab’s quest for an
“original relation.” Like Emerson’s character of non-conformism, Ahab’s enigma finds it
impossible to discover “fixed principles” lying behind the mask since it is the sublime
that disrupts the quest.
Kant’s view of the sublime suggests a fiction useful for analysis but his focus on
transcendence masks “noumenal” causes.” 30 Shaun Thomson argues that Melville’s Ahab
“disturbs the timeless ideal of poetry, encountering supernatural havoc and preternatural
forms that cannot be understood.” 31 Ahab’s “enigmatic” desire for a feeling of “mystical
freedom and unlimited self-potential,” that might be possible via a “transcendental act”
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through the loss of the self in a “mythic space,” reveals in an instant of self-conscious
irony that the “heightened idealism” (the negative sublime) of Romantic being is fraught
with “an awful and destructive fatalism.” As Ahab appears “[f]ixed in the quarterdeck, he
embodies Shelley’s “tree of life,” the idea of high poetry, and the mythic point of origin
and symbol of return of Ahab's quest.” Ahab’s momentary stance at the height of his
heroic feeling subsumes temporarily the fundamental savage irony of his quest. In that
moment on the quarterdeck through the rhetorical power of his speech that expresses his
desire to “strike through the mask” in order to bridge the particular to the universal
through mystic power and freedom; through the allegory of Ahab, Melville admits to the
fundamental irony situated in phenomenological materiality.
Melville’s insinuation suggests that a prevailing metaphysical originality tinged
with Calvinism preexists and surmounts attempts at renewal. Melville's suggestion of an
inscrutable physical and metaphysical force lying “behind the unreasoning mask,” as
Ahab puts it in his speech in “The Quarter Deck” in Moby-Dick, forms the substance of
an embryonic originality.32 In the same chapter, Stubb whispers of Ahab to Flask: “mark
him...the chick that's in him pecks the shell. T'will soon be out.”33 As if to identify the
authorial presence of such a threat, Melville has Ahab acknowledge “some unknown but
still reasoning thing [that] puts forth the mouldings of its features from behind the
unreasoning mask.”34 Like Poe, Melville posits an ominous, originary agency behind the
“great apparition” of nature that is the source of what Melville named “this great power
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of blackness.”35 This “unreasoning thing” lying famously behind the mask compels
Melville’s Ahab to attempt to strike through its apparition but the power is unyielding
since it lies beyond human experience.
This necessitarian determinism, which Melville conceptualizes in terms of
Calvinist predestinarianism, presents a theme of negative originality that contravenes
transcendentalism. Transcendental re-origination, according to Melville’s thought, is
doomed by its misunderstanding of the human condition. Specifically, in coming to terms
with the idea of an American philosophy on par with American economics and politics,
the ideal of transcendental re-origination invites questions about the source of its
philosophical ideas. Melville’s contemporary Orestes Brownson urged that “providence,
in the peculiar circumstances” of the American scene, could show a “practical
demonstration” of an emerging “ideal man.”36 This ideal originates in the “harmonious
development” of “the human soul” possible in the duty to bring about the “well-being of
humanity.” Melville countered that despite such “wonderful mirages…it is through the
malice of this earthy air, that only by being guilty of Folly does mortal man in many
cases arrive at the perception of Sense.” 37 Moreover, Melville’s guilt—his negative
originality—undercuts literary nationalism in that Young America, as we will show
momentarily, fails to see the metaphysical problems of exceptionalism, problems hidden
behind the literary orthodoxies of the cultural matrix.
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Emerson’s optimism turns on the exceptionalist claims of Americanism that
holds, as Whitman would, that “new lands, new men, new thoughts…demand our own
works and laws and worship.”38 If, for Emerson, the human condition reveals itself in a
benign “hieroglyphic” of nature, for Melville that hieroglyphic masks an inscrutable and
pernicious nature. And if Melville’s incredulousness toward Emerson’s view of the selfreliant individual as a hieroglyphic of nature marks it as a “gaping flaw,” his criticism of
that optimistic view of the hieroglyphic stems from its very negativity. Emerson’s
construct of nature as “the great apparition that shines so peacefully around us” becomes,
in Edgar Allan Poe’s The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym of Nantucket, difficult to
ignore; with its polar “white curtain,” the social reality figured in Poe’s Pym signals the
antebellum significance of such hieroglyphics.39
In August of 1850, when Melville wrote his review “Hawthorne and His Mosses”
anonymously as a “Virginian Spending July in Vermont” for Duyckinck's Literary
World, he was adding to the cluster of critical pieces on the matter of American national
literature by Margaret Fuller, Cornelius Mathews, and Poe. Melville’s Virginian provides
an allusive panegyric to Poe, who died during Melville’s European sojourn the prior year.
During that trip Melville had contracted for the publication in England of Redburn and
White-Jacket, and returned to New York with a deeper understanding of Platonic
philosophy through his company with George Adler. Melville’s “Hawthorne and His
Mosses” indicates a shift to negative originality—building on Poe’s reviews of
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Hawthorne—and turns from the developing philosophical speculations on originality in
Mardi, which was written as Melville began to wear the mantle of the American author
the Young Americans were seeking, to a more ambiguous tone of dark reform.40 Poe’s
foray into the dark reform impulse in his only romance, The Narrative of Arthur Gordon
Pym of Nantucket (1838), by foregrounding the issue of race, shifts the discourse over
national literature into a realm of ambiguity that influenced Melville from Typee forward.
In the editor’s “Note” in Poe’s The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym, appended to
the foreshortened narrative, the “editor” credits the half-breed Dirk Peters, Pym’s
sidekick, with having noticed hieroglyphic markings in the chasms of Tsalal. The
markings acknowledge the racial conflicts—abolition, paranoia over slave revolts such as
the 1831 Nat Turner uprising, arguments for recolonization, and Southern justifications
for slavery—of the period where the Tsalal islanders metaphorize that paranoia: the
editor translates from “Ethiopian” the words “To be shady” and from Egyptian, “To be
white,” and there is the final “white curtain of the South” behind which Pym cannot
escape.41 But the appended italics suggest a more inscrutable presence: lacking attribution
at the end of the editor’s “Note” are the quoted words: “I have graven it within the hills,
and my vengeance upon the dust within the rock.” 42 Poe’s satirically racist anxieties,
which have been commented upon by John Carlos Rowe and others, become transfigured
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through metalepsis into Melville’s sublime critique of transcendentalism in his chapter
“The Whiteness of the Whale.” 43 Melville undercuts the notion of appearance in all its
connotative aspects. “It was the whiteness of the whale that above all appalled me,”
Melville writes in metanarrative stance.
The association of whiteness and imperialism is palpable in Melville’s
reconsideration of its ambiguity. Its benign associations imbricate what is primordially
savage and terrible, he argues. In the nostalgia for whiteness, forgetting that Coleridge’s
albatross is merely a symbol of the “pale dread” of Nature, Melville implies—by
referring to the snow-peaked Rocky Mountains—that, America desires a “most imperial
and archangelical apparition of that unfallen world, western world, which to the eyes of
the old trappers and hunters revived the glories of those primeval times when Adam
walked majestic as a god.”44 But the underlying suggestiveness of whiteness is that it
exaggerates what is already terrible by denying it through a disguise that appeals to a
false sense of universality. Melville summarizes that “by its indefiniteness it shadows
forth the heartless voids and immensities of the universe, and this stabs us from behind
with the thought of annihilation.” The “essence of whiteness is not so much a color as the
visible absence of color, and at the same time the concrete of all colors.” 45 Whiteness is
“a dumb blankness, full of meaning, in a wide landscape of snows—a colorless, all-color
43
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of atheism.” Moving from ethnocentrism to the annihilation of an essential signifier that
might represent a universal value rather than a relative one, nothingness is a blank page,
upon which Pantheism is written. Upon that point, Poe would agree.
In his preface to The Snow Image Hawthorne reiterated William Ellery
Channing’s democratic call for a secular “common nature” by seeking truth in the
psychological “depths” of that nature.46 Romantic spiritualism provided a means of
liberation from the formal cause of American materialism. The romantic turn towards
revolution was a turn towards the imagination, in general, though Poe’s imagination
eclipsed the political ramifications of romanticism. “Poe’s hostility to popular
democracy” as well as his anxiety over race, explains the ahistorical tendency in his
oeuvre. The counter-reaction by romance authors towards the ideological absorption of
the revolutionary impulse into dogmatic nationalism gave them a “negative
prominence.”47Such a mode of negativity with respect to America revolutionary
mythologizing registers a tendency to acknowledge and promote the degree of deviation
alternative romantics held for reified narratives, principally national literature, they found
untenable. Romance writing became a structure for dissent.
Authorship in the 1840s was split over the fulcrum of romance and revolution, a
split many authors such as Hawthorne felt compelled to mediate. The social
consequences of literary deviance, or negative originality, were too ominous to accept. At
bottom, the truth of the revolutionary impulse for Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville was that
negative originality was ultimately a savage impulse and to ignore that truth was self46
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deception. Negative originality, then, “required a sense of internal control that mirrored
the social control of the cultural matrix toward its revolutionary impulses.” 48As much as
Emerson challenged Americans to embrace nonconformity the more conservative
Hawthorne was split between his intuition of negative originality and his understanding
of the risks of social ostracization. For Melville, in “Hawthorne and His Mosses,”
negative originality becomes a form of “madness.”49 In a letter to Duyckinck sent a
month after his “Emerson’s rainbow” missive, Melville remarks about Charles Fenno
Hoffman, the original editor of the Knickerbocker and editor of the Literary World from
1847-49, when the insanity set in. Melville writes:
I remember the shock I had when I first saw the mention of his madness.—But he
was just the man to go mad—imaginative, voluptuously inclined, poor,
unemployed, in the race of life distanced by his inferiors, unmarried,--without a
port or haven in the universe…And he who has never felt, momentarily, what
madness is has but a mouthful of brains. What sort of sensation is may very well
be imagined—just as we imagine how we felt when we were infants, tho’ we can
not recall it. In both conditions we are irresponsible & riot without fear of fate. 50
Silently acknowledging the condition of madness that results from the recognition that in
a sacrifice of relation, as Hoffman represents, no “rainbow” can insulate one author or
another from the ambiguity that results from “the builders up” determined by an amoral
predestination that suggests transcendence through purported truth but promises nothing.
Pierre and Young America
In a letter to Hawthorne in November of 1851 written about the time of the
Duckinck review of Moby-Dick in the Literary World, Melville alludes to his upcoming
48
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writing of the romance novel Pierre; or, The Ambiguities, telling Hawthorne that a
“Leviathan is not the biggest fish; – I have heard of Krakens.”51 The comment recalls
Melville’s admission to Duyckinck in the “Emerson's rainbow” letter of 3 March 1849.
There he said “I love all men who dive. Any fish can swim near the surface, but it takes a
great whale to go down stairs five miles or more...I’m not talking of Mr. Emerson now –
but of the whole corps of thought divers, that have been diving & coming up again with
blood-shot eyes since the world began.”52 Melville, after the disappointing reception of
Mardi and Moby-Dick, moved beyond and below the Duyckinck circle in the writing of
Pierre.
In two consecutive metanarrative chapters in Pierre beginning with book xvii
titled “Young America in Literature,” Melville declares his authorial autonomy. He
curiously states in the chapter “Young America in Literature” that he sees the romance as
a sort of history of his literary development. In writing history, he explains, an author
may choose among two “grand practical distinctions.” There is the duty to
contemporaneous events, on one hand, he says, or that an author will obey the “stream of
the narrative” with respect to events, on the other. Upon which, he declares, “I am
careless of either; both are well enough in their way; I write precisely as I please.”
Melville cares not to be bound by either facts or rules of genre; rules, ironically, amount
to an original basis thwarting his originality. But he wishes to alert the reader that he
means precisely what he says. The chapter returns to Melville’s own self-satire of the
folly of youthfulness, and examines what amounts to a retrogressive bildungsroman of
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Pierre as a poet. For Pierre, reaching maturity amounts to a reflection of the satirical
irony of youth.
The compact allusiveness of the first few paragraphs of “Young America in
Literature” shows just how precisely Melville wants to demonstrate the problematic of
originality as a thematic continuum in Anglo-American writing. He addresses this
problematic by means of an ironic subterfuge of the trope of youthfulness. “In short,”
Melville punningly chides the reader, “Pierre had frequently done that, which many other
boys have done—published.”53 Pierre, he notes, “possessed the poetic nature; in himself
absolutely, though but latently and floatingly, possessed every whit of the imaginative
wealth which he so admired, when by vast pains-takings, and all manner of
unrecompensed agonies, systematized on the printed page.”54 Melville clarifies that
Pierre’s “young and immature soul” had not yet been “accosted” by the ideology of
Romantic originality, even as Pierre was being courted by a congratulating publishing
industry. Melville compresses this idea into a highly allusive passage. He writes that
Pierre’s “soul had [not] been accosted [yet] by the Wonderful Mutes, and through the
vast halls of Silent Truth, had been ushered into the full, secret, eternally inviolable
Sanhedrim, where the Poetic Magi discuss, in glorious gibberish, the Alpha and Omega
of the Universe.”55
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Wonderful Mutes
Melville “looked on the individual as passing through various stages of
enlightenment.”56 From infancy (an “unconscious spell”) to youth (and its “thoughtless
faith”), to adolescent doubt, skepticism, disbelief, and the ultimate question ‘If’, Melville
asked: “Where lies the final harbor, where we unmoor no more?” In “this world of
lies,…Truth is forced to flee like a scared white doe in the woodlands; and only by
cunning glimpses will she reveal herself.” 57 In Pierre “there is specific warning against
the domination of literary sources....Melville evidently made a deliberate effort to perfect
his own ideas and style….”58
Melville’s “Wonderful Mutes,” a referent that William Spengemann describes as
a “mystery,”…“resemble the Fates” that “accost the maturing Pierre.” 59 Melville writes
in quasi-metanarrative:
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Not that as yet his young and immature soul had been accosted by the Wonderful
Mutes, and through the vast halls of Silent Truth, had been ushered into the full,
secret, eternally inviolable Sanhedrim, where the Poetic Magi discuss in glorious
gibberish, the Alpha and Omega of the Universe. But among the beautiful
imaginings of the second and third degree of poets, he freely and
comprehendingly ranged.60
Pierre is introduced to the “vast halls of Silent truth” and is “ushered into the full,
secret, eternally inviolable Sanhedrim,” a Mosaic court of universality. 61 The pun on
Poe’s “The House of Usher” is apparent. Poe’s silent truth sees the decrepit house sink
into a dark tarn on the vale as the narrator guest escapes having witnessed the sister
Madeline exact revenge on her brother Roderick for burying her alive. And it is clear also
that Melville’s “silent truth,” which we will see is that absence of transcendence, is
redolent of Hawthorne’s sketch, “The Hall of Fantasy,” whose narrator writes “In niches
and on pedestals, around about the hall, stood the statures and busts of men, who, in
every age, have been rulers and demi-gods in the realisms of imagination …” 62 In
gathering up these threads, then Melville allusively systematizes, as an ironic
construction, the youthful writer, saddled metaphorically on an aimless horse,
precipitated between cliff and stars, silenced by Fates masquerading as Muses, and
puzzled by the edifice of an imagination of genius, corrupted by its own fatalism.
Melville adds, “But it remains to be said, that Pierre himself had written many a
fugitive thing.”63 The expression appeared in Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine in July
1847. In an anonymously written article titled “Life of Jean Paul Frederick Richter,” Jean
Paul’s “exertions” says the author, were “mainly directed to awaken in the children a
60
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reproducing and self-creating power; all knowledge was therefore the material out of
which they were to form new combinations...” 64 The Romantic imagery of originality
finds in the “small leaf, with a little dust on it” a “fugitive thing” upon which “fancy built
a whole paradise of joy….”65 Melville treats Jean Paul’s “paradise of joy” in a doubly
ironic sense. That youth has little capacity for “self-creating power” can be seen in
youth’s limitations of experience; moreover, the youth’s limited awareness of the politics
of system of originality controlled by the “Poetic Magi,” as he calls them, turn what
might be potential originality into a fugitive thing. By publishing, Pierre discovers he is
admired, not for his original capabilities, but for his youthful attempts at composition. He
discovers the silent truth, therefore, that “whatever is new is false” 66
In the tradition of belles lettres, Melville cites “one” editor as saying that “He has
translated the unruffled gentleman from the drawing-room into the general levee of
letters; he never permits himself to astonish; is never betrayed into anything coarse or
new; as assured that whatever astonishes is vulgar, and whatever is new must be crude.”67
Melville’s metanarrative commentary has it that Pierre's imposing editor says, finally,
that “it is the glory of this admirable young author, that vulgarity and vigor—two
inseparable adjuncts—are equally removed from him.” And so it goes that even before he
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may write a mature work the critics have forestalled Pierre’s originality and “removed”
the very organ of his genius.
In a metanarrative chapter titled “A Juvenile Author, Reconsidered,” Melville
suggests that the publishing world of New York has “imputed” by “indirect intimations”
that his protagonist Pierre has a “natural genius.” 68 These intimations, which promise the
juvenile author an extraordinary “natural genius” of the poetic stuff of, say,
Wordsworth’s “Ode,” suggests something “predestinated” for the juvenile writer’s
literary immortality. Yet, “to drop all irony,” Melville quips drolly, Pierre has to this
point published the “merest magazine papers” containing “nothing uncommon.” Pierre’s
“fugitive things,” Melville adds “were the veriest common-place.”
Nature, states Melville, “had blown her wind-clarion” in Pierre’s direction from
the “blue hills” of the Berkshires. Nature “murmured melodious secrecies to him by her
streams and her woods.”69 But, Nature, Melville adds, though it nurtures the genius it is
also “very late in tutoring us as to the proper methodization of our diet.” Melville
changes his metaphor: the youthful artist stands by “immense quarries of fine marble” but
has not the instruction to shape it. If the artist-genius aspires to erect a temple of the
marble, then the intervention of tools is required: the artist “must go and study
architecture.” Echoing Coleridge’s well-known passage from The Statesman’s Manual,
Melville metaphorizes a continuum from source to work: “Now the quarry-discoverer is
long before the stone cutter; and the stone cutter is long before the architect; and the
architect is long before the temple; for the temple is the crown of the world.”
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The youthful Pierre, in “digging for precious metal in the mines” found that
“much earthly rubbish has first to be troublesomely handled and thrown out….” 70 For
the writer, then, “in digging in one’s soul for the fine gold of genius, much dullness and
common-place is first brought to light.” The artist has no internal place to put such
“rubbish” and is forced to bring it into the open. The artist’s commonplaces cannot be
removed unless they are placed into the art, itself. Then, Melville says, such
commonplaces may be destroyed. No artist can be sure, moreover, when the work is rid
of rubbish: the wiser an artist is the more “misgivings” one has. Melville’s misgivings
about the genius of the artist again complicate the Wordsworthian trope of youth. At best,
the intellect produces its best work in immaturity; such work fails as art but grants
admission to “the great University of God after death.” Vanity in worldly artistic
production damages the sincere artist. The lesser artist toils at producing mediocrity as a
“social necessity.” Art brought into the world by the need of income produces a feeble
product by a false producer.
The sadness of this recognition is “alluring” since it produces a psychological
comfort in its presence. But behind that sadness is the matter that one’s artistic rubbish
may in fact more simply be “unavoidable first fruits of genius.” What looks like youthful
genius in others may disguise the wisdom of an artist who “previously published to the
flames.”71 The literary success of youthful writers “will almost invariably…[be] indebted
to some rich and peculiar experience in life.” That is the cause of much that is considered
originality in young authors.
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For though the naked soul of man doth assuredly contain one latent element of
intellectual productiveness; yet never was there a child born solely from one
parent; the visible world of experience being the procreative thing which
impregnates the muses; self-reciprocally efficient hermaphrodites being but a
fable.72
What is taken for originality in books may be the product of “very unoriginal minds”; and
the danger is that the presumption of false originality foisted by an uncircumspect public
produces vanity. “The world is forever babbling of originality; but there never yet was an
original man, in the sense intended by the world.” 73 To possess originality, for Melville,
one must be silent. God is the only original author, he adds.
All profound things and emotions of things are preceded and attended by Silence.
What a silence is that with which the pale bride precedes the responsive I will to
the priest's solemn question, Wilt thou have this man for thy husband? In silence,
too, the wedded hands are clasped, Yea, in silence the child Christ was born into
the world. Silence is the general consecration of the universe. Silence is the
invisible laying on of the Divine Pontiff's hands upon the world. Silence is at once
the most harmless and the most awful thing in all nature. It speaks of the Reserved
Forces of Fate. Silence is the only Voice of our God…Nor is this so august
Silence confined to things simply touching or grand. Like the air, Silence
permeates all things, and produces its magical power, as well during that peculiar
mood which prevails at a solitary traveler's first setting forth on a journey, as at
the unimaginable time when before the world was, Silence brooded on the face of
the waters.74
And there remains an aporia between the horologic of terrestrial earth and the
chronometric of extra-terrestrial space. That gap is silence, and when horizontalized
across temporality and language, what remains is silence where originality is thought to
be. In this sense, as Melville argues, originality is pure negativity.
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Melville and Negative Originality
A month after Charles Dickens’ Bleak House appeared in its final serialized
installment in Harper's, Putnam's Monthly Magazine presented Melville's Bartleby, The
Scrivener.75 In Melville’s punning subtitle, “A Story of Wall Street,” a Lawyer,
characterized as an “eminently safe man,” we find a description that invites comparison
to Evert Duyckinck, Melville’s erstwhile friend and publisher. That reading has important
consideration for understanding Melville’s rejection of Young America. Bartleby, the
recalcitrant copyist dies a slow death by rejecting the expectations of the office,
proffering the famous response “I prefer not to.” This reading also has important
considerations for negative originality.
In “Bartleby, The Scrivener; A Tale of Wall Street,” Melville’s short story of the
impossibility of transcendence in a mercantile democracy, the text has been variously
interpreted as a critique of the Duyckinck literary circle and the artistic conformism of
national literature; it has been regarded, persuasively by Weisbuch, as a Dickensian satire
of English morality and of Dickens as a shallow liberalist; H. Bruce Franklin has
explicated the story as a Biblical allegory; Christopher Sten has shown the close ties in
the story to Emerson’s essay “The Transcendentalist,” a reading to which Dan McCall
gives substantial support; and these four strains interweave to contextualize the story as
an allegory of negative originality. The central bifurcation between the Lawyer-narrator
as an Enlightenment figure (the “eminently safe man”) and the Idealist Bartleby who
75
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“would prefer not to” copy, situates the essential conflict between materialism and
idealism that is the basic structure of Romantic theory. 76
There are rich parallels between Bartleby’s character “development” and the
denouement of Pierre, the negative bildungsroman of the previous year. Weisbuch gives
a Bloomian reading of Bartleby as an example of clinamen, where the strong poet
Melville excorporates and excoriates Dickens as a sentimentalist. Franklin shows the
strong ties between the Christ-like ethos of self-sacrifice and Socratic self-deprecation
that underscores the concept of Romantic irony. Sten and McCall show that the example
of Bartleby portrays Melville at his most critical of Emerson and Idealism. 77 There are
strong parallels to Hawthorne here.78 In a letter to Hawthorne (April 1851) in which The
House of the Seven Gables is considered, due to its tragic situation, given as “Hawthorne:
A Problem,” Melville posits that:
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There is a certain tragic phase of humanity which, in our opinion, was never more
powerfully embodied than by Hawthorne. We mean the tragicalness of human
thought in its own unbiased, native, and profounder workings. We think that in no
recorded mind has the intense feeling of the visible truth ever entered more deeply
than into this man’s. By visible truth, we mean the apprehension of the absolute
condition of present things as they strike the eye of the man who fears them not,
though they do strike worst to him,--the who, like Russia or the British Empire,
declares himself a sovereign nature (in himself) amid the powers of heaven, hell,
and earth. He may perish; but so long as he exists he insists upon treating all
Powers upon an equal basis.79
Both authors, if one accepts this anti-transcendentalist stance, recognize the delicate and
ambiguous balance between individuality and community; that the Idealistic and ironic
subject is forced to resolve the materialist-idealist duality by retrogression into the self,
which is tantamount to death. In this realization of negative originality, the movement of
return to self exceeds the boundaries of what is possible in mortality. Hawthorne,
Melville, and Poe had similar views in this regard.
Gilmore states that Bartleby presents the first full-length representation in
American literature of the alienated modern artist.80 Chase sees Melville as “a man
carefully probing new areas of experience...” 81 The story pits the writer Bartleby as a
creative mind unwilling to partake of a middle-class economic system based on worker
submission to the elite class; instead of resenting the Lawyer the partly unproductive
scriveners dismiss Bartleby because of his unwillingness to submit. It is not fully tenable
to view Bartleby as an author, however.82 As a scrivener he is a copyist. In the context of
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the law and the duplication of law documents, Bartleby represents an unwillingness to
transmit deeds to property and inheritance. One could regard this as rejection of the
textual authority of property. Could this be a denial of copyright, or the fate of one who
denies copyright? It is probably both. As such, the Lawyer mediates to help preserve the
authenticity of text but by doing so forecloses on originality since the language passes
into new material in a fungible way.
If we take transcendentalism to be a case of incomprehensibility, a radical
disconnect between phenomenal and Ideal reality that cannot be overcome in action and
in language, and so results in denial and regression, then we get a clear sense that for
Bartleby, negative originality attempts to overcome its ambivalent nature, where negation
as becoming cannot overcome itself except by retrogression. The central dynamic shape
of the narrative is that of chiasmus, framed by two pairs that intersect perpendicularly.
Bartleby’s movement suggests a descent, a fall that ensues in a law office and concludes
in death. The phenomenal movement then is a movement of negation. The transcendental
Ideal, however, promises a movement of return, an ascent beyond negation to a telos of
becoming. But the reality of Bartleby, and the axis point of the chiasmus is that between
originality and negativity is an existential paradox situated in the cultural matrix: the
walls that imprison the alienated self.
Ironically, though, McCall argues that Melville intended the reader to be
unsympathetic towards the Lawyer-narrator. As a Wall Street lawyer the narrator enters
the field already implicated in the connotations of the inhuman consequences of the
market. Yet this emblem of high places precipitates a personal tragedy for the Lawyer as
much or more than for Bartleby, who is already committed to his un-ironic descent. By
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inverting the figure, the overall chiasmus that sees Bartleby ascend in character through
self-denial and social autonomy as a Christ figure is set against the decline and fall of the
Lawyer who witnesses his own humanity implicated by its inability to include the
Bartleby type, best expressed in Emerson’s “The Transcendentalist.” The Lawyer
transcends the market only through his self-recognition as a fallen being.
Tracing McFarland’s “originality paradox” Bartleby represents the paradox of
imitation and individuality, whereas the Lawyer represents group convention and social
tradition; moreover the Turkey/Nippers dichotomy traces a transatlantic disjunction as
well as recognizing that imitation produces varying manifestations of alienation in each.
Both Turkey and Nippers are reduced by forms of dependency: Turkey, the British
scrivener, loses his capacity by overindulgence in the afternoon; Nippers is out of sorts in
the morning: their diminutions are complementary. 83 Turkey and Nippers function in
three ways in the story: they express the results of degrading conformity to the
marketplace, exemplifying by analogy the difference between fancy and imagination;
they provide confirmation that Melville is implementing the figure of chiasmus as his
formal critical and allegorical structure; and they show by example how copying can
become a social trait that reveals the cultural inclination to conformity in a democratic
marketplace.
The central figures are the Lawyer-narrator and Bartleby. The Lawyer’s dianoia is
a tragic one. He begins in a hubristic state and suffers a shock of recognition, and with
the denouement reveals that he has come to see the dualism between the real and the
Romantic as a central human condition. Bartleby acts as the rigid fool, and has none of
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the fluidity assumed by the Romantic ironist. There is no moment when we witness a
Promethean self-annihilation. We have in Bartleby a type closer to a Nietzshcean
Socrates: self-destruction by bad faith. That self-destruction testifies to conformity, not to
Idealism (though it exemplifies some ironic traits), but to a rejection of intimations of
immortality; his self-negations has no negative capability. Ironically the Lawyer who
insists on the proprieties of civil society comes to understand the vagaries of Bartleby’s
pathology and learns to exhibit Christian virtues, though he also shows strains of
Emerson’s avoidance of pity. He understands that he cannot free Bartleby by denying
him his freedom. Bartleby's famous response “I would prefer not to” brings to mind
Thoreau’s “Civil Disobedience.”84 The expression “passive resistance,” while it is not
Thoreau's does appear in Bartleby. The Lawyer does say “Nothing so aggravates an
earnest person as a passive resistance.” 85
McCall notes that the article places the emphasis not on the noun ‘resistance’ but
on the modifier “passive.” Bartleby’s passivity strongly contrasts the sort of resistance of
John Brown, whose raid on Harper's Ferry in 1859 became infamous.86 Bartleby’s
passivity becomes an emblem for a stance that refuses to engage an alienating economic
system, and his tragic self-denial becomes a metonym as the Lawyer states in his final
aside “Ah Humanity.” H. Bruce Franklin writes convincingly that part of the scaffolding
framing Bartleby’s self-denial stems from Matthew 25:34, which reads: “inherit the
kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world.” 87 The imperative is to
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clothe and feed the needy, and the irony Bartleby finds is that the economic system in
which he “prefers not to” engage has become the foundation that scripture condemns.
And following McCall and Weisbuch we can see a “refractory” image of character drawn
from both Thoreau and Hawthorne. Further, there are elements of Emerson as well as
Duyckinck in the figure of the Lawyer. Bartleby’s character is not a representation of
Hawthorne or Thoreau so much as a literary extension of the “moral picturesque” of
Hawthorne’s “Old Apple Dealer” and Thoreau’s anti-establishmentism. In that sense
Bartleby acts as a reflection of the consequences of a world in which the Lawyer defines
the structure of originality. Bartleby is a test case of a beneficent form of
Transcendentalism that cannot account for society and self-preservation; he makes
emblematic the ramifications of asceticism. The lawyer's detachment exemplifies
Emerson as a law giver and philosophical leader. Beyond which,
The first thing we have to say respecting what are called new views here in New
England, at the present time, is, that they are not new, but the very oldest of
thoughts, cast into the mould of these new times. The light is always identical in
its composition, but it falls on a great variety of objects, and by so falling is first
revealed to us, both in its own form, for it is formless, but in theirs; in like
manner, thought only appears in the objects it classifies. What is popularly called
Transcendentalism among us, is Idealism….88
According to Emerson, culture is divided between “Materialists and Idealists”; the
former basing on experience, the latter, consciousness: “the senses give us
representations of things, but what are the things themselves, they cannot tell.” 89
Idealism is ostensibly of a “higher nature”; events are “spirits”; the Idealist does not deny
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“the presence of this table” but sees it as “the completion of a spiritual fact.” 90 This mode
of consciousness “transfers every object in nature from an independent and anomalous
position without” into a subjective idea. As for Materialists, a “sturdy capitalist, no matter
how deep and square on the blocks of Quincy granite he lays the foundation of his
banking house or Exchange, must set it at last, not on a cube corresponding to the angles
of his structure, but on a mass of unknown…solidity.” Whereas the “materialist takes his
departure from the external world….The idealist takes his departure from his
consciousness, and reckons the world an appearance.” 91 In the chapter “The Reliable
Narrator” McCall attempts a reconsideration of the character and function of Melville's
Lawyer, the narrator of Bartleby. McCall dismisses Weisbuch’s notion that in the figure
of the Lawyer we may read Melville and Hawthorne's rebuke of Dickens.
The story is more an allegory in the mode of Romantic Irony. The bifurcation that
ironizes Bartleby’s “will” as an ascetic shows Bartleby’s self-starvation in
contradistinction from the other scriveners' appetitive identities: the allegorical names
Turkey, Nippers, and Ginger Nut, metonymize their acceptance of the terms of their own
self-alienating submission to the economic system. In “Hawthorne and his Mosses”
Melville analyzes Hawthorne’s sketch “The Old Apple Dealer.”92 Melville notes
Hawthorne's mode of “moral picturesque” where "[t]hose short, quick probings at the
very axis of reality” identify the Old Apple Dealer’s singularity as a “hueless object” who
is “poor, neglected, friendless, unappreciated.” And through the austerity of the Lawyer’s
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social distance a “good-natured gentlemen might smile, and sentimental souls might
weep.” Melville adds that the Old Apple Dealer becomes “a naturalized citizen of my
inner world.”93 The Old Apple Dealer’s wares, his apples and gingerbread, duplicate the
apples and ginger cakes in the scrivener’s office. These simple objects become the
affective correlative of poverty.
Leo Marx suggests that there is a clear parallelism between Bartleby’s “dilemma”
and Melville's authorial crisis.94 “Bartleby,” as a tale, “allegorizes a writer testing
Emersonian non-conformism and failing because of it since society and the marketplace
do not allow freedom of preference, whether to engage in commerce or to write as one
pleases. Melville, by representing writing in terms of the allegory of Bartleby,” shows the
stakes of rejecting conventions in order to pursue “baffling philosophical questions” 95
Marx reads the symbolism of Wall Street as metaphor of obstruction. The wall, its social,
economic, and ontological status that Bartleby configures as a “mask,” reveals Melville’s
own struggle with authorial freedom and his bamboozlement by literary nationalism and
Romantic originality. The windows of the law office in which Bartleby resides as a
sometime scrivener look out on a coal-blackened brick wall and another white one. The
colorless exterior, offering only the hues of print, like the legal documents Bartleby
copies, suggest the scrivener's work as devoid of imagination. Inside the office, Bartleby
sits in isolation hemmed in by a translucent glass wall. Bartleby’s exposure to original
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writing is limited to copying other's “social property.” Moreover, he must make a
“faithful copy.”
Sten argues that Emerson’s 1843 essay “The Transcendentalist” (published in
Putnam’s Monthly) motivates the dianioa of Melville's Bartleby. Melville, Sten reminds
us, had been critical of aspects of transcendentalism (as had Hawthorne and Poe). 96 In
The Confidence-Man Melville offers the most apparent caricature of transcendentalism
through his deployment of Mark Winsome and his friend and supplicant Egbert. We see
Melville’s take on transcendentalism emerging in a letter to Duyckinck (1849) and then
in Moby-Dick (1851) and Pierre (1852). Sten’s contention that Bartleby is partly a
response to Emerson lies in the similarities of the phrases “I would prefer not to” in
Bartleby, and Emerson’s statement “Unless the action is necessary, unless it is adequate, I
do not wish to perform it.”97 The former is, says Sten, “Melville’s rendering of the
idealist’s refusal to act in complicity with the monotonous and spiritually bankrupt world
of the materialist”98 After all, the Lawyer admits that scrivening is “a very dull,
wearisome, and lethargic affair.”99 Melville’s duality of “Want” and “Have” points to
another of [Melville's] visions of the essential tragedy of the human condition, the
very dualism and tragedy which Emerson himself tried to come with his peculiar
brand of idealism and his theory of “correspondence,” but an idealism and a
theory which Melville found to be naive and fallacious because ultimately lifedenying. For Melville, as demonstrated by the fate of the scrivener, death
becomes the only escape from this dualism and tragedy. The ‘correspondence’
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between the ideal and the material worlds is at best only an occasional
phenomenon and so cannot be trusted as an absolute principle. 100
The linguistic analogy between language and ‘spirit’ and ‘nature’ that Emerson hoped for
in Nature is not assured in a political world where some men die as forgotten texts in a
Dead Letter Office in Washington. What promises a positive transcendent Idealism in
Emerson's thinking assures a corresponding negation in the Real.
Bartleby’s slow death exemplifies the endless drudgery of a law clerk’s mindless
copying. The Lawyer, of course, watches with studied distance. Bartleby, once “a
subordinate clerk in a Dead Letter Office in Washington,” gives cause to the Lawyer to
quip “Dead letters! does it not sound like dead men?” 101 The Lawyer, after all, is a
Chancery attorney, the office of inheritance. Weisbuch reminds us that literary influence
involves inheriting.102 The scope of originality within this lawyer's purview is limited to
hiring “an interesting and somewhat singular set of men, of whom as yet, nothing, that I
know of, has ever been written—I mean, the Law copyists …”103Melville’s law copyists,
caricatures of American mercantile types, are also “triumphs of Dickensian
portraiture”104 Melville’s ridicule of the limitations to individualism placed on law
copyists is embodied in the lad Ginger-Nut, who saw that “the whole noble science of
law was contained in a nut shell.”105 In the last defiant gesture of non-conformity
Bartleby endlessly rejects cooperation in the alienating system, subjunctively declaring
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hopelessly “I would prefer not to”: in other words, in the American system, originality is
impossible, and the author who attempts it becomes a dead letter. If the Lawyer
represents Duyckinck we have a statement on the impossible status of the claim of
originality with respect to the prescriptions of national literature. But with the Lawyer as
a caricature of Dickens Melville offers a second critical subtext. The self-reflexivity of
British social criticism is less penetrating than is possible in the more starkly capitalist
American literary scene. Melville’s view of America is simply more barren that Dickens’
England. Of the two scriveners Turkey and Nippers, the corpulent Turkey is ineffective
after the meridian (noon); whereas, the hungover Nippers, the representative sanguinary
American comes to life after noon: the juxtaposition becomes a metonymy for an ironic
American anxiety of exceptionalism that dooms originality as it negativises it.
Weisbuch writes: “In all of this, Melville is seconding Dickens in a critique of an
absurdly abstracted system that not only ignores but attempts to replace an organic
society.” So doing, Melville “chronicles the Lawyer’s attempts to salvage Bartleby,
attempts that risk his ‘eminently safe’ status not at all and mean to domesticate Bartleby
into his unthinking world”106 Yet even as Melville’s “grotesqueness of humor,” as a
reviewer in the Boston Daily Herald Traveller wrote in 1856, might be “equal to
anything from the pen of Dickens, whose writing it closely resembles,” as Bartleby
himself pushes the Lawyer into self-doubt, Melville’s writing shifts to the style of Poe.
Melville’s Lawyer confesses:
Again I sat ruminating what I should do. Mortified as I was by his behavior, and
resolved as I had been to dismiss him when I entered my office, nevertheless I
strangely felt something superstitious knocking at my heart, and forbidding me to
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carry out my purpose, and denouncing me as a villain if I dared to breathe out one
bitter word against this forlornest of mankind.” 107
The ratiocinative self-reflection here serves to redeem the nuance psychology that
Dickens trivializes melodramatically. Dickens’ social liberalism is constrained to a
register of satire that cannot resolve the profound questions of human suffering at its
insufficient depth. Dickensian moralism is too unambiguous to resolve the inscrutable
presence of an Ishmael-like sufferer who fails to thrive amid the promises assumed of
Wall Street. It is that paradox that registers the linguistic problematic and signals the
sense of negative originality projected in The Confidence-Man.
The Confidence-Man and Negative Originality
In The Confidence-Man, his tenth novel in as many years, Melville frames the
matter of originality furtively. With a cunning gesture worthy of a hoax by Poe, the book
opens “At sunrise on a first of April.” 108 Melville’s Adam, in other words, as we are
warned, is a fool. The trope of the original genius that had been the lodestar for Young
America since the mid-1840s is now figured as a “mysterious impostor.” The singular
individual—Melville will remark further on the idea of “singular form” in chapter 44—
appearing as a confidence man, a typology of the urban con artist then prowling the
streets as in Poe’s “A Man of the Crowd,” arrives on the steamboat Fidèle (faith) as “a
man in cream-colors, at the waterside in the city of St. Louis.” Melville’s man in creamcolors, a youthful isolato character with “chin downy,” is, “in the extremest sense of the
word a stranger.” The stranger has “recently arrived from the East,” and Melville
undermines his potential originality, noting that his genius lies in his appearance, “though
107
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wherein his originality consisted was not clearly given.” Since the stranger is described as
“quite an original genius”—it is an epithet given to writers and is already reified by
Americanist magazine publishing—and the question of “vocation” is already implied to
be central to the book’s thesis, a point anticipating the metanarrative chapters that deal
directly with literary originality.
The “strange kind of simpleton” who proffers “charity” on an otherwise blank
slate turns his downy cheek to the abuse of the crowd on the boat’s deck. The stranger’s
“lunacy” results from his “muteness.” 109 His voiceless inability to defend charity
complements the barber's exclamation “NO TRUST.” This antithesis, between faith in
Christian charity, on one hand, and mercantile distrust of the unknown customer, on the
other, illustrates Melville’s own predicament as a writer whose highly original and
psychologically penetrating books have met with critical distrust by reviewers. Melville’s
vocation has in effect been “shaved.”
One of the central issues in The Confidence-Man, extending a continuum of a
concern for literary originality that reaches back to the failure of Mardi is the matter of a
faith in human goodness as a result of Nature. Offering a methodology for tracing
transcendental faith in Nature, which might offset originary evil in the Calvinist sense, is
the literary collision between imagination and appearance in fiction. Melville’s interest in
the empirical foundations of appearance is evident in incomprehensible parade of
disreputable characters on board the boat. He negativises Kant’s premise of a priori
apperception whereby the faculty of understanding might cognize the empirical. Melville
explores Kant’s “cosmopolitan” idea that, beyond metaphysical considerations,
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appearances result from universal human actions.110 Given Kant’s premise that reason is
inherently categorical in nature, the individual’s growth and development are not
instinctual but a matter of will.111 This one point has vast implication in terms of the
philosophical exemplification on the boat full of fallen figures. Genius, on the other hand,
is for Kant a “natural endowment” and would seem to be a peculiar instinct of the artistic
person. This bifurcation, between human falleness as a matter of reason, and innate
imagination of genius that (under the tenets of Idealism) promise some transcendental
good, breaks into absurdity. That is the basis for the satire of originality in The
Confidence-Man.
The Confidence-Man is a theatrical farce of representative figures. The narrative
shifts from symbolism to allegory, and back, turning away from pantheism and nature to
problems of trust and authenticity. Originality is negativized as a fallacy, placing
originality and realism in diametrical opposition. Melville rejects individualism for social
typology in the antebellum southwest. Like Hawthorne’s story “The Celestial Railroad,”
characterization involves stock positions. Romanticism had rejected this view of types
(often associated with Cervantes) in favor of individualism and the unique self. Melville
reverses the negative associations of allegory and uses its insubstantiality as a means to
show the ambiguity of character. The novel is erected on a series of structured
bifurcations. The day/night division of the novel maps on to the “symbolism of light and
darkness” that opens the work. In turn this polar structure maps the opposition between
materialism and spirituality that underscores the concern for faith, trust, confidence, and
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knowledge. The dualities pervading the book recall the pamphlet in Pierre where we
encounter the incommensurability of horologicals and chronometricals; here divine and
wordly aspects are exaggerated and ironized.
In chapter XIV, titled “Worth the Consideration of Those to Whom it May Prove
Worth Considering,” Melville raises the question in a metafictional passage that explains
the book’s allegory. The author, Melville says, is faced with two expectations; one, he
will not deviate from the consistency of character in fiction, which means that audiences
expect a degree of realism; two, on the other hand, fiction assumes “some play of
invention.”112 Melville advances the premise that “all fiction based on fact should never
be contradictory to it.” The question of fact reappraises Emerson’s notion of a
consistency of character. Since Pierre, at the latest, Melville had resisted and resented the
assumptions held by the Duyckinck circle that the ideology of Americanism in literature
must be based on themes of a consistent national character. Duyckinck had written in an
unsigned review of Moby-Dick in the Literary World (22 Nov. 1851) that Melville had
taken up the “conceited indifferentism of Emerson”: the perspective of the narratorisolato Ishmael behind Melville’s book was “dangerous...to the world [whose] most
sacred associations of life [are thereby] violated.” 113 In other words, by adopting the
stance of what Reynolds terms the dark “visionary mode,” Melville’s subversive reform
appeared to Duyckinck as a criticism of conventional modes of decency. 114 Duyckinck’s
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concern about Melville’s pantheism in the face of his own Christian conformity resulted
in a break between the two.
Even as Duyckinck read Moby-Dick as an Emersonian book, a text that is “half
essay, half rhapsody” he was, in effect, criticizing Melville for abandoning the Young
American program of a democratic literature based on Christian principles. Emerson’s
redefinition of the trinity under the auspices of Idealism and self-reliance threatened
Duyckinck’s major premise for national literature. For if Emerson could announce that
“If a man is at heart just, then in so far is he God.” 115 And if the Transcendentalist might
worry the Young Americans that Jesus Christ was but a great man, Melville’s view held
to one consistent fact: in an anecdote among his papers along with Billy Budd, he wrote
“I bless his story, The Good Being hung and gone to glory.” 116 The statement upsets an
antebellum national ideology based on an orthodox middle-light Christian value schema
that put little faith in human justice.
Melville’s literary problem is to negate both Emerson’s originalism, based on
Transcendental Idealism, a view that raises the individual parallel with the oversoul, and
consequently seeks to push his search for facts beyond those convenient to Duyckinck’s
literary project. Agreeing with Emerson, Melville asks “is it not a fact, that, in real life, a
consistent character is a rara avis?”117 But even the “acutist sage,”—Emerson—struggles
to explain “living character” in “Self-Reliance”; so readers, “who are not sages” will be
unable to “read character in those mere phantoms which flit along a page, like shadows
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along a wall.” Melville takes his point from Plato’s allegory of the cave, and the allusion
is important to understand Melville’s general distrust of enlightenment. Melville shares
Plato’s distrust of image: “If reason be the judge, no writer has produced such
inconsistent characters as nature herself has.” There is a disjunction between noumena
and phenomena at the interstices of practical reason and judgment: “experience is the
only guide; but no one man can be coextensive with what is.” But experience is limited.
Melville writes that “if these waters of human nature can be so readily seen through, it
may be either that they are very pure or very shallow.” 118 Reading character though
experience, he analogizes inconsistency with the “contrasts of the divine nature”; in other
words, it may be proposed that though originality is inscrutable it does appeal to the
conceit of genius. Yet writers are often credited (like Bulwer and Poe) for being adept at
unraveling inconsistencies and so doing create astonishment (Poe’s unity of effect).
Admiration for such authorial control is likened to analogies to the “Creator.”
Melville moves towards ironic satire, stating that authorial “ingenuity” pretends to
understand human nature from “fixed principles” of “the ranks of the sciences”;
mockingly, he mentions palmistry and phrenology. Such claims, he says, are evidence of
an “ignorance” of human nature. The proof of this is that “after poring over the best
novels professing to portray human nature, the studious youth will still run the risk of
being too often at fault upon actually entering the world.” 119 Melville’s objections seem
to be three fold. First, he argues that literary originality is not coextensive with
psychology. Psychology betrays a metaphysical inscrutability, because it taps the
unconscious, more akin to an ontological creator who originates sui generis, than a
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literary one, which is imitative in kind. Secondly, Melville criticizes a head/heart
dichotomy that promises empirical understanding but which falls short of ontological
facts. Human moral relativism undercuts the promise of moral absolutes. And thirdly,
readers mistake literary originality for metaphysical originality. It is the
incommensurability between variation and singularity—particularity—and a universality
of human nature that creates the confusion. The moral relativism that is the consequence
of an eternal and fallen human condition remains incomprehensible for readers who
expect originality to conform to familiar and conventional norms of the cultural matrix.
An excess of originality causes readers to suspect an author of inconsistency. In this
sense Melville reminds us of Emerson’s discussion in “Self-Reliance” of a “foolish
consistency.” The romance author is not being original, Melville argues, just because he
or she creates a peculiar character. Human nature is ripe with peculiarity and the root of it
is in human fallenness. The human form is coextensive with its genus. Real singularity is
an impossibility. Melville regards the criticism of authors for their inconsistency as
ignoratio elenchi, and lauds the prospect of “infallibly discovering the heart of man.” 120
That discovery is possible through dialectic, for he proposes to “pass from the comedy of
thought to that of action.”
The penultimate chapter of Melville’s The Confidence-Man begins: “Quite an
Original. A phrase, we fancy, rather oftener used by the young, the unlearned, or the
untravelled, than by the old, or well-read, or the man who has made the grand tour.”121
Originality, again in a theme developed in Pierre, undercuts Wordsworthian Romantic
originality as an attribute of youthful naivete. “Certainly,” Melville chides, “the sense of
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originality exists at its highest in an infant, and probably at its lowest in him who has
completed the circle of the sciences” 122 According to Melville’s view as one develops a
more empirical view of experience originality becomes untenable as an ontological idea.
Moreover, literary originality demonstrates the paradox of originality where even fiction
as a probable means of demonstrating ontological originality runs aground upon the
author’s experience. “As for original characters in fiction, a grateful reader will, on
meeting with one, keep the anniversary of that day.” 123 But Melville is being playful here.
The “day” is important to The Confidence-Man. The narrative transpires during a twentyfour hour period on April Fools’ Day.
At the outset, when the “man in cream-colors arrives empty-handed in St. Louis
and boards the Fidèle, the ship of fools named “faith,” we see “in the same moment as
his advent” the “mysterious imposter” described as “quite an original genius.” 124 In
contrast to this shape-shifting man in cream colors, this “original genius” whose
originality remains vague, the Missourian in chapter 23 is overcome by the “powerful
effect of natural scenery”; the Missourian, peering into the “dank twilight, fanned with
mosquitoes,” into a “dubious medium [of] that swampy and squalid domain,” recovers to
find that he has “been betrayed into being an unphilosophical dupe.” 125 Melville’s
cynicism toward Romantic originality portrays nature as a sign of Emersonian originality
that obscures reason. “But where slipped in the entering wedge?” the Missourian
wonders: “Philosophy, knowledge, experience” became disrupted by the dynamical
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sublime (Kant) that overpowered the Missourian’s guard: “the enemy stole on the castle's
south side” due to the Missourian’s too “companionable nature.” 126 Melville’s point is
that positive Romanticism’s ideal of human beneficence through intuitive reason breaks
down by an over-abundance of good will. Kantian practical reason is no assurance of
trust. Freedom is negative, and the negative sublime re-originates as permanent parabasis.
“The River” and Impure Originality
Melville’s unpublished sketch “The River” makes emblematic a number of
threads gathering together his concept of originality. The river originates as it does
quietly flowing forth like a well-spring from the frozen paradise of Itasca, Minnesota; the
Mississippi meanders south gaining current from the numerous tributaries that join it.127
As the Mississippi River joins the Missouri and Ohio Rivers marking the entrance to the
American South the Mississippi is transformed from a pure stream to a muddy
multifarious current populated by steamboats and roustabouts at the St. Louis docks. The
northern stretch of the river, above St. Anthony Falls, remains a pure stream “so clear that
the deepest fish have the visible flight of the bird.” 128 On its banks wildlife exists in
natural abundance, and “man is remote.” The land and river coexist in a “Golden Age” of
“Unsung Time. Nature’s “sacred river” remains protected by a “long China Wall” until
the silt of the Missouri pumps into the current at St. Louis, a muddying likened to an
“ambush.”
Melville, in “The River,” ironizes the Mississippi River as an emblem of
exceptionalism. The west bank of the river points to a frontier of Manifest Destiny. As
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the river descends southward it collects all the impurities of the empire into a single
stream. One could read the trope of the river in terms of an anxiety of originality; the
destiny of Americanism is a negation of its Puritan history as it accepts a futurity driven
by transformation. Or we might read the metaphor of the river as inevitable necessity of
self-definition through diversity, equality and dispersion. Patricia Wald seems to side
with the former: “Melville hypothesizes the democratic subject as orphaned from history,
the consequences of exceptionalism that result in Romantic anxiety.”129 For Wald, it is
exceptionalism that underscores a feeling of romantic anxiety by threatening the self with
a loss of individualism. In this negative sense originality is not a cultural construct as
much as it is a particularization of its antithesis. It is a rejection of a dominant narrative
derived from originality as exceptionalism. That form of originality is oxymoronic, since,
in the schema of exceptionalism, originality must be conventionalized. 130
Negative originality, in figurative terms, is self-annihilation. Yet considering
Melville’s figure of the orphaned isolato, a figure that results paradoxically from the
“intrusion” of diversity, we might consider his point of view more ambiguously as
perhaps an ironic trope. Reynolds argues that “Reform imagery has eventually become
for Melville a comfortable shell, largely devoid of political or didactic content, that can
be arranged at will in the overall mosaic of a subversive novel.” 131 Melville’s dark reform
impulses comprise a clustering of ironic images, with complex cultural sympathies.
“Dark reform imagery retains its subversive impact but at the same time feeds the purely
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literary.” The darker side of Melville’s “visionary mode” recognizes, as an individual
negative reformist, the “ineffectuality of virtue in a Satanic world.”
Negativity and the River of No Return
The question of “recovery” or a movement of return, as Leon Chai calls it,
concerns whether the state of Romantic irony—the isolation and alienation of the human
subject whose self-reflexivity creates a condition of cathexisis—might be resolved.
Resolution seems available in a nostalgic hope for the infinite, to a state of unity. But
reflexivity creates a reading of the self from another metacritical vantage point which is a
fictionalization of the self that the self creates to gain objectivity over itself. But that selfobjectification results in a fictive standpoint that is a negation of the prior self. And that
state of negativity cannot recover the prior self because of its necessary negativity, a
negativity without a reunification becomes self-destructive. If irony gains its power
through negativity the mind becomes helpless to deny itself the freedom to return to
reconciliation; to do so would bring a halt to the dialectical nature of consciousness; the
mind must accept no point as resolved since it has no temporal power over future states.
Although the dialectic of the ironic consciousness is therefore one of infinite succession,
it is bounded by mortality, and the consciousness must contain the self as substance and
as subject.
Originality, if it were to present itself, would arise beyond human experience.
Character conforms to human nature; it cannot originate outside itself. As opposed to the
invention of characters in novels, “they are not, in the truest sense, original at all. They
are novel, or singular …” (237). 132 Such “odd characters” are typical. “Every great town
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is a kind of man show, where the novelist goes for his stock.” In fiction, Melville argues,
original characters are a “rarity.” Human types are simply representative men. In human
character, he suggests, there are idiosyncratic “singular forms.” “Singular forms” remain
singular as a genus within the species of character. Originality, however, demands
“original instincts,” the uniqueness of a “prodigy,” the “new law-giver,” a
“revolutionizing philosopher, or the founder of a new religion.” Melville’s bifurcation
between singular form and original instinct can be conceptualized in terms of Kant’s
dichotomy of subject and object:
Kant states that there are
two ways in which finality may be represented in an object given in experience. It
may be made to turn on what is purely subjective. In this case the object is
considered in respect of its form as present in apprehension prior to any concept;
and the harmony of this form with the cognitive faculties, promoting the
combination of intuition with concepts for cognition generally, is represented as
the finality of the form of the object. Or, on the other hand, the representation of
finality may be made to turn on what is objective, in which case it is represented
as the harmony of the form of the object with the possibility of the thing itself
according to the antecedent concept of it containing the ground of this form.133
The former deals with aesthetic pleasure; the latter is a matter of the understanding, only.
The Romantic sublime incapacitates the understanding. As originality is a product of
Nature and the concept of form, of the understanding, originality can arise as creativity
when reason arrives at originality through negativity, and form disappears, momentarily.
Original characters exhibit, says Melville, “a discernible something prevailingly local, or
of the age.”134 The very time-boundedness contradicts the notion of originality. A
singular character is not original but peculiar or idiosyncratic. Melville recognizes that
133
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singular characters are self-reflexive. Singularity is “confined.” Originality, on the other
hand “is like a Drummond light, raying away from itself all round it—everything is lit by
it, everything starts up to it (mark how it is with Hamlet), so that, in certain minds, there
follows upon the adequate conception of such a character, an effect, in its way, akin to
that which in Genesis attends upon the beginnings of things,”135 “For much the same
reason that there is but one planet to one orbit, so there can be one such original character
to one work of invention. Two would conflict to chaos...” Indirectly Melville is
suggesting that the shape-shifting characters on the Fidèle are but one character.
Reading individual originality is to broach chaos. The point directly argues with
Emerson’s self-reliance since Melville suggests that non-conformity does not produce
ontological uniqueness but rather the absurdity that whim might result in moral goodness.
For authors, creating a “new, singular, striking, odd, eccentric” species of character (nonconformism) means that one must have “seen much.” The point seems to direct a
criticism towards Emerson who tended to his own circle. On the other hand, to produce a
truly original character, and author “must have much luck.” 136 Originality redounds to
chance. The source is outside the individual creative imagination. Melville infers a “point
in common” between literary originality and ontological originality: the “phenomenon”
(deliberately using Kant’s term) of originality “cannot be born in the author’s
imagination—it being true in literature as in zoology, that all life is from the egg.”
Ontological originality is for Melville fundamentally aleatoric.
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